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Introduction 
Here one is reminded of a somewhat modified expression of Proudhon's: whoever 
invokes humanity is trying to cheat. To confiscate the word hutnanity, to invoke and 
monopolize such a term probably has certain incalculable effects, such as denying the 
enemy the quality of being human and declaring him to be an outlaw of humanity 
Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political' 
Once, after the father of metaphysics had expounded his theory of forms using 
neologisms such as 'tablehood' and 'cuphood', Diogenes responded: "Plato, table and 
cup I see, hut your 'tablehood' and 'cuphood' - no way". This story resembles the 
occasion when Plato deployed his vaunted method of collection and division to define 
man as a 'featherless biped', and Diogenes produced a plucked chicken as a 
counterexample saying, "Here is Plato's man!" 
Robert Bracht Branham, Defacing the Currency: Diogenes' Rhetoric and the 
Invention of Cynicism^ 
' Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (Chicago: Chicago University Press 1996): 
54. 
^ Roben Bracht Branham, "Defacing the Currency: Diogenes' Rhetoric and the Invention 
of Cynicism", in The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and its Legacy, eds. 
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Events surrounding the Kosovo conflict have often been characterised as a 
(welcome) example of humanitarian intervention. Yet, as the quotes above suggest, 
notions such as 'humanity' and 'humankind' are not uncontroversial. Whilst Carl 
Schmitt worried about the political consequences of deploying these terms, Diogenes of 
Sinope - the founder of Greek Cynicism - denied that notions such as 'tablehood', 
'cuphood' and, by extension, 'humankind', make any sense at all. In reality, the crux of 
any argument regarding the possibility of analysing the political can be discerned in this 
very early opposition between the father o f (transcendental) political philosophy and the 
father of cynicism: can we think beyond the immanent reality of the human condition, 
into the realm of the transcendental, and i f we can, what are the consequences of doing 
SO: 
This study is an attempt at exploring what makes such transcendental 
understandings of 'humankind' possible, how these understandings come about, what 
Robert Bracht Branham and Marie-Odile Goulet-Caze (Berkeley: University of 
CaHfornia Press 1997): 88. 
^ Indeed, Alfred North Whitehead famously suggested that the entire Western 
philosophical tradition is but a footnote to Plato. Since Plato is also referred to as the 
father of metaphysics, it is relatively simple to discern in the origin of this metaphysical 
tradition - and in the opposition to such tradition - the fundamental questions for all 
political philosophy. 
Introduction, 7 
role they play in the generation and deployment of knowledge, what the consequences of 
adopting such terms in political reasoning are and, finally, how these notions can be 
challenged. The research is based on three pillars that allow the questions above to be 
addressed. The first pillar is provided by Michel Foucault's analysis of epistemic 
fluctuations, which reveal - amongst other things - the conceptual and historical roots of 
a very modem approach to metaphysical knowledge, that is, the sort of knowledge that 
allows for notions such as 'humankind' and, by extension, of 'humanitarian intervention' 
to make sense. The second pillar is constituted by a Foucauldian analysis of Complexity 
science as an approach to knowledge that fundamentally undermines any modern, 
metaphysical analysis of human relations. Finally, the Kosovo conflict wi l l be presented 
as a case study, outlining the practical implications and consequences of classifying 
humans through the metaphysical notions of 'humanity', 'ethnicity', or, as it happens, 
'featherless bipedalism'. 
The present work thus emerges out of three questions. 
Three Research Questions 
Question one: 
In what way can the emergence of what we loosely refer to as 'Complexity 
Theory' enhance our understanding of social affairs generally, and of human 
conflict in particular? 
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Question two: 
• Why is the Kosovo conflict a particularly good example to illustrate the role that 
Complexity can have in enhancing such understanding? To what extent can we 
speak of a new Complexity-based episteme as a break from the current 
configuration of knowledge? 
And question three: 
• What epistemic constraints - based on particular understandings of humanity and 
therefore humanitarian war - led to a particular understanding of the Kosovo 
conflict which resulted in a particular response? 
A number of studies that rely on Michel Foucault's analysis of epistemes show 
that there are epistemic constraints to what can actually be thought in specific contexts. 
For example, Ian Hacking's work on the emergence of probability shows what epistemic 
constraints have to be in place before probability can be thought.'* Those constraints, 
however, transcend the specific field of mathematics as such - they operate at the meta-
Ian Hacking, The Emergence of Probability: A Philosophical study of Early Ideas about 
Probability, Induction and Statistical Inference (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2006). 
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level, and impose conditionality on all forms of knowledge. Similarly, the quote above 
points to an interesting question: why can Plato think of tablehood, cuphood and 
humankind when Diogenes only sees cups, tables and humans (or plucked chickens, as it 
may be the case)? 
These epistemic constraints characterise the way in which we generate and deploy 
knowledge. Such constraints also characterise the way in which we frame, understand 
and consequently seek to resolve, conflict. The task of the epistemic approach, in this 
context, is to ask the following questions: what elements conditioned the way in which a 
conflict was framed, understood, and acted upon? More importantly - in our case - are 
those elements, those epistemic constraints, being challenged'^ Here is where 
Complexity becomes of relevance, for Complexity wi l l be presented as a challenge to the 
modern episteme and to all related epistemic constraints on the production and 
deployment of knowledge. In other words. Complexity is here presented not as a 
'scientific revolution' in a Kuhnian sense, or as an example of epistemological progress a 
la Lakatos, but as genuine Epistemic Revolution in the Foucauldian sense: a revolution 
whose ramifications impact on all fields of knowledge, including knowledge related to 
conflict understanding and resolution. 
This is broadly the answer to question one: Complexity provides a framework of 
thought whereby the current epistemic rules that govern the production of knowledge can 
be effectively understood and challenged. And here one should be reminded of 
Nietzsche's fundamental insight according to which all things are subject to 
interpretation, and whichever interpretation prevails at a given time is a function of power 
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and not truth. Complexity, consequently, provides a framework to challenge not only 
means of knowledge generation, but also of any power practice associated with it. 
Why Kosovo then? Kosovo represented a first in many respects. It was the first 
time that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) - a defensive alliance -
initiated a war; this in itself entails a number of important novelties. It was the first time 
that NATO broke its own consfitution - which stipulates that NATO can only act in the 
context of defensive operations. It was the first time that a NATO Supreme Allied 
Commander gave a direct order to an officer in the field authorising the use of force 
against Russian troops (Pristina airfield incident). It was also the first time that an officer 
in the field disobeyed an order from the Supreme Commander, or had it overridden by a 
single Government belonging to the N A T O alliance, rather than by N A T O itself. More 
importantly, however, it was the first time that a number of Governments were involved 
in an act that was legally dubious under the Charter of the United Nations (UN). It was 
the first time that humanitarian concerns were invoked as legitimate justifications for 
intervening in the affairs of a sovereign nation state and a member of the UN. It was the 
first time that air power alone was used to attain decisive military victory in the context 
of humanitarian intervention, which in itself entailed other interesting novelties: for 
example, it was the first time that industrial and media facilities in provinces other than 
those of immediate concern were targeted in order to prevent humanitarian disasters and 
ethnic conflict elsewhere. The other first, of course, is the introduction in post war 
Europe of ethnic cleansing practices. Finally, Kosovo represents an important "first" in 
the European context, which has important consequences for the way in which Europeans 
approach conflict, produce knowledge, use such knowledge to interpret crisis and to act 
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upon it. As Medvedev and van Ham put it: "In 'Kosovo', Europe has for the first time 
faced the increased independent agency - some would say the dominant role - of 
technology and the media in security matters, turning the war into a form of symbolic 
exchange and 'European security' into a simulacrum.""^ 
Overall, it was the first major confrontation in the post-Cold War period, which 
established the rules and principles of a new international order:^ it is in this context that 
it is particularly important to examine what allowed these new 'firsts' in knowledge 
practices and actions to be thought and implemented. Again, it is also in this context that 
it becomes particularly important to understand whether such constraints can be located 
within the development of the modern episteme - and whether Complexity represents an 
epistemic challenge to such constraints. 
^ Peter Van Ham and Sergei Medvedev (eds.), Mapping European Security After Kosovo 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press 2002), 4. 
^ It is worth noting that the first Gulf War cannot be understood in such a way as it was 
carried out on the bases of a legitimate UN mandate and was therefore the subject o f 
widespread consensus. For the other consequences of Kosovo in the context of the new 
security regimes, see Martin Smith and Graham Timmins, Uncertain Europe: Building a 
New Security Order? (London: Routledge 2001), and Martin Smith, The Kosovo Crisis 
and the Evolution of Post Cold War European Security (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press 2003). 
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A l l of these novelties lead to a refining of the questions posed above: what 
epistemic constraints led to a particular understanding of the Kosovo conflict which 
resulted in a particular response? What constraints led to the framing of peoples first as 
'Yugoslavs', then as 'Kosovars', or 'Serbs', and so on? And again - are those constraints 
being challenged? Before proceeding to present the way in which answers to the three 
research questions presented above wi l l be answered throughout this work it may be 
useful to present a number of concrete examples of discourse formation practices that 
would benefit from a Complexity-informed epistemic approach. 
Three Balkan Stories 
On April the 24^ 1999, a generation of young Europeans woke up to the headline 
"Once you k i l l people because you don't like what they say, you change the rules of 
war".' Early that morning, the building housing Radio-Television Serbia (RTS) was 
struck by NATO cruise missiles. Sixteen employees, mostly technicians and support 
staff were killed, whilst 16 other civilians were injured. The Guardian reported that some 
victims "had to be identified by a single personal effect: part of a sock, a ring. Mirjana 
Stoimenovski, mother of one of the victims, waited four days in front of the RTS building 
Robert Fisk, "Once you kil l people because you don't like what they say, you change 
the rules of war". The Independent (London), April 24, 1999. 
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for news of her son's death."* The BBC explained that "reporters at the scene said they 
saw the almost decapitated body of one man dangling from the rubble, and the body of a 
make-up artist. Another man was trapped between two concrete blocks. Doctors 
amputated his legs at the site but he later died."^ The state-run news agency Tanjug 
confirmed that about 150 people were inside the building at the time of the attack.'" 
British Prime Minister Tony Blair later explained that bombing television stations 
was "entirely justified" since they were part of the "apparatus of dictatorship and power 
of Milosevic." He added: 'The responsibility for every single part of this action lies with 
the man who has engaged in this policy of ethnic cleansing and must be stopped." The 
Prime Minister insisted that it was "very, very important people realise this."" The 
insistence may have been aimed at the confusion created in previous weeks regarding the 
exact definitions of 'TV station', 'military target', and the relationship between the two. 
The British Development Secretary, Claire Short, stated: "this is a war, this is a serious 
conflict, untold horrors are being done. The propaganda machine is prolonging the war 
and it's a legitimate target."'^ The view seemed to be shared by the entire British 
* Natasha Joffe, "At War with NATO", The Guardian (Manchester), October 23, 2001. 
^ Richard Norton-Taylor, "Serb TV Station was Legitimate Target, says Blair", The 
Guardian (Manchester), Apri l 24, 1999. 
" ' Ib id . 
" A l l quoted in Ibid. 
'Mbid . 
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Government. This is what Sir Ian Garnett, the Chief of Joint Operations at the Ministry 
of Defence, had to say: "Milosevic's propaganda machine consists of transmitters but 
also the studios from which the information is transmitted. That makes it part of the 
overall military structure. Both elements have to be attacked."'" And this is NATO's Air 
Commodore David Wilby: "RTS was a legitimate target which filled the airways with 
hate and lies over the years."'" 
But things were not so simple. Jamie Shea, the NATO Council spokesman, had 
previously stated that RTS was not a target, distinguishing between transmitters 
"integrated into military command and control communications and normal broadcasting 
facilities."'"'' What was all of this fuss about transmitters about? Under the Geneva 
Convention 'television channels and equipment' can be legitimate targets only i f they are 
"an integral part of the military apparatus'.'^ On Apri l 12 Shea informed that "there is no 
policy to strike television and radio transmitters as such. Allied air missions are planned 
to avoid civilian casualties, including of course journalists."'^ However, by April 18 
Shea was saying " I think the time has come to take a closer look at the Serb state media. 
13 A l l quoted in Ibid. 
'Mbid . 
'5 Ibid. 
'^ Joffe, "At War with NATO". 
'^ Ibid, emphasis added. 
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It is not really a media at all, it is part of President Milosevic's war machine."'* In other 
words, transmitters were now an 'integral part of a military apparatus', even though it can 
be argued that the Geneva Convention means things other than 'propaganda' when 
referring to a 'military operations', and the Convention's emphasis on military 'command 
and control' reflects this. On April 21 NATO General Giuseppe Mariani confirmed that 
NATO was in the business of "disrupting the regime and degrading the FRY propaganda 
apparatus." 
Within two weeks 'transmitters as such' had become 'propaganda machines' thus 
part of a 'military apparatus', whilst what Shea previously recognised as civilians 
(journalists, and therefore not targets) had become part of that apparatus. This resulted in 
Sir Ian Garnett's view according to which a 'propaganda machine' - by definition part of 
an 'overall military structure' - is composed of both transmitters and 'studios from which 
the information is transmitted'. So when is a TV station not a TV station? When is a 
civilian not a civilian, but a part of a 'military apparatus'? More importantly, when is 
freedom of expression not freedom of expression but 'propaganda'? The limit, the 
threshold between the meaning of a word and its opposite, has to be negotiated, 
calculated. 
Ljiljana Bererina, a survivor of the attacks released the following declaration: 
"What does RTS represent for me? An interesting job. You can't imagine what it means 
'«Ibid. 
'^ Ib id . 
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to in a poor country under an embargo to deal with international relations, to be in contact 
with foreign colleagues. But at home we never watched the news on RTS, we switched 
on the TV only when there was football.""^ Ljiljana also stated that most of those killed 
actually tended to oppose Milosevic's government. 
On the 19* of December 2001 the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 
dismissed a case against the NATO bombing of RTS on the grounds of jurisdiction. The 
Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FYR) was outside of the Court's 'jurisdiction'. To be 
sure, the Court had previously claimed jurisdiction on territories other than those 
belonging to signing parties in cases of 'military occupation' by those signing parties.'' 
A question related to the issue of jurisdiction emerges: how can a Court dealing with 
Universal Human rights be qualified by a geographical - and therefore by definition 
exclusive - element (Europe)? And such a contradiction is evident in its own 
denomination: 'European Court of Human Rights'. Should it not be renamed - 'Court of 
Rights for European Humans'? Again, the limit - even the limit of the 'Universal', of the 
'Human' - has to be negotiated, defined. The idea of a European Court of Human Rights 
is in itself reminiscent of a very peculiar mode of thinking whereby a Universal is ^ 
paradoxically - defined in terms of its own exclusion. The title that Slavoj Zizek chose 
Ibid. 
-'The question of ECHR jurisdiction is a complex one and wil l be studied at length in 
Chapter 7. 
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to assign to the second part of his compendium is in essence indicative of this: The 
Universal Exception?^ 
Richard Holbrooke's account of the Dayton peace process offers a similar account 
regarding the delimitation of meaning and the 'technicalisation' of conflict - of how 
conflict needs to be framed within limits before i t can be calculated, and resolved. 
First, there is the story of the maps. After intense days of negotiation at Dayton, 
Milosevic had made an important number of territorial concessions on behalf of the 
Bosnian Serbs (referred to as 'Pale Serbs', and often differentiated from the more 
moderate 'Banja Luka Serbs' in the account). Without realising it, during these 
concessions Milosevic had altered the proposed partition of Bosnia to a ratio of 55% for 
the Bosnian-Croat Federation side and 45% for the (Pale) Serbian side, whilst the pre-
condition agreed by all parties for negotiating at Dayton was a distribution of land 
equivalent to 5 1 % for the Federation side and 49% for the Bosnian Serbs. 
When Milosevic realised this he was rather upset. Talking to Holbrooke, he said 
"You tricked me...how can I ever trust you again?...I can do many things, but I cannot 
give you more than 5!%...! can't force Pale to accept a deal for less than 49 percent. 
^- See Slavoj Zizek, The Universal Exception (London: Continuum International 
Pubhshing Group 2005). Zizek's argument wi l l be analysed at length in the relevant 
Chapters (5 and 7 in particular). 
Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: The Modem Library Editions 1998). 
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Please believe me. This is the end of the matter.""" This is particularly interesting, as 
throughout the account it emerges that Milosevic exened a considerable amount of 
pressure on the Pale Serbs, effectively dictating terms to them. Holbrooke makes 
numerous references to Milosevic's 'charm offensives' aimed at the Pale Serbs, while 
Milosevic is repeatedly alleged to have referred to them in less than flattering terms, 
calling them 'pigheaded' and 'stupid' quite a few times. But on the percentage issue, he 
did not seem to have much room for manoeuvre. In a tragic-comical way, Milosevic 
apparently burst into a desperate monologue, stating "Give me anything, rocks, swamps, 
hills - anything, as long as it gets us to 49-51 ."'^ 
As Holbrooke put it, the 51-49 issue had taken on 'an almost theological force'.'^ 
But how do we get to a situation in which numbers - the necessarily abstract 
representation of reality - become the precondition for a (real) settlement? How can such 
an issue assume a sine qua non status in diplomatic negotiations, to the extent that the 
nature, or quality, of the question in object (land) is no longer relevant (rocks and 
swamps?). Holbrooke begins to provide an answer: 
The most disturbing aspect of this obsession with 51-49 was that it revealed how 
little each other trusted the political aspect of the Dayton agreement to which they 
Ibid, 295-296. 
Ibid, 302. 
26 Ibid, 296. 
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had both agreed. As Izetbegovic once said, a 'mountain of corpses' between the 
two sides prevented trust. The argument over the land was, in effect, a 
continuation of the war in Dayton, while the political discussions were a tentative 
effort to build a political framework for a joint future. We were all too aware of 
the internal contradiction, but there was nothing that could be done about it."^ 
Numbers take over once the immanent reality (the mountain of corpses) renders an 
agreement - any agreement - 'undecidable'. The metaphysical nature of negotiations is 
revealed once the failure to deal with the problems at the level of immanence becomes 
apparent. Indeed, this is evident in the Pale Serbs' insistence on the 51:49 ratio.^* Given 
Ibid, 297. 
28 David Campbell exposes the constructed character of the 1991 Yugoslav census (44% 
Muslim, 3 1 % Serb, 17% Croat, 6% Yugoslav - see page 79 of the book cited below), 
which provided most of the 'data' for negotiations in the region. Furthermore, Campbell 
analyses (Chapter 5 of the book cited below) the ontopological assumptions that emerged 
in relation to the nexus that is assumed to exist between identity and territory. The idea 
that such nexus exists and that it ought to be used as a ground for peace negotiations was 
a principle that was driven by the international community as much as it was by 
Belgrade. The ontopological assumptions that statistically summarise the nexus of 
territory and identity are epistemic in nature, for they underpin the mechanisms in which 
relevant knowledge is produced and deployed. See David Campbell, National 
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the perceived ethnic composition of the province (44% Mushm, 3 1 % Serb, 17% Croat, 
6% Yugoslav), it would have been impossible for the Croat-Muslim federation to accept 
anything that could not be presented as less than the 'majority' of Bosnia's territory. On 
the other hand, a partition that reflected the perceived ethnic balances of Bosnia would 
have bee unacceptable to the Serbs: you cannot fight a war and claim to have won it i f 
you are left with 31, or even 37 % of the territory. In other words, the Pale Serbs may 
have presented the Dayton agreement as the result of a military 'victory' i f the partition 
ratio reflected the fact that barely a majority of the territory wi l l be assigned to the 
enemy, which can be presented as an inevitable factor given the presence of third party 
mediators: but nothing more. That 1% thus becomes the borderline of what can be 
acceptable to both parties: on the one hand, the possibility of presenting the result as 
something that guarantees the majority principle enshrined in the perceived composition 
of the population, and the principle that a war was not 'lost' since no more (or barely 
more, that is, a negligible 1%) than half of the province's territory was lost. In other 
words, the number 51 indicates a majority - but just, barely, a majority - and its symbolic 
value derives from the fact that such a notion of 'limited' majority would have enabled 
the relevant Pale leaders to claim that they had not 'lost' the war, whilst enabling the 
Bosnian-Croat Federation to claim that a majority of the province's territory was secured. 
This is precisely why the peace needed to be calculated, as both parties sought to secure 
Deconstruction: Violence, identity and Justice in Bosnia (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press 1998). 
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what they could not achieve through military means in the negotiation process: that is, 
something they could present as a 'decisive victory'. It is worth noting that earlier 
proposals put forward by non 'Yugoslavs', that is, plans that sought to present a more 
super partis proposal, suggested a 43 (Serb) :57 (Federation) ratio (Vance-Owen Plan)"^, 
whilst plans proposed by constituents which did not have to deal with the constraints of a 
nationalist-dominated public opinion at home (the Bosniac proposal, which was promptly 
withdrawn) went for a 67 (Federation) : 33 (Serbs) deal (which comes a lot closer to the 
perceived ethnic reality on the ground as depicted by the 1991 census).•'^ In the end, the 
mathematics of the agreement had to be worked out by the two players upon whom 
specific (epistemic) nationalist-discursive constraints applied the most: Tudjman and 
Milosevic 
As Holbrooke put it, this was a perfect example of politics constituting the 
continuation of war by other means, which was characterised by an attempt to impose 
constraints that were present at the immanent level (the Pale Serbs' imperative to be 
perceived as the side that had 'won' the war) to a context that sought to do precisely the 
opposite, that is, negotiate away such 'red line' requirements. 
See David Owen, Balkan Odyssey (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1995), 121. 
^° See Carl Bildt, Peace Journey (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1998), 140. 
^' Gearoid 6 Tuathail and Carl Dahlman, "The Clash of Governmentalities: 
Displacement and Return in Bosnia Herzegovina" in Global Governmentality: Governing 
International Spaces (London: Routledge 2004), 145. 
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Richard Holbrooke's To End a War is an interesting read not only because of its 
vivid description of the Dayton negotiations, but also because it illustrates how these 
negotiations were preceded, or framed, by Holbrooke's attempts to calculate the right 
conditions for the talks. Consider for example the quote below, which refers to a 
conversation held between the American envoy and Croat officials: 
As we left the meeting, I pulled Defense Minister Susak aside. "Gojko, I want to 
be absolutely clear," I said. "Nothing we said today should be construed to mean 
that we want you to stop the rest of the offensive, other than Banja Luka. Speed 
is important. We can't say so publicly, but please take Sanski Most, Prijedor. and 
Bosnaki Novi. And do it quickly, before the Serbs regroup! 
The conflict in Bosnia engendered situations in which, according to a senior United 
States negotiator, it was necessary to secure further conflict in order to secure the peace. 
The peace had to be calculated, and the variables had to be in place. 
The TV station that is no longer a TV station, the map (the signifier) that no 
longer represents a tool to settle an object of dispute (land - the signified) but it becomes 
in itself the object of dispute, a court of justice whose (Universal) focus is limited by 
(particular) territorial jurisdictions, and the need to secure further conflict in order to 
secure the peace represent various facets of a particular mode of thought that 
" Holbrooke, To End a War, 166. 
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characterises the way in which knowledge is produced and deployed in modem 
international relations. It is the objective of this work to examine what the main tenets of 
this knowledge configuration are, to understand their most inner workings and to explore 
- with the help of a Complexity-informed epistemic approach - whether such workings 
are being challenged. It is the purpose of this work to trace the evolution of this modern 
configuration of knowledge, to understand how it has permeated through the realms of 
society and policy-making on this particular occasion (the Kosovo crisis), and to examine 
how it is being challenged by alternative configurations of knowledge. At the practical 
level these issues always remain intimately related to questions faced in the day-to-day 
practice of crisis management: what makes the thought that peace can only be achieved 
with further conflict possible? What makes a map an object of 'theological obsessions'? 
What makes a young journalist who only switches RTS to watch football part of a 
'propaganda machine' and thus part of a 'military apparatus / target'? Are these all 
incidences of metaphysics as power (or metaphysics of power)? These are only examples 
related to a limited dimension of the conflict. Chapters 6 to 8 wi l l , for example, look at 
the formation of the ethno-nationalist discourse in the region in some detail. 
The Architecture of an Argument 
Chapter 1 represents an overview of current scholarship on the Kcsovo conflict. 
As such, it seeks to provide the building blocks for subsequent arguments and to identify 
gaps in our current understanding of the Kosovo crisis. It wi l l be argued that whereas a 
substantial amount of work has been published in a great number of disciplines related to 
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the issue at hand (from political science and international relations to international law, 
via military analysis and media studies, just to name a few) very little has been done to 
synthesise such approaches through an epistemic approach so as to gather the intrinsic 
novelty inherent in what has come to be defined as the Kosovo crisis. Thus, works tend 
to be compartmentalised in their respective disciplines and the underlying constraints that 
characterise phenomena go unnoticed. For example, the contradictions that characterised 
military strategy (in terms of the obvious dissonance that existed between the stated 
objectives and the means that were chosen to implement them) were also present in 
subsequent legal reasoning - both contradictions can be traced to the same epistemic 
constraints. 
Chapter 2 wi l l seek to present the methodology through which the rise of 
Complexity is to be examined. In this case, Foucault's archaeological method wil l be 
presented, and the main underiying features of the modem episteme wi l l be outlined. 
However, it may be useful to present some of the main arguments here in order to 
emphasise the role and importance that Complexity plays in the context of novel and 
epistemic approaches to conflict. 
As a whole, this work wil l argue that the tragic events in Kosovo are characterised 
by a metaphysical understanding of conflicts and human relations. This metaphysical 
approach is responsible for the particular way in which the Kosovo conflict was 
understood, and consequent solutions calculated. The work wil l seek to demonstrate that 
the metaphysical nature of our times is to be detected not only in the realm of diplomacy, 
but in every conceptualisation that characterises contemporary Western thought. Two 
questions arise: 1) How is it possible to back such a claim, what tools do we have at our 
Introduction, 25 
disposal to elucidate this fundamental trait in the day-to-day practice of diplomacy and 
policy-making? 2) Besides, what has 'Complexity' got to do with any of this? To what 
extent can we speak of a new Complexity-based episleme as a break from the current 
configuration of knowledge? 
The underlying configuration of knowledge, the ensemble of rules that 
characterise the way in which we, as humans, approach and generate knowledge, is what 
Michel Foucault referred to as an episteme. According to Foucault, the modern episteme 
emerges once the underlying assumptions of the classical episteme no longer provide 
legitimate grounds to claims on the nature of k n o w l e d g e . W h i l s t in the classical 
episteme the nature and order of things (including humans) was determined according to 
how these stood in relation to each other, indeed according to how they represented each 
other; Modernity brings forward an epistemic configuration that no longer requires this 
representational attitude when producing and deploying knowledge. In the modern 
episteme things wi l l be examined as self-coherent and self-sufficient wholes, their 
organic structure become more relevant than their representation of other objects, and 
their limits are imposed by an analytic of finitude. The study of 'Man' becomes possible 
only when 'Man' can be delimited, and regarded as something which is produced as well 
as something that produces. Thus the 'Birth of Man' is related to the birth of the 
'humanistic sciences' and vice versa, and the nature ofthe.se phenomena is epitomized in 
33 See Chapter 2. 
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Marx's classical maxim: Men produce their own history but not in the conditions of their 
choosing. 
On the other hand the birth of such subjects of study focus our attention on these 
objects' inner, organic structures: these are always inaccessible to humans but they 
ground all claims to knowledge. It is this analytic of fmitude that determines when a TV 
station ceases to be a TV station, for example. The analytic is always present in 
discursive formations, and its limits are constantly negotiated. According to Foucault, 
such an analytic of finitude necessitates a concept of linear history to take place. In fact, 
the analytic is supposed to negotiate the limits of things, but since they can no longer do 
so in terms of their representational power, an alternative explanatory source must be 
found. This source is the concept of linear history, which reveals the intrinsic and inner 
limits of all things. Since the ultimate purpose of linear history is to assist an analytic of 
finitude in placing contingency, its linear and unidirectional nature must be maintained. 
Thus a concept of linear history is of fundamental importance for the process of 
negotiating the limits of things. 
This work wil l thus argue that the two axes of modernity identified by Foucault's 
epistemic analysis are responsible for the understanding of the nature of the Kosovo 
conflict. The two axes include an analytic of finitude, which is responsible for defining 
the meaning of concepts in the modem organisation of knowledge, and historical 
linearity, which is responsible for placing contingency upon such finitude. In other 
words, this work is an attempt to understand how the Kosovo conflict was handled in our 
age, which Foucault calls the 'Age of History', precisely because of the nature of the 
modem episteme: an episteme that is defined by a concept of historical linearity (history), 
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which comes to dominate all discursive formations. These two axes wi l l provide the 
lenses, or the tools, through which this work wi l l elucidate how a particular 
conceptualisation of events led to consequent actions in the context of the Kosovo crisis. 
Following the thesis statement above, it is now possible explain why and how we 
can introduce the Complexity element in this work (Chapter 3). Chapter 3 wi l l proceed 
to examine the evolution of scientific epistemology in general and the rise of Complexity 
in particular through the epistemic lenses presented in Chapter 2. It wi l l be argued that 
Complexity - understood as an epistemic configuration - represents a break from the 
modem episteme insofar it posits non-linear (thus non-contingent) temporality at the 
heart of theorising, thus directly challenging what Foucault called the 'Age of History' 
(modernity). There is more. Historians such as Eric Hobsbawm identify Natural 
Philosophy and German Romanticism as the precursors of Complexity - whilst noticing 
the role that such approaches to knowledge played in the 'Epistemic Civil War', which 
was fought all over Europe during the 'Age of Revolutions'. It thus becomes possible to 
argue that Complexity has the potential to re-introduce the great 'modern' debate that lay 
at the heart of such Epistemic Civil War. The debate, to put it crudely, regards the 
question of what should be the role of Reason after the Enlightenment. Once it becomes 
possible to demonstrate that Complexity can be understood in this way the implications 
for the theory and practice of international relations become immediately obvious -
approaches that see the role of Reason as being that of enabling us to cope with 
uncertainty, rather than that of providing us with certainty, wi l l generate knowledge 
practices which radically differ from current interpretations of human affairs, including 
human conflict. 
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There is an additional sense of urgency in any attempt to critically assess the 
impact of Complexity in the way we generate and deploy knowledge, particularly as the 
concept of Complexity itself is being constantly abused by dubious claims to knowledge 
(both in academia and elsewhere) that seek to re-justify themselves under the its aegis. 
By Googling 'Complexity' these days one wi l l find hundreds of hits explaining how a 
business' sales can be dramatically improved thanks to the latest insights of the new 
science, or sites claiming that better dating techniques can be acquired thanks Complexity 
Science. Or how we can now better understand 'globalisation', or regional security 
regimes, since these things are also 'complex'. The idea that Complexity in itself 
represents an important challenge to our modern configuration of knowledge and that as 
such it re-opens the question of how we should handle conscious, rational thought in the 
post-Enlightenment era does not seem to come up. Just as a prelude of what wi l l be 
discussed in Chapter 3, it is interesting to note that Foucault predicts that philosophers 
such as Bergson and Deleuze wil l precipitate the collapse of the modern episteme, whilst 
the most important theorists of Complexity Science in fields as diverse as particle 
physics, biology and cognitive neuroscience observe the affinity there is between their 
claims and philosophers such as...Bergson and Deleuze. Needless to say, Foucault sees 
in these thinkers a challenge to the modern episteme precisely because of their alternative 
conceptualisations of time. In other words, parallelisms between Complexity and post-
structuralist (and post Bergsonian) philosophy wi l l be made. The chapter wi l l argue that 
Complexity could be seen as overcoming the modem episteme and its genesis is shown to 
be compatible with Foucault's description of the evolution of the sciences - indeed, it 
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wil l argue that Foucault's archaeological method provides a more rigorous tool for 
understanding the evolution of Complexity than most other competing explanations. 
Chapter 4 wi l l apply the theoretical insights gathered in the previous two chapters 
to the development of academic International Relations theory. These aspects are 
particularly important as they concretely show how Foucault's epistemic approach can, in 
a very powerful way, account for the intellectual trajectory of specific disciplines and 
concepts, and how such trajectory is a mirror of underlining epistemic shifts that wi l l be 
identified in the previous chapter's analysis of the evolution of scientific theorising. In 
other words, Chapter 4 wi l l tangibly show how the epistemic approach presented in 
Chapter 2, and the related evolution of the sciences presented in Chapter 3, can account 
for the way in which knowledge is produced and deployed in International Relations. On 
the other hand. Chapter 5 wi l l seek to do the same for ethics. Needless to say, it is this 
knowledge that grounded our understanding of the Kosovo conflict. 
In sum, the theoretical argument of this work can be presented as follows. Our 
current understanding of conflict is characterised by epistemic constraints that condition 
the generation and deployment of knowledge. Such constraints are themselves 
characterised by the rules of the modern episteme, which, according to Foucault, 
inaugurate the "Age of History". This is because such episteme relies on a notion of 
analytical finitude, which requires the adoption of historical linearity. Overall, the 
modern episteme relies on historical linearity to function and to generate consequent 
discourses, or knowledge practices. As it happens, the formation of all human sciences 
can be analysed on the bases of the evolution of the modern episteme. International 
Relations theory (and practice) clearly evolved along the lines of the modern episteme 
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too, and this is evident in the a-historical nature of some of its most salient analytical 
frameworks (Neorealism). On the other hand. Complexity challenges the rules of the 
modern episteme, and it does so precisely through an alternative understanding of time, 
and therefore history. Thus, we now have a conceptual framework that may first allow us 
to challenge the epistemic constraints imposed on the generation of knowledge regarding 
conflict and international relations and to secondly proceed to generate alternative 
frameworks of knowledge leading to alternative understandings and actions. Finally, 
Kosovo provides a good case study for testing these claims as it represents a number of 
novelties that have emerged in the context of the international system. Kosovo, as such, 
exemplifies a transition period in which all the contradictions of the modern epsiteme -
which in this case are applied to our understanding of international relations - come to 
light. It thus offers a good opportunity to carefully dissect the inner workings of the 
modern epsiteme - and to challenge them through what wi l l be presented as an 
altemative to such episteme (Complexity). 
An Intermezzo is strategically placed between the theoretical and practical focus 
of the current work. It is hoped that the few pages it occupies wi l l represent a useful 
roadmap for the reader whenever the links between the different components of the study 
are not immediately clear. Indeed, the Intermezzo seeks to summarise the theoretical 
insights and to outline how these base considerations on the events that unfolded in the 
context of the Kosovo crisis. 
Following the theoretical perspective elucidated above and developed in Chapters 
1-5 it wi l l be possible to examine two particular concepts surrounding the Kosovo crisis, 
that is, the way in which the two axes of modernity operated in this particular case: 1) the 
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application of an analytic of finitude in the context of international law (and ethics, see 
Chapter 7) and 2) the role of historical linearity in constructing the object of enquiry 
('Kosovo') in a number of policy-making institutions (Chapter 8). It wi l l be argued 
throughout Chapters 6 to 8 that a concept of historical linearity translated into the belief 
that the conflict was characterised by perennial and persistent 'ancient ethnic hatreds', 
whilst analytical fmitude mutated into a notion of 'Universal Exclusion' and parallelisms 
with the Holocaust. Chapter 6, on the other hand, wi l l provide a detailed account of 
some aspects of what happened in Kosovo using the analytical tools developed in the first 
part of this work, and it wi l l offer some generic reflections on how the epistemic 
approach presented here can enhance our understanding of the events and on how a 
Complexity-informed analysis can help us to identify ways in which the relevant 
epistemic constraints are being challenged. 
In the case of our analysis of the juridico-ethical aspect of the crisis. Chapter 7 
wil l implement a study grounded on the understanding of the analytic of finitude as 
elaborated in Chapter 5, which echoes a perspective that can be found in Zizek's thought: 
In the chapter "Hegel's 'Logic of Essence' as a Theory of Ideology", Zizek 
makes the case for the importance of Hegel's notion of 'positing the 
presuppositions' for any serious work in ideology analysis. He also looks at the 
way Hegel reconceptualizes Kant's notion of the 'sublime' not as some 
transcendental 'beyond' out there but as a kind of fantasy image brought about by 
a split in here. This strange logic, which Zizek wil l go on to connect with a certain 
feminine 'not-all', as opposed to a masculine 'universality produced through 
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exception', wi l l have the widest implications for the rest of Zizek's work. It wi l l 
allow him to criticize, for example, the usual notion of human rights as a 
universality only possible on the basis of a series of exclusions (women, children, 
the mad, the primitive), a universality from which ultimately everybody is 
excluded, as opposed to a conception of human rights as non-universal but 
applying precisely to these exceptions. 
In a nutshell, this perspective wi l l be tested against the experience of the crisis as 
revealed in a number of documentary monuments, which all reveal the exclusionary 
nature of a Universality that had to be constructed according to the limits imposed by an 
analytic of finitude, which is in itself inherent in the rules of the modern episteme. 
Finally, the second case study (Chapter 8) wi l l examine how the axes of 
modernity (historical linearity / ancient ethnic hatreds and analytical finitude / the 
Holocaust) can be found in documentary monuments, seeking to find evidence that 
testifies to the presence of modern epistemic constraints in the discourse that was 
developed by relevant stakeholders in the context of the Kosovo crisis. For example, 
how was the issue of the 'History of the Balkans' handled in policy-making circles? Was 
there a shared understanding of the conflict, and was such an understanding based on a 
common reading of the region's history? 
.14 Rex Butler, Slavoj Zizek: Live Theory (New York: Continuum 2005), 8. 
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Curiously, Benedict Anderson has addressed the role of linear temporality in the 
construction of nationalisms. One of the objectives of our case study wi l l be to 
demonstrate that Anderson's arguments can not only be applied to the subjects 
experiencing the processes of identity formation, but that it also conditions how others, 
outsiders, frame and identify a particular group. In Anderson' classical study of 
nationalisms^"^ an entire section (appropriately entitled "Apprehensions of Time") is 
dedicated to the analysis of linear time as a fundamental component in the construction of 
national and ethnic identities.'^^ Consider for example the following claim: 
Our own conception of simultaneity has a long time in the making, and its 
emergence is certainly connected, in ways that have yet to be well studied, with 
the development of the secular sciences. But is it a conception of such 
fundamental importance that, without taking it fu l ly into account, we wi l l f ind it 
difficult to probe the obscure genesis of nationalism. What has come to take the 
place of the medieval conception of simultaneity-along-time is, to borrow again 
from Benjamin, an idea of 'homogenous, empty time', in which simultaneity is, as 
it were, transverse, cross-time, marked not by prefiguring and fulfilment, but by 
temporal coincidence, and measured by clock and calendar.^^ 
35 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso 1991). 
Ibid, 22-36. 
37 Ibid, 24. 
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According to Anderson, without an emerging concept of 'homogenous, empty time' it 
would be difficult , i f not impossible, to imagine oneself as being part of a coherent 
community. Can we also say that without this notion it would be equally difficult to 
imagine 'others' as being part of 'other' coherent communities? Is this the notion that 
characterised the conceptualisation of the 'Kosovars' and the 'Serbs', for example, from 
Rome to Washington via, Paris, Madrid, and London? Interestingly, Anderson notes that 
the emergence of linear time is probably related to the creation of modern secular 
sciences but that this link is yet to be well studied. This represents an odd omission, 
especially when one thinks that the emergence of such concept of linear time, in precisely 
those terms, was identified by Foucault in a book (The Order of Things) subtitled An 
Archaeology of the Human Sciences - sciences which Foucault characterises as being 
strictly modern and secular. It remains unclear to what extent Anderson was aware of 
Foucault and to what extent the latter influenced the former. Although Anderson refers 
to a 'Foucauldian sense of abrupt discontinuities of consciousness'' when comparing the 
notion of time in nationalistic and not-nationalistic works of literature, no explicit 
references to what would appear to be the most relevant work (i.e. The Order of Things, 
that is, where the notion of epistemic breaks and the rise of historical linearity is 
formulated) appears to be made in Imagined Communities. The last part of this work wi l l 
seek to bridge that gap. 
Ibid, 28. 
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The theoretical insights of Imagined Communities leads this study to conclude by 
revealing why and how a modern approach to the Kosovo crisis has tended to frame and 
understand the conflict in terms of ancient ethnic rivalries, and to explain the particularly 
violent nature of the Yugoslav wars on the bases of such historically linear views. A 
Complexity guided approach, on the other hand, allows us to understand that it was 
precisely the absence of such intrinsic ethnic hatreds and nationalist feelings which led to 
the extreme levels of violence in the region (see in particular Chapter 6 for a detailed 
explanation). 
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1. Framing the Kosovo Conflict 
History is a battlefield. It's constantly being fought over because the past controls the 
present. History is the present. That's why every generation writes it anew. But what 
most people think of as history is its end product, myth. 
Edgard Lawrence Doctorow' 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse to what extent existing scholarship on 
the Kosovo crisis addresses the underlying epistemic constraints that characterise the 
production of knowledge on this topic in specific and relevant disciplines. As such, the 
works that appear in this chapter have been selected with the purpose of illustrating the 
main debates in the main disciplines related to the Kosovo crisis in order to outline how 
such debates can be synthesised through an epistemic approach - this is thus not a 
'literature review' or a 'state of the art' in the classical sense, but an attempt to distil 
developments in various disciplines in order to get to the essence of various, relevant, 
debates - and to put these in an epistemic context. As outlined in the introduction, the 
current work's claims relate to the idea that an epistemic approach applied to different 
disciplines affected by the Kosovo crisis would reveal the commonality of specific 
' Quoted in Sam Girgus, "The new Covenant and the Dilemma of Dissensus: Bercovitch, 
Roth and Doctorow" in Ellen Spolsky (ed.). Summoning: Ideas of the Covenant and 
Interpretative Theory, (New York: State University of New York Press 1993): 258. 
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constraints and consequent debates that characterised the ways in which the crisis was 
framed, understood and acted upon. Such claims can be mainly summarised as follows: 
1. A modem approach to knowledge characterised our understanding of the Kosovo 
conflict as a mainly ethno-historical struggle despite overwhelming evidence to 
the contrary. An approach informed by the ethos of Complexity would, on the 
other hand, instinctively address the immanent political struggle, which is 
responsible for the construction of the past in the present. 
2. This understanding of the conflict, coupled with the metaphysical contradictions 
intrinsic within the modern episteme, conditioned the armed intervention. For 
example, confusion over the practicalities o f the war is reminiscent of the 
confusion present in a particular approach to knowledge that characterised the 
intervention. 
These two points represent a Foucauldian understanding of the modern episteme, as such 
an episteme is characterised by an 'empirico-transcendental doublet' (see Chapter 2). 
The two axes of this doublet are an analytic of finitude (which characterises point 2 
above, that is, the concept of humanitarian intervention and its practical application) and 
the concept of historical linearity (which characterises point 1). These two concepts are 
strictly related, they are, as it were, two sides of the same coin, the coin being the 
empirico-transcendental doublet. The work wil l also claim that this Foucauldian 
understanding of knowledge allows a critical appraisal of Complexity as a knowledge 
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practice that radically departs from the modern episteme, and addresses how this 
complex, 'post-modern' episteme affects our understanding of ethno-political conflicts 
and humanitarian interventions in general, and of the Kosovo crisis in particular. 
In order to ful ly make these claims, and in order to show how epistemic 
constraints condition the establishment of panicular debates in all related branches of 
knowledge, four broad strands of literature have to be reviewed. Firstly, we have 
scholarship regarding the nature of the conflict itself, which frames the crisis along ethno-
historical lines, and analyses the conflict from an academic International Relations point 
of view (nature of war, national interest, national sovereignty and so on). To this we can 
add a specific line of analysis aimed at understanding the geo-strategic, geo-critical and 
geo-political dimension of the conflict. Second, we have abundant scholarship on the 
conduct of the war, which reveals the confused practicalities related to the contradicting 
needs of conducting a 'humanitarian war'. Thirdly, we have an abundant amount of 
scholarship on the concept of 'humanitarian intervention' itself, and of its legal 
impUcations. This is important with regards to the second claim of the current work 
enumerated above, as the objective is to demonstrate that the concept of 'humanitarian 
intervention', both at the legal and ethical level, is in itself a consequence of the modern 
episteme. Fourthly, we have official institutional documents emanating from national 
parliaments, multilateral organisations etc., which crystallise a .specific understanding of 
the Kosovo conflict, both as an ethno-historical war and as a case of legitimate 
humanitarian intervention. Since these constitute primary sources when outlining the 
overall narrative of the conflict the bulk of these sources wi l l be scrutinised in the 
relevant chapters (6, 7 and 8) - this current section wi l l simply outline the most relevant 
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material in the context of the issue at hand (that is, the epistemic commonalities that 
characterise key debates across disciplines on this subject). 
In short, the four strands of literature regarding the Kosovo conflict that wi l l be 
approached from an epistemic perspective in this section can be summarised as follows: 
1) International Relations, History / Diplomatic History, Geo-politics 2) Conflict 
Resolution, Military and Defence Studies, and to a certain extent Peace-keeping studies. 
3) International Law, International Humanitarian Law (the crucial difference being that 
whilst the former addresses the legality of intervention per se, the second investigates the 
intervention from the point of view of the requirements imposed by human rights law, for 
example). Ethics and 4) official documentation, primary sources. 
Finally, this chapter wi l l conclude with an analysis and summary of key debates 
within existing scholarship, and address how the apparent contradictions and paradoxes 
in such scholarship can be synthesised through an epistemic approach. The works 
outlined below are not supposed to represent a comprehensive review of the state of the 
art in all relevant disciplines; rather, they have been selected because they represent the 
most emblematic expositions of key debates and paradoxes in each discipline. As such, 
this should not be regarded as an attempt to produce a comprehensive summary of 
developments in each area but as an exposition of how all the relevant disciplines face 
debates that - as it wi l l be argued throughout the current work - can be adequately 
synthesised through our epistemic approach. It is hoped that by outlining the key 
questions in each discipline and by outlining the merits of the epistemic approach to such 
questions the value-added of the current effort wi l l become more explicit. Specific 
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chapters wi l l proceed to refer to relevant key works in specific disciplines according to 
the focus of each chapter. 
Ethno-Diplomacy and International Relations 
A vast amount of scholarship has been developed in relation to the history of the 
Balkans and the allegedly related conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo. As a norm, most 
serious academic research on the issue tends to dismiss the idea that events in the region 
are caused by 'ancient ethnic hatreds' and proceed to meticulously analyse how present 
power struggles determine interpretations of the historical record, thus shaping a 
collective imaginary." What most works fail to do, however, is to address the 
philosophical question beyond the recognition of the fact that conflict is not historically 
determined: these consequently fail to investigate how and whether such techniques of 
building the past into the present work - in other words, they fail to ask the question 
"Why are interpretations based on the ancient ethnic hatreds idea seem to be so popular 
despite evidence suggesting these are fundamentally flawed?". Outlining the historical 
evidence is not a satisfactory way of explaining why and how - precisely contrary to such 
overwhelming evidence - the collective imaginary, both in the region and beyond, 
continues to be captured by such distorted historical notions, both in the media and in 
- See, for example, Robert Thomas, Serbia under Milosevic (London: Hurst & Co. 
Publishers 1999). 
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debates taking place at the political level within relevant legislative processes (as the last 
chapter of this work wi l l outline). On the other (policy-making) hand, the dividing line 
between those who interpret the conflict in terms of 'ancient ethnic hatreds' and those 
who refuse to do so by focusing exclusively on the immanent political struggle can be 
found across the whole political spectrum: from debates in the media (see Chapter 6) to 
debates in national parliaments (see Chapter 8). 
Amongst the key studies in the academic context we can find works by Noel 
Malcom"\ Miranda Vickers"^ and Thanos Veremis and Evangelis Kofos.^ These three 
volumes represent an impressive and detailed historical account of 'ethnic' conflicts in 
the region - Vicker's account does not outline the history with the same amount of 
erudition as does Malcom's, but she devotes ten out of fourteen chapters to the last 
century, especially the second half of it. This makes both works highly complementary. 
Interestingly they both justify these monumental efforts in academic history by arguing 
that history is constantly being trawled by those on both sides in Kosovo who are looking 
for arguments in support of current policy. For example, both books analyse and dismiss 
the claim according to which an 'empty' post-1690 Kosovo was invaded by Albanians, 
^ Noel Malcom, Kosovo: A Short History (Basingstoke: MacMillan 1998). 
Miranda Vickers, Between Serbs and Albanians: A History of Kosovo (London: Hurst 
1998). 
Thanos Veremis and Evangelis Kofos, Kosovo: Avoiding another Balkan War (Athens: 
Hellenic Foundation for European Foreign Policy and University of Athens 1998). 
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which was used as a justification for the notorious policy of forced Albanian emigration 
from Kosovo to Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s. Malcom famously claims that the 
outcome in Kosovo wi l l depend to a large extent on "the ability of ordinary Serbs to 
challenge the fixed pattern of thought which has held them in its grip for so long."^ 
Indeed, according to Malcom, both sides in the conflict have developed blinkered views 
of the history of Kosovo, but Serbia holds the key to change, for the time being at least, 
because it has the power to make change or block it. These statements reveal how well 
documented historical analysis can nevertheless lack adequate philosophical frameworks 
to interpret the historiographic evidence. From Malcom's account it is difficult to 
understand how the author himself can reach such conclusions from his own data, and the 
work lacks an analysis of how mechanisms of historical revisionism work. In other 
words, the study fails to show how the subject of analysis could be more helpfully located 
in the study of a phenomenon, that is, the rise and rise of an intellectually contingent 
notion of ethno-nationalism, which operates in fundamentally the same way across the 
imagined 'ethnic' divides. Furthermore, the question of whether the Serbian side really 
holds the key to change in a situation of open conflict is dubious - unfortunately, the gap 
between the Albanian and the Serbian visions for Kosovo has widened, not narrowed, 
since the escalation of the armed conflict. Indeed, this alarming absence of common 
ground between the two sides in Kosovo is analysed in detail by contributors to the 
excellent volume edited by two Greek scholars, Evangelos Kofos and Thanos Veremis. 
Malcom, Kosovo: A Short History, 355-6. 
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Finally, other research has demonstrated how the fiction of 'Greater Albania' has been 
successfully developed and presented by politicians within Kosovo as a means of 
mobilising the masses. This parallel development has been particularly well researched 
by the likes of Paulin Kola^ and Dobriaca Cosic* 
One of the objectives of the current effort is to go beyond the analysis of the 
historical record and question the reasons why and how such record is seen as being 
meaningful at all. In a sense, this is about borrowing Benedict Anderson's 
conceptualisation of nationalism as an ideology that depends on a 'modern' (strictly in a 
Foucauldian sense) notion of historical linearity and explore how such a notion underpins 
all historical interpretations of the conflict, from Washington all the way to Moscow, via 
Priltina and Belgrade (see Chapter 6). These fundamental notions of historically-
contingent development are being fundamentally challenged by the raise of Complexity 
Science.^ It should be noted that the idea of applying the insights of Complexity to the 
^ Paulin Kola, The Search for the Greater Albania (London: Hurst 2003). 
^ Dobriaca Cosic, Kosovo (Belgrade: Novosti 2004). 
^ The issue of whether and to what extent history, or time, places contingency on the 
development of phenomena is at the heart of the Complexity epistemic revolution. 
Complexity theorists such as Ilya Prigogine have gone as far as arguing that all the 
differences between alternative approaches to scientific epistemology boil down to 
whether one chooses to assume that time is irreversible. This issue is explored in great 
detail in Chapter 3. 
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study of history is not new. In A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History Manuel De Landa 
addresses that very question, and outlines how an alternative. Complexity-based 
understanding of history would differ from more traditional approaches (see Chapter 3). '° 
The specific issue of ethnic conflict, or the rise of nationalisms, is however not treated. 
Another impressive collection and analysis of documents can be found in Marc 
Weller's The Crisis in Kosovo 1989-1999: from the Dissolution of Yugoslavia to 
Rambouillet and the Outbreak of Hostilities.^^ Tim Judah, author of Kosovo: War and 
Revenge refers to Weller's work as the "sine qua non of all future studies of Kosovo and 
the war." It is not difficult to see why: in terms of sheer scope, this collection contains 
a mixture of legal documents, official communiques, letters and informal notes, press 
conference transcripts, and internal reports and documents produced by a varied array of 
international organisations. Its scope is only matched by Auerswald's The Kosovo 
Conflict, a Diplomatic History through Documents, which covers a shorter historical 
period (Weller traces the constitutional development of Kosovo back to 1944, whilst the 
'° Manuel De Landa, A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History (New York: Zone Books 
1997). 
" Marc Weller, The Crisis in Kosovo 1989-1999: from the Dissolution of Yugoslavia to 
Rambouillet and the outbreak of hostilities (Cambridge, Documents and Analysis 
Publishing 1999). 
Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (London, New Haven: Yale University Press 
2000). 
/. Framing the Kosovo Conflict, 45 
evidence collected by Auerswald goes back to 1987).''' What transpires from these 
collections of historical documents is the difference of opinion between state leaders and 
mediators before 1998: State leaders tended to regard the problem as primarily one of self 
determination, whilst groups working on the ground in Kosovo, such as the Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), tended to frame the issue in terms of 
human rights - these differing views (that is, a view based on the notion of self-
determination and a view based on the notion of Human Rights) lead to a very interesting 
paradox that wi l l be presented below. Indeed, whereas the notion of Human Rights is 
necessarily Universalistic the notion of self-determination relates necessarily to the 
particular. 
Tim Judah's contribution is often presented as the most authoritative account of 
what happened 'behind the scenes' in the Kosovo c o n f l i c t . T h e basic argument of the 
book is that there were no conspiracy theories, no overriding ethical imperatives, but that, 
quite simply - to put it in the author's succinct prose - "they all got it wrong."'^ In other 
words, everybody was drawn towards a conflict that they did not understand, and in the 
case of NATO, which they did not particularly care about in the first instance. This 
Philip Auerswald and David Auerswald, The Kosovo Conflict, a Diplomatic History 
through Documents (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000). 
Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge. 
' ^ Ibid , 311. 
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argument is virtually identical to Hobwsbawm's'^ and Kissinger's.'^ Although this is 
probably the most plausible interpretation of the conflict - and indeed, the one that more 
closely matches the notion of 'emergence' in Complexity theory, as a phenomenon that 
grows out of complex systems to determine its own rules of development - the 
interpretation lacks an analysis of why exactly, at the intellectual level, we did indeed all 
get it all wrong. It certainly was not due to lack of first hand information - it would have 
been a lot more helpful i f Judah asked why information, which was indeed readily 
available (note the presence and excellent work of the Kosovo Verification Mission), was 
interpreted in such a clumsy way. In short, were there any constraints that limited the 
understanding of the Kosovo crisis despite the availability of abundant information? 
However, this view is controversial for another obvious reason: i f the whole affair was a 
mistake, there is not really much left to explain - this is naturally a view that many 
International Relations analysts are not to keen too share. 
Eric Hobsbawm, "Guerra Umanitaria? No, e solo un pasticcio" in L'Ultima Crociata? 
Ragioni e Torti di una Guerra Giusta, ed. Ulrich Beck and Nolberto Bobbio (Rome: Libri 
di Reset 1999), 58-67. 
Henry Kissinger, "New World Disorder: The ill-considered war in Kosovo has 
undermined relations with China and Russia and put NATO at risk," Newsweek, 31 May 
(1999). 
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Robert Thomas''* excellent account of the political struggle within Serbia, which 
pointed towards the need of manipulating Kosovo for political reasons, is a lot more 
helpful in enhancing our understanding of the relevant actors' alleged motivations. 
Thomas has the merit of revealing the inner workings of Milosevic's nationalist strategy, 
which did precipitate the conflict - in this context we are presented with an analysis of 
how this specific environment was formed (that is, an environment in which others could 
make 'mistakes'). The understanding of this environment is crucial regardless of how 
one perceives the alleged motivations of those who eventually decided that an air 
campaign was a suitable solution to the problem. 
David MacDonald's'^ impressive study on the representation of the Holocaust in 
the Balkans wonderfully illustrates how such motivations are translated in revisions of 
history."^ In a similar way, Julie Menus' Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War, 
concentrates in unveiling the many misunderstandings but fails to provide a 
comprehensive explanation of why and how the myths could be successfully deployed for 
Thomas, Serbia under Milosevic. 
David MacDonald, Balkan Holocaust? Serbian and Croatian Victim-Centred 
Propaganda and the War in Yugoslavia (Manchester: Manchester University Press 
2002). 
•° MacDonald's detailed study of the Holocaust analogy wil l provide much of the ground 
for arguments presented in Chapters 4 and 7, which seek to present the Holocaust as an 
'analytic of finitude' through which other acts of genocide are framed. 
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political reasons, and how they progressively started to be perceived as truths."' In this 
context, Auerswald's game-theory based explanation has at least the merit of defining its 
assumptions, without apparently being concerned by the extraordinary nature of such 
assumptions.'^ Works mainly focusing on the historical dimension also include a 
collection edited by Serbian academics. The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and 
21 Julie Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War (London, Berkeley: 
University of California Press 1999). 
" David Auerswald, "Explaining Wars of Choice: An Integrated Decision Model of 
NATO Policy in Kosovo", International Studies Quarterly Vol . 48, (2004): 631-662 
wants to convince his readers that institutional analysis alone can settle the question of 
why and how some states can decide to act on wars of choice in order to defend crucial 
geo-strategic interests (the author seems happy to state that the idea according to which 
states follow their geo-strategic interests when they can is the 'only' assumption of his 
model). The author, however, forgets to explain what those interests are, and how they 
were served by armed intervention. Worse, the conclusions do not explain past or present 
behaviour. Thus, the theory goes, countries such as Italy and Germany intervene less 
because of the nature of their institutions, yet this did not seem to matter too much when 
Germany took the arguably extraordinary decision to unilaterally recognise Croatia and 
when Italy unilaterally decided to intervene in Albania a few years later. 
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Catharsis'^, where the issue of political manipulation of history also features 
prominently, as it does in Branimir Anzulovic's Heavenly Serbia: from Myth to 
Genocide'^, and in Thomas Benedikter's / / Dramma del Kosovo: daliOrigine fra Serbi e 
Albanesi agli Scontri di Oggi'^ (The Drama of Kosovo: from the origins to today's 
conflict between Serbs and Albanians). Again, the generic problem persists: whilst both 
the Serb and the Italian academics insist in stating that the historical record is often 
manipulated, they fail to account for how such manipulation is either possible or 
successful, or both. Reviewing both works Christopher Cviic thus adequately repeats the 
standard mantra: "In 1991 Milosevic converted to the concept of the Greater Serbia that 
had previously been the preserve of nationalists like Vuk Draskovic and Vojislav Seselj. 
This was a political master stroke because it completed the process of Milosevic's 
transformation into a national icon." But even more pertinently, Cviic asks - with 
evident frustration, which is shared by this author - the question that is not addressed by 
these works: "But what made this possible? Why did the Serbs respond to him so 
Nebojsa Popov, The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and Catharsis (Budapest: Central 
University Press 2000). 
Branimir Anzulovic, Heavenly Serbia: from myth to Genocide (London: Hurst 1999). 
Thomas Benedikter, // Dramma del Kosovo: dall'origine fra Serbi e Albanesi agli 
scontri di oggi (Rome: Datanews Publications 1998). 
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well?"'^ This is really the crucial question. Again, the lack of philosophical analysis 
leaves all of this 'historical record' in a conceptual vacuum from which it is difficult to 
understand the nature of the knowledge frameworks that allowed such approaches to 
history to emerge. The works on the issue of ethnic nationalism in the region that were 
published prior to the NATO intervention at least have the merit of situating the rise of 
such phenomena in a broad historical context, thus examining the complex relationship 
between the issue and wider considerations over the nature of European Modernity and 
its uneven spread across the continent. Such works include Ivo Banac's The National 
Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics'^ and Tom Winnifrith's Shattered 
28 
Eagles, Balkan Fragments. 
Finally, Michael Mccgwire provides another interesting example of the way in 
which a linear understanding oh history (in itself responsible for the framing of the 
conflict in terms of 'ancient ethnic hatreds') seems to have handicapped the way in which 
the conflict was handled by the relevant actors. In an article simply entitled, Why did We 
Bomb Belgrade?'^ Mccwire notes how NATO failed to grasp the immanent political 
Christopher Cviic, "The Serbian Exception", International Affairs No. 3, Vol. 75 
(1999): 639, emphasis added. 
Ivo Branac, The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics (Ithaca, 
London: Cornell University Press 1984). 
28 Tom Winnifrith, Shattered Eagles, Balkan Fragments (London: Duckworth 1995). 
Michael Mccgwire, "Why did We Bomb Belgrade?," International Affairs Volume 76, 
(2000): 1-24. 
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struggle at the heart of the struggle, opting instead for a sketchy historically-based 
understanding of the conflict: 
There are other lessons to be drawn from the Balkan tragedy, including the 
tendency to define complex conflicts in oversimplified and moralistic terms, 
labels which then drove policy and shaped public expectations. In part, this 
reflected our damaging ignorance of the convoluted politics of the situation, a 
debility compounded by our slow learning curve. Reacting to each conflict in 
turn, the West applied undigested lessons from the previous one, whereas the 
underlying causes of the four successive wars' were qualitatively different, each 
requiring a particular set of responsesS'^ 
Thus, Mccgwire concludes that there is an underlying assumption according to which 
history - including recent history - is something that we have something to 'learn from' 
and that this assumption determined the West's clumsy approach to the Kosovo crisis and 
its lack of understanding regarding the immanent, particular political struggles that 
actually underpinned the crisis and specific aspects of the conflict. The surprise with 
which Albright reacted to the fact that the Kosovar delegation did not seem at all 
30 Ibid, 22, emphasis added. 
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convinced about the Rambouillet agreements at first shows a striking ignorance of the 
internal politics characterising the delegation's deliberations.^' 
The disciplines of Critical Geopolitics and International Relations have examined 
the Kosovo crisis and generated their own particular debates. From a geo-political 
perspective''', the most indicative contributions include John O'Loughlin's and Vladimir 
Kolossov's reflections on the geopolitics of the Kosovo war^ ,^ Alexandra Gheciu's study 
on the interactions between norms, power and politics in a specific geo-political context'''* 
and Mark Corson's and Clemson Turregano's analysis of the unintended consequences 
'^ Wesley Clark, Waging Modern War (New York: PublicAffairs): 163-189. 
The Kosovo Crisis has had a profound impact on the discipline of Critical GeopoUtics, 
which has generated a substantial amount of scholarship. This section will focus on 
outlining works that are consonant with the objectives at hand (outlining key debates in 
specific disciplines relevant to Kosovo) whilst Chapter 4 will concentrate on more 
generic works related to broader argumentations on the impact of Kosovo on the 
discipline as such. 
John O'Loughlin and Vladimir Kolossov, "Still Not Worth the Bones of a Single 
Pomeranian Grenadier: the Geopolitics of the Kosovo War 1999," Political Geography 
21, (2002): 573-599. 
Alexandra Gheciu, "International Norms, Power and the Politics of International 
Administration: The Kosovo Case," Geopolitics 10, (2005): 121-146. 
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resulting from a failure to thinking geo-politically.''^ O'Loughlin outlines how 
'geopolitical' wars are becoming more and more dependant on public opinion and shows 
how such public opinion allowed for NATO intervention. Interestingly, the argument 
overlooks the question of which variable (public opinion and geo-strategic 
considerations) ultimately carried more weight: presumably, given the context presented 
by the article, the conclusion is that geo-strategic goals are being now being shaped by 
public opinion, which ultimately has the last say on what is strategically important and 
what is not. However, there seems to be a lack of consensus on the variables or set of 
variables (if any) that decisively led NATO to the decision of waging its first war. 
In analysing institutions that have been set up in Kosovo after the conflict Gheciu 
invites the reader to consider the role played by such institutions in great debates in 
International Relations^^, outlining the differences between Kantian-inspired liberal 
"'^  Mark Corson and Clemson Turregano, "Spaces of unintended consequences: The 
Ground Safety Zone in Kosovo," GeoJournal 57, no. 4 (2002): 273-282. 
•'^  Again, Kosovo has had an enormous impact on the discipline of International 
Relations: so much so that some standard textbooks take this crisis as a starting point 
when outlining different approaches within the discipline: see, for example Jennifer 
Sterling-Folker (ed.) Making Sense of International Relations Theory, (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner 2006). Whilst this .section seeks to outline what is, in an epistemic context, a 
relevant debate, Chapter 4 will explore in more detail key works that relate to the general 
evolution of the discipline in the light of the Kosovo crisis. 
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theorists (the new institutions represent a positive development in the context of an 
evolving enforcement of human rights) and the take of critical theorists (such institutions 
represent Western hegemonic values, which are not, strictly speaking, Universal). 
The debate is interesting insofar it presents a curious paradox: if humanitarian war 
is indeed waged, at least to some extent, to defend self-determination (or at least the 
cultural characteristics of populations that are threatened simply because of their ethno-
cultural nature), how can it do so in the name of Universal principles? Indeed, how can 
particularity and diversity be upheld through Universalism? Gheciu's own take on the 
matter is particularly revealing. After arguing that scholars on both sides tend to under-
analyse the relationship between the nature of governance and the nature of subjects upon 
which governance is enforced, Gheciu suggests that practices of governance are 
implemented precisely to provoke a subjective change in the nature of individuals. Thus, 
"the international administration has sought to establish new institutions around Western-
defined norms of liberal democracy, and, at the same time, to socialize Kosovars into 
taking such norms for granted, and (re)producing them - at the expense of alternative 
(e.g. socialist and/or nationalist) norms - in their province."''* In other words, Gheciu 
seems to be arguing that in the struggle to defend diversity such diversity must be 
" Gheciu, "International Norms, Power and the Politics of International Administration: 
The Kosovo Case," 123. 
Ibid. 
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replaced by a system that eliminates its defining feature, which in this case seems to be 
nationalism. 
The most apparent paradox addressed by existing scholarship in this first strand of 
literature relates to the tendency of framing the conflict in terms of 'ancient ethnic 
hatreds' despite substantial evidence to the contrary and despite the views expressed by 
key actors (see last section of this chapter and Chapter 6). On the other hand, recurring 
debates in Geopolitics and Internafional Relations often relate to questions on the exact 
relationship between geo-strategic ('material') and other proclaimed motives in the 
Kosovo crisis and to questions on the relationship between the Universal and the 
particular, or, more exactly, on how a particular issue can be defended through a 
Universal approach. 
Fighting Ugly: Doing Good by Doing Evil 
Probably the most significant account and assessment of the operational details of 
the conflict were presented by the Independent International Commission on Kosovo."'^  
The Report makes, predictably, a number of references to the historical circumstances 
affecting the crisis in the region, and famously concludes that the NATO intervention was 
'illegal but legitimate', without apparently realising that such a statement quite simply 
'^^  Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: Conflict, 
International Response, Lessons Learned (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000). 
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does away with the legalist approach to international law (or with the UN Charter, which 
has been trying to impose the legalist approach on international relations in the post war 
period). Such approach relies on the idea that what is legal in a democratic collective 
security system must necessarily be legitimate, but the same does not necessarily apply 
vice-versa: this is the essence of Francis Boyle's appropriately named Foundations of 
World Order: The Legalist Approach to International Relations (1898-1922).'^^ It is 
particularly interesting in this context that the Report does not address the dislocation 
between the illegality of the war and its intentions with the word 'moral or 'ethical', 
choosing instead to deploy the word 'legitimate', thus undermining the very body of law 
that is supposed to determine what is legal and therefore necessarily legitimate. This 
paradox is addressed in Chapter 7. 
The paradoxical approach of 'ultimate causes and minimum risk' is one of the 
cornerstones of our work, as it is argued that such dislocation is always necessarily 
caused by a metaphysical approach to the notion of Human Rights. Countless books and 
articles address this obvious paradox, and yet fail to address the conceptual reasons why 
such 'ultimate causes' could even be presented without the relevant bodies of public 
opinion questioning the nature of 'minimum risks' in a context of such transcendental 
importance. Such works include Pierre Martin's and Mark Brawley's Alliance Politics, 
"''Francis Boyle, Foundations of World Order: The Legalist Approach to International 
Relations (1898-1922) (London and Durham: Duke University Press 1999). 
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Kosovo and NATO's War: Alliance or Forced Allies'^^; Michael Waller's, Kyril Drezov's 
and Bulent Gokay's Kosovo: the Politics of Delusion^', but especially Albrecht 
Schnabel's and Ramesh Thakur's Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian 
Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship!^^ 
This last work in particular does a great job in identifying a good number of 
contradictions between words and actions in relation to the way in which the air 
campaign was conducted. 
A very interesting source of analysis of the paradox between the humanitarian 
concerns of the campaign and the actual practice covering the selection of targets is to be 
found in a legal study conducted by the Australian Aerospace Centre."*"* Amongst other 
"" Pierre Martin and Mark Brawley, Alliance Politics, Kosovo and NATO's War: Alliance 
or Forced Allies (London: Palgrave). 
Michael Waller, Kyril Drezov, and Bulent Gokay, Kosovo: The Politics of Delusion 
(London, Portland: Frank Cass 2001). 
Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur, Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian 
Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship 
(Tokyo: United Nations Press 2000). 
Kathryn Cochrane, "Kosovo Targeting: A Bureaucratic and Legal Nightmare: The 
Implications for US/Australian Interoperability", Australian Aerospace Center, June 
2001. 
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things, the study notes that NATO members decided to ignore the legal constraints of 
Humanitarian Law (and not simply the UN Charter, but also humanitarian law covering 
the laws of war, that is, additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, agreed in 1977, 
and especially Protocol 1) in order to be able to conduct this particular humanitarian war: 
"it is significant that the UK, as a party to Protocol 1, holds that it was a political 
rather than legal obligation to avoid collateral damage to civilians by the positive 
identification of the target by NATO strike piiots."*^ 
The study clearly indicates that Australian law may be incompatible with 
NATO's targeting practice, and that this may have consequences in terms of the 
interoperability of possible future US - Australian operations. The nature of such 
incompatibility is revealing. Indeed, Protocol 1 does require combatants to carry 
greater risks than civilians, meaning that "Australia may have to insist on Rules of 
Engagement that expose its forces to a more than minimal risk, and an obligation to 
protect civilians and civilian objects to a higher degree than may have been required 
of the US whose Rules of Engagement reflect the less constrained pre-1977 
customary international law.''^ ^ According to Cochrane, Protocol 1 makes the talk of 
ultimate aims [human rights) incompatible with the notion of'minimum risk'. 
http://www.defence.gov.au/raaf/airpower/html/publications/papers/apdc/apdc 03 kosovo 
targeting.pdf (accessed 23 April 2008). 
-^•^ Ibid, 14. 
Ibid, 18. 
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The Australian study clearly shows that the humanitarian principle was 
dropped when NATO decided to disregard the legal consequences of Protocol 1. 
This was possible because the US was the only NATO party that was not a signatory 
to the 1977 addendum to the Protocol, and it was the US that conducted most of the 
bombing: "the US is not a party to the 1977 First Additional Protocol to the Geneva 
Conventions...it is largely because Protocol 1 binds the US only to the extent that it 
reflects customary international law that the US carried the bulk of the bombing 
sorties in the Kosovo campaign - a campaign much criticized for its targeting 
decisions."''^ 
The situation is thus that a Humanitarian War could be conducted without 
violating US domestic law (for Protocol 1 is necessarily incorporated into the domestic 
legislation of all signatory parties) precisely because the US refused to sign a treaty 
obliging combatants to assume the greater risk in war situations, a treaty that was the 
designed precisely to protect civilian populations, thus turning it into a major peace of 
humanitarian law within jus ad helium. Thus, humanitarian wars occur as a result of 
countries not adhering to law treaties designed to defend humanitarian principles. As 
Chapter 7 will demonstrate, this is but one of the many paradoxes that emerge out of a 
metaphysical understanding of humanitarian war, caused by the conceptual impossibility 
to reconcile the phenomenal imperatives of conflict with the declared noumenal maxims 
Ibid, 4. 
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of transcendental values. This study will seek to demonstrate how this is caused by the 
nature of the modem episteme. 
Other works have attempted to ask the question of why NATO decided to 
intervene in Kosovo. Tariq Ali's edited volume is probably the most emblematic attempt 
from the Left.'*^ Here we read that there are a number of reasons why NATO decided to 
intervene, ranging from the (allegedly) strategic importance of Kosovo as a transit point 
for natural resources coming from the Caspian sea to an American desire of weakening 
Europe by flooding it with refugees. Then we have, of course, Chomsky. Although 
Chomsky does his usual great job in pointing out the discrepancies between intentions 
and actions, the reader can be excused for feeling at loss when trying to understand the 
logic of Chomsky's militant 'imperialist' approach. In 200 pages of The New Military 
Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo^^ we are presented with a devastating account revealing 
the hidden motives of intervention, without ever being told what those motives were. 
The closest we come to a motive is encapsulated in the mysterious claim according to 
which NATO's intervention was intended to remove "an unwelcome impediment to 
Washington's efforts to complete its substantial takeover of Europe."" '^' 
Tariq Ali, ed.. Masters of the Universe? NATO's Balkan Crusade (London: Verso 
2000). 
''^  Noam Chomsky, The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo (London, Pluto 
Press 1999). 
50 Ibid, 137. 
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A rather more interesting attempt at reconciling words with deeds can be found in 
Michael Ignatieff's Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond.^^ Here the author laments the fact 
that "we had talked the language of ultimate causes and practiced the art of minimum 
risk", a critique very similar, if not identical, to Michael Walzer's." However the work 
fails to critically assess the reasons why such paradoxes are apparently so recurrent, and 
does not analyse the conceptual confusions the lie behind this failure to act out the full 
consequences of one's words. This evident dislocation between the proclaimed 
objectives and the methods that were adopted to implement them is not to be found in Ivo 
Daalder's and Michael O'Hanlon's Winning Ugly: NATO's war to save Kosovo.^^ In this 
work the Powell Doctrine is vigorously defended and the intervention is classed as a total 
success, albeit an 'ugly' one - however, the authors fail to analyse the nature of this 
ugliness or to reconcile such ugliness (which, as stated above, included the deliberate and 
systematic undermining of Humanitarian Law ad bellum) with the aims of the war. 
When looking at accounts of how the bombing campaign was conducted the 
relevant literature seems to unveil another key debate that relates to another relevant 
paradox: why was there such a clear dislocation, or incompatibility, between the 
'^ Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond (London: Chatto & Windus 2000). 
''^  Brian Orend, "Michael Walzer on Resorting to Force," Canadian Journal of Political 
Science 33, No. 3 (2000), 523-547. 
Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO's war to save Kosovo 
(Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press 2000). 
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proclaimed objectives of the intervention and the means adopted to attain them? The 
current effort suggests that the paradoxes that inevitably arise in such contexts 
(dislocation between aims and means to achieve them) are caused by the very nature of 
the modern episteme, which undermines all related actions: these are the inevitable gaps 
that we find between the transcendental notion of human rights and the phenomenal 
nature related to their implementation. As the final part of this study will suggest, such 
paradoxes are characterised by the two axes of the modern episteme, which in the case of 
Kosovo mutated into a concept of 'ancient ethnic hatreds' (historical linearity) and into 
parallelisms with the Holocaust (analytical finitude). 
The Evolution of Humanitarian Intervention 
By far the largest body of literature on the Kosovo crisis revolves around the 
practice, legality and morality of humanitarian intervention. From an ethical perspective, 
J .L. Holzgrefe's and Robert Keohane's Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and 
Political Dilemmas represents the most interesting attempt at presenting the various 
strands of the debate in a coherent manner.^ "* However, the work fails to recognise the 
'^^  Robert Keohane and J .L Holzgrefe, eds., Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal 
and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003). 
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underlying epistemic characteristics of all different positions, and does not address the 
context in which such ethical concerns are formed."''^  
On the notion of humanitarian intervention, four recent works in particular have 
sought to analyse and trace the development of such phenomenon: Simon Chesterman's 
Just War or Just Peace?^^; Christine Gray's International Law and the Use of Force^^, 
58 
Nikolaos Tsagourias's Jurisprudence of International Law and Nicholas Wheeler's 
Saving Strangers.^^ Overall, these four works on humanitarian intervention focus on five 
broad topics: the nature of the law, its relationship with the notion of legitimacy, the 
divide between the legality and morality of humanitarian intervention, the role of 
institutions, the role of alliances and the cautionary principle - but they all fail to identify 
the underiying epistemic axes that characterise and determine the evolution of ideas 
within those different strands. Out of these topics, the most interesting debate in the 
Aspects of this work will be addressed in Chapter 5. 
Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and 
International Law (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (Oxford, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000). 
Nikolaos Tsagourias, Jurisprudence of International Law: The Humanitarian 
Dimension (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000). 
Nicholas Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International 
Society (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
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context of the current effort relates to the relationship between the notions of legality and 
morality. Reviewing these works, Nico Krisch identified this debate as playing a crucial 
role: "it seems - and much of the public debate on Kosovo focused on this issue - that 
the main problem of humanitarian intervention consists in the divergence of law and 
morality: while considerations of justice and human rights demand the recognition of a 
right to intervention, international law prevents this by anachronistically relying on order 
and on state sovereignty."^^ 
The solutions to these debates are particularly revealing in the context of the 
epistemic analysis that will be conducted in following chapters, which explore the 
difficulties inherent in reducing a metaphysical principle into immanent action. This also 
concerns debates on foundationalism in the philosophy of science. Indeed, as Krisch 
argues, those who argue in favour of intervention regard humanitarian concerns as being 
more important than maintaining a foundational reference in Treaty-based law, whilst 
detractors are more concerned by the possibilities of abuse emanating from this 
relativistic approach to the law. 
The considerations above were based on the assumption that morality demands a 
right to unilateral humanitarian intervention, as claimed by Tsagourias and Wheeler. But 
does morality indeed warrant such a clear answer? According to the usual claim, the 
problem of humanitarian intervention highlights the tension between human rights and 
Nico Krisch, "Legality, Morality and the Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention After 
Kosovo", European Journal of International Law No. 1, Volume 13 (2002): 327. 
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state sovereignty and the resulting argument suggests that whilst human rights are based 
on moral grounds state sovereignty is not.^' This is how the whole debate is framed in 
the context of a conflict between sovereignty and morality: since sovereignty is not 
regarded as having strong foundations in justice, the conclusion is drawn that human 
rights should, in a moral perspective, prevail. Yet a question remains: how and why can 
we even think in terms of an opposition between the morals and the law of humanitarian 
intervention when the latter is supposed to be the instrument through which the former is 
applied? In the question "what should be more important: the absolute value of the law 
or the reality of victims on the ground?" we can discern all the paradoxes inherent within 
the modern episteme, related to the vicissitudes of linking the noumenal and phenomenal 
realms. These interesting paradoxes wi l l be examined in the penultimate chapter of our 
analysis. Chapters 5-7 wi l l also show how the Holocaust - fu l f i l l ing the role of analytical 
finitude which has been assigned to it by the modern episteme - is that which allows us 
to discriminate situations where a 'moral' approach to the law (implementation of the law 
^' The debate between Idealism and Realism in International Relations is an old one. 
What the moralistic approach seems to ignore, however, is that the entire post-war 
settlement is supposed to represent and enforce a 'moralistic' (or 'legalistic', which is 
precisely the reason why morality and legality are equivalent in such system) approach to 
international relations, and the United Nations was set up precisely to police this 
principle. See footnote 66 above but also Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: 
Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 1994). 
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as it is, embodied in a legai-positivist stance) or an 'etiiical' approach to such law 
(situating existing law in meta-ethical arguments) ought to prevail. 
This leads to an important observation related to Nikolaos Tsagourias' 
contribution. Tsagourias, in Jurisprudence of International Law, approaches the issue of 
humanitarian intervention from a jurisprudential angle. For most of the book, however, 
he merely describes different strands of thought in international law and their approach to 
humanitarian intervention. He eventually opts for a 'discursive model of human dignity', 
which is based on critical reflections on international law. The book is theoretically 
deficient, and fails to tackle the otherwise interesting question of whether the notion of 
human rights is better served by a system of customary law based in jurisprudence than 
by a deficient system of Treaty-based meta-law. In reality, the issue of whether state 
practice, case-law and a jurisprudence-based approach (as opposed to a Treaty-based 
meta-law) constitute a legitimate way of looking at the issue of humanitarian intervention 
represents a central preoccupation within the discipline of international humanitarian law 
(see Chapter 7). 
An interesting observation on the tension between jurisprudence and meta-law in 
the context of humanitarian intervention can be found in Michael Glennon's Limits of 
Law, Prerogatives of Power: Interventionism After Kosovo^' Glennon argues that: "[The 
UN] Charter failed for the same reason that the League Covenant failed: Member States 
declined to accept an automatic commitment to use force in response to an armed attack, 
62 Michael Glennon, Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power (New York: Palgrave 2001). 
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leaving victim states to fend for themselves."^^ In other words, Treaty-based law failed 
precisely because Member States did not want to be bound by it - this makes the 
argument of whether humanitarian intervention should draw its legitimacy from 
customary case law and jurisprudence or meta-law rather interesting. Indeed, we have a 
situation in which Treaty law fails precisely because States do not want to be bound by it, 
and yet such law exists precisely to defend States from each other. To enhance the 
paradox, the alternative to Treaty law is jurisprudence based on customary law, that is, 
law based on actual practice and precedents: precedents that are hard to come by, 
precisely because States tend to refuse any automatic responsibility when it comes to 
humanitarian emergencies - which is precisely the reason why treaty-based law exists. 
How can we replace a system that did not function precisely because States refused to 
make it function by a system that works on the basis of precedents in the context of the 
very same issues (humanitarian disasters), to be established by the very same actors -
who refuse to be bound by automatic responsibility? In other words, is the jurisprudence 
route not simply justifying an ad hoc approach to humanitarian law (in itself a paradox, 
since humanitarianism implies Universality), and i f so, to what extent is this ad hoc 
approach consonant with traditional ideals of justice? 
63 Glennon, Limits of Law, 9. 
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The three paradoxes and debates that can be encountered in this context relate to 
i) the anachronistic^'* juxtaposition of legality and morality (or legitimacy), i i) to what 
kind of legal practice ought to be considered when regulating humanitarian intervention 
and i i i ) to the paradox inherent in treaty-law as a set of practices that are meant to defend 
States from each other and yet falls out of favour as such States see the related binding 
resolutions as being potentially more dangerous than the dangers these are meant to 
prevent. As the penultimate chapter of the current work wi l l demonstrate, metaphysical 
notions of human rights are precisely what allow for a related law system to be extremely 
contingent, and it is the failure of the relevant actors to accept the fu l l consequences of 
breaches that undermine the very nature of the system. In other words, it is precisely 
because the meta-law is conceptualised in metaphysical terms that relevant actors can 
pick and choose when to accept responsibility for breaches to humanitarian law and then 
argue in favour of an approach based on jurisprudence: it is the dislocation between the 
nominal and the phenomenal (again, a dislocation that is allowed for by the nature of the 
modern episteme) that allows for the fragmentary interpretation of the law. 
Conclusion: Epistemic Considerations on the Key Debates 
Anachronistic because such juxtaposition was meant to have been solved by the 
Wilsonian legacy and by the establishment of a legalist approach to international 
relations, embedded in the UN. 
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The last chapter of this work wi l l outline the interpretations and prejudices that 
characterised understandings in policy-making circles of what was actually occurring in 
the region. It wi l l be argued that the two axes of modernity characterised the way in 
which knowledge was generated and deployed in this context. The analysis wi l l focus on 
the parliamentary debates in the UK. 
However, the accounts of individuals who played a key role in shaping the 
conflict can be also used to broadly reflect all the paradoxes identified in the relevant 
disciplines outlined above. When reading accounts written by some of the key actors in 
the Kosovo crisis it becomes immediately apparent that the paradoxes and debates 
outlined and categorised above played a crucial role in the policy-makers' minds, and one 
of these can be offered here as a sample of what wi l l be discussed in Chapters 5 and 7. 
Consider, for example, the following contradicting statements in relation to the historical 
nature of the struggle. First, John Norris, Communications Director for Deputy Secretary 
of State Strobe Talbott: 
While many of the disputes in the Balkans have been mislabelled as "ancient 
ethnic hatreds", Kosovo probably comes closest to living up to the title. Disputes 
between Serbs and Albanians over control of the territory stretch back centuries. 
The region has deep symbolic importance to both ethnic communities, and the 
twentieth century was marked by a disturbing series of violent ethnic expulsions 
and counterexplulsions by both Serbs and Albanians in an effort to 
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demographically dominate the region. These tensions also often took on religious 
overtones..." 
Second, Wesley Clark, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander for Europe: 
And throughout the process of negotiations, 1 had learned the region and its 
personalities. Above all, I recognized that fundamentally, quarrels in the region 
were not really about age-old religious differences but rather the result of many 
unscrupulous and manipulative leaders seeking their own power and wealth at the 
expense of ordinary people in their countries.^^ 
The generic point according to which tho.se famous 'ancient ethnic hatreds' were more a 
product of actual political needs than a permanent feature of the region is expressed by 
Richard Holbrooke in the Bosnian context: 
" John Norris, Collision Course (London: Praeger 2005), xix. Note how Norris states 
that the 'ancient ethnic conflict' label applies to Kosovo more than to any other conflict 
in the Balkans, proceeds to justify such statement by listing a number of reasons of why 
this is so without apparently realising that all the factors he enumerates are applicable to 
the 'imagined history' of virtually all other conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. 
Clark, Waging Modern War, 68. 
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Thus arose an idea that 'ancient hatreds', a vague but useful term for a history too 
complicated (or trivial) for outsiders to master, made it impossible (or pointless) 
for anyone outside the region to try to prevent the conflict.^^ 
Finally, this view seems to be corroborated precisely by one of the region's 
'unscrupulous and manipulative leaders' during a remark he made in the earlier parts of 
his career (early visits to Kosovo): 
Orthodox priests held aloft icons of Milosevic and Lazar, while thousands of men 
and women crowded around the podium. Arguably, this was Milosevic's finest 
hour. Secretly, however, he admitted that most of this was nothing more than 
'bullshit'.^* 
Yet, the 'ancient ethnic hatred' theory was - as the last chapter of this work wi l l seek to 
demonstrate - extremely popular in the policy circles of relevant capitals. Going through 
the literature, one cannot help concluding that the propensity that relevant actors had to 
give this theory any credit was inversely proportional to the amount of time they had 
spent in the region, or the amount of time they had spent conducting 'hands-on' policy in 
this context. It is telling that diplomats and policy makers who spent a substantial 
" Holbrooke, To End a War, 22. 
MacDonald, Balkan Holocaust?, 71. 
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amount of time on the ground (for example Holbrooke and Clark) seem to have been 
more likely to conclude that the conflict had in fact very little to do with those alleged 
ancient hatreds. 
In sum, the paradoxes and key debates that have been outlined throughout this 
section and which wi l l constitute the key pillars of follow-up chapters include: 
1) In terms of history and International Relations, the most obvious debates 
relate to the following questions: 
A) Was the conflict characterised by ancient ethnic hatreds or by 
immanent political developments in the region, which sought to 
reconstitute the past in the present in order to sustain related political 
claims? 
B) Why did NATO decide to intervene, and to what extent were 
considerations genuinely based on humanitarian concerns, rather than 
on political (NATO's credibility, for example) and geopolitical (new 
balance of power, access or transit for key raw materials) factors? 
Alternatively, i f the whole affair was a huge 'mistake', was such 
mistake simply characterised by the relative competence of relevant 
administrators (as Kissinger suggests) or by a deeper, psychological -
not to say epistemic - framework which led to a specific 
understanding of the conflict and consequently to specific 'solutions'? 
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Or was it just a genuine mistake characterised by a 
simple...coincidence (Hobsbawm)? 
2) When it comes go the technicalities of the conflict, the key debates relate to 
the following issues: 
A) The nature of the relationship that exists or ought to exist between the 
notions of 'legality' and 'legitimacy'. 
B) The contradiction inherent in fighting a war in the name of ultimate 
causes with minimum risks. 
C) The contradiction inherent in side-stepping Humanitarian Law in order 
to fight a Humanitarian War. 
D) The contradiction inherent in adopting a strategy reliant on the 
principle of 'diplomacy backed by force' whilst restricting that 
strategy by openly limiting the extent and nature of the force factor 
(note the explicit announcements that no ground forces would be used 
at the outset of the conflict). 
3) When it comes to legal approaches to the conflict, key debates involve the 
following issues: 
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A) The nature of the relationship that exists or ought to exist between the 
notions of ' legali ty ' and 'morality'. 
B) The issue of whether moral and ethical imperatives are better served 
by a treaty-based or a jurisprudence approach to humanitarian 
intervention. 
So why exactly should all of these debates be framed and understood through an 
epistemic approach? A l l of the debates outlined above fall into one of the two following 
categories: 1) the relationship between temporality and causality 2) the relationship 
between transcendental principles and their (finite) implementation. In other words, 
these are all debates that can be approached and explained through an epistemic 
approach, and through an understanding the modern episteme's empirico-transcendental 
doublet in particular. Crucially, an epistemic approach wil l inform how the two 
categories above depend on each other: that is, an understanding of an analytic of finitude 
(category 2 above, or that which determines how transcendental principles are framed 
and implemented) relies on a linear and contingent interpretation of temporality (category 
!)• 
The current work wil l dissect the debates outlined above and place them in their 
respective epistemic contexts. For instance, the anatomy of the empirico-transcendetal 
doublet (which is composed of the two axes exposed here, that is, historical linearity and 
the analytic of finitude) wi l l be discussed in the next chapter (Chapter 2). The role of 
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historical contingency - and the way in which such role is being challenged by 
Complexity - in the subsequent chapter (Chapter 3). The analytic of finitude, and its 
consequences for debates on humanitarian intervention, wi l l be debated in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 4 wi l l also look at how the knowledge and practice of International Relations has 
evolved according to these two axes, whilst Chapter 5 wi l l do the same in the context of 
ethics and the law. Chapters 7 and 8 wi l l reveal how they operated in framing 
understanding and action in the context of the Kosovo crisis. Chapter 6 wi l l broadly 
outline the evolution of the conflict on the bases of the epistemic constraints outlined in 
the previous sections. 
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2. An Archaeology of Modernity 
Preludes of Science: Do you really believe that the sciences would ever have originated 
and grown if the way had not been prepared by magicians, alchemists, astrologers, and 
witches whose promises and pretensions first had to create a thirst, a hunger, a taste for 
hidden and forbidden powers? Indeed...the whole of religion might yet appear as a 
prelude and exercise to some distant age. 
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science' 
Introduction 
This chapter wi l l outline Foucault's epistemic approach in general and Foucault's 
analysis of the modern episteme in particular. The modern episteme wi l l provide the 
theoretical lenses through which all remaining material wil l be approached. The chapter 
wil l conclude with an application of Foucault's description of the modern episteme to the 
evolution of scientific epistemology: this is necessary because: A) Chapter 4 wi l l outline 
how much International Relations knowledge and practice was influenced by such 
evolution and because B) such an analysis wi l l allow us to better grasp the novelty 
' Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science: With a Prelude of Rhymes and an Appendice of 
Songs (New York: Vintage Books Edition 1974): 240. 
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inherent in Complexity science. First, Complexity wi l l be presented as a departure from 
the modem episteme (Chapter 3). Second, it wi l l be shown that the contemporary 
production and deployment of knowledge in fields such as International Relations and 
Human Rights Law is reminiscent of the modern episteme: such developments follow 
epistemic rules and evolve on the bases of the constraints imposed by the modern 
episteme (Chapters 4 and 5). Third, the two axes of such episteme (historical linearity 
and an analytic of finitude) wi l l be shown to have characterised the way in which the 
Kosovo crisis was understood and acted upon (Chapters 7 and 8). Finally, a presentation 
of developments in Kosovo wil l reflect on how alternative, post-modern (strictly in the 
Foucauldian sense, that is, approaches that break from the modern episteme as described 
by Foucault) and Complexity-inspired approaches may have warranted different 
interpretations and different responses (Chapter 6). 
The immediate reactions of most of those who come across Michel Foucault for 
the first time are characterised by an unusual mix of fascination and despair. The detailed 
analysis of crucial texts and the magnitude of erudition required to produce those 
paragraphs incite the former, but the idea that our efforts to understand the worid around 
us are inexorably anchored to fluctuating epistemes is, at first glance, hardly comforting. 
Nonetheless, i f we accept the basic premises of this argument, i f we accept that all 
knowledge is contextualised, and that contexts evolve; the methodological programme 
elaborated by Michel Foucault in The Order of Things and in his Archaeology of 
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Knowledge can prove to be extremely useful." An accurate reading of these two texts 
would suggest that their author did not write them with the intent to dismiss all claims to 
knowledge, as he did not set out to adopt a quintessential relativist position. Indeed, the 
opposite is true: the archaeological method is characterised by analytical rigour. As 
Gutting well explains, there are three things that should be kept in mind when 
confronting Foucault: first, archaeology does not simply emanate from Foucault but is the 
result of a much longer tradition in the French study of thought, a tradition that includes 
Bachelard and Canguilhem.'' Second, archaeological studies are grounded on the study of 
" Michel Foucault, Les Mots et les Choses (Saint Amand, Cher: Gallimard, 2001) and 
L'Archeologie du Savoir (Mayenne: Gallimard, 2001). Note that the texts have been 
studied in French and that all citations are extracted from the French originals (my 
translations). Occasionally editions in English are used - when this is the case the 
English text is cited and referred to. Overall, the chapter makes extensive use of primary 
sources (that is, of Foucault's texts themselves) and secondary authors (such as Gary 
Gutting, cited below) are mainly used as an aide to paraphrase (or indeed translate) key 
passages from Foucault's original. Although the final parts of the section offer a brief 
overview of debates surrounding alternative interpretations of Foucault's work the 
current effort attempts to remain as fathful as possible to the primary sources and to offer 
an interpretation based mainly on such sources. 
See also Dominique Lecourt, Marxism and Epistemology: Bachelard, Canguilhem, 
Foucault (London: New Left Books 1975). 
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historical practice and not on philosophical theory. Third, "...archaeology is not...an 
engine of universal scepticism or relativism, undermining all pretensions to truth and 
objectivity. The project...does not, in itself, question the objectivity or validity of a body 
of knowledge to which it is applied."'' 
Thus, at second glance, the fact that the study of changing epistemes has been 
provided with such a rigorous analytical tool should provoke enthusiasm. The task that 
lies ahead is to understand the fields related to the Kosovo crisis through this perspective. 
This should not take exclusively the form of adapting Foucault's concepts that were 
elaborated for the precise study of social reality as was, for example, the concept of 
power related to the analysis of the prison; to the study of global politics and economics.^ 
It should not exclusively attempt to detect a causal relationship between a precise 
configuration of knowledge and a parallel configuration of power.^ It should also, and 
primarily, constitute a comprehensive attempt to chart the evolution of the relevant 
disciplines and the representations that these have created of international practice in 
Gary Gutting, Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Scientific Reason, Modern European 
Philosophy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 11. 
James Keeley, "Towards a Foucauldian Analysis of International Regimes," 
International Organization 44, no. 1 (1999), 83-105. 
Brian Blair, "Knowledge, Power, and the Modern State: Towards a Genealogy of 
Universal Productionist Order, 1500-1815", (Phd Thesis, University of Newcastle, 1997). 
5 
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archaeological terms (Chapters 4 and 5). Only then Foucault's insights could be fully 
applied to the understanding of the present state of international theory and practice.^ 
^ Michel Foucault has had an enormous impact on the academic disciplines which relate 
the most to the current study (International Relations and Critical Geopolitics). Yet, our 
study is not the right place to provide a survey of how Foucault has been appropriated by 
these disciplines for mainly two reasons: first, we wil l use Foucault as a provider of 
(meta-theoretical) epistemic lenses through which theory can be developed an applied. 
For this reason the current research does not seek to understand what a Foucauldian 
analysis can bring to the understanding of Kosovo, rather, we are more interested in 
triangulating Foucauldian meta-theory with a detailed discussion on the nature of 
modernity and modern understandings which, in turn, wi l l base a Complexity-inspired 
analysis of the Kosovo crisis as an alternative methodology. There have been attempts to 
discuss the implications of Foucault for International Relations in the light of the 
specifically Foucauldian analysis of modernity: the most relevant work in such context is 
provided by John Gerard Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity 
in International Relations", International Organization 47, No. 1 (1993): 139-174. 
Second, the appropriation of Foucault by scholarship in International Relations is not 
umproblematic, but a critical and detailed analysis of such challenges has been conducted 
elsewhere: see Jan Selby, "Engaging Foucault: Discourse, Liberal Governance and the 
Limits of Foucauldian IR", International Relations 21, No. 3, (2007): 324-345. 
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As already stated in the introduction, the first part of this study wishes to oudine 
and apply Foucault's understanding of the general frameworks of knowledge that have 
characterised modernity. This wi l l be of crucial importance for the general argument of 
the present work. In fact, it wi l l be argued that an understanding of modernity such as 
Foucault's can facilitate the comprehension of many theoretical and practical advances 
within human knowledge and activities. In order to accomplish this analysis it wi l l be 
necessary for this chapter to firstly introduce Foucault's general examination of the birth 
of the modern configuration of knowledge. Foucault presents these arguments as he sets 
out to analyse the second epistemic break, in which the classical episteme fades paving 
the way for modernity, in Chapter 7 of The Order of Things. 
Following this introduction to Foucault's thought we wi l l expose how Foucault 
applied these theoretical insights to the analysis of those empirical sciences which are 
based on the modem episteme. In The Order of Things Foucault illustrates his arguments 
through the archaeology of modern political economy, biology and philology. The 
analogies wi l l be restricted to what Foucault considers to be the most crucial elements 
defining modern knowledge: the substitution of Order with History, and the necessity to 
construct an anthropological and historical analytic of finitude around the newly bom 
'man'. Finally, the chapter shall argue, in two parts, that modern scientific epistemology 
has evolved through pattems similar to those exposed by Foucault. In other words, the 
chapter shall conclude by arguing that the metaphysical nature and the historical linearity 
of modern science have emerged within a much broader epistemic context - that is, the 
context of modemity. This is important because the next chapter wi l l present Complexity 
as a new episteme that challenges the foundation of the old - as such, it challenges the 
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foundations of all knowledge practices including those present in the fields related to the 
study of the Kosovo crisis. 
The Modern Episteme 
Foucault defines the era of the modern episteme as the "Age of History."^ While 
in the classical age elements were classified according to their identities and differences -
that is, by the spatial position they occupied in the ordered tables constituted by 
taximonia and mathesis - the collapse of representation obliges elements to be classified 
according to their proximity in the temporal succession of events. We therefore assist in 
the substitution of the principle of the classical tables - Order - with the principle 
inherent in organic structures - History. As Foucault puts it: "History gives place to 
analogical organic structures, just as Order opened the way to successive identities and 
differences."^ 
This sudden mutation is responsible for a double fragmentation of knowledge: 
Not only modes of enquiry wil l differ according to how they deal with the concept of 
temporality, but emerging empirical "sciences" or disciplines wi l l be formed around the 
perceived "history" of the elements that compose them. This second event leads to the 
* Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences 
(London: Routledge, 1989), 219. 
^ Ibid, 219. 
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binh of organic structures as fields of knowledge, fields that wi l l be centred on historical 
transcendental notions. The classical configuration of knowledge did not require a 
concept of temporality: "there was no important distinction between analytic {a priori) 
and synthetic (a posteriori) knowledge. An analysis of representations in terms of 
identities and differences was at the same time a connection (synthesis) of them in the 
ordered tables that express their essential reality."'° 
Nonetheless, with the decline of the classical episteme, representation cannot be 
regarded as the sole foundation of knowledge. Thus occurs a crucial schism. Foucault 
explains that once the representational foundations of thought fade, analytic disciplines 
are founded on epistemological grounds that fundamentally differ from the basis on 
which synthetic disciplines are based. The result is that "on the one hand we have a field 
of a priori sciences, pure formal sciences, deductive sciences based on logic and 
mathematics, and on the other hand we see the separate formation of a domain of a 
posteriori sciences, empirical sciences, which deploy the deductive forms only in 
fragments and in strictly localised regions."'' 
The split between a priori and a posteriori grounds for understanding is itself 
explicit in the triangular configuration that characterizes modern philosophy. The general 
problem is that i f representation ceases to suffice as an explanatory source per se, this 
explanatory source can only be located within an enquiry that either claims to deal with 
'° Gutting, Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Scientific Reason, 184-5. 
" Foucault, The Order of Things, 246. 
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the essential reality of things (i.e., with an essence that precedes any other reality) or with 
their synthetic nature. It is precisely this problematic that forces western thought to 
formulate philosophical justifications for these transcendental notions. 
Philosophy, especially after Kant, is given the task of resolving the conflict 
between the emerging transcendentalisms and the world of representation. 
Representation, in this sense, is "essentially the relation between a subject and the object 
it thinks and experiences."'^ This is how an embryonic conceptualization of temporality 
is introduced within the general frameworks of knowledge. For this relation can be 
analyzed either in terms of the conditions that precede and therefore ground the 
possibility of any representation, or in terms of how the experiencing subject stands in 
relation to already represented objects (metaphysics). 
The first solution corresponds to the creation of a transcendental philosophy of the 
experiencing subject, while the second leads to a transcendental philosophy of the 
experienced objects. Both solutions respectively correlate to the appearance of analytic 
and synthetic sciences. Finally, both solutions equally assume that it is necessary to 
connect representations in terms of which our experience occurs to either a subject or an 
object that lies outside that experience but grounds its possibility. Philosophical criticism 
wil l therefore question representation from the a priori requirement of an experiencing 
subject, while metaphysics wi l l seek to understand representations in terms of the 
12 Gutting, Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Scientific Reason, 185. 
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experienced objects. In both cases, representation is not a causal source of explanation in 
itself. 
There is, however, a third possibility. This consists in accepting what Kant calls 
the phenomenal world of empirical experience as the only ground for the attainment of 
knowledge. Positivism is simply defined as a rejection of all transcendental notions. But 
to what extent, then, is positivism not merely a return to the classical method that regards 
representation, as opposed to both alternative forms of transcendentalism, as the sole 
grounds for understanding? Gutting answers that the epistemic difference lies simply in 
the fact that during the classical era, phenomenal and representational knowledge were 
the sole grounds for all understanding, while with modernity they constitute only some 
among other options. Precise ways of understanding have to be situated within an 
epistemic context that, analyzed as a whole, dictates the evolution of these. 
Discourse Formation in the Modern Empirical Sciences 
Foucault exposes how the decline of representation gives way to organic 
knowledge in three empirical sciences: economics, biology and philology. For the 
purposes of our argument, we wi l l restrict the analysis to the disciplines of economics 
and biology, for they both offer important insights that wi l l ground an analysis of the 
'scientification' of International Relations, that is, of the formation of International 
Relations as a truly 'modern' empirical science - this, in turn, wi l l reveal how the 
Kosovo crisis was understood on the bases of relevant epistemic constraints. A particular 
focus wi l l be put on Foucault's description of the formation of economic thought, as it 
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clearly demonstrates that the emergence of linear historicism is a consequence of a 
metaphysical sort of theorising which is developed through a transcendental notion of 
labour. 
This very notion of labour wi l l provide an important analogy as we wi l l proceed 
to describe the similar process of formation of 'scientific' International Relations: the 
positing of anarchy wi l l be presented as another transcendental notion through which 
events are to be understood. On the other hand, Foucault's analysis of the formation of 
biology reveals that, not only does metaphysical theorising produce linear historicism, 
but it also generates an analysis which is primarily concerned with the notion of function. 
Thus, we shall also argue that the emergent concepts of 'function' and 'unit' evolve 
within similar epistemic formations both in biology and in 'scientific' International 
Relations. 
Foucault proceeds in his analysis of economic thought by focusing on two key 
writers that can be seen as the founders of economics as a separate empirical science: 
Smith and Ricardo. With Adam Smith a new concept enters the arena of economic 
thought: the notion of work. To be sure, previous economic thought had already dealt 
with this notion, nonetheless, the physiocrats considered work to be one of the many 
factors that can reduce exchange to need and commerce to the primitive exercise of 
barter, that is, they considered work as that which could represent value. For Smith, on 
the other hand, work becomes the irreducible notion around which all values wil l be 
measured: 
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Suddenly, wealth wi l l no longer establish its interior order of equivalence by 
comparing exchangeable objects, nor by estimating the power of every object to 
represent another object of need (of which the most irreducible example is food); 
but it wi l l be organised around the units of work which really produces it. Wealth 
remains a representational element that functions: but that which it finally 
represents, is no longer an object of desire, but work.'^ 
Thus Smith modifies the notion of work and turns it into the irreducible factor which 
measures wealth. Nonetheless, his notion of work is still entangled with classicism: the 
function of work is still to represent (and not determine thanks to its inner organic nature) 
values which are ultimately reduced to exchange and need: 
Smith did not define (as had earlier thinkers who employed the concept) labour in 
terms of the needs and desires that are represented by commodities in the system 
of exchange. He used it as an irreducible measure of value. To this extent, 
Foucault sees him moving beyond purely representational view of wealth. On the 
other hand, Foucault holds that Smith never decisively broke with the Classical 
approach. Even though he viewed labour as the measure of a commodity's value, 
13 Ibid, 235. 
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he still held that the commodity had value only because of its connection with the 
representational system of exchange.'" 
Despite this, labour becomes the transcendental notion which isolates and 
organises all remaining elements within the newly defined area of economics. As we wi l l 
argue in Chapter 4, a similar process (the debates between Aron and Waltz) ensured that 
the realm of International Relations came to be regarded purely through the notion of 
anarchy, and this determined the underlying mles of knowledge production within the 
field. This matters not so much because of a perhaps naive belief that Intemational 
Relations theory somehow influences practice. Rather, it matters because theory and 
practice (or knowledge and power) are embedded within the same modern epistemic 
context. The tracing of such ideas can thus reveal the underlying assumptions of practice, 
and serve as guides for genealogical enquiry - which is what wi l l be done through an 
analysis of the Kosovo crisis. 
Smith's new transcendental notion of labour is precisely that which limits and 
consequentially grounds the possibility of understanding man as an economic subject, 
and it does so by introducing the cmcial notions of linear History and temporality. 
Smith's answers to arguments criticising labour's new role exemplify the way in which 
labour became - through Smith - the absolute irreducible notion grounding and limiting 
the new 'organism' of economics. For instance, how can labour be the measure of 
14 Gutting, Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Scientific Reason, 187. 
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everything since work itself has a price, which is even variable? Indeed, where there is 
abundant workforce labour wi l l be cheaper, and vice-versa. 
Foucault notes how Smith handles this issue. For Smith this was indeed true, but 
market circumstances influenced what could be purchased with an hour of work, and not 
the unit of labour itself Similarly, the fact that different units have different capabilities 
to deal with the impositions of anarchy does not mean that Anarchy, as that which 
determines the 'international system', ceases to influence the actions of all actors 
involved. Demand and supply mean that a day of work can buy more or less, but for the 
experiencing subjects, for working men, a day of work remains the same. And this is 
precisely because they are limited by time, pain and fatigue: the temporality of labour, the 
imponance of this finite life, mean that a day's work is always a day's work, no matter 
how much this day can buy. Thus Foucault highlights Smith's fundamental quote, "The 
equal quantities of work are always the same for those who work."'^ 
But how can hours of work remain equal regardless of what they can buy 
considering that changes in working practices, such as the introduction of new 
technologies, alter the productive capacity, the pain and fatigue, and thus the nature of 
labour itself? Again, Smith argues that labour as such does not change: what changes is 
the relationship between work and production. Labour, understood as time, pain and 
fatigue is a fixed numerator: only the denominator is variable. When technological 
advances are introduced, the productive power of labour is multiplied, that is, the number 
15 Foucault, Les Mots et les Choses, 235. 
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of objects that are being produced increases dramatically in what remains one labour unit 
(a day, for example). Therefore, the value of these objects wi l l diminish and such objects 
wi l l now be able to acquire objects which embody a proportionally lower amount of 
labour (note here how the measure of value through work is still dependent on the 
representational system of exchange). However, in this process, work has not diminished 
in relation to the products, but it is the products that have lost value in their relationship 
with labour. 
Thus labour is not 'invented', but it has changed its function within economic 
thought and within what has now become an economic organism. It has become a 
transcendental measure of economic value through which the economic factors 
experienced by economic agents are analysed. This establishment of labour as the new 
unit of measurement required a decisive break from the representational order of value 
constituted by exchange, which was in turn rooted in the notion of need: 
. . .within exchange, with the order of equivalence, the measure that establishes 
equality and difference is not of the same nature as the notion of need. This 
measure is no longer linked to the desire of men...it is an absolute measure, as it 
does not depend on men's hearts or needs, but it is a measure that is imposed 
upon them from the outside: it's their time and their pain...if according to men, 
what they are exchanging is objects of need, for the economist, that which 
circulates in the market in the shape of objects, is work; and not objects of need 
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that are represented by other objects, but time and pain which are transformed, 
hidden, and forgotten.'^ 
Similarly, anarchy broke the established dogma which believed that the causes of war 
were to be found in either the 'representational' notion of human nature or in the intrinsic 
nature of particular states: it is the system, organised through anarchy, that externally 
'imposes' its rules on the agents. Anarchy was not 'invented' by Waltz, but Waltz did 
change its fundamental organising task within 'scientific' International Relations. 
Finally we can remark how the irreducible notion of the object, which defines and 
limits the possibility of economic knowledge, necessitates a History to justify the orders 
of value it creates: 
The equivalence between objects of desire is no longer established through the 
intermediary of other objects and desires, but they are defined by a transition to 
what is, for them, radically heterogeneous; i f there is an order within wealth, i f 
this can buy that, i f gold is wonh two times more than silver...it is because all men 
are submitted to time, to pain, to fatigue, and, taken this to its logical extreme, to 
death itself Men exchange because they have desires and needs; but they can 
16 Ibid, 236. 
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exchange and organise values because they are submitted to time and to great 
external fatalities.'^ 
From Smith on, it is the temporal succession that labour represents which wi l l found and 
limit the possibility of understanding economic agents in terms of the work they have to 
experience. Thus Foucault insists that from Smith on we can witness the creation of a 
certain anthropology within economic thought, and that this conceptualisation of man as 
an economic agent is possible thanks to the history that limits the existence of man itself 
Moreover, it wi l l be History that wi l l determine the laws of value through the 
transcendental notion of labour. To conclude with Smith, Foucault reminds us that 
"From Smith on, the time of the economy wi l l no longer be cyclical, rather, it wi l l 
become the internal time of an organisation which grows according to its own needs and 
develops according to its own autochthonous laws - the laws of capital and of production 
regimes."'^ 
The decisive step towards modernity is articulated as Ricardo presents labour not 
only as a measure of value but also as the sole source of value. From this moment "value 
ceases to be a sign, it becomes a product."'^ Ricardo represents the solution to the 
confusions of Smith's thought, which are caused by an ambiguous position between two 
'^ Ibid, 237. 
'** Ibid, 238. 
'^ Ibid, 266. 
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epistemes. Smith had to satisfy one condition in order to measure value through labour: 
he had to assume that the amount of work necessary to produce an object was equal to the 
amount of labour that this object could buy in the representational system of exchange. 
This creates a major confusion, as there is no difference between labour as a productive 
force and labour as a commodity. Every product represents a certain amount of work, 
and labour had to represent a certain amount of products: value, in this case, is still a sign. 
However, Ricardo argues that any value of any object originates exclusively from the 
work that was required to produce it. Value is no longer determined by whatever an 
object can represent in the system of exchange, as the physiocrats - who were still 
trapped in the Classical episteme - wanted us to believe. Value is equally no longer 
determined, as Smith argued, by the representational power of labour as a service that can 
be exchanged and quantified like a commodity. Ricardo goes the extra mile in proving 
the veracity of his claim on labour as the exclusive source of value, for 
...the 'value' of things increases proportionally to the amount of work that is 
necessary to produce them, while it does not vary according to the rise or decline 
of the wages that are paid in the system where labour is exchanged as any other 
merchandise...from Ricardo on, the possibility of exchange is based upon work, 
and a theory of production now necessarily precedes a theory of exchange."'^ 
20 Ibid, 266-67. 
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Similarly, once anarchy is 'discovered', a theory of International Relations must precede 
a theory of foreign policy (see the Waltz - Aron debate in Chapter 4). 
Three important consequences follow from this qualitative change in the notion of 
value. The first consequence is the emergence of a casual series which radically differs 
from anything known in the age of representation. During the classical age casual 
phenomena were always cyclical because these concerned exclusively the representation 
of objects, which represented one another in circular manner. Thus prices increased 
when representative elements grew faster than the represented objects: "this is because 
value is always related to the system of exchange, in which any change in value is always 
correlated with inverse change in other values. Since the system always involves a finite 
number of correlated values, changes can only be cyclical."^' 
The notion of History, and the notion of 'man' (as either a transcendental subject 
or object), does not exist in the representational episteme. From Ricardo on, labour -
once it establishes itself at the very core of economic knowledge and allows no place for 
representation - organises value according to a causality of its own. This system of 
causality, on the other hand, is totally dependent on historical thought. Since labour is 
what determines value, and labour itself is dependent on forms of production, and forms 
of production change; the ultimate value of an object is the result of a linear process of 
historical causality. Forms of production are composed by the division of labour, the 
quantity and quality of tools, the amount of capital invested...all of these factors are 
21 Gutting, Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Scientific Reason, 187. 
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determined by work that has already been conducted. This, as Foucault explains, is a 
crucial development, as: 
...we witness the birth of this grand linear and homogenous series which is the 
process of production...this kind of serial accumulation breaks for the first time 
the reciprocal determinations which alone appeared in the classical analysis of 
wealth. This introduces at the same time the possibility of a continuous historical 
time, even if , as we shall see, Ricardo only thinks this history in terms of a 
persistently slower axis of time, and eventually, he sees a total suspension of 
history.' 
This quote is of fundamental importance for the overall argument of our work. 
The birth of a transcendental philosophy of the object introduces linear historical analysis 
in economic thought. The very possibility of such an economic understanding must be 
based on analytical finitude, and that is precisely why the emerging historical thought 
must necessarily be linear. History imposes finitude on man in an eschatological manner 
(man works, but it produces with means that precede it), and it also explains, linearly, 
why labour confers a certain value to an object in a given time: had the relationship been 
non linear (or Complex...), History could not have limited and therefore not explained 
the relationship between labour and value in a given moment, precisely because non 
Foucault, Les Mots et les Choses, 268, emphasis added. 
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linear relationships offer a multiplicity of options, whilst what History really needs is the 
capacity to be contingent, to limit and explain the economic subject man through the 
transcendental notion of labour that is experienced by such; and to reconcile man as that 
which produces with man as that which is produced. 
This development also causes the 'birth of man': during the classical age man was 
analysed simply in term of how it stood in relation to the general taximonia and mathesis, 
thus man's needs and labour were only regarded in relation to equivalents in men's needs 
and desires. In turn 
Modern economics deals with the factors that have caused men to form such 
representations - for example, with the barrenness of nature that forces us to 
work, with the bodily deficiencies and the external threats that limit our ability to 
produce...modern economics is ultimately based not on an analysis of 
representations but on an 'anthropology' of human finitude."'' 
Another important consequence relates to the linear evolution of the economy. To 
illustrate this point, Foucault exposes how Ricardo dealt with the notion of land rent. 
While Smith and others saw these profits as a sign of the earth's fruitfulness, Ricardo 
shows that a proper theory of value should consider the bareness of land. It is the labour 
employed in the cultivation of the most difficult terrain that establishes the general value 
23 Gutting, Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Scientific Reason, 188. 
2. An Archaeology of Modernity, 97 
of food. As populations increase and less fertile lands have to be cultivated, and 
proportionally more labour employed; humanity slowly reaches a point in which values 
wil l be stabilised by the relationship between scarcity and the possibility of human 
existence, a relationship which is totally founded on a Hnear view of History. At that 
point: 
The tide of History wi l l at last become slack. Man's fmitude wi l l have been 
defined - once and for all, that is, for an indefinite time. Paradoxically, it is the 
historicity introduced into economics by Ricardo that makes it possible to 
conceive of this immobilisation of History...it is the cumulative time of population 
and production, the uninterrupted history of scarcity, that makes it possible from 
the nineteenth century onwards to conceive of the impoverishment of History, its 
progressive inertia, its petrification, and, ultimately, its stony immobility. We see 
that History and anthropology are playing in relation to one another. History 
exists (that is, labour, production, accumulation and growth of real costs) only in 
so far as man as a natural being is finite: a finitude that is prolonged far beyond 
the original limits of the species and its immediate bodily needs, but that never 
ceases to accompany, at least in secret, the whole development of civilisations 
...History does not allow man to escape from his initial limitations - except in 
appearance, and i f we take the word limitation in its superficial sense; but i f we 
consider the fundamental finitude of man, we perceive that his anthropological 
situation never ceases its progressive dramatisation of his History, never ceases to 
render it more perilous, and to bring it closer, as it were, to its own impossibility. 
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The moment History reaches such boundaries, it can do nothing but stop, quiver 
for an instant upon its axis, and immobilise itself forever?'^ 
Thus, we can equally conclude with Foucault's statement. 
What is essential is that at the beginning of the nineteenth century a new 
arrangement of knowledge was constituted, which accommodated simultaneously 
the historicity of economics (in relation to the forms of production), the finitude 
of human existence (in relation to scarcity and labour), and the fulfilment of an 
end to Hi story...Hi story, anthropology, and the suspension of development are all 
linked together in accordance with a figure that defines one of the major networks 
of nineteenth century thought...F/H/fMc/e, with its truth, is posited in time; and time 
is therefore finite. The great dream of an end to History is the Utopia of causal 
systems of thought, just as the dream of the world's beginnings was the Utopia of 
the classifying systems of thought."'' 
The sentence 'Finitude, with its truth, is posited in time, therefore time is finite' is a 
maxim characterising modem understanding, and a maxim characterising all knowledge 
Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, 259, emphasis 
added. 
25 Ibid, 262-63, emphasis added. 
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- including knowledge on the Kosovo crisis - based on the modern episteme. 
Continuous historical time and historical linearity are also epistemic formations that 
allow the idea according to which persistent ethnic hatreds characterise conflict to be 
actually thought. 
This is an understanding which arises from a modern attempt to establish the 
possible grounds of human knowledge, and represents the opposite pole of other attempts 
to think beyond the human condition (as the following chapter wil l elucidate, Bergson's 
effort to think beyond the human condition entails a non-linear concept of temporality, 
and the replacement of the concept of 'possible' with the concept of 'virtual'). 
Just like the analysis of wealth, the analysis of nature was based on a system of 
representation, that is, species were classified in taxonomic tables according to their 
identities and differences. The revolution in economic thought caused by Ricardo's 
displacement of labour as that which provides value but lies outside any possible 
representation is paralleled by Cuvier's modification of the notion of 'organic structure' 
as a notion that lacks any form of representation. From Cuvier on, the internal link which 
makes all structures dependent on each other is no longer to be found at the 
representational level: the internal link becomes the very foundation upon which all 
correlations wil l be analysed. For Cuvier, organic structure had a role prior and 
independent of taxonomic classification, or, as Geoffroy Saint Hilaire put it: "Organic 
structure is becoming an abstract being...capable of assuming numerous forms.""^ 
26 Ibid, 264. 
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That is how we find the new role given to the concept of function. In the classical 
age, an organ was defined by its structure and by its function; it was like a system which 
could be analysed from either the role it played or from that of its morphological value: 
...the two modes of decipherment coincided exactly, but they were nevertheless 
independent of one another - the first expressing the utilisable, the second the 
identifiable. It is this arrangement that Cuvier overthrows: doing away with the 
postulates of both their coincidence and their independence, he gives function 
prominence over the organ - and to a large extent - and subjects the arrangement 
of the organ to the sovereignty of function."^ 
This event in the architecture of knowledge - the primacy of function as the defining 
feature of elements - is rendered possible by the replacement of representation with a 
transcendental notion (Life) which orders functions. Life, as that which defines and 
limits the study of nature, is that which functions must ultimately ensure. 
Indeed, it is only when we consider the organ's relation to the function that we 
identify similarities there where there is nothing identical at the superficial, or 
representational, level: 
" Ibid. 
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...a resemblance that is constituted by the transition of the function into evident 
invisibility.. . i t matters little, after all, that gills and lungs may have a few 
variables of form, magnitude, or number in common: they resemble one another 
because they are two varieties of that nonexistent, abstract, unreal, unassignable 
organ, absent from all describable species, yet present in the animal kingdoms its 
entirety, which serves for respiration in general."* 
In biology, what to classical eyes were merely differences juxtaposed with identities must 
now be ordered and conceived on the bases of a functional homogeneity which 
constitutes their hidden foundation, "when the same and the other both belong to a single 
space, there is natural history; something like biology becomes possible when this unity 
of level begins to break up, and when differences stand out against the background of an 
identity that is deeper and, as it were, more serious than the unity.""^ Moreover, this 
primacy of functionality implies that new relations emerge: those of coexistence, of 
internal hierarchy, and of dependence with regard to the level of organic structure. 
Guvier thus introduces some important developments. Foucault argues that 
This pre-eminence of one function over the others implies that the organism, in its 
visible arrangements, obeys to a structure....it is understandable, then, how the 
-* Ibid, 265. 
Ibid. 
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species can at the same time resemble one another and be distinct from one 
another. What draws them together is not a certain quantity of coincident 
elements; it is a sort of focus of identity which cannot be analysed into visible 
areas because it defines the reciprocal importance of the various functions; on the 
basis of this imperceptible centre of identities, the organs are arranged in the 
body...Animal species differ at their peripheries, and resemble each other at their 
centres; they are connected by the inaccessible, and separated by the apparent. 
Their generality lies in that which is essential to their life; their singularity in that 
which is most accessory to it...^° 
Scientific International Relations describe States as functionally alike units, which differ 
only insofar they have different capabilities for the accomplishment of the same task: 
survival. The inaccessible organic structure orders elements through a transcendentalism 
that occults the generality but exposes the singularity. In other words, what links them is 
invisible functionality, what separates them, is how they perform their common function, 
and this is how academic International relations explains intervention in Kosovo (Chapter 
4). 
This new primacy of functionality also has several implications for how we start 
thinking about life. Life, of course, is no longer a feature, or a quality, that can describe 
an element in the natural world, but becomes the foundation and the limitation of what a 
30 Ibid, 266, emphasis added. 
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'science of nature' can seek to discover: that is how the notion of 'order' disappears as 
the basis for a general science of nature. Instead of having a unified table of 
classification, we wil l have a discontinuous reality characterised by how the maintenance 
of life can be achieved through varying forms of functionality. Thus, 
There is opposition between identities and differences: they are no longer of the 
same fabric, they are no longer established in relation to each other on a 
homogenous surface: the differences proliferate on the surface, but deeper down 
they fade, merge, and mingle, as they approach the great, mysterious, invisible 
focal unity, from which the multiple seems to derive, as though by ceaseless 
dispersion. Life is no longer that which can be distinguished in a more or less 
certain fashion from the mechanical; it is that in which all the possible distinctions 
between living beings have their basis."" 
This, as Foucault explains, legitimises the criteria of isolation in modern anatomy, 
for its is this anatomy that "gives rise to an interior space...\t is a matter of an anatomic 
disarticulation; the major functional system has to be isolated; it is now the real divisions 
of anatomy that wi l l make it possible to form the great families of living things."''^ This 
is, also, how the international system finds itself to be 'anatomically' isolated: the 
" Ibid, 269. 
Ibid. 
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international is characterised by its main 'functional system': self help in conditions of 
anarchy. 
Foucault demonstrates how Cuvier and Ricardo are both subject to the same 
notion of temporality, and how this emerging History is needed once representation 
becomes obsolete and transcendental philosophies of the object are formed. Foucault 
explains that because living things are now defined by functional factors, it becomes 
impossible to order them in continuous taxonomic tables: "There is no possibility of 
ordering the variety of functional systems in a continuous series...as a result, the 
continuum of Classical orders is replaced by a discontinuous proliferation of species of 
life.""''' Consequently, the pressure of environmental forces determines the discontinuity 
between different functional systems: 
For natural history, distinctions of species were explained by pre-established 
differences expressed in the taxonomic tables. The differentiation of species was 
not produced by any external causal factors operating on real plants or animals. 
But for Cuvier and those who came after him [consider Darwin], the separation of 
living things into different classes is due to the different ways that living things 
are linked to the surroundings on which they depend for survival...for modern 
.^ 3 Gutting, Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Scientific Reason, 191. 
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biology, the nature of a species is causally dependent on the environment in which 
its members exist.""* 
This allows us to understand how temporality is introduced into biology: "Precisely 
because living things are scattered into discontinuous groups that have been formed by 
the pressure of environmental forces, they are essentially tied to the time in which these 
forces and their effects exist...with Cuvier...life is essentially tied to time; it is a 
thoroughly historical reality."''"'' 
But what is the nature of this temporality? What follows is crucial to understand 
how History as a tool for analytical finitude fundamentally determines any modem 
empirical science based on transcendental philosophies of objects. The quote that 
follows could be regarded as the 'manifesto' of epistemic modernity: 
Historicity, then, has now been introduced into nature.../; took the suspension, 
and, as it were, the placing between parentheses, of that kind of history to give the 
beings of nature and the products of labour a historicity that would enable 
modern thought to encompass them, and subsequently to deploy the discursive 
34 Ibid. 
•^^ Ibid, 192. 
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science of their succession...from the nineteenth century [chronological 
sequences] express...the profoundly historical mode of being of things and men.^^ 
The suspension of history is needed because, as knowledge becomes fragmented 
and isolated, a requirement of analytic finitude is necessary. Since this requirement is 
embedded in history, history becomes finite, and together with the anthropological 
finitude of man, places contingency on the experiencing subject. These developments are 
related to the project of developing a transcendental philosophy of the object. How did 
these epistemic constraints limit the specific ways in which the Kosovo crisis was 
interpreted? Was an analytic of finitude - a conceptual isolation of the crisis -
responsible for ultimately creating a historically linear understanding of the conflict in 
order to use such understating to justify the limits of such analytic? Is this not the sort of 
continuous time Benedict Anderson argues is responsible for allowing a concept of 
nationalism to emerge?" These wi l l be the main questions that subsequent chapters will 
seek to address. 
Science and Fragmentation: The End of Empiricism 
Foucault, The Order of Things, 276, emphasis added. 
See Chapter 6. 
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In concentrating on the Vienna Circle this study shares Steven Smith's position 
regarding the successive stages of 'positivism' and their influence on the discipline of 
International Relations - and, as we wi l l argue, their influence on our framing of the 
Kosovo crisis. Smith argues that we can discern three waves of positivism: 
the first variant is that developed by Auguste Comte in the early nineteenth 
century,...the second variant is that of logical positivism, which emerged in the 
1920s in what was known as the Vienna Circle...the third variant is the one that 
has been most influential in the social sciences in the last fifty years. It emerged 
out of logical positivism, but moved away from its extremely stark criteria for 
what counts as knowledge...''^ 
As Smith explains, the third influential variant is the result of the mixed conclusions of 
the Vienna Circle: it emerged from it, but it formulated quite different interpretations of 
science. These different formulations are the consequence of the end of empiricism as 
the dominant epistemic position within the philosophy of science. 
More importantly, it is crucial to consider the Vienna Circle becau.se the 
following sections wi l l argue that it is possible to discern in the Circle's most 
Steve Smith, "Positivism and Beyond," in International Theory: Positivism and 
Beyond, ed. Ken Booth, Steve Smith and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 15. 
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fundamental conclusions the schisms that have characterised all social sciences: for what 
concerns International Relations, it wi l l be demonstrated that the arguments which 
oppose Waltz to Aron, for example, should be viewed in terms of the realist / anti-realist 
schism that resulted form the Vienna Circle. This argument wi l l be expanded in the 
fourth chapter, when Waltz's constant references to the Circle's ideas w i l l be shown to 
represent the thrust of his efforts to actualise the epistemological status of 'scientific' 
International Relations. On the other hand, it wi l l be demonstrated that Aron was 
accused of not considering the Circle's conclusions on the role of empiricism in the 
formulation of hypothesis: thus resulted the accusation of being a backward positivist. 
Subsequent chapters wi l l show that debates relates to the principles and practicalities of 
the Kosovo conflict - indeed, debates on the ways in which the conflict should be framed 
- are equally reminiscent of such crucial epistemic debates. 
It is fundamental to understand the Circle's arguments, and their successive 
influence on the epistemology of International Relations, in terms of Foucault's 
description of the modern episteme. For what does the end of empiricism in scientific 
methodology represent i f not the break from a certain kind of representation? As outlined 
above, Foucault demonstrates how modernity is characterised by a break-up of 
representation in three distinct modes of enquiry: the formulation of a transcendental 
philosophy of the object (metaphysics), of the subject (criticism), and the birth of 
positivism. Metaphysics results from an a posteriori analysis of the subject in terms of 
the objects it experiences, while Criticism results in the a priori contextualisation of the 
experiencing subject. Positivism is defined by Foucault as the refusal to engage with any 
transcendental philosophy. The fundamental question, which is to be kept in mind in the 
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following presentation of the Vienna Circle, is: to what extent is Foucault's positivism 
distinct from the classical episteme's bases of representation? 
Gutting considers this very problem as follows: 
...positivism might seem a reversal to classical modes of thought. Is it not, after 
all, the identification of reality with the world of representations? Should we not, 
therefore, regard it as a mere revival of the empiricist philosophies of the 
Classical age? Although Foucault does not raise this question, he might respond 
by maintaining that it is not possible to separate positivism from the critical turn 
that it rejects. The point would be that, once this turn has been made, there are, in 
contrast with the Classical age, alternatives to regarding thought as merely a 
system of representations. Positivism may maintain that in fact this is all our 
thought is, that there is nothing beyond the phenomenal realm. But it does so in a 
context that, in contrast to the Classical age, at least allows the possibility of other 
construals of thought.^^ 
.39 Gutting, Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Scientific Reason, 185. 
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Once the turn has been made, there is no going back: and the turn - that is, the collapse of 
the 'dogmas of empiricism' - has occurred, as Willard Van Orman Quine maintains, in 
Vienna.'" 
Indeed, the philosophers of the Circle introduced the problematic that frames the 
empiricist dilemma as a base for their formulation of logical positivism. The first 
message of the Circle was that i f we think of science as being concerned exclusively with 
general phenomena, and i f we also assume that a general proposition can be considered 
as a scientific hypothesis only after empirical validation, we have to accept the fact that it 
is not possible to directly experience generalities. This is the main paradox upon which 
an alternative scientific methodology, a more 'coherent' one. had to be built. This 
paradox, in fact, leads us to believe that it is impossible to justify scientific hypotheses on 
empirical experience.. .precisely because of the biological finitude of human beings. This 
ultimately relates to the exact link that can be established between the generic, or 
Universal, hypotheses and phenomenal, or particular issues: this thus represents yet 
another epistemic constraint that characterised many of the debates surrounding 
intervention in Kosovo. 
The debates that took place were all attempts to conceptualise alternative (logical 
as opposed to empirical) foundations for scientific enquiry."" For instance, the 
Willard Van Orman Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," From a Logical Point of 
View, ed. Willard Van Orman Quine, (Cambridge M A : Harvard University Press, 1951). 
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philosopher Fries proposed to the Circle the argument that there were three possible 
solutions to this empirical problem. The first one was to accept hypotheses on the 
grounds of the intellectual authority of those scientists who had produced them. This 
position is qualified as 'dogmatic'. The second proposition was to regress ad infinitum in 
order to empirically certify the bases upon which all theoretical constructs were built. 
This option ('regressionism') was obviously not viable. The third solution was the one 
that Fries advocated: it was possible to logically deduct propositions which were based 
on facts that had been previously empirically tested. Fries's proposal was categorised as a 
'foundationalist' solution. 
Carnap also proposed an alternative variant of foundafionalism. He argued, with 
Wittgenstein, that the meaning of all complex propositions depends on the meaning of the 
elementary concepts that compose them. Moreover, Carnap agreed that the meanings of 
propositions are dependent on the context of truth within which they are situated. 
Nonetheless, Carnap argued that some propositions were irreducible, independent from 
other propositions, inherently true and objective. These are what we wi l l call irreducible 
propositions. According to Carnap these propositions did not need to be justified, and 
could serve as the basis for all consequent scientific theories. Nonetheless, the idea of 
irreducible propositions had to be abandoned after the powerful critique of Neurath. The 
For the debates within the Circle see Anouk Barberousse, Max Kistler, and Pascal 
Ludwig, La Philosophie Des Sciences Au Xxe Siecle, (Manchecourt: Flammarion, 2000), 
Chapter 1. 
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same criticism led Neurath and Carnap to adopt a common position that expressed the 
impossibility of formulating foundational propositions derived from sensory experience. 
Foundationalism, moreover, was vividly rejected by the other fellows of the 
Circle, most notably by Popper. Popper restated that we cannot affirm the validity of any 
facts, even i f these are empirically detectable, i f we want to use them in order to 
formulate general propositions. We cannot, as individuals, experience multiple 
phenomena at the same time. The generality to which science aspires and the 
individual's limited empirical experience that is supposed to justify its propositions 
constitute an irreducible paradox - a paradox that characterises all (epistemic) modern 
knowledge. In a sense, we are faced with Foucault's description of the struggle to relate 
the transcendental with the representation of empirical experience, and with the 
limitations imposed by our own biological finitude. In this sense, the empirical stance of 
reducing philosophical (theoretical scientific propositions) truths to empirical truth is, in 
Popper's eyes, untenable. Indeed, Popper later famously announced that scientific 
enquiry could only proceed through 'conjectures and r e f u t a t i o n s ' . N o r m a l sciences 
were then facing the very uncertainty principle that many social sciences still face. This 
situation was characterised by the nearly total unreliability, unavailability or 
unwillingness to use empirical data for the formulation of scientific hypothesis. This also 
Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. 
London, Routledge 2002. 
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caused the famous schism that gave birth to the opposition between reahsm anti-reaHsm 
in science. 
Significantly, some members of the Circle concluded that foundationalism had to 
be abandoned because it was intrinsically paradoxical. In fact, foundationalism (both in 
its logical and empiricist mould) seeks to establish irreducible propositions which are 
supposed to satisfy two important requirements. As Davidson explains: "The foundations 
of knowledge must be simultaneously objective and subjective, that is, certain but 
nevertheless subject to eventual refutation."'*'' The problem is that these two 
requirements (objectivity and subjectivity) are simply not compatible, and cannot be 
satisfied by an irreducible proposition. As Barberousse notes, "from this moment the 
road taken by Neurath and Camap leads to the opposite direction to the one taken by 
Schlick."^ 
The turn had been made. In fact, this paradox encouraged some philosophers 
such as Carnap and Neurath to argue that it was more adequate to renounce the idea of an 
absolute foundation of knowledge in order to maintain the objectivity of science 
(relativism), while other members of the Circle, headed by Schlick, considered absolute 
foundations indispensable, thus rejected the idea that foundations must necessarily be 
objective. As we noted, this paradox terminated, via scientific fragmentation, 
reductionism in science, a philosophy that sought to reduce the whole of science to 
Ibid, 30. 
Ibid, 29. 
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experienced singular phenomena. This was one of the two dognnas of empiricism 
detected by Quine."*^ From our perspective this schism is fundamental as it encourages 
scientific theorising to move away from the epistemic pole of empirical positivism as 
defined in Foucault's description of the modern triangular configuration of knowledge. 
The move towards metaphysical theorising is, on the other hand, something that has 
characterised and continues to characterise the generation and deployment of knowledge 
in International Relations in general, and in relation to the Kosovo crisis in particular. 
The schism has had an enormous importance on scientific theorising over the past 
decades. For scientific 'realists', who attempted to satisfy the objectivity requirement by 
questioning basic assumptions, do not really envisage the task of theorising as 'anti-
realists', who postulate the crucial importance of absolutes; do. This is particularly true 
when it comes to differentiate general 'real' patterns from accidental ones: 
...Realist theorists believe that...it is necessary to elaborate metaphysical 
theoretical constructions in which...non-observable entities must be postulated in 
order to explain generalities. On the other hand, empiricists affirm that it is not 
possible to postulate an absolute capable of explaining generalities i f the 
45 Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism,". 
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construction of this absolute has to take place outside the scientific process 
itself...'*' 
Vienna marks the beginning of an era in which metaphysical construals are viewed as a 
legitimate bases for the scientific enterprise - in the same way that metaphysical 
justifications may come to be viewed as legitimate bases for bellicose endeavours. Of 
course, this metaphysical stance is rejected by the empiricists, those who Foucault 
describes as 'positivists'. Nonetheless, this positivism is no longer regarded as the only 
path to scientific understanding, and it is precisely this path that Quine describes through 
the notion of 'dogma'. Following Cutting's arguments, this schism should be taken as 
marking the definite break-up with representational modes of thought within the 
philosophy of science. And there is no better way to demonstrate this than by fully 
grasping the consequences of the following quote, describing the conclusions of the 
Vienna Circle: 
The logical analysis demonstrates that pure thought cannot be a source of 
empirical knowledge: the possibility of an a priori synthetic knowledge, which is 
fundamental in Kant's philosophy, is strongly rejected. Only two kinds of 
propositions have a legitimate claim within science: those which are a priori, but 
Barberousse, La Philosophie Des Sciences Au Xxe Siecle, 90, emphasis added (my 
translation). 
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tautological (that is, with no real meaning) and those that are synthetic, but always 
a posteriori, of empirical science/^ 
In Foucault's epistemic triangle, Vienna marks a new configuration of scientific thought 
in which transcendental philosophies of the subject are rejected in order to render 
legitimate only metaphysical or 'positivist' claims to scientific understanding. Indeed, 
tautological (metaphysical) claims are meaningless because these transcendental notions, 
as Foucault reminds us, are outside the possibility of knowledge: but they ground, by this 
very virtue, all possible claims to knowledge. The a posteriori claims, on the other hand, 
only consider as legitimate observations that follow from empirical observation. To 
reinforce the argument that the modern epistemic fracture translates, in the philosophy of 
science, into the debates that took place in Vienna, it is possible to read the following 
assertion through the arguments exposed above. Gutting, in maintaining that positivism 
is distinct from representation, indicates that: 
Of course, the positivist can try to exclude these other construals (as, for example, 
meaningless). But how can he do this except by methods (for example, the appeal 
to a principle of verification) that themselves go beyond the resources of thought 
limited to the phenomenal realm? Thus positivism seems to face the alternative 
of either making the merely dogmatic assertion that thought is to be identified 
47 Ibid, 298. 
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with representation or else falling in incoherence by attempting to establish this 
assertion.''* 
Is this not, after all, what characterises the empiricist stance since the Vienna Circle? 
And since, as Smith argues"^, the bulk of academic International Relations is based on a 
specific understanding of 'positivism', what are we to make of related developments and 
related understandings of the Kosovo conflict? 
The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science 
One of the main contributions of twentieth century philosophy of science was to 
demonstrate how the scientific method is not characterised, as it was generally thought, 
by the mere objective observation and experimentation of reality. I f we apply Foucault's 
definition of the modern organisation of knowledge, arguments such as Popper's and 
Kuhn's make us realise that what we often brand as 'science' is not located within the 
analytic or positivist epistemic poles. Rather, the 'scientific method' is centred on 
presuppositions, or conjectures, that have more to do with metaphysical transcendental 
theorising than with positivistic experimentation or mathematical / logical essences. In 
this sense, the realist 'scientific method' should be regarded as a transcendental 
48 Gutting, Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Scientific Reason, 186. 
Smith, "Positivism and Beyond". 
2. An Archaeology of Modernity, 118 
philosophy of the object, for the subjects of scientific enquiry are ultimately examined by 
how they stand in relation to the basic presuppositions of the paradigm, and not vice-
versa. 
There is a difference to be noted, however, and this is that whilst Vienna marks 
the beginning of a new epistemic context, a context in which metaphysical 
presuppositions are regarded as legitimate grounds for the scientific enterprise, arguments 
such as Kunn's indicate that, in a sense, there has always been a strong metaphysical 
dimension within scientific thought. Kuhn argues that science has always been 
paradigmatic: scientists always relied on assumptions to make sense of their research. 
However, it can be argued, as Kuhn does, that the social sciences, including International 
Relations, were at a pre-paradigmatic stage. The adoption of paradigmatic science also 
implies the adoption of all its inconveniences.^*^ Kuhn's Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions explores the notion of 'paradigm' and what is at stake in the claim to 
knowledge made by paradigmatic science: 
...they constitute what I 'm here calling normal science. Closely examined, 
whether historically or in the laboratory, that enterprise seems an attempt to force 
^° The application of Kuhnian arguments to International Relations has caused important 
controversies. For a more detailed argument see Stefano Guzzini, Realism in 
International Relations and International Political Economy: The Continuing Story of a 
Death Foretold, (Florence: European University Institute Press, 1992), 27-30. 
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nature into the preformed and relatively inflexible box that the paradigm supplies. 
No part of the aim of normal science is to call forth new sorts of phenomena; 
indeed those that wi l l not f i t the box are often not seen at all. Nor do scientists 
normally aim to invent new theories, and they are often intolerant of those 
invented by others. Instead, normal-scientific research is directed to the 
articulation of those phenomena and theories that the paradigm already supplies. 
The benefits and disadvantages of paradigms in the natural sciences, explains Kuhn, lie 
respectively on the possibility of deep inquiry and on the limitations imposed by a 
paradigm: 
...perhaps these are defects. The areas investigated by normal science are, of 
course, minuscule; the enterprise now under discussion has drastically restricted 
vision. But those restrictions, born from confidence in a paradigm, turn out to be 
essential to the development of science. By focusing attention upon a small range 
of relatively esoteric problems, the paradigm forces scientists to investigate some 
part of nature in a detail and depth that would otherwise be unimaginable.^' 
51 Both quotes in Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1970): 24. 
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The study of reality seems to follow from metaphysical assumptions. How does this 
correlate to Foucault's arguments on modernity's desire to supersede taximonia and 
mathesis by studying the deep core of the organism? Is this deep core not ultimately 
inaccessible, do we not always need, in the end, to replace these hidden truths with 
metaphysical assumptions? This depth and detail that would otherwise be unimaginable, 
does this not correspond to a general trend aiming at discarding the superficial nature of 
representation in order to ful ly grasp what causes such representations? Are paradigms 
being introduced as the equivalents of those 'nonrepresentational sources of 
representational systems' in the empirical sciences? In other words, this necessity to 
study the order of things from the representational source, does it not necessarily entail 
the creation of a metaphysical system of thought? What is this inflexible box into with 
which nature is forced to comply, i f not an example of a tool that allows to study things 
from that which they experience? Is a paradigm not, after all, a perfect example of a 
transcendental philosophy of a metaphysically constructed object? Does this inflexible 
paradigmatic box not perfectly illustrate the notion of analytic finitude inherent to all 
projects wishing to constitute a transcendental philosophy of the object? Finally, the 
fundamental question, which wil l be tackled in the next chapter: does this transcendental 
philosophy of the object necessitate linear historicism in scientific methodology as it does 
in economics, biology and philology - and in International Relations? To what extent did 
this characterise the way in which the Kosovo crisis was framed? And to what extent are 
these constraints being challenged? 
Dupre, in a book with a very pertinent title, seeks to illustrate the "dependence of 
modern science on metaphysics" arguing that "science itself cannot progress without 
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powerful assumptions about the world it is trying to investigate...without...a prior 
metaphysics."^" In a way, his project is similar to the main arguments of our work. 
Dupre insists on the fact that a scientistic approach to social events, and 'scientific' 
approaches that are characterised by metaphysical foundations, produces precise ways in 
which we think of, for example, the political and economic realms. Thus Dupre proceeds 
to demonstrate how the three main consequences of metaphysical science (essentialism, 
reductionism and determinism) have characterised the 'scientific' analysis of social 
events.^ "^  It is important for us to take note of Dupre's arguments: 
To lead to the most significant consequences, the thesis that scientific belief 
depends always on background assumptions not all which can be equally subject 
to empirical warrant must apply not merely to more or less theoretical beliefs, but 
also to what are taken to be the empirical data on which scientific beliefs might be 
founded.^"* 
Conclusion 
John Dupre, The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of 
Science (London: Harvard University Press, 1995), 1-2, emphasis added. 
53 Ibid, 244-64. 
Ibid, 246. 
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The project to develop a distinct archaeological methodology was conducted as 
Michel Foucault attempted to frame his previous and future works in a coherent research 
programme. In this sense, the project of The Archaeology of Knowledge is entirely 
consistent with the findings of The Order of Things as it effectively constructed a 
methodology that would deal with the emergence of 'man' in the modern episteme by 
eliminating the importance of the human subject in the structural analysis of thought. 
The purpose is not to study epistemes because they necessarily determinate that, 
for example, empiricism and reductionism are philosophies which, by epistemic 
definition; were destined to disappear once A or B happened. The purpose is rather to 
understand what allows for challenging philosophies of science to emerge, how these are 
formed, how these influence intellectual and practical outputs and how these relate to the 
production of knowledge on the Kosovo crisis from a 'scientific' International Relations 
perspective, for example. Waltz's "scientific International Relations' wi l l not be 
thoroughly analysed because of the influence that it may have had on diplomatic practice, 
rather, the theory wi l l be presented as a "monument' to the modem episteme, whose 
underiying axes - the analytic of finitude and historical linearity - influence the way 
events themselves are interpreted (in this case, the Kosovo crisis). This, in turn, wi l l 
allow a second part to show how the most important traits of this configuration can be 
discerned in the practice of international relations (the shift from a purely descriptive 
analysis of an episteme to an explicative analysis, that is one which tackles the power / 
knowledge nexus, is often translated by Foucault in terms of a shift from archaeology to 
genealogy). For the moment, however, we wil l proceed in presenting Complexity 
science as a 'postmodern science', in order to investigate the revolutionary potential of 
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this within an epistemic framework. In the following chapter we shall make a 
supplementary effon to present modern science as a transcendental philosophy of 
constituted objects. At this point it would be important to point out that there have 
been many interesting debates surrounding Foucault's innovative intellectual project.^^ 
Whilst it is not the intention to ignore such debates, which have been considered in the 
formulation of the analysis, the current study requires that a specific understanding of 
Foucault's definition of modernity is provided in order to concentrate the analysis on 
what defines modernity and Complexity: that is, a diametrically opposed understanding 
of temporality. The importance and requirement to concentrate on this issue leaves very 
little space for a detailed consideration of secondary litterature. 
See, for example, the aptly named work of Beatrice Han, Foucault's Critical Project: 
Between the Transcendental and the Historical, (Stanford: Stanford University Press 
2002) and Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism 
and Hermeneutics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1983). 
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3. Complexity and the Epistemology of Science 
What is the role of lime?...Time prevents eveiything from being given at once...Is it not 
the vehicle of creativity and choice ? Is not the existence of time the proof of 
indeterminism in nature? 
Henri Bergson, The Possible and the Real' 
Introduction: French Philosophy and the Modern Episteme 
Whilst the previous chapter outlined the nature of the modern episteme, the 
current section wil l present how Complexity - by Foucault's own standards and 
definitions - challenges the same modern epistemic configuration. The current chapter 
wi l l thus provide the lenses that wi l l enable the current work to analyse how the Kosovo 
crisis may have been framed, understood and acted upon differently had Complexity-
based approaches been adopted. 
As Michel Foucault describes the birth of the modern episteme, however detailed 
the account is, the reader cannot fail to notice that something is missing. As the previous 
chapter has shown, Foucault explains that as the era of representation withers, paving the 
Henri Bergson, Ouevres (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1959): 1331, my 
translation. 
3. Complexity and the Epistemology of Science, 125 
way for the modern episteme; the realm of philosophy finds itself divided into three 
distinct areas of enquiry - but Foucault maintains that this division is only valid until a 
figure appears in philosophy: "The criticism - positivism - metaphysics triangle of the 
object was constitutive of European thought from the beginning of the nineteenth century 
to Bergson."" Bergson? Why Bergson? Are we to understand that Henri Bergson was 
the first thinker to push Western philosophy beyond the modem organisation of 
knowledge? Foucault does not say, at least not within The Order of Things. Presumably, 
it is important to have enough knowledge of Bergson to gather the significant differences 
between this philosopher and the recently presented modern episteme. 
Bergson, a fascinating figure that also happens to appear, intriguingly, in a 
seemingly unrelated book: The End of Certainty."^ In this exciting work Ilya Prigogine, a 
Nobel prize winner in biology and one of the emblematic figures of a loosely defined 
'Complexity Science', explains why and how the deterministic scientific era, 
characterised by Newtonian principles of certainty embedded in the reversibility of Time; 
is coming to an end. Prigogine, incidentally, declares that his work in the natural 
sciences has been deeply influenced by philosophical inquiry. He even goes on to 
declare: "The dream of my youth was to contribute to the unification of science and 
" Foucault, The Order of Things, 245. 
Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, The End of Certainty: Time, Chaos, and the New 
Laws of Nature (New York: Free Press, 1997). 
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philosophy by resolving the enigma of time.""* A unification of two realms of knowledge 
that, as the previous chapter shows, Foucault argues have been divided as a consequence 
of the end of representation. Furthermore, Foucault argues, as explained above, that the 
single most important phenomenon that characterises the collapse of representation and 
the consequent birth of the modern episteme is precisely centred on emerging and 
contrasting notions of linear temporality and history, an emergence that caused the 
fragmentation of knowledge into different forms of enquiry. 
But what should really be of interest in this bizarre literary detour is that the 
problematic of time within Prigogine's arguments brings us back to...Bergson. Consider: 
"The results of nonequilibrium thermodynamics are close to the views expressed by 
Bergson...Indeterminism, as conceived by Whitehead, Bergson, and Popper, now appears 
in physics."^ So, a general problematic starts to emerge, a problematic that should be of 
particular interest for International Relations theorists and for any student of the Kosovo 
crisis. Is International Relations not the discipline, after all, in which Kenneth Waltz's 
dominant neo-realist paradigm is constantly accused of a 'scientistic' a-historicism? 
Does the culprit not defend his positions in the name of 'scientific' methodology? 
Moreover, recent works in International Relations theory coincidentally seek to adjust 
these 'scientistic' fallacies by introducing the notion of historical research to the 
^ Ibid, 72. 
Ibid, 72 and 108. 
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discipline.^ It would seem that i f Bergson is considered to mark the limit of one precise 
configuration of knowledge through a specific concept of temporality on the one hand, 
and to found the bases upon which new knowledge is being produced on the other, it 
would be useful for us to understand where fields of enquiry related to the Kosovo crisis 
stand, epistemologically and ontologically, in relation to these developments. 
Is there a possibility that recent and not so recent debates concerning the nature 
of 'scientific International Relations' are built upon fundamentally misleading notions of 
'science' and 'history'? How is all of this related to our understandings, and judgements, 
of crucial events such as the intervention in Kosovo? Do various interpretations of the 
Balkans in general not suffer - in their attempts to emulate 'scientific rigour' - from a 
systematic 'historical reductionism'? More importantly, is a 'pseudo-scientistic' 
approach, reminiscent of modernity's attempt to construct transcendental philosophies of 
objects, determining the way we conceive arguments such as 'human rights', 
'humanitarian intervention' and 'history'? 
This chapter is a modest attempt to begin answering these tricky questions. 
Firstly, it wi l l put them in order. To do so, a general framework of understanding, which 
has been provided in the first chapter, wi l l be used. This is the principal reason why the 
present chapter wi l l use Foucault's analysis of epistemic fluctuations, and general 
concepts provided by contemporary French philosophy, as a way of understanding the 
^ See Barry Buzan and Richard Little, International Systems in World History: Remaking 
the study of International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
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epistemic differences that exist between modern transcendental philosophies of objects 
and Complexity. This framework should equally allow us to fully grasp the significance 
of Bergson's philosophy. Consequentially, the chapter shall firstly explore the links that 
exist between Bergson himself this break from modernity, and scientists such as 
Prigogine. Second, it wi l l analyse the genesis of Complexity through the epistemic 
lenses provided by the previous chapter. This should allow the next chapter to 
understand the consequences of all of these arguments for the social sciences in general 
and for the discipline of International Relations in particular. It wi l l be demonstrated that 
the scientific basis which have founded much of 'scientific International Relations' 
theory (and practice) are being seriously undermined by developments within the 
epistemology of science. It wi l l be equally necessary to show that many of these notions 
(such as temporality), boil down to the notion of freedom of action, or, to put it in 
fashionable terminology, to the structure and agency debate. This is the question that, 
after all, has fascinated philosophy since its inception: to what extent is human action 
contextually (i.e. historically, socially, economically, psychologically, etc.) determined? 
Keeping this in mind, Gary Gutting describes French philosophy in the twentieth 
century as the 'Philosophy of Freedom'.^ This author offers an account that describes 
how "from Bergson through the existentialists and poststructuralists, individual human 
^ Such is the title of the conclusive last chapter of Gary Gutting, French Philosophy in the 
Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
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freedom was itself a radical starting point that required no philosophical foundation."^ 
This can explain why, for example, French philosophy of science occupied such an 
elevated status: the desire to demonstrate that deterministic science was compatible with 
human individual freedom was indeed a major motivation for philosophers such as 
Boutroux, Poincare, Le Roy and others.^ As we shall see, Bergson's ideas emerged from 
initial debates within this current of thought. The need to relativise the determinism with 
which the scientific method is often associated perhaps explains the fact that authors such 
as Bachelard and Canguilhem have preceded Thomas Kuhn's description of scientific 
revolutions by more than thirty years.'° Foucault's Order of Things was also, to a certain 
extent, a history of epistemic revolutions. Within these contexts, we have seen how he 
explored the way in which 'scientific' disciplines such as biology were constituted." 
' Ibid, 380. 
^ Ibid, 26 and 40. 
'° Ibid, 87. Similarly, When Foucault was accused of omitting Kuhn's arguments from 
his Order of Things; he replied that since his book made several references to 
Canguilhem further references of Kuhn were not necessary. See Gutting, French 
Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, 39. 
" Foucault has been undoubtedly influenced by the work of historians of science, 
especially Canguilhem and Bachelard. Indeed, Gutting believes that the ideas of these 
two thinkers are crucial for an accurate understanding of Foucault's arguments. 
Moreover, it was Canguilhem that proposed the very terminology 'Archaeology of 
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The Thought of Henri Bergson 
As noted above, Gutting explains that the philosophers of the Third Republic had 
an intense interest in science. Indeed, it would seem that while we "can think of 
philosophy's pre-modern period as the time, before the scientific revolution, when it was 
identical with science, when philosophy was simply the enterprise of understanding the 
world in all its aspects."'"; the task of philosophy after the triumph of the 'scientific 
revolution' is relegated to justify a role for itself. As Gutting puts it, the argument is that 
after the incredible success of scientific discovery philosophy had to demonstrate that a 
number of phenomena were not explainable through the "scientific method' alone. 
Philosophy's task was to show that in order to pursue the abstraction that modern 
science must necessarily adopt certain non-quantifiable aspects of our experience are 
ignored. Philosophy, thus, must exhibit that it "can and should root itself in an 
experience with an immediacy or concreteness that escapes the abstractions of modem 
science."'"'' And, as the following paragraphs wil l illustrate, these abstractions are 
produced because of the metaphysical nature of modern science, and its drive to 
Knowledge' to Foucault. See Gutting, Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Scientific 
Reason, 1-54. 
'" Gutting, French Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, 49. 
' • Ib id , 50. 
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formulate a posteriori transcendental philosophies of objects.'* Note how this 
corresponds to Foucault's arguments regarding the fragmentation of knowledge and the 
new role of philosophy as a discipline that seeks to recover the lost uniqueness of 
wisdom.'"'' 
Henri Bergson is in this respect one of the most important figures within the 
spiritualist tradition, a tradition that advocated the presence of a distinctive philosophical 
experience. Bergson followed with a lot of interest the developments that were taking 
place within the philosophy of science. More precisely, Poincare's initial doubts 
concerning the infallible objectivity of science, and his disciple's (Le Roy) reinforcement 
of these doubts must have played an essential role in the constitution of Bergson's 
thought. At the core of Bergson's philosophy of science lies the conviction that the 
scientific method adopts a cinematographical view of temporality, which implies, as 
Gutting puts it, "that science views reality not as a continuous flux (the duration that in 
fact is) but as a series of instantaneous 'snapshots' extracted from this f lux." '^ 
Science's cinematographical view of duration is due to the fact that it is primarily 
concerned with action. As thought that is primarily concerned with practice, science 
must abstract from that concrete reality that we experience, in which temporality is not 
simply another form of space, but a "wholly qualitative multiplicity, an absolute 
'" See Dupre, The Disorder of Things. 
' -'' Foucault, The Order of Things, 217-49. 
'^ Gutting, French Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, 51. 
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heterogeneity of elements which pass into the other."'^ For Bergson, in the real 
continuum of duration there are no distinct elements that precede or follow real points in 
'time'. In this context, it becomes meaningless to speak of an a priori or an a posteriori: 
Bergson envisages a notion of temporality as a "continuous flux of novelty in which 
nothing is ever fixed, complete, or separate. In this flux, anything that we can say exists 
'now' also incorporates into a qualitative whole everything we can say is 'past', a whole 
that is itself being incorporated into the new synthesis of the 'future'."'^ The distinction 
between the synthetic and the analytic disappears in the flux of time, for it is precisely 
this continuous temporal vortex that is responsible for the formation of things (a 
posteriori) and their essential reality (a priori). This is the main postulate of what has 
been referred to as Bergson's 'superior Empiricism' (more on this below). And again, it 
is precisely this refusal to deal with transcendentalisms that characterises Bergson's drive 
for an immanent reality that can be experienced but that cannot be cut into bits and 
abstracted. Clearly, the emergence of such ontology revolutionises the bases of the 
modern episteme. 
Bergson equally argues that it is misleading to view modern science, through 
differential calculus, as a method that alters the basically static notion of time. Modern 
science differs from classical science insofar the former democratises the notion of 
temporality: while classical science privileged some 'moments' over others, modern 
Ibid, 57. 
Ibid. 
3. Complexity and the Epistemology of Science, 133 
science seeks to explain phenomena from any temporal standpoint. In this sense, because 
all temporal standpoints are considered, time 'appears' in modern science, much in the 
same way 'man' appears once it becomes an object of knowledge. Nonetheless, the 
assumption that the flux of time is divisible into isolated elements is not altered. Bergson 
also refuses the idea that modern science has given time a fundamental role. The 
argument contested is that modem science has made temporality an independent variable 
of deterministic mathematical equations, and that this represents a major qualitative shift 
from Aristotle's static physics. Bergson, in contrast, argues that the problem lies 
precisely in turning temporality into a parameter. The flux of time is not just a 
quantifiable parameter that can be isolated and used as a variable, but a constitutive 
process characterised by sheer heterogeneity and multiplicity.'^ In other words, time is 
not something thanks to which things happen (a variable), but it is rather something in 
which things happen, something thus that establishes the very parameters and laws 
according to which events unfold. In this sense, temporality is not something that places 
contingency, but precisely the opposite: that which ensures perpetual transformation, a 
process of becoming without being. The concept of being, by definition, necessitates a 
set of parameters to define its existence, the notion of becoming, on the other hand. 
The argument is rather different when it comes to Bergson's positions on relativity. 
See Keith Ansell Pearson, Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual: Bergson and the 
Time of Life (London: Routledge, 2002), Chapter 2. 
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necessitates a concept of continuous and non-linear time to ensure that the becoming 
process never produces a definite being. 
Having established the fact that science fails to tackle the issue of real 
temporality, Bergson argues that philosophy might have been expected to occupy this 
empty ground. However, this was not to be. Much as Foucault has argued, philosophy 
has attempted to resolve problems inherent in the modern episteme, instead of attempting 
to surpass them. Modern philosophy, Bergson argues, has not challenged the view of 
time as "nothing more than a fourth spatial dimension, which could readily be viewed as 
having no creative efficacy, as merely the vehicle for the automatic unrolling of a 
nomologically determined s e q u e n c e . T h i s modern scientific vision of time, as 
Prigogine maintains, is all but dead. 
Bergson argues that a philosophy that sought to adopt a more immanent approach 
to temporality would reveal how the very notion of time is inherent to any 
conceptualisation of human freedom. To expose the point, Bergson attempted to present 
just how problematic a divisible notion of time is when applied to the analysis of 
psychological states. In his doctoral thesis, Bergson posited the problem as follows: 
accepting the notion that our decisions, feelings and emotions occur at identifiable 
isolated 'spaces in time', the determinists wi l l maintain that human wi l l is never free 
because determining causes exist. On the other side of the spectrum, non-determinists 
either deny the existence of these casual determinants (libertarianists) or argue that the 
20 Gutting, French Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, 57. 
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presence of these does not infringe human freedom (compatibilists). Bergson's thesis is 
that to view the self as a constitution of separate psychological states, which might be 
linked by causal connections, leads us to an unsolvable paradox of human freedom. On 
the contrary, "a description of the self that accords with the immediate givens of 
consciousness shows it to be an organic whole that creatively produces its future, and this 
production is precisely what we mean by freedom.""' 
Now we can start to understand how Bergson goes beyond the modern episteme. 
His conceptualisation of temporality refuses the a priori / a posteriori distinction upon 
which the modern organisation of knowledge is based. His rejection of 
transcendentalism, coupled with his insistence on the realm of immanence, has produced, 
amongst many, challenges to the modern notions of abstraction, temporality, empiricism, 
science and freedom." It is precisely by demolishing the modern episteme's 
understanding of all possible paths and conditions for the attainment of knowledge that 
Bergson issues a challenge to Kant's revolution in philosophy and in science, for "unlike 
the transcendental procedure of Kant, [Bergson] does not refer to the conditions of all 
possible experience; rather, it is moving toward 'the articulations of the real' in which 
conditions are neither general and abstract nor are they broader than the 
' ' Ibid, 58. 
" For Bergson's 'superior empiricism', see Keith Ansell Pearson, Philosophy and the 
Adventure of the Virtual: Bergson and the Time of Life, 12. 
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conditioned...Bergson insists upon the need to provide a genesis of the human 
intellect."'-' 
In order to advance in the critique of the Kantian revolution Bergson introduces 
the ideas of virtual muUiplicities, of temporality and of intuition as means of thinking 
beyond the human condition as opposed to means of thinking within such condition. 
These rather complex issues need to be tackled carefully. Therefore, this section wil l 
only briefly introduce these notions and present them as a critique of the Kantian 
epistemic revolution""*, while we wi l l focus on more precise definitions as the study 
proceeds to describe Deleuze's philosophy of Life in relation to Complexity science. 
Ibid, 11-13, emphasis added. 
Although it would be relevant to fully elucidate the nature of Bergson's analysis on 
time as opposed to Kant's, we do not have the space for this here. For a succint 
presentation of Bergson's views, see two important pages in what is probably his most 
relevant work in this context: Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory (New York: Cosimo 
Classics 2007), 280-282. Considerations on the nature of time play a crucial role in 
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: indeed, the whole of Section I I of Part 1, which deals 
with transcendental aesthetics, is dedicated to the notion of time: Immanuel Kant, 
Critique of Pure Reason, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 1999): 88. It should be noted 
that Bergson dedicates an entire chapter to the criticism of Kant's understanding of space 
and time and the relationship these have with the notion of freedom and intellect. See 
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The Kant - Bergson nexus is of course important for any interpretation of 
Complexity through epistemic lenses, for, as stated above, Foucault considers Kant as a 
fundamental thinker for the modern episteme, while considering Bergson as the first post-
modern philosopher. We can begin to see the similarities and differences that exist 
between Kant and Bergson by focussing on the antinomies that are inherent in Kant's 
critique of pure reason. These antinomies arise, according to Kant, when "reason 
oversteps the bounds of sense and understanding and freely speculates on issues it is not 
equipped to adequately deal with"^^, thus generating a number of contradictions. Such a 
contradiction, for example, is embedded in the following statement: 'Man has complete 
freedom' and 'There is no freedom since everything operates in accordance with natural 
necessity'. As we have seen, Bergson does tackle this issue by maintaining that human 
freedom can only be conceived of in terms of duration. 
However, to put it bluntly, Kant denies that we can ever think in terms of 
duration, for that would imply thinking beyond the human condition, and that is not 
possible because...we are finite beings. A l l the Kantian elaboration of the conditions and 
possibilities of knowledge are grounded on an analytic of human finitude, this being the 
reason why Kant can be legitimately defined by Foucault as the turning point of 
modernity. Moreover, Foucault has also identified this finitude as the very source of 
Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution (Mineola, New York: Courier Dover Publications), 
356-363. 
Ibid, 115 
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historical linearity, that is, the contingency that makes finitude possible. But this should 
be looked into in more detail, for, as the study wil l seek to argue in a second part, 
especially using recent literature on the argument, not only is the latest wave of 
'scientific' (Waltz) and 'social' (Wendt) IR theory purely Kantian, but so is our 
perception of the causes of conflicts and our related actions - especially the justifications 
for such actions. Foucault teaches that it is precisely the Kantian finitude, his insistence 
on the limits of the human bodily apparatus to perceive and ground all possible paths to 
knowledge, which produces historical teleology. Only thinking beyond the human 
condition can allow us to fully appreciate history as becoming, as the non-linear process 
which ful ly reflect the nature of the vortex of time. 
It is important to specify that there is, nearly by definition, .something 
intrinsically intuitive in the way Bergson tackles these antinomies. Bergson's very first 
work on psychological states, and later works on matter and memory, attempt to 
legitimise an intuitive (as opposed to purely rational) form of knowledge. Not that an 
intuitive approach lacks of rigour: on the contrary, Bergson's superior empiricism is seen 
as a more rigorous, because of its immanent nature, methodology than many purely 
metaphysical proceedings. As we have seen, 'rational' proceedings need to subdivide the 
flux of time into quantifiable strata: only intuition can perceive temporality as the 
heterogeneous and continuous flux that in fact is (for example, Bergson argues that out of 
all our senses, sight is the most prone to subdivide duration, while hearing comes closer 
to the appreciation of the totality that time represents). 
Such intuitive proceedings are related, for example, to the way memory works. 
Marcel Proust, who was Bergson's student until 1894 in the Sorbonne, has immortalised 
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this vision of memory as a purely intuitive exercise in his main work Remembrance of 
Things Past (In Search of Lost Time) in which the author explores not rational and 
voluntary memory, which is controlled by our intelligence and rationality, but 
involuntary memory, which arises from unexpected stimuli, from events that appear to be 
insignificant but that reveal the darkest corners of our psyche, and through the association 
of internal feelings and intuitive actions, the enormous inner and hidden construction that 
is our memory. There is something purely unconscious and intuitive that characterises 
our existence and our ways to know: this is Bergson's response to the rationalistic 
categorising of all possible conditions for the attainment of knowledge. 
Bergson and Complexity Science: Ilya Prigogine 
There are at least two ways in which the scientific developments elaborated by 
Prigogine can be broadly understood within a Bergsonian framework. Firstly, Prigogine 
quickly acknowledges the cinematographical nature of pre-complexity science and 
secondly, indicating how this precise view is caused by the notion of time as an illusion, 
Prigogine relates the problematic of the reversibility of time with the conceptualisation of 
human freedom. For Prigogine it is precisely the positing of temporality as the creative 
drive inherent to the living and inert elements of nature that pushes a number of thinkers, 
including himself, to equate Complexity science with 'freedom'. 
On the other hand, numerous philosophers within the framework of post-
structural thought have also been enormously inspired by the Bergsonian time / freedom 
nexus. Amongst these, one of the more striking examples is Deleuze. Whilst the links 
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between Bergsonism and Deleuze have been covered extensively elsewhere^^, as indeed 
have been the relations between Deleuze / Guattari and Complexity science"^; the 
purpose of the current work is to situate all these relations within a Foucauldian 
framework. And it is precisely Foucault's concise definition of 'modernity' as an 
organisation of knowledge that shall provide some parameters for the understanding of 
these relations: it seems obvious, for instance, that much debate concerning the nature of 
Complexity science is flawed precisely because it lacks a general philosophical landscape 
within which notions such as 'modernity' can be situated. 
Deleuze himself wrote a book on Bergson, see Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, (New 
York: Zone Books, 1988). For other works on Deleuze and Bergson see, for example: 
Constantin Boundas, "Deleuze - Bergson: An Ontology of the Virtual," in Deleuze: A 
Critical Reader, ed. Paul Patton (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996); Paul Douglass, 
"Deleuze's Bergson: Bergson Redux," in The Crisis in Modernism: Bergson and the 
Vitalist Controversy, ed. Frederick Burwick and Paul Douglass (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996); Paul Douglass, "Deleuze and the Endurance of Bergson," 
Thought 67, no. 264 (1992). For an interesting piece in Italian consider Maria Rosario 
Restuccia, "Deleuze E Bergson," Cannochiale 1, no. 2 (1983). 
See Manuel De Landa, Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy (London: Continuum, 
2002). Guattari's last book deals with the relations between his and Deleuze's work and 
Complexity theory: Felix Guattari, Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm, 
(Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1995). 
3. Complexity and the Epistemology of Science, 141 
Prigogine articulates the idea that contemporary science uses a static nofion of 
time principally by making reference to Einstein and Hawking. Einstein famously 
declared that 'time is an illusion'. More recently, "in his Brief History of Time, Hawking 
introduces 'imaginary time' to eliminate any distinction between space and time.""^ Thus 
Classical and Modem physics have maintained a spatialised vision of time that is 
basically static, and, even today, scientists assume as a "matter of faith that as far as the 
fundamental description of nature is concerned, there is no arrow of time.""^ 
For Bergson, as we have seen, the cinematographical view of time is adopted 
because of science's primary concern with action. To a certain extent, Prigogine agrees. 
For it is the desire of immediate practical results that the technique of reductionism is 
adopted: looking at things on the smallest scale, it is thought, confers a deeper and 
therefore practical knowledge concerning the object under study. However, it is not 
principally reductionism that facilitates the immobilisation of time. Fundamentally, what 
reductionist and "practical' science requires in order to justify the idea of static 
temporality is...a metaphysical dimension. In the following arguments the relevance of 
Foucault's description of the modern frameworks of knowledge and Dupre's description 
of the metaphysical nature of science should become apparent. 
Prigogine and Stengers, The End of Certainty, 58. 
Ibid. 
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Prigogine argues that "Nature involves both time-reversible and time-irreversible 
processes."^" Reversible processes exclude temporality as a constitutive apparatus of the 
process. Examples of these processes can be found in Newton's formulation of classical 
physics and in Schrodinger's basic equation of quantum mechanics. In both cases, 
equations are invariant with respect to time inversion. Contrarily, time irreversible 
processes break time symmetry. In these processes temporality does affect how the 
general rules of motion wi l l impact the system in a precise temporal context. More 
importantly, time irreversibility produces entropy. An example of time irreversible 
processes is the .second law of thermodynamics. However, Prigogine argues that time 
reversibility is produced firstly because we accept to reduce the analysis to an elementary 
level (isolationism), and secondly because we abstract: "Reversible processes correspond 
to idealizations: We have to ignore friction to make the pendulum work reversibly.""^' In 
Foucault's words, these metaphysical transcendentalisms adopt reductionism because 
they "must deploy the deductive forms only in fragments and in strictly locaHsed 
regions". 
Once Prigogine dismisses the idea that entropy might be caused by insufficient 
data or faulty examination, the ideas that follow from his arguments suggest that, i f we 
bear Foucault in mind, time reversibility is a particular cause of a transcendental 
philosophy of objects, that is, a metaphysical system that, as Kuhn puts it, ignores 
-° Ibid, 18. 
-^ ' Ibid. 
3. Complexity and the Epistemology of Science, 143 
elements which do not happen to coexist with the basic premises of a paradigm. This 
causes the need to discard incompatible elements (precisely such as the second law) on 
the grounds of humanity's imperfect observation capacities (due to its finitude?) or on the 
inadequacy of its instruments. However, 'The results presented thus far show that the 
attempts to trivialize thermodynamics...are necessarily doomed to failure. The arrow of 
time plays an essential role in the formation of structures in both the physical sciences 
and biology."^' 
Time irreversibility becomes undeniable once, on the one had, we adopt a more 
immanent approach to nature, and on the other, we look at populations and not at single 
elements that compose them. In a sense, this approach is very similar to what Deleuze 
has described as 'Bergson's superior empiricism'. Pearson describes one of its features 
as follows: "Instead of chopping up experience into atomistic sensations, which can then 
only be brought into union with one another in terms of a purely abstract principle that 
swoops down upon them from high and folds them in its own conjunctive categories, 
[Bergson's empiricism] recognizes a continuity and concatenation between things."'^ "^ 
The apparently contradictory pulls towards immanence and connectivity are resolved 
through the continuum of time and this notion of empiricism. 
To present this point, we must illustrate Prigogine's proposals for a unified 
theory of quantum mechanics. Quantum theory is in a very paradoxical state. Despite 
Ibid, 71, emphasis added. 
•'"^  Pearson, Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual, 12. 
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providing some remarkable predictions since its formulation about sixty years ago, the 
scope and meaning of the theory are still widely discussed. As Prigogine explains, this is 
unprecedented in the history of science. The ambiguity of quantum theory can be 
exposed through its principal calculus, that is, the Schrodinger equation. This equation is 
both time reversible and deterministic, but Prigogine explains that it presents us with a 
paradox: 
The basic assumption of quantum theory is that every dynamical problem can be 
solved at the level of probability amplitudes exactly as every dynamical problem 
in classical mechanics was traditionally associated with trajectory dynamics. But 
strangely, in order to attribute well-defined properties to matter, we have to go 
beyond probabilities amplitudes; we need probabilities themselves [what Deleuze 
would call immanent actualities].'''' 
Thus, by presenting an example using the Schrodinger equation, Prigogine shows that 
.. .initially we started with a single wave function T, but we still end up with a 
mixture of two wave functions, ul and u2. This is often called the 'reduction' or 
'collapse' of the wave function. The Schrodinger equation paradoxically seeks to 
34 Prigogine and Stengers, The End of Certainty, 47. 
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transform a wave function into another wave function, but it ends up moving from 
a 'pure state' (the wave function) to an ensemble, or mixture 35 
As Prigogine sees it, the problem is that "we need to move from potentialities described 
by the wave function ^ to actualities that we can measure." This is a problem that De 
Landa describes quite well as he presents the processes that characterise the shift from the 
non-metric virtual to the metric real within the Deleuzian ontology."'^ As both Deleuze 
and Prigogine argue, these actualisations occur through the breaking of time symmetry. 
We should remark that the problem of moving from a potentiality, expressed in 
probabilistic rather than essentialist terms, to an immanent reality, corresponds to what 
Gutting considers French philosophy's call, to which Bergson vividly adhered, for a form 
of thought that "can and should root itself in an experience with an immediacy and 
concreteness that escapes the abstractions of modern science. 
Prigogine's solution for the dual status of quantum theory involves thus a more 
immanent approach to nature as well as an apparently contrary trend towards anti-
reductionism. This is, in the fullest meaning of the term, a flat epistemology: The whole 
Ibid, 48. 
De Landa, Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy, Chapter 3. 
The analysis of how we move from a potentiality to an immanent reality should be of 
interest to anyone who argues that the events in Kosovo are a simple actualisation of a 
crisis that was simply waiting to happen. 
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is treated as a unit, but without higher, transcendental, levels of analysis such as 
motionless essences or metaphysical assumptions. Prigogine proposes to substitute the 
function that results from Schrodinger's equation with Poincare's resonances; the crucial 
point being that these resonances involve populations and not individual wave functions. 
In Prigogine's words, 
Through Poincare's resonances, we achieve the transition from probability 
amplitudes to probability proper without drawing on nondynamical 
assumptions[that is, metaphysical]...Only by going beyond a reductionist 
description we can give a realistic interpretation of quantum theory. There is no 
collapse of the wave function, as the dynamical laws are now at the level of p 
[populations], the density matrix, and not [individual] wave functions 4*. 
Moreover, the observer no longer plays any special role. The measurement device 
has to present a broken time symmetry. For these systems, there is a privileged 
direction of time, exactly as there is a privileged direction of time in our 
perception of nature, it is this common arrow of time that is a necessary condition 
of our communication with the physical world; it is the basis of our 
communication with our fellow human beings. '^ 
38 Prigogine and Stengers, The End of Certainty, 54, emphasis added. 
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The cnjx of all this is that the 'probabilising revolution' (which characterises the 
proposed Poincare's resonances) is ending up demonstrating that probabilistic results do 
not follow from an imperfect human knowledge but represent a real state of affairs in 
nature. This situation, Prigogine keenly maintains, produces an end of certainty, which 
should be welcomed as enhancing a new conceptualisation of human freedom that has 
not been possible since the famous Epicuru's Dilemma/^^ And, more importantly still, 
time plays a crucial role in this new conceptualisation of the basic laws of nature and 
human freedom. Prigogine is happy to demonstrate that his conclusions concord with 
Bergson's conceptualisation of temporality:"^*^ 
I am certainly not the first one to have felt that the spatialization of time is 
incompatible with both the evolving universe, which we observe around us, and 
our own human experience. This was the starting point for the French 
philosopher Henri Bergson, for whom "time is invention or nothing at a l l ' . . . ! 
mentioned one of Bergson's later articles, "The Possible and the Real"...where he 
expressed his feeling that human existence consists of 'the continual creation of 
^^Ibid, 10. 
For a more detailed account see Damian Popolo, 'Trench Philosophy, Complexity, and 
Scientific Epistemology: Moving beyond the Modern Episteme", Emergence 5, no. 1 
(2003): 77-98. 
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unpredictable novelty', concluding that time proves that there is indetermination 
in nature.'*' 
What is important to understand is the relevance of all of this with Deleuzian and 
Bergsonian ontology. For Deleuze, the wave function would not represent merely 
'probabilities', but it would be a striking example of the virtual, and the virtual, which 
expresses itself through time-breaking symmetries, is real: "The virtual is real without 
being actual, ideal without being abstract.""*" In short, Pearson describes such ontology as 
follows: "With Deleuze and Bergson we have the distinction between virtual 
(continuous) multiplicities and actual (or discrete) multiplicities, a conception of the 
evolution of life as involving an actualisation of the virtual in contrast to the less 
inventive or creative realization of the possible."'*'' Prigogine's need to move from 
probability amplitudes to probability proper (real, existing) entails a conceptual shift 
from the realisation of the (essentialist - metaphysical) possible to the actualisation of the 
(immanent - multiple) virtual. Moreover, Prigogine stresses that the achievement 
consists in moving from probability amplitudes (that is, possibilities) to probability 
proper without relying on 'non-dynamical assumptions', that is, on metaphysical 
concepts separated for the immanent actuality. In this case, the famous collapse of the 
41 
42 
Prigogine and Stengers, The End of Certainty, 54. 
Pearson, Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual, 1. 
Ibid. 
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wave function represents a striking example of the natural shift from the non-metric 
continuous (but Real) virtual to the metric concrete actual. Interestingly, Bergson 
declared that the new science of space-time required a concept of "immediate and 
constantly varying duration" i f it was to avoid remaining abstract and deprived of any 
meaning.*"* In short, with this ontology we understand that the virtual multiplicities are 
real without necessarily having been actualised, and this presents a sharp contrast with 
the rules of the modern episteme, which is characterised by transcendental philosophies 
of objects or subjects. 
Prigogine notes that his main objective is to demonstrate that the spatialisation of 
time is incompatible not only with the physical world, but also with 'our own human 
experience'. Following Foucault, we can understand how the crucial component of 
modernity, that is, the analytic of fmitude, characterises scientific epistemology as a 
transcendental philosophy of the object that necessitates a linear concept of time. 
Through Prigogine we have an example of a new science that, via Bergson, goes beyond 
the modern episteme in terms of our understanding of the physical world. However, 
given the interests of both Bergson and Prigogine, it may also be useful to understand 
how a Complexity methodology can underpin our understanding of 'our own human 
experience'. 
It is interesting to observe how contemporary cognitive research deals with 
problems related to the concept of human freedom. Indeed, most research on 
^ Ibid, 
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consciousness and the brain is characterised by the famous Kantian deadlock described 
above - with the slight difference that the phenomenal is to be located in the very 
material space of the brain, while the noumenal consciousness is precisely that which 
cannot be explained through research on the brain alone. It goes without saying that 
'freedom' (or 'transcendental imagination') is assumed to be located in this noumenal 
aspect: on the contrary consciousness (and all other properties) would have to be 
understood in terms of mechanical bio-chemical reactions. An interesting work of 
analytical philosophy demonstrates how most attempts to understand consciousness in the 
neurosciences derive precisely from this false division between the phenomenal (the 
brain) and the noumenal: Bennet and Hacker show that such attempts are flawed 
precisely because of efforts in attributing the brain with all exclusive competences with 
regards to the phenomenal notion of 'consciousness'."^ The problem may lie, however, 
in the fact that brain dynamics are studied in terms of traditional 'snapshot' methodology, 
while its emergent properties may indeed be only understood i f such dynamics are 
Max Bennet and Peter Hacker, Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (London: 
Blackwells 2003). 
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analysed in terms of duration.'*^ Contemporary cognitive research is also increasingly 
finding an inspiration in the thought of Bergson."' 
A (Short) Genesis of Complexity 
Before broadly assessing the implications of Complexity's epistemic revolution in 
terms of its relationship with a post-modern (in Foucauldian) or post-structural 
understanding of life - and for their related understandings of the Kosovo conflict - we 
should bear in mind Michael Dillon's warning. To "compare' complexity inevitably 
leads to the temptation of defining it. Dillon, however, reminds us of the Nietzschean 
Roger Lewin, Complexity: Life at the Edge of Chaos, (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press 2000), Chapter 8: The Veil of Consciousness. 
For an excellent example of a modern-Kantian deadlock in cognitive neuroscience, and 
of a solution that is clearly inspired by Bergson, see Stephen Robbins, "Semantics, 
experience and time," Cognitive Systems Research 3, no. 3 (2002): 302. A summary is 
presented in Damian Popolo, "Complexity as an Epistemic Revolution: Considerations 
on the New Science in the Context of Western Intellectual History", in Philosophy and 
Complexity - Worldviews, Science and Us, edited by Carlos Gershenson. London: World 
Scientific 2007. 
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belief according to which only things which do not have a history can be defined.'*^ 
Complexity, as a set of loosely defined principles, does have a history, a history which 
enables us to capture its ethos rather than its precise (and necessarily abstract, for 
necessarily essentialist) definition. Since a critical assessment of Complexity is 
becoming more and more urgent, it is equally urgent to give careful consideration to the 
genesis of Complexity's underpinning ideas. 
The urgency is due to the fact that in recent years there has been an explosion of 
work concerned with the implications of Complexity Science. There is no subject that 
has remained un.scathed. Within the areas covering International Relations, it seems that 
everything can be understood in novel ways thanks to the insights of Complexity. We 
have discovered that Complexity can provide insights to better understand the dynamics 
of globalisation"^, of war^° and even of regional security regimes.^' Theorists have 
Michael Dillon, "Poststructuralism, Complexity and Poetics," Theoiy, Culture & 
Society 17, no. 5 (2000): 1-26. 
John Urry, Global Complexity (Polity Press, 2002). 
David Alberts and Thomas Czerwinski ed.. Complexity, Global Politics and National 
Security' (Washington D.C: National Defense University Press, 2003). See also Alan 
Beyerchen, "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War", International 
Security, 17:3 (Winter 1992): 59-90. 
Walter Clemens, ed.. The Baltic Transformed: Complexity Theory and European 
Security (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2001). 
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attempted to construct models of international politics on Complexity-inspired concepts 
of turbulence''- and system interaction." In a way or another. Complexity has fascinated 
and influenced the work of scholars whose names are well known to the International 
Relations research community, such as Robert Cox "^*, Janet Abu-Lughod^\ Immanuel 
Wallerstein^^ and John Lewis Gaddis.^^ This is not to mention the enormous impact of 
58 
Complexity on other branches of social sciences, especially sociology. 
James Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics, a Theoiy of Change and Continuity 
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992). 
"" Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in political and Social Life, (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1999). 
Consider: "Even the notion of the haphazard can be contested, as scientists now 
perceive order within chaos [footnote referencing Gleick]". Robert Cox, Approaches to 
World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996): 148. 
"'^  Consider: "The traditional 'same cause yields same effect' logic that underiies 
positivist social science seems sadly ill-equipped to deal with systemic change. Instead, 
the theories of chaos (recently described by Gleick) may be more pertinent". Janet Abu 
Lughod, Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250 - 1350 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 1989): 369. 
Consider: "The imponance of complex systems analysis for the analysis of social 
science is far-reaching". Immanuel Wallerstein, Open the Social Sciences: Report of the 
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Yet, with so much debate over relatively novel terms, there is a serious risk that 
the term 'Complexity Science', and with it the concept, wi l l eventually be diluted to a set 
of rather shallow notions. At best, the term would then be considered to be useful only 
insofar it can provide appealing metaphors for old concepts that one may want to pre.sent 
in original ways. Worse, the term could be adopted to justify rather dubious concepts as 
having benefited from the latest insights of the new science. 
It is in these contexts that the most simple questions, such as 'what is Complexity 
Science?', tend to become the most difficult to answer. These are the questions that 
Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press 1996): 63. 
Consider: "The moment was one of what chaos theorists call 'sensitive dependence on 
initial conditions:' had things occurred differently on a personal scale at this particular 
time, vast differences on a collective scale would have followed from them. Contingency 
created circumstances in which Wilson and Lenin defined mutually hostile ideological 
visions, imposed them upon the countries they led, and then departed from their positions 
of leadership, leaving it to less visionary successors to determine what their legacies were 
to be". John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 1997): Chapter 1, Section I I . 
" To note interesting reflections on the nature of Complexity in relation to the notion of 
freedom in the Foreword in Raymond Eve, Sara Horsefall and Mary Lee eds.. Complexity 
and Sociology: Myths, Models and Theories (London: Sage Publications 1997). 
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increase the temptation for a standard, and therefore inadequate and confusing, definition. 
This is evident in the latest round of the 'Science Wars', in which Sokal attempts to 
deliver us from the heresy of a humanities-based interpretation of Complexity by stating 
that Complexity is, contrary to what it may seem, essentially Newtonian.^^ This is of 
course in contradiction with the arguments of other well-established scientists who, 
despite disagreeing on what Complexity 'is ' , agree on what it is not: Newtonian.^° 
Sokal's neat definition of Complexity seems to be at odds, for example, with Prigogine's. 
Moreover, an avalanche of volumes, both in 'popular science' and in academia 
seek to neatly present Complexity as a set of strictly defined concepts. The creation of a 
'Complexity checklist' used to label research as 'Complexity research' is all too evident, 
for example, in Albert's and Czerwinski's work.^' These quests for precise criteria, 
which seem to be in line with the (modern?) nature of our times, are not only artificial but 
contribute to a general failure to critically assess the philosophical, historical and indeed 
epistemic impact of Complexity - worse, this failure prevents us from analysing how 
understandings of conflicts may have differed had they been based on an epistemic 
assessment of Complexity. The objective of producing a short genesis of Complexity is 
Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont, Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectual's 
Abuse of Science, (New York: Picador 1999), Chapter 7. 
^° See Prigogine and Stengers, The End of Certainty. 
^' Alberts and Czerwinski, Complexity, Global Politics and National Security. Chapter 1. 
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not therefore related to the task of 'defining', of indeed 'presenting' the object, but to 
capture its inherent ethos.^" 
A timely reminder of Complexity's origins can be found in the works of Eric 
Hobsbawm. Hobsbawm rightly asserts that the principles of Complexity did not 'appear' 
but re-appeared under the misleading tag of 'chaos theory'. The re-appearance of such 
ideas was possible thanks to the increasing calculating powers of computers. According 
to Hobsbawm the re-emergence of 'Complexity' has profound implications for the 
concept of causality. Such an approach does have the potential to undermine several 
'political, economic and .social' assumptions^'', including - as the current study argues -
assumption of the nature of the Kosovo crisis. 
Apart from thoroughly describing the effects of Complexity in the world of the 
natural sciences, Hobsbawm proceeds to describe how, drawing on Max Planck, 
scientific and social, economic and political history are necessarily intertwined, indeed, 
Hobsbawm shows how social events are underpinned by the way in which scientific 
methodology portrayed itself as a new path towards certainty from the beginning of the 
'short twentieth century'. Hobsbawm masterfully demonstrates how modern science, 
seen as a path to certainty, and the "Age of Catastrophes' (or the 'short twentieth 
This is very much in line with the findings in Dillon, "Poststructurahsm, Complexity 
and Poetics". 
•^^  Eric Hobsbawm, L'Age des Extremes, (Bruxelles: Editions Complexes, 1999): 697. 
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century') are inherently related.^ "* Crucially, Hobsbawm identifies the genesis of 
Complexity in the truly European 'epistemic civil war', which was characterised by two 
contrasting interpretations of the role of reason after Enlightenment, and therefore of 
modernity. In particular, Hobsbawm identifies in German Romanticism and Natural 
Philosophy - and in the work of Goethe - important inspirations for the precursors of 
chaos theory. This is important as it reveals how Complexity emerges out of a very (anti-
newtonian) embryonic 'modernity', which was at odds with contrasting (Newtonian) 
epistemes.^^ Hobsbawm retrieves this crucial information on Goethe's fundamental 
Ibid, Chapter 18. 
" Consider: "Developments within 'chaos theory' in the 1970s and 1980s are not without 
commonalities with the emergence, in the beginning of the 19'"' century, of a 'romantic 
scientific school', of which Germany was the primary focus (Naturalphilosophie); that 
reacted to the dominant 'classical' science, essentially represented by practices in France 
and in Great Britain. It can be interestingly observed that two eminent pioneers of the 
new science (Feigenbaum and Libchaber) were in fact inspired by Goethe's - radically 
anti-newtonian - theory of colours, and also by Goethe's treatise 'On the Transformation 
of Plants', which can be considered as a precursor of anti-Darwinian and anti-evolutionist 
theories." Hobsbawm, L'Age des Extremes, 756, my translation. The corresponding 
quote can be found in page 542 of the version in English, The Age of Extremes (London, 
Vintange 1996). 
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influence on the two precursors of Complexity in Gleick's seminal book.^^ Such an 
account of contrasting 'modernities' is also present in Negri's and Hardt's Empire!''' 
The genesis of Complexity is therefore to be located in a moment of dislocation 
between two opposing visions of 'scientific' knowledge, ultimately based upon two 
different visions regarding the role of reason after the Enhghtenment: whereas one school 
of thought regards reason as that which can provide ultimate certainty after the collapse 
of theology, the other would argue that the role of reason is to enable us to deal with 
uncertainty, which is a natural and irreducible feature of the world around us.^ ^ What we 
are referring to in here is the re-introduction of German romanticism in modern science 
through the emergence of Complexity. It is tempting to interpret recent developments 
within the epistemology of science as the re-introduction of romanticism's ethos, should 
James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science (New York: Viking Penguin 1987). 
" Consider: "The origins of European modernity are often characterized as springing 
from a secularising process that denied divine and transcendent authority over woridly 
affairs. That process was certainly important, but in our view it was really only a 
symptom of the primary event of modernity: the affirmation of the powers of f/i/5- world, 
the discovery of the plane of immanence". Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire 
(Cambridge M A : Harvard University Press 2000): 71. 
I offer a more detailed reflection in Damian Popolo, "Complexity in a Complex 
Europe: Reflections on the Cultural Genesis of a New Science," in Thinking Complexity: 
Complexity and Philosophy, ed. Paul Cilliers (Mansfield, M A : ISCE Publishing 2007). 
3. Complexity and the Epistemology of Science, 159 
we say, 'through the back door'. As such, the future of Complexity should be seen in 
terms of the 'longue duree' as one of the possible paths to knowledge opened by the 
European intellectual heritage. 
The broad intellectual movement referred to as Natural philosophy is credited 
with being the main influence on the precursors of Complexity, yet it is important to note 
that it played an important role in shaping the modern European system of thought. 
Hobsbawm locates in the 'classicism - romanticism' nexus another battleground for the 
'dual Revolution' in the 'Age of Revolutions', namely the economic (industrial 
revolution) and political (French revolution), developments that re-configured every 
aspect of thought in the Old World. As Hobsbawm explains. 
The main currents of general thought in our period have their correspondence in 
the specialised field of science [note Foucault's account on the creation of 
fragmented fields of knowledge], and this is what enables us to establish a 
parallelism between sciences and arts or between both and socio-political 
attitudes. Thus 'classicism' and 'romanticism' existed in the .sciences, 2Lnd...each 
fitted in with a particular approach to human society. The equation of classicism 
(or, in intellectual terms, the rationalist, mechanist Newtonian universe of the 
Enlightenment) with the milieu of bourgeois liberalism, and of romanticism (or, 
in intellectual terms the so-called 'Natural Philosophy') with its opponents, is 
obviously an over-simplification, and breaks down altogether after 1830. Yet it 
represents a certain aspect of truth. Until the raise of theories like modern 
socialism had firmly anchored revolutionary thought in the rationalist past, such 
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sciences as physics, chemistry and astronomy marched with Anglo-French 
bourgeois liberalism. For instance, the plebeian revolutionaries of the Year I I 
were inspired by Rousseau rather than Voltaire, and suspected Lavoisier (whom 
they executed) and Laplace not merely because of their connections with the old 
regime, but for reasons similar to those which led the poet William Blake to 
excoriate Newton. Conversely, 'natural history' was congenial, for it represented 
the road to the spontaneity of true and unspoiled nature. The Jacobin dictatorship, 
which dissolved the French Academy, founded no less than twelve research chairs 
at the Jardin des Plantes. Similarly, it was in Germany, where classical liberalism 
was weak, that a rival scientific ideology to the classical was most popular. This 
was Natural Philosophy...it was speculative and intuitive. It sought for 
expressions of the world spirit, or life, of the mysterious organic union of all 
things with each other, and good many other things which resisted precise 
quantitative measurement or Cartesian clarity. 
Few doubt that in the end it was the 'rationalist, mechanist Newtonian universe of the 
Enlightenment', and its 'particular approach to human society' that prevailed. Some 
Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolutions. (London: Abacus 2003): 335, emphasis 
added. 
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attribute to this triumph of rationalism the worse crimes of the Twentieth century^° -
particularly with regards to the metaphysical essence of this approach.^' The concluding 
chapter of the current work wil l proceed to analyse exactly why, in this context, the 
Holocaust represents the quintessential embodiment of a number of modern epistemic 
features and, consequently, represents the ultimate point of reference for discourses on 
suffering and analytical finitude. Finally, Hardt and Negri see a constant cleavage 
between metaphysics and philosophies of immanence throughout European history, a 
cleavage that is also embedded in the 'classical - romantic science' nexus7" It is also 
Consider: "Bauman argues that the Holocaust was not a novum in history but the 
outcome of technological rationalism of modern society and the attendant normative 
socialisation of modern subjects". Anthony Gorman, "Whither the Broken Middle? 
Rose and Fackenheim on Mourning, Modernity and the Holocaust" in Social Theoiy after 
the Holocaust, ed. Robert Fine and Charles Turner (Liverpool: Liverpool University 
Press 2000): 49. 
^' Consider: "Drawing on the ontology of Martin Heidegger, philosophy even imputed 
the murderous tendencies evinced in the Holocaust to the metaphysics of the subject and 
to the hubris of Western humanism". Robert Fine, "Hannah Arendt: Politics and 
Understanding after the Holocaust," in Social Theory after the Holocaust, ed. Robert Fine 
and Charles Turner (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press 2000): 35. 
Hardt and Negri, Empire. 
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important to note the influence of German philosophy on the development of Natural 
Philosophy, Romanticism and Complexity science.^'' 
Complexity, Post-structuralism, and the Modern Episteme. 
The nucleus of the argument presented in this chapter is that Foucault describes 
modernity precisely through the birth of temporality, and that it is this changing notion of 
time that Foucault argues has been revolutionised by Bergson who, in turn, is 
fundamental for the thoughts of Prigogine - a standard bearer of Complexity Science -
and post-structuralist philosophers such as Deleuze. Bearing this in mind, the question 
that follows from a reading of Prigogine's arguments, which explain how Bergson's ideas 
are now being introduced into physics, has to ask whether or not physics is surpassing the 
modern episteme. The interest for this question is somehow reinforced when one thinks 
that the path undertaken by modern science broadly corresponds to Foucault's description 
of modernity: one the one hand, 'representational' empiricism seems to have been 
outmanoeuvred by 'metaphysical' science (a development which, as we shall see. Waltz 
is eager to imitate), whilst on the other hand history appears in modern science but it has 
We do not have the space to elucidate such links here. For a more detaled account, 
see Damian Popolo, "Complexity as an Epistemic Revolution". 
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a strictly linear and homogenising character: much as the time envisaged by Ricardo. We 
shall also be tempted to affirm, following Foucault, that both developments are linked. 
Thus, the argument that the current work wants to make is that any attempt to 
understand the nature of Complexity, and Complexity's potential impact on other 
branches of knowledge, which does not give a central role to its notion of time 
necessarily produces mixed results. Moreover, such an attempt should also have a 
contextual backing for its arguments, otherwise, words such as 'time' and 'modernity' 
run the serious risk of being nothing but convenient terms deprived of any meaning. 
Much of the debate surrounding the question of whether Complexity can be seen 
as a manifestation of 'post-modern' science is focussed around vacuous notions of 'post-
modernity' and 'complexity'. The Foucauldian framework presented here has the 
advantages of giving a coherent context for the understanding of modernity's ethos, 
without necessarily 'defining' it, whilst allowing us at the same time to consider as 'post-
modern' (strictly in this Foucauldian sense) any construct of knowledge that does not 
adhere to modernity's conceptualisation of time, for modernity is defined as the 'age of 
(a precise form of) History', and this precise understanding of History was responsible 
for the way in which Kosovo was understood (Chapter 6). As many authors have 
noticed, defining what Complexity Science is exactly meant to be constitutes a daunting 
task. Many perceive Complexity as being simply the manifestation of what Lakatos 
would call a 'progressive paradigm'. The emergence of notions such as 'deterministic 
chaos' suggest that Complexity is nothing more than a more sophisticated tool for the 
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unfolding of real patterns that just happen to appear as being completely random^''. 
Others suggest that Complexity, in a number of fields, has changed many paradigmatic 
assumptions to the point of legitimately claiming to be a proper Scientific Revolution in 
the Kuhnian sense^^ As it should be clear, this chapter suggests that Complexity 
Science, understood as the set of knowledge practices which, as in Prigogine's case, 
postulate the central importance of time irreversibility; could be understood as an 
epistemic revolution. Thus, Foucault allows us to put some order in the debate by 
characterising Complexity not simply as that which looks for indeterminist, as opposed to 
deterministic, scientific laws; not simply as a field of knowledge that calls for 
interdisciplinary inquiry and recognises the non-linear character of the 
interconnectedness of all things; but as a set of practices which depart in their quest for 
knowledge on the •post-modern' assumption that the arrow of time exists, and that time is 
irreversibly a constitutive element in the formative processes of things and not simply a 
convenient parameter. 
''^ Byrne, for instance, considers Complexity exclusively for its potential in quantitative 
social science, and believes that the new science wil l 'eradicate post-modernism'. See 
David Byrne, Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences : An Introduction (London: 
Routledge, 1998). 
For complexity as a paradigmatic revolution see James Gleick, Chaos (London: 
Vintage, 1998), 37-39. 
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It is precisely this characterisation of time that is described in De Landa's chapter 
"The Actualisation of the Virtual in Time'.^^ In this exciting work, De Landa 
acknowledges the link between Complexity Science and Deleuze within a general 
problematic of temporality. Thus, after quoting a passage of Prigogine in which a 
reference to Bergson is made, De Landa notes that Complexity's link with some 
fundamental aspects of Deleuzian ontology "is not a coincidence, since Deleuze was 
greatly influenced by those philosophers (such as Henri Bergson) who were the harshest 
critics of the reversible and uncreative temporality of classical science."^^ 
As an example of the utility of these Foucauldian arguments, we could consider 
Dillon's important contribution. In an audacious attempt to understand the relation 
between Complexity and Post-structuralism, Dillon's main line of argument is that both 
share important intellectual grounds, but that ultimately what divides them is still 
fundamental^^. Dillon argues that i f we attempt to capture Complexity's and Post-
structuralism respective ethos we would realise that what these two curtents of thought 
See De Landa, Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy, 82-117. 
Ibid, 84. However, Deleuze's relation to Bergson is a complex one, and cannot be 
fully detailed here. Pearson, for instance, correctly reminds us that "I t is inadequate to 
describe Deleuze as a Bergsonian, not simply because of the many and varied sources he 
draws upon, but rather because of the highly innovative character of his Bergsonism." 
See Pearson, Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual, 167-204. 
Dillon, "Poststructuralism, Complexity and Poetics." 
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share is a commitment to the 'anteriority of radical relationality'. This means that 
"nothing is without being in relation, and that everything is - in the way that it is - in 
terms and in virtue of relationality."'' Nonetheless, this commitment differs depending 
on whether this anteriority of radical relationality is seen as being simply that, as it is the 
case for Complexity, or whether the anteriority of radical relationality is relationality with 
the radical non-relational. Here the radical non-relational is the "utterly intractable, that 
which resists being drawn into and subsumed by relation albeit it transits all relationality 
as a disruptive movement that continuously prevents the fu l l realization or final closure 
of relationality, and thus the misfire that continuously precipitates new life and new 
80 
meanmg. 
For Heidegger the radical non-relational is death. For Levinas, it is the Other. 
For Derrida, it is Alterity, while for Lacan, it is the Real.^' Ultimately, it is because of 
the presence of these radical non-relationals that post-structuralism assumes a Poetic 
character, while Complexity is still entangled in its technical quest for an "implicate 
orderliness - the orderliness as such even i f the notion of order is developed in novel 
ways - of the anteriority of radical relationality. 
' ' I b i d , 4. 
«°Ibid ,5 . 
As argued by Dillon in Ibid. 
Ibid, 4. 
3. Complexity and the Epistemology of Science, 167 
However, we can argue that following Dillon's description of the radical non-
relational, Complexity does seem to have a perfect candidate to assume this role: 
Temporality. The arrow of time is constitutive and present in all formations, but the 
virtual that the arrow of time represents is never fully actualised: the process never stops. 
As De Landa describes the ontology of Deleuze and Prigogine, these are philosophies of 
becoming without being. ^ And it is precisely the fact that no process ever ful ly 
'becomes' something, following Prigogine, that the arrow of time can ensure 'the 
continuous precipitation of new life and new meaning'. Furthermore, it is precisely the 
presence of temporality as a radical non-relational that makes Complexity 'poetic'. 
Guattari has explored the notions of chaos theory and their relation to his own work in 
psychoanalysis, and has argued that, following complexity, "In this conception of 
analysis, time is not something to be endured: it is activated, orientated, the object of 
qualitative change...in these conditions, the task of the poetic function, in an enlarged 
sense, is to recompose artificially rarefied, resingularised Universes of subjectivation."*''* 
Foucault's categorisation of epistemes allows the observer to understand the centrality of 
8^  
" As opposed to essentialist practices of being without becoming, De Landa, Intensive 
Science and Virtual Philosophy, 84. Note that this is reflected in the title of one 
Prigogine's most important books, Ilya Prigogine, From Being to Becoming: Time and 
Complexity in the Physical Sciences (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1980). 
Felix Guattari, Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm, 18-19. 
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the notion of time as that which characterises the qualitative difference inherent within 
Complexity science. 
Other attempts to relate Complexity with 'post-modernism' have mainly dealt 
with issues concerning connectivity^^ and / or the possibility of effective prediction^^, but 
have generally failed to address to central notion of temporality, which, as we have seen, 
should be central to any discussion surrounding the nature of 'modern' or 'post-modern' 
k n o w l e d g e . O n e notable example of a study which does address the potential of 
Complexity in terms of a Derridean approach to philosophy can be found in Protevi.^^ 
However, apart from efforts outlined above, most other debates do suffer form a clear 
lack of conceptual rigour when addressing the notions of Complexity and 'modernity'. 
To exacerbate the confusion and the shallowness of such debates, the Review of 
International Studies has published a recent interview with Robert Jervis that can be 
Paul Cilliers, Complexity and Postmodernism, (London: Routledge, 1998). 
Gotku Morgol, "What Is Complexity Science? Postmodernist or Postpositivist?," 
Emergence 3, no. 1 (2002). 
Byrne, for example, commentates with surprise that Cilliers' exploration of 
Complexity and Postmodernism did not entail an absolute relativism...see J ASS book 
review, http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.Uk/2/2/reviewl.html (accessed 26 April 2008). 
John Protevi, Political Physics: Deleuze, Derrida and the Body Politic (London: 
Continuum - Athlone 2001). 
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mentioned as an example.^' In the interview, Jervis talks about Complexity and 'post-
modernism' without ever defining what he means by either 'modernism' or 'post-
modernism'. 
Nobody quite agrees on whether Complexity could really be seen as a 'Poetic' 
science, or whether Complexity is just another classical quest for .scientific laws, albeit 
indeterminist, but laws nonetheless. It would be hard to describe the situation better than 
Turner: 
Large divisions are beginning to arise - between those who study 'deterministic 
chaos' and those who allow an element of the random into the picture; between 
those who believe it can be useful only when strictly confined to mathematical 
descriptions and those who hold that it marks the one way bridge from math into 
physical reality; between those who see it as something that can take place within 
the traditional framework of space as we understand it and those who feel it 
demands new definitions of space itself; between those who regard the field as 
reconcilable with classical notions of time as a space like dimension and those 
who see it as confirming the uniqueness and irreversibility of time, between those 
who see it as a new piece of content within science and those regard it as implying 
modifications in the scientific method; between those who see it as a supplement 
89 Thierry Balzacq, "Interview with Robert Jervis", Review of International Studies 30, 
no. 4 (October 2004): 559-582. 
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to the mechanism of evolution and those who regard evolution itself as a special 
case of nonlinear emergence; and between those who see it as a confirmation of 
human freedom and responsibility and those who see it as another scientific 
reduction of the human to the mechanistic.^*^ 
Thus, we would argue, the need for some sort of 'criteria'. However these 
standards are not meant to strictly 'define' what Complexity 'is': these criteria should 
allow us to better capture a certain ethos, or, 'historical significance'. A philosophical 
understanding of the concept of modernity, as elaborated by Foucault, as well as an 
appreciation of the genesis of Complexity, as presented by Hobsbawm, should enable us 
to fully and critically assess the implications of Complexity. Complexity may not simply 
be a revolutionary epistemology: it may indeed represent an ethos that fundamentally 
challenges our perception of modern life and human interaction, including perceptions on 
the Kosovo crisis. 
Conclusion 
The previous chapter has sought to demonstrate that modernity, as Foucault 
describes it, allows for a number of epistemic configurations and paths to knowledge. 
^° Frederick Turner, "Foreword," in Chaos, Complexity, and Sociology: Myths, Models, 
and Theories, xxi i , emphasis added. 
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That chapter has equally shown that the Vienna Circle marks the moment in which 
scientific methodology fluctuates towards the transcendental pole of the modern 
episteme: logical po.sitivism, as the Vienna theorists formulated it, is nothing but a 
transcendental philosophy of objects. Such chapter has thus sought to demonstrate that 
transcendental philosophy rests upon what we may refer to as the two 'axes of 
modernity', these being an analytic of finitude and historical linearism. 
This chapter, on the other hand, has argued that a number of recent developments 
within scientific epistemology - inspired by Bergson - have rejected both axes of 
modernity in favour of an immanent approach to the object of analysis. This is 
significant for at least two reasons: first because, as the next chapter wi l l argue, the 
discipline of International Relations was constructed as a 'modern (American?) social 
science'^', as a transcendental philosophy of the object modelled on the conclusions 
reached by the logical positivist in Vienna. Secondly, as the final three chapters wi l l seek 
to illustrate, because other concepts related to the Kosovo conflict are based on the two 
axes of modernity that characterise the dominant discourse in present international 
affairs. The path to knowledge elucidated in Vienna can be seen therefore as the 
dominant discourse in both formal academia and in the everyday interpretation of events, 
whilst developments outlined in the pages above (the emergence of Complexity Theory) 
^' For a recent analysis of Stanley Hoffman's famous definition, consider Steve Smith, 
"The discipline of international relations: still an American social science?", 77?^  British 
Journal of Politics and International Relations 2, no. 3 (2000): 274-402. 
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constitute a robust challenge to the very epistemic rules that make Vienna - and the 
subsequence knowledge practices - possible. Furthermore, the challenge is centred 
round the specific role of time; the linear interpretation of which Foucault explains is 
necessary for the modern episteme to exist. The next chapter wi l l seek to bring these 
discussions from meta-theory to the level of specific disciplines, that is, the disciplines of 
International Relations and Humanitarian Law / Ethics. Such chapter wi l l thus outline 
what the theoretical insights presented until now mean in the context of International 
Relations theory and Ethics by providing a genesis of the disciplines: it wi l l be shown 
that the formation of such disciplines broadly corresponds to the patterns outlined by 
Foucault in relation to other empirical sciences. The current work wil l conclude by 
bringing these insights down to a further level, that is, the level of practice, by outlining 
how the frameworks presented until now conditioned the way in which the Kosovo 
conflict was framed and acted upon. Such outlining wil l simultaneously present how 
alternative. Complexity-based understandings would have warranted different 
interpretations and actions. 
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Cause and effect: such a duality probably never exists, - in truth we are confronted by a 
continuum out of which we isolate a couple of pieces, just as we perceive motion only as 
isolated points and then infer it without ever actually seeing it. The suddenness with 
which many effects stand out misleads us; actually, it is sudden only for us. An intellect 
that could see cause and effect as a continuum and a flux and not, as we do, in terms of 
arbitrary division and dismemberment - would repudiate the concept of cause and effect 
and deny all conditional it}'. 
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science' 
Introduction: Science as the new Metaphysics in Transcendental Philosophies of the 
Object. 
Whilst introducing Nietzsche as a political thinker, Keith Ansell Pearson explains 
that "one of the consequences of humanity's faith in morality is the cultivation of 
truthfulness, of a will to truth (think of the Christian confession, for example). Over time 
' Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science: With a Prelude of Rhymes and an Appendice of 
Songs (New York: Vintage Books Edition 1974): 173. 
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this wi l l to truth in Christianity is transmuted into the intellectual conscience which 
underlies modern scientific inquiry."^ Science is the new metaphysics after the death of 
God: such is Nietzsche's diagnosis. To be sure, Nietzsche believes that European 
philosophy (and society?) since Plato has been infected by metaphysics - however, its 
recent evolution into '.science' is particularly cunning. On such basis Michel Foucault 
proceeded to analyse modern modes of metaphysical knowledge. 
This chapter wil l be guided by the Nietzschean belief that modern scientific 
enquiry is characterised by a ' w i l l to truth'"\ which takes the form of what Foucault 
described as transcendental philosophies of objects. Interestingly, the idea according to 
" Keith Ansell Pearson, An Introduction to Nietzsche as a Political Thinker, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 36. Equating modernity's quest for truth with 
modernity's craving for certainty is what allows Michael Dillon to translate such desire 
for certainty into a notion of security in modern political thought - see Chapter 8. 
•' Babette Babich offers some related insights in her masterful analysis of Nietzsche's 
Philosophy of Science: "As the mechanism of contentment in the face of nothing, in the 
wake of nihilism, science is the 'latest and noblest form' of the ascetic ideal." Babette 
Babich, Nietzsche's Philosophy of Science: Reflecting Science on the Ground of Art and 
Life, (New York: State University of New York Press, 1994): 203. Also note the 
similarities between Nietzsche's definition of 'continuum and f lux ' (first quote of this 
chapter) with Bergson's views on the nature or real time (Chapter 3). 
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which there is no 'scientific truth' can be found in the works of both Nietzsche and 
Prigogine: as Babette Babich puts it, 
For Nietzsche, "Thinghood was invented by us from the first". Reality as we take 
it to be in itself and the understanding we have of reality necessarily correspond 
insofar as this is trivially insured by the reciprocity of any relational construction. 
This kind of interpretive correspondence is the communication or dialogue noted 
by Prigogine and Stengers: "Whatever we call reality, it is revealed to us only 
through the active construction in which we participate."'* 
Following this insight - which characterises two of the most fundamental axes of 
modernity - this chapter wi l l unveil the epistemic configuration of contemporary 
international relations theory and contemporary debates surrounding ethics, international 
law and universal human rights. Following the previous chapters, the two axes have been 
identified as historical linearity and the analytic of finitude. It is important to remember, 
however, that both factors are intertwined: in the last instance, according to Foucault, it is 
^ Ibid, 150. I f the identification of Prigogine as the kernel that unites Foucault's and 
Bergson's definition of the limits of the modern episteme and the beginning of a new one, 
Babich's identification of Prigogine as a "Nietzschean" scientists only reinforces the 
arguments on the synergies between Complexity science and German philosophy 
outlined in the previous chapter. 
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an analytic of finitude which produces fuzzy empirico-transcendental doublets, which in 
turn necessitate a concept of historical linearism in order to function. The present chapter 
wil l argue that the metaphysical nature of modern science - a nature that begins to 
dominate scientific epistemology from the Congress of Vienna onwards - characterises 
the formulation and deployment of knowledge in two important fields related to the 
Kosovo crisis: the evolution of academic International Relations (IR) and the 
characteristics of contemporary ethics in relation to humanitarian intervention. 
The first section of the chapter wi l l analyse the evolution of international relations 
and unveil the inherent historical linearity present in its most dominant paradigms. A 
genesis of the discipline of International Relations wil l thus be elaborated and used to 
show how this discipline, as a modern empirical science, was formed on the bases of the 
epistemic rules identified by Foucault. Although the analysis may not seem to be entirely 
relevant to the overall argument of the present work at first, the elaboration of such a 
genesis wi l l allow a subsequent section to explain how the empirical formation of the 
discipline conditioned the discipline's understanding of the Kosovo crisis. In doing so, 
the work is consistent with Rob Walker's approach to the analysis of academic 
International Relations.'' 
^ As Jorg Kustermans put it whilst reviewing a classical text in International Relations 
literature, "it is stated that the discipline of International Relations is not descriptive of 
the practice of international relations, but that it is rather constitutive of it. Walker speaks 
of theories 'demarcat[ing] and disciplin[ing] the horizons beyond which it is dangerous to 
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From this point of view any approach (such as Walker's) that tackles the issue of 
state sovereignty by analysing both its spatio-temporal assumptions and its fundamental 
dichotomy (particularity versus universality) - as the current study seeks to do through a 
Complexity-informed epistemic methodology - is particularly important. Thus, IR 
formations are not studied in virtue of what they say, rather, they are studied in virtue of 
what they (epistemically) represent. 
Also, an understanding of how the modern episteme conditioned the formation of 
related understanding wi l l allow following chapters to discuss how Complexity's 
undermining of the modern episteme relates to a new challenge facing any analysis of 
crises that rely on such episteme. Considerations wi l l also be made on how epistemic 
formation influence the discipline of geography (via geopolitics), and how this discipline 
pursue any political action [ . . . ] ' (p. 6) A central aspect of this constituting power of 
International Relations Theory is its insistence on the principle of state sovereignty. This 
principle represents one particularly early modern spatio-temporal solution to the 
problem of particularity' versus universality. The latter is a dichotomous tension that all 
people of all times have to deal with. The spatio-temporal construct 'state sovereignty' is 
at once elegant and problematic." Jorg Kustermans, "Walker, R.B.J. (1993), 
Inside/outside: International Relations as Political Theory, Cambridge / New York: 
Cambridge University Press" IPIS Book Review 
http://www.ipisresearch.be/download.php?id= 125 (accessed on 23/06/2008). 
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challenges - throught alternative conceptualisations of space - modern interpretations of 
the Kosovo conflict. 
A second section wil l deal more specifically with the problem of an analytic of 
finitude in contemporary debates surrounding ethics, international law and human rights; 
areas in which the strains caused by the empirico-transcendental doublet are the most 
evident. Finally, the chapter wi l l seek to re-introduce the ethos of Complexity as a 
philosophy of immanence in both instances. In sum, the current chapter seeks to apply 
the insights developed in the previous chapter to the development of theoretical 
knowledge, which in turn conditions the deployment of such knowledge in the context of 
the Kosovo crisis: the empirical consequences constitute therefore the focus of Chapters 5 
to 7. 
An Archaeology of International Relations (IR) Theory: From Raymond Aron to 
Kenneth Waltz 
Following the archaeological method, it is important to proceed with an 
examination of the 'monuments' of IR theory in order to detect the traces of the modern 
episteme. The epistemic shift that characterised IR theory, which is identifiable in the 
documents of the discipline, can help us to trace the evolution of such shift in other areas 
of international life. The Aron / Waltz shift in not anachronistic: it illustrates the larger 
epistemic movement characterised by the establishment of transcendental philosophies of 
the object. The Aron / Waltz nexus is at the heart of recent and contemporary IR theory, 
for all the documents produced by the discipline ever since reflect one side or the other of 
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the epistemic change. A l l IR theories are in one of the two sides of the same 'epistemic' 
coin. In fact, the Waltz / Aron debate is a clear correlation of the debates presented by 
Foucault in the disciple of economics as this was trying to establish itself as a modern 
empirical science following the rules of the modern episteme. As following paragraphs 
hope to demonstrate, it is easy to see a Smith in Aron, and a Ricardo in Waltz. 
The objective of Raymond Aron was, by his own account, to create a scientific 
theory of International Relations. He was not only one of those who advocated the 
introduction of a 'scientific' methodology in IR, he also was one of the first scholars who 
presented the enormous difficulties that this methodology implied, in order to reject it 
later in his career. This is largely the reason why his arguments and the reactions that 
these have caused, such as Waltz's formulation of neorealist theory, should constitute the 
starting point of a study concerned with the discontinuity that characterised much of the 
shift from a notion of scientific enquiry to another. In fact, the latest model of scientific 
research that emerged in IR is rooted in this discontinuity, which provides the 
justification for its claims. As the following paragraphs wi l l argue, this epistemological 
rupture in IR is caused by the post-Vienna demise of empiricism in the philosophy of 
science and the subsequent triumph of the metaphysical approach that was described in 
detail by Foucault as he proceeded to unveil the nature of the modern episteme. In this 
epistemic context, and given the well documented relation between developments in the 
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philosophy of science and in IR theory (and practice) it becomes particularly important to 
address questions related to the nature of such science (see Chapter 3).^ 
As Jean Jacques Roche explains, Aron's reference was the discipline of political 
economy, a discipline that had pushed forward its degree of theorisation/ Walras and 
Pareto had already noticed the reductionism that characterised this area, but it was thanks 
to this feature that political economy managed to give a simplified vision of a complex 
reality. This reductionism, however, did not adversely affect the utility of Keynes's 
'General Theory', for example. This theory was possible because Keynes had identified 
a number of interdependent and dependent variables, which shaped the basis of his 
theoretical effort. This was also the underlying idea of Aron's Y'aix et Guerre entre 
^ Consider, for example, Steve Smith, "Positivism and Beyond", in International Theory: 
Positivism and Beyond, edited by Ken Booth, Steve Smith, and Maya Zalewski, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Steve Smith and Martin HoUis, 
Explaining and Understanding International Relations, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996); Steve Smith and Ken Booth, eds. International Relations Theory 
Today, (Polity Press, 1995), and, more importantly, Jim George, Discourses of Global 
Politics: Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations, (London: Palgrave 
McMillan 1994). 
^ Jean Jacques Roche, Theories des Relations Internationales, (Paris: Montchrestien 
1999), 10-17. 
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Nations? The purpose of this work was firstly to identify a field proper to 'International 
Relations' by elucidating its most obvious defining point: the ultimate legal and 
legitimate reliance on armed force by all of the actors involved in the field, in other 
words, the total lack of a common source of sovereignty. On this defining assumption 
Aron began to identify categories within which generalities could be detected, and 
categories which were more 'anomalous'.^ This categorisation required the detection of a 
certain number of dependant and interdependent data. 
However, in a famous article published in 1967, Aron had to accept defeat by 
stating that a scientific theory of IR was illusionary for a number of reasons. '° First, we 
should consider Aron's notion of 'theory'. According to Aron there are two definitions 
of 'theory' in the Western philosophical tradition. The first equates a theory to a 
'philosophy'. This definition places the word 'theory' at odds with the notion of practice: 
to have a particular theory about something is equivalent to making reference to a 
particular philosophy, thus, in this sense, the more something is 'theoretical' the least it is 
anchored to 'practice'. The second definition of theory is the one we find in 'scientific' 
Raymond Aron, Peace and War: a Theoiy of International Relations, (New York: 
Praeger 1966). 
^ As Explained by Stanley Hoffmann, "Theories et Relations Internationales," Revue 
Frangaise de Science Politique, March (1961), 427. 
Raymond Aron, "Qu'est-ce qu'une Theorie des Relations Internationales?," Revue 
Frangaise de Science Politique, October (1967), 837-861. 
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practice: In this sense, "a theory represents an hypothetical-deductive system, that is 
constituted by a number of propositions in which the terms are rigorously defined and the 
relations between these terms (or variables) often take a mathematical form. This system 
is elaborated from a conceptualisation of a perceived or obsei-ved reality..."^^ This 
suggests that, according to Aron, a scientific theory must be grounded on empirical 
reality. This makes of Aron an empiricist, and as such, it makes of Aron an intellectual 
that should have faced the challenges of empiricism as these were presented by the 
Vienna Circle. 
Aron knew that the relationship between theory and reality is more complicated 
than what the quote above suggests. For instance, Aron recognised that political 
economy must be founded on a least two presuppositions which cannot be qualified as 
being strictly empirically objective. These are the criteria of isolation and of idealisation: 
"...pure theory implies the creation of a well defined system (the economic system) 
within a more general system (global society) and the definition of a Active actor (the 
homo economicus) which differs drastically from real actors."'" Aron also states that 
economic theory "substitutes effective economic life with an artificial market, where not 
real man interact, but subjects of which the characteristics are determined by the 
" Ibid, 838, my translation, emphasis added. 
' - I b id , 839. 
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economist, who dispose of perfect information and who have a defined unique objective: 
the maximisation of any given quantity."'"^ 
Axon's interest for political economy, that is, for a modern empirical science; is 
interesting precisely because of the tensions between 'theory' (the metaphysical) and 
'practice' (the empirical). Interestingly, Waltz's inspiration is also to be found within this 
empirical science, but while Aron is interested in macroeconomic Keynesianism, Waltz is 
interested in microeconomic theory. In Aron's reference to political economy, the 
tension is obvious: while, as the above quote suggests, pure theory forms 
conceptualisations from empirical reality; this reality must be limited and defined...by 
conceptualisations. Needless to say, we find in Aron's description of political economy 
all the features of the modern empirical sciences; the subject 'man' is analysed through 
the notion of interest which becomes, as Foucault describes it, the transcendental notion 
of desire (the experienced object). Moreover, it is the transcendental and eschatological 
notion of desire, that is the criteria of idealisation; which defines the analytic finitude of 
man as an object of enquiry for the organism 'political economy'. 
Thus, Aron considers that "the progress of the economic sciences are due to a 
constant dialectic between theory an empirical reality."''' The relationship between 
'theory' (the formulation of transcendental notions) and empirical reality (the 
phenomenal world that is experienced by men) is qualified as being dialectical. This is so 
'•^Ibid. 
Ibid, 840. 
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because in the relationship between the simplified models of economic theory and the 
reality they are supposed to explain, both factors are mutually constituted. Nonetheless, 
we cannot fail to acknowledge that in this tense relationship the 'empirical world' has the 
last word, and determines the validity of the criteria of isolation and of idealisation 
which, in turn, condition the study of the 'real' world. I f we consider Aron's 
categorisation of the six main factors which characterise economic theory as a 'science', 
the above suggestion becomes evident. As the first and second points, Aron explains that 
in order to isolate a sub-system, it is necessary to define it in terms of what makes it 
different and particular. Second, scientific progress is based in a continuous relationship 
between simplified models and empirical observation. Third, idealisations are made, but 
these are rooted on the empirical world.'"'' 
The fact that even idealisations must remain anchored to the empirical world 
characterises what Aron means when he says that economic theory is 'scientific': such a 
theory can certainly be constituted by theoretical models, but such models are only 
possible once empirical research demonstrates what are the general 'essential 
Consider: "During the last thirty years, the progress of scientific economic knowledge 
has been based mainly on empirical, statistical and descriptive studies. Empirical and 
statistical studies have allowed analysts to become conscious of essential phenomena...It 
is national accountancy, much more than theory, that has given governments the means to 
better master economic fluctuations." Ibid, 841. 
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phenomena' which can be eventually simplified through models that artificially isolate 
and idealise these phenomena. 
Waltz summarised the reasons why Paix et Guerre, by the account of its author, 
had allegedly failed:'^ 
1) There are a multitude of factors which do not allow the isolation of domestic politics 
from the area of international politics. The defining point of the discipline, anarchy, did 
not allow an effective separation of the field and the establishment of adequate 
parameters of study. 
2) The State, as the principal actor, does not necessarily pursue a unique goal defined in 
terms of national interest or even security. In other words, it is extremely difficult to 
rationalise the main actors, while economic theory, for example, managed relative 
success by rationalising the consumer and turning it into homo economicus. 
3) There is an impossibility to distinguish dependant variables from independent 
variables, which are supposed to provide the grounds for casual explanation. 
'^ Kenneth Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory", Journal of International 
Affairs 44, no. 1 (1990): 21-37. It is important to note that Waltz's formulation of 
neorelaism comes precisely as a reaction to Aron's argument on the impossibility of 
establishing a scientific theory of IR. 
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4) There is an absence of quantitative data upon which researchers could rely. 
5) There is an absence of an automatic restoration of equilibrium, which would suggest 
the presence of general patterns. 
6) Finally, and partially because of the arguments exposed, the theoretical field of IR as 
defined by Aron does not offer the possibility to predict or act in the 'real' world of 
relations between state units. 
As a consequence of all this, Aron concluded that it was only possible to study IR 
as some sort of sociology defined as an intermediary between theory and events (and is 
this not, after all, what the latest 'social turn' in IR seeks to do? Are scholars such as 
Wendt simply picking up IR theory where Aron left it in the 6 0 s ? ) . T h u s , "the field of 
IR does not allow the construction of a scientific theory, not because of the insufficient 
number of concepts but because the very nature of the field cannot be reduced to a unique 
approach."'^ This is a conviction that French political scientists have shared for quite a 
Roche, Jean Jacques. Theories des Relations Internationales, 9-17. 
Ibid. 17, my translation. 
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long time, and these show no signs of changing idea.'^ Incidentally, this message also 
communicates the idea that IR can only be studied with interpretative (Weberian) 
methods, which could roughly fall within what Hollis and Smith defined as 
'Understanding'."° 
It is therefore probably correct to affirm that Aron's problems arise from the 
empirical world of IR. It is this empirical world that presents the six obstacles which 
have been enumerated. There is not, for instance, a strictly objective empirical factor that 
can differentiate the internal from the external. An 'internal' condition within France, for 
example, may trigger an 'external', or 'international', response by Germany, and vice-
versa. The absence of quantitative data and of stability mechanisms further advances our 
reasons to believe that Aron is facing, as an empiricist, an empirical world which simply 
cannot be isolated, nor quantified. Additionally, Aron makes it quite clear that the notion 
of 'anarchy' as the defining property of the system cannot account for the behaviour of 
states: the transcendental notion of anarchy does not make states unitary and rational 
actors as the notion of self interest turns humans into precisely that son of unitary and 
Anecdotally, when a Professor of Political Science at the Institute for Political Studies 
in Lyon finished reading Wendt's Social Theory of International Politics, he came into 
the classroom the day after and solemnly declared " I am quite sure I have read the same 
book 40 years ago - Monsieur Wendt has forgotten our Aron". 
"° Steve Smith and Martin Hollis, Explaining and Understanding International Relations, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
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rational actors."' Anarchy (or self help), unlike Interest or Desire, does not seem to be a 
functionally viable transcendental. 
Opponents were quick to point out that Aron - and other 'backward positivist' 
like him - had missed the point. Vienna had already dealt with the issue of empiricism as 
a valid - and exclusive - ground for the formulation of scientific theories at length. It 
concluded that for knowledge to advance, it was necessary to move beyond empirical 
positivism into logical positivism."" Backward positivists they were, so goes the 
argument, because they had not incorporated the lessons of great debates, like those 
"' As Aron put it: "Can this definition [absence of common source of sovereignty] serve 
as the foundation of a scientific theory...? There can be no scientific theory of 
international relations because we cannot assume that actors, under any historical period 
or within any system, pursue a unique objective: the conscious or unconscious wi l l to 
maximise power. Those who suppose the actor's wi l l to 'maximise power' do not even 
understand the basic mistake inherent in the terms they are using." Aron, "Qu'est-ce 
qu'une Theorie des Relations Internationales", 846-7. 
"" As Smouts argues, "traditionalists close to the English School and those who assumed, 
like Raymond Aron, that the multitude of simultaneously pursued empirical objectives 
characterised state actors as being too un-determinist to formulate a proper theory, with 
premises, hypothesis and laws, these were categorised as backward positivists, unable to 
formulate Science." Marie Claude Smouts, Les Nouvelles Relations Internationales, 
(Paris: Presses de Science Politique 1998), 16, my translation. 
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provoked by the Vienna Circle, which precisely dealt with the problems that arise when 
we try to formulate what has been defined as non-empirical science. They failed to move 
IR from classical empirical positivism to some sort of 'logical positivism'. 
Reconsider the arguments presented in Chapter 2: for realists theory precedes any 
analysis, theory is a conceptual construct, these constructs are neither 'true' nor 'false', 
but simply useful or not. As Foucault explains, the irreducible notions that organise 
organisms in the modern episteme are not 'accessible', they are not really 'there': but 
they limit, and at the same time ground, the possibilities for understanding." Theories 
explain laws. Here is when this reference to the philosophy of science becomes relevant 
for considerations on IR theory. Indeed, after an analysis of Waltz's arguments, it should 
become apparent that the discipline has moved from an 'anti realist' position to a 'realist' 
one. Or, in Foucault's triangle, there has been a shift from the positivisl pole towards the 
metaphysical one (where modern scientific epistemology and the modern empirical 
sciences are located, and where the empirico-transcendental doublet exerts maximum 
authority), as metaphysical a posteriori constructs precede the analysis of the 
'phenomenal world ' . It could be argued that by posing metaphysical constructs at the 
core of the scientific enterprise, science elaborated a transcendental philosophy of the 
object, as the subjects of the scientific inquiry are analysed by their relation to these 
~^ "In their essence [Life, Will, Word] they are outside knowledge, hut for this very 
reason, they are the condition to attain knowledge...", Foucault, Les Mots et les Choses, 
257. 
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presuppositions, theoretical constructs...or transcendental objects. These also represent 
what Kuhn calls scientific paradigms. Crucially, since metaphysical theorising is where 
the axes of modernity enjoy maximum authority, it will be argued that an analytic of 
finitude and historical linearity condition the way in which the modern empirical science 
of IR has been constructed. Thus, the following paragraphs will demonstrate that the 
immobilisation of time and the isolation of the discipline require each other, and that it is 
precisely this immobilisation of time, for example, that renders interpretations based on 
perennial 'ancient ethnic hatreds' in the Kosovo context possible. 
Neorealism is, in essence, an attempt to discredit empirical positivists and to 
update the discipline on the basis of logical positivism, which is itself reliant on 
metaphysical theorising, which in turn legitimises the positing of transcendental notions 
such as 'anarchy' at the heart of what is now proper 'scientific t h e o r i s i n g ' . I t should be 
evident from the six statements exposed above by Waltz that Aron rejected metaphysical 
theorising. For instance, i f variables cannot be empirically detected and categorised, i f a 
As Linklater put it, "Waltz's neorealism seeks to emulate developments in the 
philosophy of science and structural modes of social scientific explanation which are 
absent from classical realism. This quest for methodological rigour is central to the 
principal neorealist endeavour which is to delineate the main structural features of the 
system of state." Andrew Linklater, "Neoralism in Theory and Practice", in International 
Relations Theory Today, ed. Steve Smith and Ken Booth, (Oxford: Polity Press, 1995), 
46. 
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field of study cannot be inducfively isolated, it is simply not possible to construct 
scientific theories on it. The single most important difference between realists and anti 
realists is based upon diverging ideas on whether or not it is possible to theorise on non-
observable elements, or even on conceptual assumptions."'' 
Incidentally, Waltz's critique of Aron is entirely based on this aspect of realist 
philosophy. This critique could be seen as the IR equivalent of these debates that have 
taken place in the philosophy of sciences. This is where the archaeological method can 
prove to be useful: a precise shift within the modern episteme determines what it means 
to do 'science', different notions of 'science' are examined by the internal epistemic 
configuration they occupy. The shift from archaeology to genealogy would study in turn 
how these notions affect practice. 
Why is this important? What does it have to do with either the Kosovo crisis or 
Complexity theory? In the answers to these questions lies much of the crux of the 
argument of the overall study. In a nutshell - and just to serve as a signpost leading to an 
argument that wi l l be explored in much more detail in the last three chapters - the 
moment we accept that metaphysical theorising is not only a valid ground for the 
formulation and application of scientific knowledge but that it represents, in fact, a more 
legitimate ground than empirical experience, we can start imaging and justifying all sorts 
of things - especially in an age that is characterised by the triumph of techne and by 
See an interesting example in Smith and Hollis, Explaining and Understanding 
International Relations, 208. 
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arguments which seek to emulate, and to justify themselves, on the bases of superior 
'scientific theorising'. For example. Lord Carrington could imagine that Yugoslavia in 
1991 was an 'artificial' construct whose dismantlement was both desirable and necessary 
to avoid conflict. Despite overwhelming evidence suggesting that the vast majority of 
Yugoslavs - except those very nationalist fanatics whose only hope to attract the attention 
of the masses was to generate as much havoc as possible - had no particular desire to 
start killing each other"*, the Western intellectual and pseudo-scientific tradition meant 
that it was a lot easier to think that the region was cluttered with ancient ethnic hatreds 
whose pressures could only be kept at bay by the iron lid of a bi-polar world (Newtonian 
"^  At this point it may be useful to remember David Campbell's important point about the 
real source of violence in Bosnia: "...the level of violence in Bosnia was brought on not 
by the clash of autonomous and settled identities but by the attempt to produce a society 
in which the divisions between people could be clearly seen and enforced. As one 
commentator remarked during the escalation of the war, "those who now say that Bosnia 
is being carved along its seams are wrong: Bosnia is being cut right through its living 
flesh, hence all the blood'". Campbell, National Deconstruction, 93, quoting Mensur 
Camo, "A Peacenik's Guide to 'The Other Bosnia,'" War Report 21 (August / 
September 1993): 16-17. In other words, the source of violence derived from a very 
flawed understanding according to which such violence had transcendental causes: 
another example of how flawed policy is very apt at generating self-fulfilling prophecies. 
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images of gravitational spheres of influence, political physics and balances of power 
seem to have been very much in fashion over the past few centuries)."^ 
We could also imagine that the solution to the various crises could be solved on 
the bases of old census data containing rather flawed categorisations, and that the ethnic 
divisions allegedly characterising the region were more real than supposed. 
Paradoxically, such mechanisms for the generation and deployment of knowledge ended 
up by aiding the arguments of the very Yugoslav nationalists in whose interest it was to 
promote the idea that a nationalist solution for Yugoslavia was inevitable. Thus, the 
West's ideological imperative on the necessity of creating stable, tolerant and multi-
ethnic states went strangely hand in hand with the West's preferred means of solving all 
Balkan crises since 1991: the partition of Yugoslavia (unilateral German recognition of 
Croatia and Lord Carrington's proposals), of Bosnia (at Dayton), and of Serbia (Kosovo). 
Such were the epistemic rules that characterised much of Western thinking: metaphysical 
theorising based on transcendental philosophies of objects (which are in turn 
characterised by the axes of modernity: an analytic of finitude enforced by historical 
linearity) - which is precisely what is being undermined by Complexity's focus on the 
Interestingly, Kissinger notes with a discernable amount of frustration that there was 
absolutely no evidence supporting the Domino Theory which ultimately led the United 
States into the Vietnam quagmire. Evocative metaphysical images - based on sketchy 
representations of physical processes - seemed to be, however, more attractive than 
empirical facts. See Kissinger, Diplomacy, 624. 
4. Complexity and the International: Historical Linearity, J94 
realm of immanence and on the irreversibility of time. From the moment the intellectual 
apparatus designed to understand crisis (IR) shifts towards the metaphysical pole -
following the course traced by post-empiricist scientific epistemology - the two axes of 
the empirico-transcendental doublet begin to enforce contingency on the way in which 
knowledge on the Kosovo crisis was generated and deployed. 
But we have a duty to analyse how the metaphysical intellectual frameworks -
which characterise much of practice - have been formed in order to outline how these can 
be dismantled by a Complexity ethic. Furthermore, this undertaking exposes the reason 
why it is so important to thoroughly analyse the genesis of contemporary philosophy of 
science: for all recent attempts at formulating 'scientific explanations' of conflicts are 
based on either Neorealism's attempt to emulate scientific epistemology after Vienna or 
by Neorealism's critics refusal to do. Complexity - as the latest turn in scientific 
epistemology - also plays a crucial role in showing how IR theorists using 'scientific' 
explanations to justify their theories work on the bases of rather outdated scientific 
debates and thus fail , in their own terms, to bring the latest developments of scientific 
epistemology into any academic discipline related to the understanding of conflict. Thus 
Complexity represents a double failure for such theorists: the first failure relates to the 
fact that the scientific bases of their theories have been undermined by Complexity 
proper, the second, that such undermining has not been taken into consideration by them, 
meaning that - contrary to their claims - their own theories failed to account for the truly 
latest developments in scientific epistemology. As an illustration, consider that Kenneth 
Waltz was, in 1979, considering events that took place in 1922 (the Vienna Circle) as 
representing the latest developments in scientific epistemology, whilst in 1963 Edward 
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Lorenz from the Massachusetts Institute for Technology was engaged in publishing the 
seminal work in which the Lorenz attractor - precursor and key element of the so called 
'butterfly effect', and of subsequent formulations of chaos and complexity theories - was 
described for the first time. These are rather thin grounds for those who chose to argue 
that they were adapting the discipline of IR to the latest insights of scientific 
epistemology as the basis to accuse others of being 'backward positivists'. 
Indeed Kenneth Waltz, by his own admission, sought to introduce logico-
positivistic theorising in the analysis of conflicts. Metaphysical science was introduced 
in 'Scientific IR' by a theory which sought to shape the discipline as a modern empirical 
science and a transcendental philosophy of objects: it is for this reason than Kenneth 
Waltz can deploy Conant's quintessentially metaphysical definition of science in defence 
of his own theory: "science is a dynamic undertaking directed to lowering the degree of 
empiricism involved in solving problems.""^ 
Since the study of how the philosophy of science, especially for what concerns 
positivism, has influenced the social sciences in general and IR in particular has been 
conducted elsewhere"^; it would be unfruitful to reproduce the same account here. 
Kenneth Waltz, "Laws and Theories", in Neorialism and its Critics ed. Robert 
Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press), 34. 
Steve Smith, "Positivism and Beyond," in International Theory: Positivism and 
Beyond. 
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However, it would be interesting to notice, on tiie bases of the arguments exposed above, 
the significance of the following statement: 
This view [the third 'variant' of logical positivism] was extremely important in 
the social sciences, where the orthodoxy of the 1950s and 1960s was one of trying 
to apply the ideas of the main proponents of this view, Carnap, Nagel, Hempel 
and Popper, to the fledging social science disciplines. Particularly important was 
the work of Carl Hempel...because he developed an extremely influential account 
of what is involved in explaining an event.^° 
Carnap had to renounce to the idea of irreducible propositions after the fierce criticism of 
Neurath, Popper can be considered as the champion of anti-foundationalism, Nagel (who 
Waltz quotes in his 1979 work against inductivists) criticises the empiricist stance while 
Hempel formulated a famous paradox of empirical confirmation. A l l four took part in the 
debates within the Vienna Circle, and their refusal to consider empirical reality as a 
legitimate source of scientific propositions capable of explaining generalities. Waltz 
would argue, did not seem to be incorporated by behavioural 'data counters' in the social 
sciences. 
Chapter 2 has illustrated how the Vienna Circle resulted in a profound schism 
within the philosophy of science. After these debates, empirical experience was no 
Barberousse. La Philosophie Des Sciences Au Xxe Siecle, 90, my translation. 
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longer regarded as a legitimate source of scientific knowledge di per se. Within the 
triangle of knowledge designated by Foucault the consequences of this schism become 
evident. Any social science wanting to emulate normal science could take the path 
proposed by the likes of Popper and Nagel, which we can confidently designate as the 
metaphysical path (since, as stated above, metaphysical propositions must be elaborated 
in order to explain empirical generalities). In this path, empirical experience is relegated 
to testing propositions which do not necessarily originate from an observation of 'reality'. 
Therefore, the discontinuity rooted in the attempt of superseding empiricism entails some 
important consequences. This work wil l proceed to outline how Neorealism, as it floated 
towards the metaphysical epistemic pole by basing itself on a rejection of empiricism, 
was constituted according to the rules that constituted those empirical sciences which 
adopted similar metaphysical theorising from the beginning of the modern epistemic 
configuration (economics and biology, for example). 
Neorealist IR as a Modern Empirical Science 
This work has so far sought to describe the modem organisation of knowledge, to 
demonstrate that the decline of empiricism in the philosophy of sciences pushed social 
disciplines claiming scientific status closer to the metaphysical pole and exposed how the 
modern empirical sciences, situated in this metaphysical pole, were constituted through a 
transcendental philosophy of the object which was in turn characterised by an empirico-
transcendental doublet composed by an analytic of finitude enforced by the creation of 
historical linearity. These sciences, moreover, were arranged according to the rules 
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inherent to the metaphysical pole of the modern episteme: they structured and isolated 
knowledge around transcendental notions, and thus created what we can refer to as 
'organic knowledge'. The isolation of fields of knowledge implied, among other things, 
the positioning of functionality as the main factor ordering elements, in temporal fashion, 
within these separate structures of knowledge. This section wi l l proceed to explain how 
Neorealism, precisely because of its reference to the philosophy of sciences, was 
constituted as a modern empirical science, and therefore demonstrates striking conceptual 
similarities with the two disciplines analysed by Foucault (economics and biology). This, 
it wi l l be argued, characterised much of the intellectual grounds on which understandings 
of the Kosovo crisis were produced and deployed through a strict implementation of the 
two axes of modernity. 
The belief that Neorealism's constitution resembles that of the modern empirical 
sciences, and that this is in turn due to the decline of empiricism in the scientific 
epistemology that Waltz sought to emulate, is reinforced by Foucault's arguments on the 
peculiar situation in which the human sciences find themselves. After reminding the 
reader of the triangular composition of the modern episteme, Foucauit goes on to argue 
that the human sciences are to be found between these three poles, and that it is precisely 
this peculiarity that characterises the complexity of these disciplines. As was noted 
above, the modern composition of knowledge offers three answers to the decline of 
representation: the synthetic a priori of the mathematical sciences, the analytical 
posteriori of empirical sciences, and the conceptualisation of man through philosophical 
reflection. Philosophy, in turn, deals with the appearance of man, which is the result of 
the collapse of representation and becomes, by definition, the object of the human 
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sciences, in three ways: man can be questioned by that which he experiences or by his 
very capacity to experience, while the rejection of both conceptualisations, and the wil l to 
remain within the purely phenomenal world, gives birth to empirical positivism. 
According to Foucault, the main problem is that the human sciences find it difficult to 
locate themselves in this configuration of knowledge. 
Once empiricism declines in scientific and philosophical reflection, those human 
sciences that are aware of these developments can only shift within this modern triangle 
and approach the metaphysical pole. The nucleus of the argument is that, as we 
attempted to illustrate, the metaphysical pole (where the modern empirical sciences are 
situated) has been constructed upon the crucially necessary notion of finitude. This 
finitude is double: it is both historical and anthropological. And is this very notion of 
finitude understood as the contingent that Complexity science challenges. As Waltz 
discredits the empirical, the a priori mathematical formalisalion, the inductive, and 
introduces a new discourse concerning the real nature of science; scientific IR can only 
Consider: "From this epistemological trihedron the human sciences are excluded, at 
least in the sense that they cannot be found along any of its dimensions or on the surface 
of any of the planes thus defined...what explains the difficulty of the 'human sciences', 
their precariousness, their uncertainty...is the complexity of the epistemological 
configuration in which they find themselves placed, their constant relation to the three 
dimensions that give them their space."" Foucault, Les Mots et les Choses, 347-348, my 
translation, emphasis added. 
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float towards, and inspire itself from; these empirical sciences that before it have 
conceptualised man, history and their finitude as that which enforces contingency, that 
which really explains what happens at the empirical level. This framework of analysis 
provided by Foucault is much more useful to understand the present situation of IR 
theory than the fruitless and tiresome story of the 'great d e b a t e s ' . I t is also a more 
suitable apparatus for understanding how related, modernity-based understandings of the 
Kosovo crisis have been constructed. 
Waltz's critique of Aron is entirely based on that aspect of realist philosophy that 
was exposed previously which regards precisely the role of unobseravables and the 
validity of induction. This critique could be seen as the IR equivalent of these debates 
that have taken place in the philosophy of sciences. Waltz's work in 1979 begins with a 
powerful attack on empiricism and on induction. According to Waltz, realists (in the IR 
sense) such as Aron and others base their analysis on very problematic epistemological 
grounds. Adopting empiricist positions, they cannot conceptualise beyond what they 
describe. They analyse meticulously empirical data in the hope of accidentally finding 
regularities in the comparison of precise cases. In a sense, this is what Aron does when 
he draws categories (taximonia?) and differentiates general groups from anomalous ones 
(this is also why it takes 850 pages for Aron to complete a general theory of IR, while 
Waltz's account goes on for 251 pages only). 
See Yosef Lapid, "Through Dialogue to Engaged Pluralism: The Unfinished Business 
of the Third Debate", International Studies Review 5, no. 1 (2003), 128-131. 
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Unfortunately, 850 pages cannot account for much, because, as Waltz explains, 
the empirical world is potentially infinite. It is precisely this infinity which causes 
problems: in these circumstances, how could we possibly analyse man as an experiencing 
subject? Therefore, approaches that are based on induction wi l l inevitably face failure, 
they don't tell us anything: that which is potentially infinite, that which consequently 
offers an infinite number of explanations, ends up by explaining nothing at all. Waltz 
agrees with Levi Strauss and describes this approach as 'inductive illusion'. Theory must 
precede inductive enquiry, because it is not 'the world out there' that can provide 
scientific explanations, but these explanations can be based only on scientific theoretical 
constructs, which explain reality: 
Rather than being mere collections of laws, theories are statements that explain 
them. Theories are qualitatively different from laws. Laws identify invariant or 
probable associations. Theories show why those associations obtain. Each 
descriptive term in a law is directly tied to observational or experimental tests. In 
addition to descriptive terms, theories contain theoretical notions. Theories 
cannot be constructed through induction alone, for theoretical notions can only be 
invented, not discovered." 
3.3 Waltz, "Laws and Theories", 32. 
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Here Waltz quotes Nagel and Isaak. Waltz's notion of a scientific theory, thus, is rooted 
on a variant of logical positivism which advocates ideas first proposed by scientific 
realists in the Vienna Circle.'''' These concern the role of un-observables. That which 
cannot be observed, Waltz explains, is not only a legitimate ground for scientific enquiry, 
it constitutes the very factor that can hope to explain observables. Waltz proceeds in 
explaining how Newton based his laws of gravitation on theoretical constructs that were 
not only 'invented' for the purposes of scientific enquiry, but that were later proven to be 
completely inaccurate. Even so, Newton's theory of gravitation correctly predicts the 
movement of celestial and terrestrial bodies. Waltz deduces that theoretical constructs 
are neither true nor false, but simply useful or not. Moreover, these constructs are useful 
insofar they allow us to aggregate otherwise dispersed empirical data around them (this is 
the criterion of aggregation): "...its power [Newton's Theory] lay in the number of 
previously disparate empirical generalisations and laws that could be subsumed in one 
explanatory system".''"'' 
Waltz's ideas, therefore, seem to be rooted on Nagel's conception of what a 
scientific theory is and on Conant's perception of what scientific theories are for: 
'^ ^ Smith and Hollis argue that "...the attempt [to create a scientific study of society] was 
inspired by the works of logical positivists in the 1930s, notably Rudolph Carnap, Carl 
Hempel and Ernest Nagel". See Explaining and Understanding International Relations, 
50. 
'''' Waltz, "Laws and Theories", 32. 
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"science is a dynamic undertaking directed to lowering the degree of empiricism involved 
in solving problems."^^^ Waltz explains quite well how the rupture from empiricism 
translates into a new scientific procedure for the study of IR: advances in logical 
positivism allow and require that a complex and potentially infinite empirical reality is 
analysed through the concepts of isolation, abstraction, aggregation and idealisation. 
These four criteria constitute, I suggest, Neorealism's 'Kuhnian paradigmatic box ' . " 
It becomes easy to understand how this shift determines the answers to Aron's six 
obstacles for scientific enquiry. For what concerns the complexity of our field. Waltz 
argues that the role of a scientific theory is precisely to simplify a complex reality. For 
•'^  Ibid, 34. As the quote defines the nature of the scientific enterprise after the collapse of 
empiricism it is useful to repeat it. 
In Waltz's words, "The difficulty of moving from casual speculations based on factual 
studies to theoretical formulations that lead one to view facts in particular ways is 
experienced in any field. To cope with this difficulty, simplification is required. This is 
achieved mainly by following four ways: (1) by isolation, which requires viewing the 
actions and interactions of a small number of factors and forces as though in the 
meantime other things remain equal; (2) by abstraction, which requires leaving some 
things aside in order to concentrate in others; (3) by aggregation, which requires lumping 
disparate elements together according to criteria derived from a theoretical purpose; (4) 
by idealization, which requires proceeding as though perfection were attained or a limit 
reached even though neither can be." Ibid, 38. 
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what concerns the absence of quantitative data, Waltz reminds us that, for example, 
Adam Smith used very little empirical data in his studies (and, following Foucault, we 
also know why). The identification of laws does not depend on their measurement. 
Waltz equally contests the notion that there is restoration of equilibrium within 
economics. For what concerns the capacity to predict. Waltz states that when economists 
fail in their predictions their approaches are no less scientific than when they don't. 
According to Waltz, a scientific theory does not predict but it establishes laws which are 
sufficiently constant for an eventual loose forecast.^* 
It is evident that Waltz bases his own thought on epistemological advances within 
the discipline of positive economics. On the other hand, Adam Smith's application of 
Newton to economics and Durkheim's sociology are fundamental for Waltz's thought.''^ 
Newtonianism can be discerned in both these classical theorists by the law of as.sociation. 
According to this law, units (planets, consumers, individuals or states), by their 
association create something that is more than the sum of its parts, something that 
therefore transcends units and something that thus dictates the behaviour of such units. 
Newtonianism in physics produces gravity, in economics it produces the invisible hand of 
the market, in sociology society's constraint on the actions of individuals, in IR the 
Ibid. 
"'^  Karl Manzer studies how Newtonianism is applied by both Adam Smith and Thomas 
Hobbes. See Karl Manzer, Thinking in Complexity: The Complex Dynamics of Matter, 
Mind, and Mankind, (Berlin: Springer-Verlag), 257. 
4. Complexity and the International: Historical Linearity, 205 
international system. We cannot see gravity, and we cannot see the invisible hand, but 
these are theoretical constructs, which make a number of assumptions that effectively 
allow the detection of regularities. These also represent the transcendental philosophies 
of the object described by Foucault. 
Waltz's parallelisms with economics show that the international system becomes 
an IR version of the market, and, as Waltz explains, it should be studied accordingly. 
Microeconomic theory does not need a theory of the f i rm to detect market constraints just 
as an international theory does not need a theory of the state to detect the systemic 
constraint of the international system.'^ ^ The scientific study of IR is no longer based on 
'biological' models which attempt to discern regularities caused by the constant demands 
of human nature (Morgenthau) but on "economic' models in which regularities are to be 
found within a system that transcends its component parts. This is one of the main 
consequences of the discontinuity between empiricism and post-empiricism. 
Another important consequence is the reliance on theoretical constructs. While 
empiricism based scientific enquiry on sensory experience, thus allowing for broad 
parameters of study, post-empirical .science relies on a set of assumptions which guide 
scientific endeavour. Waltz correctly points out that the empirical worid is potentially 
infinite, but i f this is true, we must deduce that the parameters of study under empiricism 
are very broad too. The paradox inherent in wanting to synthesise a potentially infinite 
Waltz makes references to microeconomic theory all throughout chapters 2-5 in 
Keohane, Neorealism and its Critics. 
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empirical reality into finite explanations based on finite sensorial bodies characterises 
much of the analytic of finitude described by Foucault and many of the dilemmas of 
empiricism outlined by the Vienna Circle. On the other hand, the introduction of 
theoretical constructs limits research to what is permissible within the theory. In this 
sense, post-empirical science becomes paradigmatic. We can deduce a shift from Aron to 
Waltz in terms of a shift from a strictly empirical science to a science dominated by 
paradigms. It is the 'paradigmisation' of IR that serves as an intellectual filter, 
effectively dominating and reducing the number of alternative approaches that can be 
considered as 'scientific'. This filter also limits what can and cannot be considered when 
analysing the causes of the Kosovo conflict, and when designing adequate responses. 
Unlike Carr and Morgenthau, for example, for whom the 'scientific' method 
meant different things at different times and established different dichotomies, 
paradigms, precisely because they are the result of metaphysical theorising and not of 
'reality', abruptly determine what is scientific on more exclusionary basis. To be sure, 
Kuhn argues that science has always been paradigmatic: scientists always relied on 
assumptions to make sense of their research. However, it can be argued, as Kuhn does, 
that the social sciences, including IR, were at a pre-paradigmatic stage. The adoption of 
paradigmatic science also implies the adoption of all its inconveniences (see Kuhn's 
definition of 'normal science' in Chapter 2). 
Paradigmatic science involves the procedures elaborated by Waltz (abstraction, 
isolation, idealisation and aggregation) which are supposed to replace procedures based 
on induction. These are the limits of what Kuhn calls the 'preformed and relatively 
inflexible box'. The attempt to force social reality into it has not gone unchallenged. We 
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can here note that Waltz's idea of the nature of scientific enquiry is extremely close to 
Kuhn's description of normal science. Indeed, Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
is dedicated to Conant, Kuhn's Professor, and key reference for Waltz when it comes to 
justify his anti-empiricist stance."*' 
Waltz wants to detect regularities, not change, and he is therefore not interested 
with alternative theories which could explain new phenomena. That which does not f i t 
into the box is relegated to secondary importance, and this could be seen as the roots of 
the IR / International Political Economy (IPE) schism."*" The critique of Neorealism, and 
the consequent fragmentation of IR theory, exposes substantial similarities with the 
description of paradigmatic science as exposed by Kuhn. Kuhn shows that, in the end, 
the acceptance of the implications of paradigmatic science depends on whether or not we 
accept to 'pay the price' for depth in our analysis. Kuhn's descriptions of paradigms, 
which has become crucial within the modern philosophy of science, is what allows Waltz 
to construct the limits of IR as a discipline, and to organise it around a transcendental 
notion based upon the four criteria of paradigmatic science. As any transcendental 
philosophy of the object, the new empirical science of IR necessitates a notion of 
The 1983 edition of Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions includes a dedication to 
Conant: "To James B. Conant who is at the origin of this book". Waltz uses Conant's 
arguments about the purpose of scientific theory, see Waltz, "Laws and Theories", 34-36. 
See Susan Strange, "International Relations and Political Economy, a Case of Mutual 
Neglect", International Affairs 46, no. 2, (1970): 204-315. 
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analytical finitude and a notion of historical linearity (which is ultimately responsible for 
the popularity of interpretations based on perennial 'ancient ethnic hatreds') to enforce 
the contingency of the object on the subject. Crucially, the criteria of isolation, 
abstraction and idealisation rely on an absolutely contingent notion of historical linearity' 
(the "striking similarity in the quality of international life during the past millennia") in 
order to deploy the analytical finitude (particularly through the criterion of finitude) they 
are supposed to enforce. 
A) Isolation 
John Gerard Ruggie argues that Waltz's intentions can be understood by 
analysing the analogous case of Durkheim.'*'' Durkheim's objective was to establish 
sociology as an independent and 'scientific' field of enquiry. In the Rules of the 
Sociological Method Durkheim's first task is thus to isolate the discipline of sociology, to 
explain on what grounds this isolation is justified and to proceed the study according to 
the parameters established. One of the main ideas in Durkheim's thought was shaped by 
the law of association. By their interaction, individuals form something (society) which 
in turn determines the behaviour of the component parts. Sociology is thus defined as the 
John Gerard Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the Worid Polity: Toward a 
Neorealist Synthesis", in Neorealism and its Critics, ed. Robert Keohane (New York: 
Columbia University Press 1985): 131-133. 
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scientific study of this system (society), and it finds itself isolated from other disciplines, 
for example psychology, that study human behaviour but at a different level of analysis. 
As Weber said, a discipline establishes itself by its method and not by its object of 
enquiry. 
Waltz's objective is to establish IR as an independent field of enquiry. The 
justification of such isolation could already be found in Man the State and War^'^, where 
the third image (the international level) is identified as a legitimate source of explanation 
for the causes of war. Theory of International Politics^^ established the rules of the 
sociological method in IR. We are thus confronted with a double isolation: first, the 
isolation of IR from other disciplines, second, the isolation of the political. We should 
note how both isolations are based on exclusionary methods. Waltz defines the 
'international' as that which is dominated by an anarchy and 'domestic' that which is 
organised by hierarchic structures. As in Cuvier's biology, 'The Order of Things' is 
defined according to the functionality of the elements that compose them. 
Here, Waltz bases himself on the works of Nadel and Fortes to define the criteria 
of isolation. The system must be defined according to 1) its principles of organisation 2) 
the distinction between units and the detection of their functions 3) the distribution of 
capabilities between units which have the same functions. 1) is therefore characterised 
^ Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: 
Columbia University Press 2001). 
"•^  Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (New York: McGraw-Hill 1979). 
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by anarchy. This has a very important impact on 2). The second point, in fact, defines 
states as the units of the international system according to their functions (survival and 
self-help). 3) consequently isolates IR as the study of units (nation-states) that interact in 
an anarchic system according to their functions: all units have similar functions but 
different capabilities to perform their tasks: ''States are alike in the tasks that they face, 
though not in their abilities to perform them. The differences are of capability, not 
function.""*^ 
IR thus becomes the systemic study of capability distribution. The study of the 
distribution of power is more imponant than the study of the functions of the units. It 
matters more to know whether the system is bipolar or multipolar than it is to know 
whether or not welfare provision is a function of the French state, for it is the 
international system that places a structural constraint on the units. What is considered to 
be the major functional system is thus, in anatomical fashion, isolated. The invisible 
hand of the system, the transcendental notion of Anarchy, becomes the focus of analysis 
as this is what determines behaviour. In microeconomic theory, it matters little how 
firms are organised internally as it is the invisible hand of the market that determines their 
behaviour. 
In turn, this isolation of the international defines the political. A political theory 
of IR studies the structural constraint that the international system places on that kind of 
Kenneth Waltz, "Political Structures" in Neorealism and its Critics, ed. Robert 
Keohane, 91. 
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unit which is defined by self - help. Is 'political' , therefore, that which deals with the 
pressure exercised by the international system formed by states and characterised by 
anarchy on no other than its component parts. An anarchic system formed by firms 
would form the object of enquiry of another discipline. Naturally, states do change - but 
the analytical finitude inherent in the process of isolation is enforced, as argued below, by 
the concept of historical linearity. 
B) Abstraction 
Waltz introduces abstractionism with the idea that there are structural forces in 
operation in the international system, and that these can be seen only i f we are willing to 
abstract. I f the causes of state behaviour were to be found at the state level, the argument 
goes, a change in this level of analysis would necessarily alter the way states interact. 
However, despite all the changes that have occurred at the state level, regularities persist. 
Waltz explains that over the centuries states have changed their internal organisation, 
ideology, economic and social systems, but that 'regularities' still occurred. Therefore, 
despite all these changes, Waltz is keen to express the somewhat puzzling idea that the 
quality of international life has been strikingly constant for the past millennia. Waltz 
does not deny the fact that the sources of some events are to be found at the level of 
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states: "Causes at the level of units and of systems interact, and because they do so 
explanation at the level of units alone is bound to mislead."'*^ 
Waltz expresses the concept that a systemic science of IR looks at that system 
which is created by the association of units, and that in turn determines the behaviour of 
component parts, just like economic theory studies the market, and not the f i rm. I f we 
want to study relations between states at the state level, as realists and behaviouralists 
alike did, we are dealing with the study of foreign policy. IR differs from the study of 
foreign policy Aron ultimately advocates precisely because it places its analysis at a 
different level. Here Waltz is asking IR 'scientists' not only to ignore all that which has 
been left out by the principle of isolation, but to equally ignore that which studies the 
quality (ideology, internal organisation, economic system, religion, state society 
relations...) and to focus on the distribution of capabilities across the international system. 
A .scientific study of IR is therefore focused on the permanence of unit functions (self-
help) to detect regularities that are derived for a system, which is in turn precisely 
characterised by these functions. The system is nonetheless more than the sum of its 
parts. At this point the organic nature of IR and its similarity with the evolution of 
economics and biology is obvious - as far as a Complexity-based critique is concerned, 
however, the most important notion that links them together is the notion of historical 
linearity, for that is the very notion that has been undermined by Complexity science. 
Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 68. 
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Waltz accepts that the visual range of his systems theory is quite limited: 
"Systems never tell us all we want to know. Instead they tell us a small number of big 
important things. They focus our attention on those components and forces that usually 
continue for long periods."^^ Or, in Kuhn's words, 'the areas investigated by normal 
science are, of course, minuscule, but...'. Once abstractionism becomes essential for the 
new self-image of scientific enquiry it becomes nearly nonsensical to accuse Waltz of 
reductionism. No more than Newton, quickly comes the reply. And where would we be 
without him now? A l l claims to scientific knowledge have always relied on a strong 
vision of science as a source of linear progress."^^ The implications of scientific research 
become in a sense the price to pay for such progress. The fact that most of Neorealism's 
critics failed to confront Neorealism on its terms and on its own turf means that it has 
been relatively easy for Neorealists to dismiss critics as science-ignorant intellectuals 
who do not understand the purpose and nature of scientific theorising. The fact that no 
serious critic has been able to point out that Waltz's principles of isolation, abstraction 
and idealisation constituted conceptual dinosaurs in the epistemology of science and were 
largely outdated - even in 1979 - is quite surprising. 
C) Idealisation 
Kenneth Waltz, "A Response to my Critics", in Neorialism and its Critics, ed. Robert 
Keohane (New York, Columbia University Press 1986): 329, emphasis added. 
Ibid, 255-301. 
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The criteria of idealisation poses a threefold implication for the study of IR. As 
we understand it, it is probably the most controversial factor of Waltz's attempt to apply 
developments within the philosophy of science to IR. Waltz argues that: "We can freely 
admit that in fact states are not unitary, purposive actors. States pursue many goals, 
which are often vaguely formulated and inconsistent...we know that assumptions are 
neither true or false and that they are essential for the construction of theory."'^^ Equally, 
Prigogine reminds its readers the friction has to be ignorer for a pendulum to work 
perennially. 
Aron had attempted to define the realm of IR as that in which Anarchy prevails, 
nonetheless, he arrived to the conclusion that it was unfruitful to affirm that this defining 
property conferred a rational and unitary status to the actors. Above, Waltz is saying the 
same. But what is it then that allows Waltz, despite this agreement with Aron (there is no 
empirical evidence to suggest that states are unitary and rational actors...) to reinstate the 
notion of Anarchy as that which characterises the behaviour of units? We know that 
assumptions are neither true or false and that they are essential for the construction of 
theory, we understand that post-empirical philosophy of science allows for this sort of 
argument. This is the essence of paradigmatic, post-empirical epistemology. 
Anarchy becomes thus just the sort of transcendental notion that we associated 
with the modern empirical sciences: the hidden, unexplainable force that is outside of 
50 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 119. 
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knowledge (for it does not really exist, it is neither true or false) but grounds its 
possibility. This is an example of the sort of deadlock inherent in empirico-
transcendental doublet which again is being resolved through the transcendental. The 
argument is that, while we can say that units are not unitary and purposive actors, we 
have to assume that they are. Similarly, there are no strictly objective foundations for 
claims made by the 'homo economicus' model. The need to idealise is perhaps the most 
important theoretical construct which characterises Newtonian science. Here Waltz is 
asking that not only a 'scientific' theory of IR should not question the unity and 
rationality of state actors (for the units are functionally alike and differ only in 
capabilities), but that such a theory should also develop hypothesis precisely on the 
assumption that units wi l l react as rational actors to structural constraints. 
The first implication is then formulated in the rationality assumption. The second 
implication is to be found on the unitary character that is conferred to the units. Not only 
must we assume that units are rational, but also that they are unitary purposive actors. 
The most famous critique of this assumption is to be found in Allison's study of the 
Cuban missile crisis.''' In this study, Allison shows that decisions made by the US were 
not the direct result of external pressures but rather of a long bargaining process between 
American state bureaucracies, which all had different agendas. 
^' Graham Allison, 77?^  Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
(Boston: Little Brown 1971). 
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Third, idealisation also means that we have to assume that the system has priority 
over the unit, we must therefore analyse the rational reactions of unitary states to 
systemic pressures. Here idealisation means that we assume states act in response to 
systemic pressures. This has obvious implications for the structure and agency debate. 
Wendt, for instance, argues that units do not act in response to the logic of anarchy, 
because 'anarchy is what states make out of i t ' . Smith argues, however, that Wendt's 
attempts to reconcile the structure and the agency in a way that ultimately leads his 
approach to fall on the 'explaining' side of the spectrum. It becomes obvious that i f the 
study of IR is simply the study of the systemic constraint we assume that the capacity for 
autonomous action by agents is severely restricted. 
D) Aggregation 
Aggregation is the principle according to which apparently disparate elements 
can be analysed together i f commonalities between them are detected through the 
processes of isolation, idealisation and abstraction. 
The four criteria here exposed have many implications for the notions of history 
and change. Waltz is very clear about this: "Within a system, a theory explains 
recurrences and repetitions, not change."^^ Incidentally Foucault noted that all social 
Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 69. 
4. Complexity and the International: Historical Linearit}', 217 
science focused on regularities rather than on change was characterised by the exclusive 
attention paid to the functionality of the objects.'''' Idealisation, just like the other 
criterion, is embedded in a paradigm, and this is what allows for the detection of 
regularities. What is important to note, however, is that - just as Foucault predicted - the 
only way in which Neorealism can successfully impose analytical finitude on the subject 
of enquiry is to dismiss any notion of change whilst focussing on historical linearity. 
Quite naturally, we will see continuity in the past few "millennia of international life" if 
that is the only thing we are allowed to look for by this 'scientific' paradigm, which has 
to assume the alleged permanence of the functions. This explains why time in IR has to 
adopt exactly the same linear stance it adopted in the modern empirical sciences of 
economics and biology. This linear history is what characterises, in turn, the 
'Apprehensions of Time' Anderson argues lie at the centre of nationalist discourse 
(Chapter 6). Furthermore, this is the linear history that determines the way in which 
Kosovo was understood as yet another instance of perennial, ancient ethnic hatreds. 
A l l of the criteria exposed above imply the creation of a-historical science. 
Wallerstein remarks that the way in which forms of knowledge - especially those which 
greatly influenced the study of social organisation - can be fundamentally divided 
according to how they handle concept of temporality. The so-called classical view of 
science relies of temporal linearity: 
"...any analysis which seeks continuity is based on the alledged permance of 
functions" . Foucault, Les Mots et les Choses, 370, my translation. 
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The so called classical view of science...was built on two premises. One was the 
Newtonian model, in which there exists a symmetry between past and future. 
This was a quasi-theological vision: like God, we can attain certitudes, and 
therefore do not need to distinguish between past and future, since everything 
coexists in an eternal present. The second premise was Cartesian dualism, the 
assumption that there is a fundamental distinction between nature and humans, 
between matter and mind, between the physical worid and the social/spiritual 
worid.^^ 
The symmetry between past and future is thus one the main characteristics of 
Newtonianism, and embodies perfectly Foucault's definition of the 'Age of History'. 
In IR many have drawn attention to this main feature of the last scientific image in 
the discipline. Cox, for instance, categorises Neorealism as a 'problem-solving' theory.^'' 
This kind of theories must, by definition, establish temporal parameters of study which 
allow the detection of regularities. Problem solving theories take the world as it is and try 
to make it work more smoothly. Within the latest version of 'scientific IR' history 
becomes little more than a ground where we can experiment theories, and not something 
which is constitutive of the very present 'reality' these theories are seeking to explain. 
Wallerstein, Open Social Science, 2, emphasis added. 
Cox, Approaches to World Order. 
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Thus we are faced with a scenario of ceaseless repetitions, in which regularities within 
the social field are seen not only as being separate from actors (the subject / object 
dichotomy) but also as separate from their own past. Overall, the implications of 
scientific enquiry can be summarised by reductionism (both spatial and temporal) and by 
the belief in an external reality independent from what constitutes it (the object / subject 
differentiation). Ashley summarises the implications of Neorealist positivism as follows: 
In general, positivist discourse holds to four expectations. The first is that 
scientific knowledge aims grasp a reality that exists in accord of human 
subjectivity (hence their objectivity) and internally harmonious or contradiction 
free (as i f authored from a single point of view). The second is that science seeks 
to formulate technically useful knowledge, efficient action, and exert control in 
the service of given human values. The third is that sought-after knowledge is 
value-neutral. The fourth, consistent with the first three, holds that the truth of 
claims and concepts is to be tested by their correspondence to a field of external 
experience as read via (problematic) instruments or interpretative rules."''^  
Nonetheless, despite various categorisations of Neorealism as an 'a-historical' 
theory, could we not argue, with Foucault, that "paradoxically. Waltz's fixism can arise 
Richard Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism" in Neorealism and its Critics, ed. Roben 
Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press 1986): 281. 
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only against historical background: it defines the stability of things..."?"" Whereas the 
anthropological finitude in Waltz's thought is clearly provided by non-empirical science, 
for that is what justifies the positing of (the object) Anarchy as the absolute through 
which (the subject) man wi l l be studied, how is the empirico-transcendental doublet 
resolved in this newly formed modern human science that has just shifted towards the 
metaphysical pole, a pole which is embodied in modern empirical science? 
The positing of Anarchy as that which produces man also introduces the question 
if, and to what extent, man produces Anarchy. Here we realise that, for example, 
Wendt's maxim "anarchy is what states make out of i t " does not, as such, represent a 
major epistemic shift from Neorealism, but simply chooses to deal with this empirico-
ranscendental notion from the opposite direction, just like when Foucault explained that a 
transcendental philosophy of the object does not break with Kantian transcendentalism 
(which, as we know, was posited in the subject), but simply operates form a different 
direction within the established architecture of knowledge. But how does Waltz limit the 
capacity of this man to go an build alternative worlds, is historical contingency not as 
necessary for Waltz, once the choice of developing a transcendental philosophy of object 
is taken, as it was for Ricardo and Cuvier? From a Foucauldian perspective the following 
represents the most striking representations of Neorealism as a modem empirical science: 
" See Chapter 2 for Foucault's description of Cuvier's and Ricardo's historical fixism. 
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""The enduring anarchic character of international politics accounts for the striking 
sameness in the quality of international life through the millennia."^^ 
Thus, although it would require several pages to pin down this argument, one can 
readily imagine what an account of international history would be like once it becomes 
submitted to that Anarchy transcendental, we can readily see the world slowly, and 
linearly, being populated, somehow inexplicably organising itself into 'unit-like' 
elements, and once this process is complete, as the four corners of the globe are now 
filled and all units become aware of each other, just like when Ricardo predicted a 
permanent state of scarcity as a result to the spread of populations; we achieve a 
permanent state of Anarchy...at this point, history can only 'quiver for an instance upon 
its axis, and immobilise itself forever'. 
It is again with an already cited sentence of Foucault that we believe we can show 
how the emerging transcendentalism of the object and the finitude of history in Waltz's 
thought need each other, for " i t took the suspension, and, as it were, the placing between 
parentheses, of that kind of history to give the beings of nature and the products of labour 
[and, why not, the products of Anarchy], a historicity that would enable modem thought 
to encompass them, and subsequently to deploy the discursive science of their 
succession...""''^ Waltz can offer a discursive science of the succession of events in 
international politics: by ensuring that Anarchy stops history, and that history limits men. 
Waltz, Theoiy of International Politics, 66, emphasis added. 
See Chapter 2. 
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Neorealism argues that successions of events are to be understood through the 
distribution of capabilities across functionally alike elements, because just as all men 
experience labour, it is their time and their pain; all units experience Anarchy. Here too 
we see how the anthropological versant of finitude, the fact that we can be allowed, 
contra Aron, to consider that, after all, Anarchy does determine what states can or cannot 
do; relates to an historical versant of finitude, for anarchy, with its truth, is posited in 
time, and time is therefore finite. 
It is essential that we understand Neorealism's epistemic context i f we are to 
criticise it in a constructive way. The real problem with arguments such as those 
presented in Ashley's critique^^ is that what the likes of Ashley regard as Neorelism's 
poverty is precisely what Neorealists regard as a strength: paradigmatic science (which is 
responsible for the principles of isolation, abstraction and idealisation Ashley is so keen 
in attacking). No wonder Waltz dismisses Ashley in just 5 pages.^' Accusing 
Neorealism of idealising states is about as meaningful as blaming vegetarians for not 
recognising the merits of eating meat. On the other hand, understanding the epistemic 
genesis of Neorealism is crucial for it equates to understanding the epistemic context in 
which knowledge on the nature of crisis - including the Kosovo crisis - was generated 
and deployed. Complexity offers a mechanism for undermining such knowledge in its 
own terms. Incidentally, debates over the nature of Waltz's theory are all but dead. 
Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism". 
^' Waltz, "A Response to my Critics", 337-341. 
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Ewan Harrison continued the legacy through a number of recent articles regarding Kant 
and systemic theories in the Review of International Studies.^' 
International Relations' Understanding of the Kosovo Crisis and the Role of Critical 
Geopolitics 
Whereas the discipline of Critical Geopolitics seeks to examine social 
constructions of space^^, new turns in post-structuralist International Relations, 
anthropology and sociology seek to analyse the social construction of time^'^ By 
reframing, questioning and exploring the natures of time and space, these approaches 
^' Ewan Harrison, "Waltz, Kant and Systemic Approaches to International Relations", 
Review of International Studies 28 (2002), 143-162 . 
•^^  Consider: "Geography was not something already possessed by the earth but an active 
writing of the earth by an expanding, centralizing imperial state. It was not a noun but a 
verb, a geo-graphing, an earth writing by ambitious endo-colonizing and exocolonizing 
states who sought to seize space and organize it to fit their own cultural visions and 
material interests". Gearoid 6 Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, (London: Routledge 1996), 
2. 
An evident example is Benedict Anderson's efforts in the section entitled 
"Apprehensions of Time" in Imagined Communities, 22-36. 
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resemble Prigogine's efforts in relation to time^'' and the efforts of countless others who 
sought to re-examine the nature of space in relation to the new discoveries of quantum 
mechanics and of Complexity s c i e n c e . W e also know that some of the pioneers of 
Complexity science can be found in German Natural Philosophy, we know that Bergson 
provides the bases of Prigoginian and Deleuzian arguments and we also know - thanks to 
Babette Babich - that Nietzschean perspectivism is very much in line with Complex 
understandings of time in space. Thus, it becomes possible to claim that post-structural 
approaches to international life - through their affinity with Complexity science -
represent a more valid interpretation of 'scientific' IR than the Neorealist attempt to 
introduce logical positivism in the discipline. Thus the importance of understanding the 
genesis of Complexity (as Chapter 3 sought to do) - if Complexity understandings of 
Kosovo (see Chapter 6 to 9) are similar to post-structural accounts of the conflict it is not 
not because we may be attempting to present post-structural approaches as Complexity 
approaches in disguise: rather, this is so because both approaches share the same 
epistemic origin, which is rooted in their respective questionings of modernity's bases: 
the empirico-transcendetal doublet (analytic of finitude and linear time). 
Consider again Babette Babich's quote of Prigogine: "Whatever we call reality, it is 
revealed to us only through the active construction in which we participate". 
As an example, consider Manzer, Thinking in Complexity, 31-47. 
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Neorealism does not fail because it is too 'scientific' - it fails because it is not 
'scientific' enough, and because its incorporation of the 'latest scientific developments' 
stops in 1922. In other words, it fails in its own terms. 
At this point it would be interesting to outline how such different epistemic 
approaches to the issue of conflict generated alternative understandings of the Kosovo 
crisis. An interesting attempt to understand the Kosovo conflict through different theories 
- and to understand different theories through the Kosovo conflict - can be found in a 
volume edited by Jennifer Sterling-Folker.^^ Such volume constitutes a novel approach 
to the comparative analysis of different theories, which consists in applying such theories 
to a specific and common issue. In this context, it is interesting that Kosovo was chosen 
as the case study to be analysed. The reasons given for such choice are indicative of the 
importance of Kosovo for the very way in which we approach the issue of generating and 
deploying knowledge in the area of human conflict: 
These are elements that make Kosovo an event of interest to scholars of 
international relations. It is an event that is ripe for multiple theoretical 
applications, since it involves a myriad of topics of interest to IR scholars, such as 
ethnic violence and war, identity politics, massive human rights violations, 
national sovereignty, cooperation among great powers, and international 
67 Jenniffer Sterling-Folker, Making Sense of International Relations Theoiy, (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner 2006). 
4. Complexity and the International: Historical Linearity, 226 
institutions, to name only a few of the more obvious. Because, as Sergei 
Medvedev and Peter van Ham have observed, "Kosovo's symbolizes and 
exemplifies the relevance of many 'end'-debates and 'post'-debates within the 
academic discipline." 
It is thus that we should compare different understandings not only in relation to the 
subject at hand but also in relation to how such understandings de facto represent 
epistemic shifts that have been outlined up to now. Such interpretations of the crisis wi l l 
allow the epistemic observer to gauge the epistemic shifts and changes within a specific 
configuration of knowledge in the first instance, and Complexity-like changes that 
represent genuine epistemic breaks in a second instance. 
The epistemic approach - accompanied by a critical understanding of Complexity 
- allows us to immediately locate different approaches to the Kosovo crisis on the bases 
of where such approaches stand in the context of the epistemic fluctuations described 
throughout the current work. In particular, we can identify approaches which take the 
outside world as constituted - this is a world in which the actors (or, in Foucauldian 
terms, "Man") are analysed from the perspective of the objects that constitute them (in 
this case, the International System). As we have seen, this corresponds to the attempt of 
creating transcendental philosophies of objects. Adherents to this epistemic penchant 
often enjoy pointing out that their assumptions on the objective reality of the world 
Ibid, 3, emphasis added. 
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equates to their ability of seeing things as they really are - they thus generally take pride 
in being described as r e a l i s t s . O n the other hand, we have Complexity-akin, critical 
geopolitical attempts to analyse how the subjects actually constitute the objects of study. 
Critical geopolitics thus looks at how practice generates normative discourse which, in 
turn, shape the frameworks within which actors interact. As outlined by Jennifer 
Sterling-Folker, Kosovo represents a perfect case for contrasting the two approaches. 
Kenneth Waltz's disciples often refer to the prophet's last attempt to update the 
Neorealist doctrine in a post-Cold War context.^° This is the case with Neorealist 
approaches to the Kosovo conflict. Karen Ruth Adams, for example, concludes that: 
Neither Yugoslavia's disintegration nor US intervention in the Kosovo war was 
foreordained. Yugoslavia could have adopted policies more conducive to 
domestic harmony, and the United States could have been more mindful of 
Yugoslavia's dependence on US aid. But due to the structural constraints of 
international anarchy, polarity, relative capabilities, and the security dilemma, 
"patterns of behaviour nevertheless emerge" (Waltz 1979: 92). The causes. 
Consider how Waltz responds to Ashley's and Cox's attempts to look at things from 
the other side of the epistemic spectrum: "Ashley and Cox would transcend the world as 
it is; meanwhile we have to live in it". Waltz, "A Response to my Critics", 338. 
''^ Kenneth Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War", International Security 25, 
Vol. 1,2000: 5-41. 
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conduct, and consequences of Yugoslavia's civil wars conform closely to 
structural realist expectations about these patterns. Yugoslavia, a weak state, 
experienced both civil and international war. Moreover, the United States, a state 
with unrivalled power, intervened in Yugoslavia's domestic problems and 
dominated international decisionmaking about how to respond to them^'. 
But what is Neorealism's explanation for the crisis, or for foreign intervention? 
Given the scope and scale of US dominance, much could change in Kosovo 
before a new balance of power emerges. Depending on how "the spirit moves i t " 
(Waltz 2000: 29), the United States could take over the whole peacekeeping 
operation, walk away altogether, hold its position in the southeastern sector while 
the European sectors are consolidated, or even lead the way to a lasting 
settlement. None of these can be ruled out. In an anarchic realm, dominant 
71 Karen Ruth Adams, "Structural Realism: The Consequences of Great Power Politics", 
in Making Sense of International Relations Theory, ed. Jennifer Sterling-Folker, 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner 2006): 33, emphasis added. In this paragraph Adams is quoting 
Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). 
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power gives its possessor "wide latitude in making foreign policy choices" (Waltz 
2000: 29)". 
The paradox of these statements is, from an epistemic point of view, sublime. In a 
nutshell, Neorealism is telling us that nothing of what happened in the Kosovo crisis 
could have been predicted (or was foreordained), that because of the anarchic nature of 
the system anything could still happen, and that the United States basically did what it did 
because it could. This basic and superficial description of reality is at odds with the 
promises of a theory that originated in opposition to Aron's descriptive sociologism 
devoid of any predictive - or scienfific - power. Finally, the author in question manages 
to state that "patterns emerge" and that "nothing was foreordained" whilst "no options 
can be ruled out" within the same paragraph. The idea that "patterns emerge" refers to 
what Waltz was saying in 1979, whilst the idea that things go according to how "the spirit 
moves i t " refers to what Waltz was saying in 2000. 
But what was Waltz saying in 2000? Surprisingly, Waltz explains that 
Neorealism is. not obsolete, whilst readily accepting that any change of system would 
indeed render Neorealism obsolete: 
" Ibid. In this paragraph Adams is quoting Kenneth Waltz "Structural Realism after the 
Cold War", International Security 25, no. I , 2000: 5-41. 
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True, i f the conditions that a theory contemplated have changed, the theory no 
longer applies. But what sorts of changes would alter the international political 
system so profoundly so profoundly that old ways of thinking would no longer be 
relevant? Changes of the system would do it, changes in the system would notJ^ 
Naturally Waltz affirms that not much has changed because anarchy and self-help still 
applies. But then why is it that Neorealism does not seem to have much to say about 
what was, arguably, one of the most important events in international life after the Cold 
War? 
Constancy of threat produces constancy of policy; absence of threat permits 
policy to become capricious. When few i f any vital interests are endangered, a 
country's policy becomes sporadic and self-willed. The absence of serious threat 
to American security gives the United Sates wide latitude in making foreign 
policy choices. A dominant power acts internationally only when the spirit moves 
it. One example is enough to show this. When Yugoslavia's collapse was 
followed by genocidal war is successor states, the United States failed to respond 
until Senator Robert Dole moved to make Bosnia's peril an issue in the 
forthcoming presidential election; and acted not for the sake of its own security 
but to maintain its leadership position in Europe. American policy was generated 
73 Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War", emphasis added. 
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not by external security interests, but by internal political pressure and national 
ambition 
But then Waltz concludes: 
Every time peace breaks out, people pop up to proclaim that realism is dead. That 
is another way of saying that international politics has been transformed. The 
world, however, has not been transformed; the structure of international politics 
has simply been remade by the disappearance of the Soviet Union, and for a time 
we will live with unipolarity. Moreover, international politics was not remade by 
the forces and factors that some believe are creating a new world order.^ "'' 
These modern contradictions are crucial for our understanding of how a particular kind of 
knowledge was generated and deployed with regards to the Kosovo crisis. To sum 
Waltz's points, we have the three following statements: 
• Neorealism is a theory which states that anarchy and self-help condition the way 
in which units behave internationally. Anarchy is the transcendental object 
through which the subject is analysed in the context of what can be called, in 
Ibid, 29, emphasis added. 
" Ibid, 39, emphasis added. 
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Foucauldian, a transcendental philosophy of the object. Neorealism accepts that 
changes of structure would render it obsolete, but changes within structures would 
not. 
• Self-help and Anarchy seem to have ceased enforcing constraints on the 
international activity of states. Indeed, Waltz openly states that American 
intervention in the Balkans was caused by internal factors rather than by systemic 
pressures. This alone would seem to constitute an acceptance of the fact that there 
has a been a change of systems, rather than a change within systems, and that the 
theory no longer applies. It is safe to assume that the lack of systemic constraints 
is due to unipolarism (that is, lack of danger). 
• However Waltz concludes by stating that unipolarism constitutes an internal 
change within the system, rather than a change of systems, and that - despite 
everything Waltz states about the nature of American intervention in the Balkans 
- anarchical constraints still characterise international action, and that structural 
realism is therefore still relevant. 
These paradoxes are crucial because they bring out the epistemic mechanism whereby 
knowledge is produced and applied in relation to international life, and prove the 
intrinsically modern nature of such knowledge. Indeed, it is easy to see how Waltz 
masters the two axes of the empirico-transcendental doublet to defend his claims. First, 
an analytic of finitude whereby inside / outside limitations are negotiated is applied. 
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Thus we can talk about changes within and without. Second, such analytic of finitude is 
enforced through a concept of historical linearity - but such claim only makes sense in 
the context of the empirico-transcendental doublet. The modern episteme is what allows 
Waltz to think and say that uniporalism does not constitute a change to the uninterrupted 
linear flow of time but remains merely a change within a system that such linear time is 
de facto enforcing. Thus linear time becomes once again what provides meaning to the 
entire epistemic construct and prevents it from falling apart. It is only through the prism 
of linear time that all the paradoxes outline above make, as it were, any sense at all. The 
crucial point here is that, as the next chapters will demonstrate, it is exactly this 
mechanism of thought that allows the idea of Kosovo as a region frozen in time and filled 
with ancient ethnic hatreds to emerge. Considering that Neorealism remains the 
dominant school of thought in academia and that - as the next chapter wi l l argue -
historically-linear accounts of the region have influenced key policy makers more than 
any other interpretation, the unveiling of the inner mechanisms of functional, linear time 
is of fundamental importance for understanding how related knowledge on the crisis was 
produced and enforced. 
The Critical Geopolitical turn, on the other hand, offers an interpretation of social 
action that is far more closely aligned to ethos of Complexity, especially in relation to the 
irreversibility of time and the social construction of the reality we examine. Three 
excellent examples of this, which all focus on the Kosovo crisis, can be found in the 
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contributions of Alexandra Gheciu^^, Vladimir Kolossov", Virginie Mamadouh and 
Gertjan Dijkink.^^ The three contributions represent a geopolitical attempt at assessing 
the other side of the epistemic equation, that is, the way in which objects are constituted 
by subjects. This approach, for example, leads Gheciu to claim that "the international 
administration exercised significant power in the legal/institutional reconstruction of the 
province, and in its systematic attempts to socialise Kosovars into accepting Western-
based norms of liberal democracy as the only reasonable foundation of their polity. 
Kolossov, on the other hand, examines how evolving factors influence the very way in 
which areas of research (in this case border studies) are framed: 
New postmodern approaches successfully complement traditional methods of 
border study, considering boundaries and cross-boundary interactions at different 
Alexandra Gheciu, "International Norms, Power and the Politics of International 
Administration: The Kosovo Case", Geopolitics 10, vol. 1, (2005): 121-146 
Vladimir Kolossov, "Border Studies: Changing Perspectives and Theoretical 
Approaches", Geopolitics 10, vol. 4, (2005): 606-632. 
Virginie Mamadouh and Gertjan Dijkink, "Geopolitics, International Relations and 
Political Geography: The Politics of Geopolitical Discourse", Geopolitics 11, vol. 3, 
(2006): 349-366. 
Gheciu, "International Norms, Power and the Politics of International Administration: 
The Kosovo Case", 349, emphasis added. 
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levels (from the global to the local) and as a single system. Moreover, recent 
publications show that the scale of analysis is not naturally determined, but 
represents a social construct and can be used to define the object and the scope of 
a conflict. Postmodern approaches help us to understand how a political discourse 
can define the position and role of articular boundaries and borders in foreign and 
domestic politics and thus enable critical thinking about political choices.^° 
Finally, Mamadouh and Dijkink provide insights into how shaping specific geopolitical 
areas according to normative cultural principle becomes embedded in the international 
relations of some national states: "After the Kosovo war at the end of the 1990s, the 
Europeanisation of the Balkans became the key priority of the Greek government to 
stabilise the region and this process was naturalized and speeded up by consistently 
renaming the region South Eastern Europe."^' 
These constitute some hints of what sort of fundamental role Critical Geopolitics 
could play in the context of a Complexity-inspired epistemic configuration. However, 
the Foucauldian framework and the outline of Complexity's defining characteristics wi l l 
allow the conclusion of the current work to better outline such role in relation to the dual 
function that linear time and space play in knowledge-generating processes. In short, just 
^° Kolossov, "Border Studies: Changing Perspectives and Theoretical Approaches", 628. 
81 
Mamadouh and Dijkink, "Geopolitics, International Relations and Political Geography: 
The Politics of Geopolitical Discourse", 361. 
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as a linear notion of spatial and conceptual finitude and a notion of linear time require 
each other, it wi l l be argued that non-linear approaches to space are essential to construct 
and understand the non-linear features of time which ultimately characterise both the 
Complexity approach and a the approach of new analysis of crisis, thus taking 
understanding beyond the constraints of the modern episteme. 
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Throughout the longest period of human history ...the value or non-value of an action 
was inferred from its consequences ...In the last ten thousand years.. .one has gradually 
got so far, that one no longer lets the consequences of an action, but its origin, decide 
with regard to its worth: a great achievement as a whole...the mark of a period which 
may be designated in the narrower sense as the moral one...Instead of the consequences, 
the origin - what an inversion of perspective! To be sure, an ominous new superstition, a 
peculiar narrowness of interpretation, attained supremacy precisely thereby: the origin 
of an action was interpreted in the most definite sense possible, as origin out of an 
intention; people were agreed in the belief that the value of an action lay in the value of 
its intention. 
Friedrich Nietzsche' 
Whilst the previous section sought to outline the epistemic background of 
contemporary mechanisms for the generation of knowledge about crisis, the current 
section wil l apply such epistemic considerations to the issue of ethics, which wi l l then be 
applied in the context of a detailed analysis in Chapter 7. The starting point for an 
epistemic consideration of the issues surrounding contemporary ethics is embodied in -
following the nature of the modern episteme - the question of the transcendental. 
' Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 32. 
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Furthermore, the Bergsonian link that unites Complexity science and post-structural 
philosophy wi l l be presented through a presentation of the Deleuzian understanding of 
the transcendental. 
As Zizek re-discovers and presents Deleuze, the issue of ethics as a transcendental 
emerges with relation to virtually every issue. For instance Zizek maintains that the most 
'fundamental philosophical gesture' is not to attempt a closure of the gap between the 
empirical and the transcendental, but rather to open such gap to the point of rendering 
these fields irreducible to each other. Fundamentally, this is desirable because even what 
we refer to as 'the transcendental' is formulated within our very finite reality." The 
appeal of Deleuze's philosophy, compounded by dilemmas in the sciences and the 
' Zizek describes such fundamental gesture as thus: Not to close the gap, but, on the 
contrary, to open up a radical gap in the very edifice of the universe, the 'ontological 
difference', the gap between the empirical and the transcendental, in which neither of the 
two levels can be reduced to the other (as we know from Kant, transcendental 
constitution is a mark of our - human - finitude and has nothing to do with 'creating 
reality'; on the other hand, reality appears to us only within the transcendental horizon, so 
we cannot generate the emergence of the transcendental horizon from the ontic self-
development of reality). Slavoj Zizek, Organs without Bodies: On Deleuze and 
Consequences, (London: Routledge 2004), xi . 
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emergence of Complexity^ is that the gap is opened to the point that the empirical is 
embodied with an ethos of immanence which in turn becomes transcendental: 
the genius of Deleuze resides in the notion of transcendental empiricism: in 
contrast to the standard notion of the transcendental as the formal conceptual 
network that structures the rich flow of empirical data, the Deleuzian 
'transcendental' is infinitely richer than reality - it is the infinite potential field 
of virtualities out of which reality is actualised. The term 'transcendental' is 
used here in the strict philosophical sense of the a priori conditions of possibility 
of our experience of constituted reality. The paradoxical coupling of opposites 
(transcendental + empirical) points toward a field of experience beyond (or 
rather, beneath) the experience of constituted reality."* 
This reading of Deleuze has a deep impact for the analysis of both axes of modernity, 
which are the object of this work. As far as the 'birth of History is concerned', Zizek 
argues that the process of becoming is the antithesis of history understood in the 
Zizek himself elaborates on the connection between Deleuze's "transcendental 
empiricism" and Complexity in Ibid, 4. Note the similarity between Zizek's description 
of Deleuze's transcendental empiricism and Prigogine's transcendental-empirical account 
of the collapse of the wave function described in Chapter 3. 
' I b i d . 
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eschatological sense within the modern episteme. Thus Zizek finds in Foucault the first 
attempt to produce an account of becoming, or to produce a history of history. 
Importantly, such attempt relies on analysing the immanent nature of such histories whilst 
disregarding (often distorting) the historical context.^ 
As wil l be argued below (Chapter 6), Zizek's understanding of this Foucauldian 
'immanent history' informs his views on the Kosovo conflict - which resonate with a 
Complexity-based understanding - and on the flawed interpretations that were made. 
The Kosovo 'Event' has been understood in terms of the (not necessarily 'correct', or 
helpful) 'historical context' (ancient hatreds, ethnic divisions etc.) instead of being 
understood in terms of the very immanent political struggle. It is important to note how 
this notion of immanent history delineates the conceptual triangle Foucault - Bergson / 
Deleuze - Prigogine (Complexity). It is this triangle which, in many ways, substantiates 
the claim that Deleuzian post-structuralism equates to a Complex epistemology in the 
study of human affairs precisely because of its conceptualisation of time. 
In Zizek's words, "Foucault's discursive analysis studies lekta, utterances as pure 
events, focusing on the inherent conditions of their emergence and not on their inclusion 
in the context of historical reality. This is why the Foucault of The Archaeology of 
Knowledge is as far as possible from any form of historicism, of locating events in their 
historical contexts - on the contrary, Foucault abstracts them from their reality and its 
historical casualty and studies the immanent rules of their emergence." Ibid, 10. 
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The analytic of finitude, on the other hand, is what really informs the inclusion 
and exclusion within an ethical analytic of 'rights'. Here too Zizek finds in Deleuze a 
way of not reducing the empirical and transcendental levels to each other: 
Deleuze is right in his magnificent attack on historicist 'contextualisation': 
becoming means transcending the context of historical conditions out of which a 
phenomenon emerges. This is what is missing in historicist anti-universalist 
multiculturalism: the explosion of the eternally New in/as the process of 
becoming. The standard opposition of the abstract Universal (say, Human Rights) 
and particular identities is to be replaced by a new tension between Singular and 
Universal: the Event of the New as a universal singularity.^ 
But what does this precisely mean for the concept of Human Rights? How can we 
understand Human Rights as a 'universal singularity'? 
A 'Bergso-Deleuzian', Complexity-informed analysis of 'immanent 
transcendentalism' necessarily demands an exploration into the concept of the inside / 
outside: understood as that which remains inside or outside the classical transcendental 
realm. In what is possibly the most challenging work regarding the status of the modern 
episteme in relation to Complexity and Systems Theory, the question of Ethics is 
explored precisely through a Complexity-informed analysis of the inside/outside or 
^ Ibid, 14-15, emphasis added. 
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immanent/transcendental. The collection of essays in Observing Complexity: Systems 
Theory and Postmodernity' represent a rare attempt at critically understanding the ethos 
of Complexity through the epistemic lenses provided by Foucault (for example, a whole 
section of the book is entitled Systems Theory and the Postmodern Episteme). 
Rasch's important contribution regarding Immanent Systems, Transcendental 
Temptations, and the Limits of Ethics^ begins with the recognition that "we have become 
distinctly suspicious of transcendental attempts to construct inviolate and panoramic 
levels of vision labelled God, Reason, or Truth."^ Adorno and Horkheimer made the 
same point in Dialectic of Enlightenment, where they described how 'pure positivism', 
which is the end result of the Enlightenment, is driven by a fear of the outside: "'Nothing 
at all may remain outside, because the mere idea of outsideness is the very source of 
fear.""^ Adorno and Horkheimer do not fear this as much as they fear the loss of the 
outside, understanding the outside as "an other of the all-pervasive administered 
^ William Rasch and Gary Wolfe, eds.. Observing Complexity: Systems Theory and the 
Postmodern Episteme, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 2000). 
William Rasch, "Immanent Systems, Transcendental Temptations, and the Limits of 
Ethics" in Observing Complexity: Systems Theory and the Postmodern Episteme, eds. 
William Rasch and Gary Wolfe (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 2000). 
^ Ibid, 73. 
•°Ibid. 
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society."" It is in the context of this inside / outside negotiation that the Holocaust -
understood as the most radical approach towards the outside - plays the crucial role of 
analytical finitude in interventionist debates on the Kosovo conflict. In other words, the 
Holocaust imposes the analytic limit of what can he considered inside or outside the 
imperatives of Western (modern) moral responsibilities (Chapters 5 and 7). 
The question of knowledge of the outside has been revitalised in the last century, 
precisely as a result of empirical research in all fields, as for example, 
The inevitable self-referential aspects of quantum physics, (the best known 
example), linguistics (the fact that research in into language has to make use of 
language), the sociology of knowledge (which had demonstrated at least the 
influence of social factors on all knowledge), and, perhaps most significantly, 
cognitive science. Brain research has shown that the brain is not able to maintain 
any contact with the outer world on the level of its own operations, but - from the 
perspective of information - operates closed in upon itself. This is obviously also 
true for the brains of those engaged in brain research.'" 
This is the inescapable impasse of the modern episteme as described by Foucault: nothing 
remains outside; all explanations for the order of things originate from a mysterious 
" I b i d . 
'- Ibid, 74. 
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source inside. Consider for example Maturana and Varela, who concluded tiiat "the 
nervous system as such cannot distinguish between illusion, hallucination, and 
perception. Such a distinction can only be made retrospectively, through the use of a 
different experience as a meta-experiential authoritative criterion of distinction."''' On 
these bases, how can anyone possibly claim to have acquired any knowledge of the 
outside world? As Luhmann put it: "Knowing is only a self-referential process. 
Knowledge can only know itself, although it can - as out of the corner of its eye -
determine that this is only possible i f there is more than only cognition. Cognition deals 
with an external world that remains unknown and has to, as a result, come to see that it 
cannot see what it cannot see."'"* 
Even the process of knowing is captured by the organic model of the modern 
episteme: the external as such remains unknown, but it grounds the possibility of 
knowledge in the inside. In the words of Rasch, "a living system has no access to its 
environment. What it presents to itself as the outside world are representations of its own 
internal states...There simply are no informational exchanges, no informational input-
output relations between autopoietic living systems and their environments."'^ 
Why is this relevant to a Complexity-based understanding of the ethics of the 
Kosovo crisis? The real point of the section is that a Complexity-ba.sed understanding 
'-^  Ibid. 
' ^ Ib id . 
'•^  Ibid, 75. 
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(such as Luhmann's) reveals how the modern episteme places contingency on all ethical 
knowledge and necessarily reproduces paradoxes that are inherent within such episteme. 
Absolutely all such paradoxes relate to an absolute impossibility of logically linking the 
transcendental to the empirical, despite the fact that the modern episteme requires a 
separation of the two fields through its empirico-transcendental doublet. Chapter 7 will 
demonstrate how this essential paradox - which neatly translated into the Zizekian notion 
of Universal Exception - characterises the totality of ethical and legal discourses 
surrounding the Kosovo conflict. 
In the realm of ethics, it becomes difficult to see how the self-referential cycle can 
be broken. According to Luhmann the key is to generate productive and meaningful 
knowledge within a modern system of thought which is aware of its own self-referential 
circularity. Indeed, the challenge is to understand "how the tautology of self-reference 
can be interrupted and unfolded in a productive manner. [Systems] are faced with the 
interesting and circular problem of generating meaningful external references where none 
exists. Luhmann considers this loss of reference, or loss of the outside, to be a defining 
feature of the modernity we find ourselves in, and as such it makes no sense to condemn 
it:' 
The NATO intervention in Kosovo, as the following chapters wi l l elucidate, was 
characterised by a deadlock. The very visible disjuncture between the reasons of 
intervention and that modus operandi of intervention is rooted in a very modem 
Ibid, 76, emphasis added. 
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confusion regarding the status of transcendental notions 'outside'. Ultimately, the 
Universal that was constructed and deployed in relation to intervention proceeded 
through a system of exclusion: there was no meaningful relation with the 'outside'. A 
critical appraisal of Complexity, on the other hand, can show that " i f moral codes...no 
longer deliver direct evidence of the transcendental realm, but rather become historicized 
and seen as socially constructed artefacts, the task of reclaiming authority must be 
negotiated within the domain of immanence that has been loosed from its transcendent 
anchorage . "The attempt to create an ethical relation at the level of immanence must 
thus be motivated by a desire to resolve the conflict that occurs in the realm of ethics, 
which is itself caused by the paradoxes inherent to the empirico-transcendental doublet. 
It is in the context of self-referencing notions in language that Wittgenstein 
declared that 'Ethics is transcendental'.'^ Wittgenstein does put forward the most direct 
vision of the absolute inarticulateness of ethics. The world is, the arguments goes, a 
closed system. In such system, all propositions are of equal value; therefore the world 
has neither sense nor value. Worse, i f anything guaranteed non-contingency (that is, 
something that is of unequal value) that something must be outside the contingent world, 
and that exclusion alone would prevent it from exerting any influence in the contingent 
'^ Ibid, 76, strong emphasis added. 
'^Ibid . 
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plane. Absolute transcendental value is impossible in a ful ly contingent worid.'^ Of 
course, the implication of this is that "there can be no ethical propositions. Ethics cannot 
be articulated, cannot deal with the world, and cannot leave describable evidence of itself 
in the world; it serves as the unspeakable limit or condition of the world. Ethics is 
transcendental."'^ It is the closed nature of the system - its very finitude - that imposes 
ful l contingency on items within the system. 
It would be difficult to a find a more pertinent example of the modern episteme at 
work. In the self-referential universe of the organism, the 'outside', inaccessible and 
unspeakable ' l imi t ' of the world grounds its 'condition' within the organic organisation 
of knowledge. The main difference from what Dillon would call the radical non-
relational'' and this organic (modern) organisation of knowledge is that in poetic 
endeavours the non-relational is seen precisely as that which cannot be attained (or 'the 
Sublime) whilst in the modern episteme we have non-relationals being incorporated in 
organisms of knowledge. In organic systems the hidden, absolute values are 
Or, as Rasch puts it, "Since everything in the world is contingent, nothing in the worid 
can express lack of contingency. Whatever guarantees the non-contingency of the world, 
as opposed to the contingency of the facts within the worid, must lie outside the world, or 
else it too would become contingent and incapable of guaranteeing non-contingency. 
Absolute value is absolutely different and distant from the world." Ibid, 77. 
^-°Ibid. 
' ' Dillon, ""Poststructuralism, Complexity and Poetics". 
5. Complexity and the International: The Analytic of Finitude, 248 
determinants, whilst in poetic relationships they are precisely the opposite: that which 
prevents determinism from happening. Non-contingency is ensured precisely by the 
immanent actualisation of the virtual in time - the crucial difference being that the virtual 
is potentially infinite, because it is a process of becoming. 
Wittgenstein of course describes the impossibility of ethics in terms of the 
contingency embodied in language: "a book on ethics would have to be a book outside of 
the world of language, since there is no language in which a book that could not be 
written otherwise could be written. But of course no book, in any meaningful sense of 
the word, could be written outside the world of language...[this] reveals the basic 
experience one has when confronted with the impossible task of ethics."^" And yet the 
whole edifice is built on the problematic empirico-transcendental doublet: according to 
Wittgenstein "the entire project is fraught with a paradox' because " i f ethics can only 
exist in the transcendental realm of necessity, then ethics can never be glimpsed from 
within the immanent world of contingency.""^ That is the crux of the paradox: how can 
we imagine of something (ethics) that is, logically speaking, outside our possibility of 
knowledge? 
Rasch identifies the typically modern problem regarding the contingent horizon 
from which we look at the transcendental (that is, the contingent horizon from which we 
~ William Rasch, "Immanent Systems, Transcendental Temptations, and the Limits of 
Ethics", 78. 
Ibid. 
5. Complexity and the International: The Analytic of Finitude, 249 
aim at the transcendental notion of ethics).'" On the basis of the impossibility inherent in 
fully grasping the transcendental from within the empirical finitude in which we find 
ourselves Rasch concludes with a perfectly modern twist: " i f it is to remain true to its 
own transcendence, ethics, it seems, must maintain the necessity of its own impossibility. 
In fact, ethics is identified as the necessity of its own impossibility.""^ 
The inherent modernity in these statements is something that has not gone 
unnoticed by Rasch. This is where the post-modern ethos, embedded in a culture of pure 
immanence within Complexity, informs the debate over ethics. Rasch's basic argument 
corresponds to Zizek's fundamental philosophical act, that is, "to open up the gap 
between the empirical and the transcendental, in which neither of the two levels can be 
reduced to the other". In other words, to bring the transcendental back into the 
immanent, to operate the Deleuzian shift from the metaphysical to the virtual, to 
incorporate ethics into a philosophy of pure immanence, or of life. 
Rasch thus argues that: 
In Rasch's words, "To wonder at the existence of the world is to attempt to place 
oneself outside of the world, but this attempt can only occur as a conceptualisation within 
the world and therefore becomes part of it...attempting to imagine ethics as absolute 
value is as noble and as futile as attempting to escape language by means of 
language...the attempt to escape the boundaries of our language, which are the 
boundaries of our world, is - ironically - perfectly hopeless." Ibid, 79. 
Ibid. 
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Wittgenstein starts with a basic distinction - call it immanence/transcendence, 
inside/outside, relative/absolute, contingency/necessity, sense/nonsense - and 
attempts to think the possibility of crossing over from the left side of this 
distinction to the right. The world of language in which this attempt is made is 
radically immanent. It is a world in which sense is made, in which every 
proposition implies its own negation, i.e. the possibility of its own non-existence. 
The attempt to think ethics (defined as an absolute value) is an attempt, made 
from within the contingent world of sense-making, to transcend the contingent 
world of self making. The inside stretches to become its own outside in order to 
see itself as and know itself as absolute necessity. But the task is hopeless, 
necessarily doomed to failure."^ 
The sentence in italics encapsulates the status of the modern episteme. The paragraph 
that follows is its opposite, that is; an ethos of post-modernity embedded in Complexity. 
It could be regarded indeed as a manifesto of a postmodern (strictly in the Foucauldian 
sense) approach to ethics: 
The transcendental/immanent distinction, coupled with the impossibility of 
escaping the domain from which this distinction is made, results in a vast and 
Ibid, 80. 
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oppressive immanence, the inescapability of which is guaranteed by the attributes 
given to that side of the distinction that cannot be reached. The world thus 
becomes absolutely contingent. It cannot be otherwise that the fact that the world 
can be otherwise. The impossibility of necessity is necessarily the case. 
Transcendence guarantees the conditions of the possibility of immanence by 
removing itself from the field of observation, for i f observed, it would disappear 
into the vast immanence it calls forth. And so immanence becomes the closed 
system of the worid whose contingency is not contingent. We are left with a 
systemic solipsism. The outside is acknowledged as the absolute condition for the 
existence of the inside, but it remains supremely unknowable. It is the silence that 
delimits the world'^. 
This "silence of the worid" is nothing other than what Foucault describes as the (modem) 
inner organic truth which finds itself outside all possibilities of knowledge but grounds -
through it absence - all possibilities to attain knowledge. It is precisely the acceptance of 
this as a non-relational that turns the contingent into the non-contingent. The lesson here 
is that "the supreme power of transcendence, then, is its undoing. One cannot evoke the 
outside and demand a radical change of the world, because the only change that could 
satisfy the claim of absolute ethics...[is] an ethical totalitarianism in all questions, a 
" Ibid. 
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single-minded and painful preservation of the purity of the uncompromising demands of 
ethics. 
Intervention in Kosovo opened a new chapter in the collective imaginary, at least 
in the West, in which something legitimate may not necessarily be something legal. Yet 
it is legitimate to ask whether this was not somehow framed in terms of an 'ethical 
totalitarianism' which pursued the construction of a Universal on the grounds of the 
exclusion of the particular. This is especially the case when one looks at the schism 
between intent and the way in which the intent was pursued. It is only in a context of 
flawed distinctions between the empirical and the transcendental, between the Universal 
and the particular; that it makes sense to bomb a TV station in the name of, amongst other 
things, freedom of speech. 
The question of ethics as a transcendental necessarily develops into a question of 
the relationship between the self and the other. As Rasch puts it, "If...ethics is 
proclaimed to be a transcendental, then the domain of the ethical is simultaneously the 
domain of the other, and the question of the relationship of this ethical outside to the 
immanent inside becomes a meditation on the relationship of the self to the other.""^ 
''8 
Ibid, 81. The strong emphasis is justified by the relevance of this insight when applied 
to the notion of humanitarian intervention. 
Ibid. 
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Here is where concepts regarding the establishment of an ethical link with the other''", 
also in relation with the thought of Levinas and Derrida"^', become relevant. It is however 
useful to bear in mind that "precisely because of the inescapability of violence and of 
language, Derrida resists in Levinas what we have seen in Wittgenstein's, the absolute 
transcendence of the other."'' 
With this in mind, we can now attempt to answer the question presented at the 
beginning of this section: how can we understand Human Rights as an example of 
Complex "universal singularities'? According to Zizek, 
Often, we stumble on a particular case that does not fully ' f i t ' its universal 
species, that is 'atypical'; the next step is to acknowledge that every particular is 
'atypical', that the universal species exist only in exceptions, that there is a 
structural tension between the Universal and the Particular. At this point, we 
become aware that the Universal is no longer just an empty neutral container of its 
subspecies but an entity in tension with each and every one of its species. The 
See, for example, David Campbell, "Justice and the International Order: the Case of 
Bosnia and Kosovo" in Jean Marc Coicaud and Daniel Warner, eds.. Ethics and 
International Affairs: Extents and Limits (Tokyo: The United Nations University Press, 
2001). 
Campbell, National Deconstruction. 
Rasch, Immanent Systems, Transcendental Temptations, and the Limits of Ethics, 83. 
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universal Notion thus acquires a dynamics of its own. More precisely, the true 
Universal is this very antagonistic dynamics between the Universal and the 
Particular. It is at this point that we pass from 'abstract' to 'concrete' Universal -
at the point when we acknowledge that every Particular is an 'exception', and, 
consequently, that the Universal, far from "containing' its particular content, 
excludes it (or is excluded by it). This exclusion renders the Universal itself 
particular (it is not truly universal, since it cannot grasp or contain the particular 
content), yet this very failure is its strength: the Universal is thus simultaneously 
posited as the Particular."^"^ 
Chapter 7 wil l demonstrate how virtually all legal cases surrounding the Kosovo conflict 
failed to ' f i t the Universal species', which were in turn constructed precisely on the bases 
of the exclusion they generated. In the case of the European Court of Human Rights, for 
example, these exclusions were formed through the notion of 'territory', or rather, 
through social construction of such notion. Incidentally, this Deleuze-inspired discussion 
on the universal brings us back to...Complexity, for Zizek - after outlining this 
relationship between the Universal and the Particular - states: "no wonder one of 
Deleuze's references here is Ilya Prigogine..."^"* 
"'"^  Zizek, Organs without Bodies, 50-51. 
Ibid, 51. 
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Deleuze's reliance on Prigogine for the formulation of his own approach to 
transcendental empiricism is evident, and Prigogine's own reliance on Bergson -
arguably Deleuze's starting point - closes the Complexity-Poststructuralism circle. This 
is the circle that wi l l allow the rest of the current work to treat a Deleuzian understanding 
of ethics as a Complexity-based understanding of ethics, which wi l l be u.sed to elucidate 
the practical implications for the way in which ethics were deployed in the legal context 
of the Kosovo crisis in Chapter 7. 
The crux of the argument is that a poststructural approach to ethics would seek to 
eliminate the outside transcendental as a determinant whilst bringing the ethical relation 
to the other on the 'inside'. As such, the 'Universal Human Rights' would become, 
simply, the 'rights of humans': by removing the outer, transcendental notion of Human, it 
is necessary to operate after what Foucault termed the 'death of Man' . Fundamentally, 
the idea that Universal Human Rights should be applied to, particular ethnic groups 
(which are themselves determined and constructed within particular discourses) is 
essentially and 'epistemically' a modern idea. Such an application results in a 
construction of the Universal in terms of exclusions. '"'* 
This debate goes back a long way. Scholars have, for example, identified similar 
notions of cosmopolitanism in Diogenes of Sinope: when Diogenes proclaims to belong 
to the 'cosmos', rather than the 'world' or to any other location, the message is that the 
Cynic regards other men and women as members of a 'cosmos' which, in its very 
immanence, transcends local cultures, religions, historical periods, etc. That is how, 
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Rasch explains how Drucilla Cornell attempts to create this Derridean approach to 
the other by recognising the other's otherness while bringing it into the system of the self: 
Cornell's transcendental other must have a way of entering into the system while still 
retaining its status as outsider'.'^^ The result is the creation of a semi-transcendental 
other, which does not accept the absolute transcendence of the other but remains the 
'outside' within the self that allows for the self to engage in ethical relations. Indeed, 
Cornell's objective is "to establish a hierarchical relationship between ethics and 
morality. Morality, which is to be subordinated to ethics, is equated with the enunciation 
of behavioural norms and the generation of a system of rules. The ethical relation, on the 
other hand, does not manifest itself as discourse. Rather, it is embodied by a carefully 
semi-specified way of being that allows it to sit in judgment on moral systems.""^' 
despite of its inherent immanence and disregard for metaphysics. Cynic cosmopolitanism 
was inherently ethical: its relation was based on the belief that the 'other', despite its 
'otherness', was an integral part of our "self. Thus the construction of ethical arguments 
on the basis of ethnicity would have been meaningless for Diogenes and other Cynics. 
The construction of Universals on the exclusionary basis of the 'other' is, nonetheless, a 
defining characteristic of the two axes of modernity under scrutiny. 
•'^  Rasch, Immanent Systems, Transcendental Temptations, and the Limits of Ethics, 85. 
"^^ Ibid, 84, emphasis added. 
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Because ethics cannot express itself through discourse, it is equivalent to the radical non 
relational, thus giving a 'poetic' character to the ethical relation. This bringing of the 
outside into the self differs radically from the modern approach to ethics which sees 
ethics as the transcendental 'outside', which nonetheless imperfectly characterises 
organic systems from within as our (Kantian) gaze on transcendental imagination - as 
Zizek explains - is emphatically always limited by our own finitude. 
This role of ethics is also present in Luhmann's thought. According to Rasch, 
The distinction between morality and ethics is historically conditioned. Ethics as 
the reflection theory of morality becomes necessary when castle-based moral 
codes of conduct, defined by Luhmann as the unity of morality and manners, 
gives way, along with the stratified ('feudal') social organisation in which it 
flourished, to increasingly complex, differentiated modernity. In both its 
utilitarian (Bentham) and Kantian varieties, this new emphasis on ethical 
reflection is registered as the as the necessity for establishing criteria for choice. 
In other words, ethics becomes formalised, moved from a consideration of the 
moral 'fibre' or substance of an individual to a consideration of action on the face 
of competing alternatives. 7726' Kantian solution, as is well known, relies on the 
validity of the transcendental / empirical distinction and therefore, in Luhmann's 
view, is no longer tenable: 
38 Ibid. 93, emphasis added. 
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What is crucial hiere is the idea of ethics understood as a reflection of morality emerges 
when the moral ethos - understood as the unity between itself and manners - is dissolved. 
This dissolution causes a fragmentation between the goals of morality and the means of 
achieving these, and it is only here that ethics emerge as the 'self-consciousness' of 
morality. It is because of this 'modern' dissolution that we can conclude with Luhmann: 
"By acting as a mediator between morality and society, ethics is charged with minimizing 
the devastation morality is capable of unleashing.""^' As Chapter 8 will argue, the 
Holocaust constituted the analytical finitude, or the mediator, modernity necessitated in 
order to minimise the "devastation morality is capable of unlashing". In the case of 
Kosovo, the moral stance was embodied in the legal-positivist tradition, which held that it 
was absolutely immoral to uphold human rights by violating the body of law that was 
precisely supposed to protect such rights. The sort of inaction that this moralistic 
approach promoted, according to debates in the UK Parliament, could not be considered 
in the face of a possible Holocaust. 
Incidentally, this is the crucial aspect of modern ethics that Nietzsche pointed to. 
Nietzsche is invaluable to assess critiques of intervention in Kosovo. Whilst most of 
them are concerned with the legality and morality of intervention, few of these ask 
whether the modus operandi of intervention was compatible with its own, "ethical' goals. 
As the next case studies wi l l seek to demonstrate, this is because the Universal at the 
Ibid. 
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heart of the moral argument was based on its own exclusions. The very actors of the 
conflict were constructed following the rules inherent to the modern episteme and on the 
bases of a Kantian ethical model. The conceptualisation of the conflict in terms of 
imagined communities (the 'ethnic Albanian') impeded an analysis of the immanent 
political struggle at the root of the crisis. At this immanent level, it is much more 
difficult to reduce the multitude to such an imagined community: to the 'ethnic 
Albanians', for example. By following a classical modern pattern of thought, the actors 
had to be defined according to an analytic of finitude, which equally entailed a very 
contingent historical linearity. In the case of Kosovo, historical linearity was enforced 
through a notion of ancient ethnic hatreds, whilst ethical analytical finitude was deployed 
through parallelisms with the Holocaust (Chapters 5-7). Thus, the multitude was 
stratified and personalised into a (finite) body, to which the logic of Universal Human 
rights - itself operating through a logic of exclusion - was applied (Chapter 7). A more 
immanent approach would have warranted a reflection in terms of the ethical relation to 
others, preceded by an immanent analysis of a political problem. 
The construction of the other - perceived as something outside - lies at the 
heart of the problem embedded in moral arguments regarding Human Rights and 
intervention. When the dissolution between morality and its manners occur, the 
problem becomes more evident, and calls for an ethical approach (via the 
deployment of the Holocaust) to make judgements on its own morality. It is only 
after a (exclusionary) construction of the other has taken place that it makes sense 
for an institution to refer to a multitude as the 'ethnic Albanians'. 
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Metaphysical Law and Ethical Categorisations 
An interesting categorisation of approaches to the problem of ethics has been 
conducted by Holzgrefe in the collective work 'Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical 
Legal and Political Dilemmas'.'^'^ The categorisation of ethical approaches perfectly 
illustrates the essentially Kantian divide present in all arguments. According to 
Holzgrefe, we could design an ethical chart with four axes or dimensions, each with two 
extreme poles. The first ethical divide would consist of concerns over the source of 
moral concern. Here, we would find that 'Naturalist theories of international justice 
contend that morally binding international norms are an inherent feature of the world' 
whilst 'Consensualist theories...claim that moral authority of any given international 
norm derives from the explicit or tacit consent of the agents subject to that norm'."*' 
The second ethical divide deals with the appropriate objects of moral concern. 
Here we find that 'Individualist theories of international justice are concerned ultimately 
with the welfare of individual human beings' while 'collectivist theories...maintain that 
groups - typically ethnic groups, races, nations, or states - are the proper objects of moral 
'^ ^ J.L Holzgrefe, "The Humanitarian Intervention Debate" in Humanitarian Intervention: 
Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas, eds Robert Keohane and J.L Holzgrefe, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003). 
^' Ibid, 19. 
5. Complexity and the International: The Analytic of Finitude, 261 
concern'."*" The third ethical divide is related to the appropriate weight of moral concern. 
Here "Egalitarian theories of international justice claim that the objects of moral concern 
must be treated equally' whilst 'Inegalitarian theories...require or permit them to be 
treated unequally'.'*'' Finally, the fourth ethical divide regards the proper width of moral 
concern. Here 'Universalist theories assert that all relevant agents - wherever they exist 
- are the proper objects of moral concern'. On the contrary, 'Particularist theories...hold 
that only certain agents...are the proper objects of moral concern'.'*'* 
The fact that Holzgrefe is able to devise such a taxinomia and to classify 
utilitarianism, natural law, social contractarianism, communitarianism and legal 
positivism according to its principles is telling. In the end, it is simple to discern the 
different approaches to the empirico-transcendental doublet inherent in the modern 
episteme. The problem inherent in approaching such 'divides' from one extreme or the 
other is not a concern of contemporary ethical theory: it is just assumed that positions 
and the extremes of such divides are irreconcilable. Interpretations of specific events can 
thus always be preceded by qualifications such as 'under X approach'. A telling 
example: supporters of 'act-utilitarianism' claim that any military action is justified i f it 
saves more lives than it loses: "Thus, for example, NATO's killing of ten civilian 
employees of Radio Television Serbia (RTS) in Belgrade during Operation Allied Force 
Ibid. 
'•^  Ibid, 20. 
Ibid. 
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could be justified on act-utilitarian grounds i f destroying 'a source of propaganda that is 
prolonging this war and causing untold new suffering to the people of Kosovo' [quote by 
Claire Short] saved more lives than it cost."^^ 
Presumably, it would be safe to assume that Claire Short, Madeleine Albright (we 
believe that the price is worth i t . . . ) and Tony Blair (I cannot apologise for removing a 
brutal dictator...) are all act-utilitarians. Is it not the case that ultimately the arguments of 
this group represent a classical example of morality, understood as Luhmann does, as a 
concern emanating from the vision of the outside which relies on the construction of 'the 
people of Kosovo'? Is the ethical relation here not absent in the sense that those ten RTS 
employees have already, anyway, been constructed as the 'other' and excluded by a 
Universal constructed in way Zizek put it above? Do they count in the calculation aiming 
to reduce 'untold new suffering'? Is the job of ethics in this case to 'minimize the 
devastation morality is capable of unleashing'? 
As Kratochwil puts it, "there is in law itself always a tension between positive law 
and those transcendental standards, which - according to the natural law approach -
provides positive prescriptions with the character of 'true law'.""*^ In Kratochwil we 
Ibid, 22. 
Friedrich Kratochwil, "International law as an approach to international ethics: A plea 
for a jurisprudential diagnostics" in Ethics and International Affairs: Extents and Limits, 
eds. Jean Marc Coicaud and Daniel Warner, (Tokyo: The United Nations University 
Press, 2001). 
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have an attempt to surpass the Kantian deadlock, and in a sense the modern episteme 
itself, in law. It is an approach guided by the same principles that inform Prigogine's 
attempt to remove the metaphysical and to act on immanent populations, or what Deleuze 
would call the manifold. The crux of the argument is that contemporary ethics -
following Kant - are placed under the aegis of what we would call Foucault's 'analytical' 
strand in the modern episteme. This approach, it is argued, has failed on its own terms. 
According to Kratochwil, the analytical-transcendental approach to ethics poses a 
number of dilemmas: 
Beginning with abstract principles rather than concrete practices and institutions 
leads not only to a devaluation of the 'state' as an institution...but it also 
reinforces the tendency to conceive of ethics as an analytical enterprise, 
concerned with the elaboration of standards to which every rational being has to 
consent. But then, such an approach reduces ethical reflection to a largely 
cognitivist enterprise that can be tackled through the demonstration and 
application of the right principles to a specific 'subsumed' situation. On the other 
hand, since abstract principles do not come with their own specification for 
application, we are often at loss when a situation can be described from two 
different perspectives and can be subsumed under to different principles, or even 
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when the same principle leads to entirely different prescriptions in a concrete 
case, depending on the level of generality one applies...'*'' 
These are the dilemmas of the empirico-transcendental doublet all over again. 
Kratochwil recognises that this analytical ethical enterprise is founded on Kantian 
deontology which, when applied to the immanent reality "quickly becomes incoherent.""'^ 
In this field, Kratochwil advocates a renaissance of jurisprudence since according to this 
approach "a rule has a definite meaning i f its terms clearly correspond to the factual 
circumstances selected as relevant by the rule."'*' In the end Kratochwil states that "what 
we primarily need is an appropriate heuristics for helping us in our perplexities rather 
than abstract principles from which we can elegantly and parsimoniously derive our more 
particular action-guiding prescriptions, ranging from nuclear war to animal r i g h t s . A 
Complexity, post-modern approach to the Kosovo conflict would take into account these 
attempts to depart from the transcendental in the realm of international law (see Chapter 
7). 
Ibid, 17. 
Ibid, 20. 
^ ' Ib id , 32. 
ibid, 33. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to trace evidence of the modern nature of our 
understanding of contemporary conflict, ranging from the way in which we have 
constructed a 'modern social science' primarily concerned with the study of war (IR 
theory) to the ethics surrounding arguments related to humanitarian intervention. The 
final chapters of the study wi l l deconstruct the arguments related to the Kosovo conflict 
to show how this intrinsically modern way of thinking conditions practice, and wi l l also 
seek to reveal how an understanding of the conflict based on a post-modern approach 
may have warranted different outcomes. The main findings of the chapter reflect the 
presentation of the modern episteme and an outline of Complexity as a challenge to such 
episteme in Chapters 2 and 3. In particular, this chapter has sought to reveal how: 
• The academic discipline of International Relations has followed the path 
of other empirical sciences which were constituted as transcendental 
philosophies of objects. Such formation is characterised by the two axes 
of modernity embodied in the empirico-transcendetal doublet: the isolation 
of an organic body of knowledge whose finitude is enforced by the 
linearity of time. It wi l l be argued that such a perspective influenced the 
way in which the Kosovo crisis was understood and acted upon. 
• Critical Geopolitics and new approaches to International Relations which 
question, respectively, the social nature of space and time can - and 
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should - be understood as Complexity-based approaches to understanding 
the reality of conflicts. Such approaches thus constitute a valid application 
of 'Complexity science' to the field, and the linkages can be seen by the 
commonalities of authors key representatives of each field use as main 
references (the Prigogine - Bergson - Deleuze triangle constituting the 
most obvious example). 
Such triangle also forms the bases of an understanding of the modern 
episteme's formulation of transcendental ethics. Rasch's interpretation of 
Luhmann's Complexity-based systemic approach is a particularly relevant 
attempt at surpassing the paradoxes inherent within modern ethics and to 
bring the issue of ethics at the level of Deleuze's transcendental 
empiricism. Finally, the ensemble of paradoxes inherent in the modern 
approach to ethics (paradoxes which have been carefully located within 
the two axes of modernity and within the empirico-transcendental doublet) 
have been described in the context of what Zizek calls the principle of 
Universal Exclusion. Finally, such paradoxes have been brought to light 
in the context of contemporary debates regarding the role of the ethical 
link in the context of moral responsibilities, the categorisation of ethical 
approaches to humanitarian intervention and the role of jurisprudence in 
deploying legal constraints on issues surrounding humanitarian 
intervention. 
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• The bringing down of meta-theoretical concepts to the level of theory it 
has been possible to see how the two axes of modernity translated into a 
notion of historical linearity in academic IR and a notion of Universal 
Exclusion in contemporary ethical thought. The rest of the study wi l l 
bring such notions down a further level by showing that in the case of 
Kosovo historical linearity was enforced through a notion of perpetual 
'ancient ethnic hatreds', that Universal Exclusion characterised legal and 
ethical debates surrounding the intervention whilst analytical finitude took 
the form of a parallelism with the Holocaust in order to negotiate the limit 
of the West's moral responsibility. 
Such conclusions wi l l be applied to the specific case of the Kosovo conflict in the 
coming chapters allowing this work to address the three research questions addressed at 
the beginning of the effort. 
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Intermezzo: A Roadmap to an Argument 
The following chapters wi l l synthesise the theoretical perspectives outlined so far 
and indicate how a Complexity-informed epistemic approach would account for the 
events that unfolded in Kosovo. At this point it may be useful to summarise what the 
theoretical insights exposed so far entail: 
• Foucault argues that the modem episteme is essentially characterised by 
an empirico-transcendetal doublet, which is enforced in all modern 
attempts to generate knowledge through transcendental philosophies of 
objects. The doublet is implemented through the two axes of modernity, 
namely, an analytic of finitude and a concept of historical linearity. The 
construction of modern scientific epistemology - which greatly 
conditioned the formation of academic disciplines that sought to 
understand international conflicts - followed these modern epistemic rules 
from Vienna on, adopting what Dupre calls a metaphysical stance', and 
what Kuhn refers to as paradigmatic science." According to Foucault the 
modern episteme opens what here refers to as the 'age of History', as the 
Dupre, The Disorder of Things. 
Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 
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newly born subject 'man' can only be isolated and thought of because of a 
concept of historical linearity. Foucault also believed that Bergson - and 
consequently Deleuze - were philosophers that transcended the modern 
episteme precisely because they recognised the role that linear temporality 
played in the generation of modern knowledge and created alternative 
conceptualisations of time that radically differed from the modern concept: 
whereas linear time serves the modern purpose of enforcing contingency, 
Bergson's and Deleuze's virtual time serves the purpose of guaranteeing 
novelty (Chapter 2). 
Complexity theorists such as Prigogine recognise that the defining feature 
of the new science is its alternative conceptualisation of time and the 
recognition that time is irreversible - what Prigogine calls the 'arrow of 
time' is therefore at the heart of his new science of uncertainty. 
Incidentally, Prigogine also uses Bergson as a starting point for his own 
science, reinforcing the idea that Complexity represents an epistemic 
break. Considering that recent research has unveiled the influence that 
German Natural Philosophy and Romanticism exerted on the early 
precursors of Complexity, and the consequent similarities that have been 
noted between philosophers such as Nietzsche and these precursors, a 
number of commentators have proceeded to outline the idea according to 
which post-structuralism represents one side of the Complexity coin in 
philosophy. Overall, the roots of Complexity call for a re-opening of 
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ancient debates on the role of reasons after the Enlightenment: whereas the 
modern episteme has sought to ensure that Reason was tasked with the 
mission of providing certainty (through the generafion of metaphysical 
thought and science). Complexity in a post-modern episteme would rather 
have Reason serving the purpose of ensuring that we can cope with an 
uncertainty which - far from being the consequence of inadequate human 
understanding - is a defining feature of nature (Chapter 3). This is 
important because Chapter 8 w i l l proceed to argue that the notion of 
certainty at the meta-theory level translates into a notion of security at the 
level of politics, and that it is precisely this metaphysical notion of security 
that characterises the way in which we think of international conflict. 
Following a detailed analysis of the nature of the modern episteme it has 
been possible to thoroughly examine how the rules inherent within such 
episteme have conditioned the generation and application of knowledge in 
International Relations (Chapter 4) and in the field of ethics (Chapter 5). 
The whole of Chapter 4 sought to descend the theoretical ladder and to 
show how the insights presented in the previous two chapters influence the 
way in which two specific areas of knowledge are affected by the 
constraints imposed by the modern episteme. 
The last three chapters of the study seek to demonstrate that notions of 
historical linearity translated into assumptions on the existence of ancient 
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ethnic hatreds, whilst analytical finitude enforced contingency through 
Universal Exclusions and through parallelisms with the Holocaust. The 
identification of the axes of modernity in Kosovo-related discourse allows 
for an epistemic understanding of how Complexity challenges the very 
grounds upon which these understandings of the Kosovo crisis were 
constructed. 
From now on our task is to relate what has been explored so far to the specific incident of 
the Kosovo crisis, in order to provide and answer to the two questions that motivate this 
exercise: In what way can the emergence of what we loosely refer to as "Complexity 
Theory" enhance our understanding of social affairs generally, and of human conflict in 
particular? And why is the Kosovo conflict a particularly good example to illustrate the 
role that Complexity can have in enhancing such understanding? 
Following the three bullet points above, the following chapters wil l seek to 
answer questions that can be found across all disciplines that sought to understand 
various aspects of the Kosovo crisis (see end of Chapter 1) through Complexity-informed 
epistemic lenses. For each bullet point above, the remaining three chapters wi l l use such 
lenses to identify what sort of questions and knowledge would really be regarded as being 
crucial for a Complex understanding of the crisis, and in particular to demonstrate that: 
• The ethnic conflict in Kosovo is essentially a modern conflict brought about by 
very modern attempts to enforce authority. As such, and contrary to many claims, 
the ethnic conflict was not the product of ancient ethnic hatreds which remained 
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constant (linear history) but the product of very immanent political struggles. 
Such a vision is Complexity-based insofar history is regarded as a non-linear 
process which is afar more akin to the Deleuzo-Bergsonian notion of 
'actualisation of the virtual' (and the virtual comprises an infinite number of 
possibilities) rather than the modern notion of 'realisation of the (limited) 
possible'. In other words, Chapter 6 wi l l seek to demonstrate that the ethnic 
conflict was itself generated by the actualisation of virtual myths which served the 
purposes of immanent political struggles. Furthermore, Chapter 6 w i l l 
demonstrate that the creation of the ethno-nationalist discourse depends on a 
successful deployment of the two axes of modernity, namely an analytic of 
finitude, and - especially - a concept of linear time. 
The modern episteme equally characterised the way in which ethical and legal 
knowledge was generated and deployed in the aftermath of the crisis. Therefore 
Chapter 7 will seek to demonstrate how the two axes of modernity were applied in 
the context of ethic and legal discourse in the Kosovo crisis. 
Finally, as Chapter 3 outlined, the notion of certainty is at the root of the modern 
episteme. Such concept of certainty neatly translates into a concept of security. 
Thus the notion of security - which finds in the Holocaust the maximum example 
of its analytic of finitude, whilst finding in the notion of ethnic ancient hatreds the 
equivalent for historical linearity - lies at the root of the very modern way in 
which the "West" interpreted and acted upon the conflict. In particular. Chapters 
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5 and 7 will seek to outline how these two concepts constituted recurring 
arguments in the political debate. More specifically, the motivations given for 
the forceful resolution of the crisis corresponded to these two axes of modernity: 
1) events on the ground reached the limit of what is permissible within the ethical 
finitude modernity (the Holocaust, of which notorious events in Bosnia brought 
unpleasant memories) and 2) since the conflict is characterised by historically 
linear ancient ethnic hatreds a peaceful resolution is not possible. 
In each case it wi l l be argued that a Complexity-ethic guides the analysis. In this context, 
the conclusion of the work - apart from summarising the findings - wi l l seek to explain 
how the disciplines of Critical Geopolitics and Critical International Relations can 
successfully constitute a new Complexity paradigm in the study of conflict. 
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6. Kosovo: From 1389 to 1999 and Back 
L'Histoire est la science des choses qui ne se repetent pas - Histoiy is the science of 
things that do not repeat themselves. 
Paul Valery 
Introduction: Complexity and Six Hundred Years of Non-Linear History 
Chapter 5 indicates that Zizek's reading of Deieuze - in particular of Deleuzian 
concepts of transcendental empiricism - conditions his views on the role of history in the 
Kosovo crisis. What are Zizek's views then? "There are no 'old myths' which we need 
to study i f we are really to understand the complex situation, just the present outburst of 
racist nationalism which, according to its needs, opportunistically resuscitates old myths. 
To paraphrase the old Clintonian motto: no, it's not the old myths and ethnic hatreds, it's 
the political power struggle, stupid!"' 
David Campbell has already identified how such proposition translated in the 
practice of settlement in Bosnia. With regards to Bosnia, Campbell maintains that, "the 
conflict is constituted in the present, and that "history' is a resource in the contemporary 
' Slavoj Zizek, "Against the double blackmail", Lacan.com 
http://www.lacan.com/kosovo.htm (accessed 27 April 2008). 
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struggle."" Ultimately, the Complexity paradigm also shows how the virtual is always 
ever being constructed (or actualised) in the present. Following Bergson, it is always 
quite impossible to exactly determine when the past becomes present and/or when the 
present becomes the future: what needs to be studied is, in line with Foucault's arguments 
in the Archaeology of Knowledge, the immanent rules of formation of an argument (even 
a historical argument), in the immanent present. 
The current chapter constitutes an attempt at placing the two insights above in a 
Complexity-epistemic context and to show how they apply to the case of Kosovo. First, 
it would be useful to remember that the Complexity ethic plays a crucial role in shaping a 
theory of 'immanent history', or to deconstruct, in tandem with post-structural 
philosophy, history as a meta-narrative.'' Second, we should bear in mind that this brings 
up questions on the role that modernity plays in enforcing linear temporality - which, as 
" Campbell, National Deconstruction, 84. 
For arguments in favour of this hypothesis and on the Complexity-Post-structuralism 
consider Chapter 3 but also Cilliers, Complexity and Postmodernism, Matthew Abraham, 
"What is Complexity Science; Towards the end of Ethics and Law Parading as Justice", 
in Thinking Complexity: Complexity and Philosophy, ed. Paul Cilliers (Mansfield: ISCE 
Publishing 2007): 121-122, Stephen Sheard, "Complexity Theory and Continental 
Philosophy Part 1: A Review of Letiche's Phenomenological Complexity Theory", in 
Ibid, and Damian Popolo, "Complexity in a Complex Europe". 
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it wi l l be argued below, is an essential pre-condition for the formulation of any nationalist 
myth: 
One of the main aims of the instrumental rationality flowing from the 
enlightenment was to create conditions in which we are not controlled by 
contingency. To achieve these conditions, it is necessary to understand, and 
preferably control, the future. This demands a coordinated and goal-oriented 
action in the present. Modernism becomes a project that demands our total 
commitment against the forces of irrationality and chaos. The modernist project 
has two important effects on our understanding of time. In the first place, our 
actions need to be coordinated. This can only happen i f time is universalised is 
such way that we all live in the "same" time...The second effect of instrumental 
rationality on our understanding of time is a result of the desire to control the 
future; for the future to be made knowable. This would only be possible i f the 
future, in some essential way, resembles the past....The actual result of this 
ideology is to extend the present into the future, causing us to live in a perpetual 
"present". The sacrifice made in order to achieve this, however, is nothing short 
of sacrificing the very notion of temporality. Nowotny calls it the "illusion of 
simultaneity."'^ 
4 Paul Cilliers, "On the Importance of a Certain Slowness", in Thinking Complexity: 
Complexity and Philosophy, ed. Paul Cilliers (Mansfield: ISCE Publishing 2007). 
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Thus, the scope of the current chapter is limited to outlining how this historical 
linearity - which has be thoroughly examined in the previous chapters - characterised 
both the emergence of the nationalist discourse in Serbia and in Kosovo and the reactions 
to such nationalisms in the 'West'. A first section of this chapter wi l l deal with the 
former, whilst a second section wi l l deal with the latter. The second point wi l l also 
constitute the focus of the final chapter, where historical linearity wi l l give way to an 
analytic of finitude (embodied in the memory of the Holocaust) as the defining feature of 
the reaction to the perceived nationalist problem. The current chapter wi l l also seek to 
demonstrate that such understandings inherent in the modern episteme conditioned the 
way in which the run-up to the conflict was perceived, and how the NATO intervention 
in itself was planned and implemented. 
Living in the Past, in the Present: Apprehensions of Time in Nationalist Discourse 
Benedict Anderson has addressed the role of linear temporality in the construction 
of nationalisms. One of the objectives of our case study w i l l be to demonstrate that 
Anderson's arguments can not only be applied to the subjects experiencing the processes 
of identity formation, but that it also conditions how others, outsiders, frame and identify 
a particular group. In Anderson' classical study of nationalisms^ an entire section 
^ Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso 1991). 
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(appropriately entitled Apprehensions of Time) is dedicated to the analysis of time as a 
fundamental component in the construction of national and ethnic identities.^ Consider 
for example the following claim: 
Our own conception of simultaneity has a long time in the making, and its 
emergence is certainly connected, in ways that have yet to be well studied, with 
the development of the secular sciences. But is it a conception of such 
fundamental importance that, without taking it ful ly into account, we wil l find it 
difficult to probe the obscure genesis of nationalism. What has come to take the 
place of the medieval conception of simultaneity-along-time is, to borrow again 
from Benjamin, an idea of "homogenous, empty time', in which simultaneity is, as 
it were, transverse, cross-time, marked not by prefiguring and fulfilment, but by 
temporal coincidence, and measured by clock and calendar.^ 
The idea of nationalism vannot emerge without linear time, one of the two axes of 
modernity. According to Anderson, without an emerging concept of "homogenous. 
^ Ibid, 22-36. 
^ Ibid, 24. Contrast this notion of time as allowing simultaneity with Bergson's 
conception: "What is the role of time?...7/me prevents everything from being given at 
once...Is, it not the vehicle of creativity and choice ? Is not the existence of time the 
proof of indeterminism in nature?" 
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empty time' it would be difficult, i f not impossible, to imagine oneself as being part of a 
coherent community. Can we also say that without this notion it would be equally 
difficult to imagine 'others' as being part of 'other' coherent communities? Is this the 
notion that characterised the conceptualisation of the 'Kosovars' and the 'Serbs', for 
example, from Rome to Washington via, Paris, Madrid, and London? It is interesting that 
Anderson notes that the emergence of linear time is probably related to the creation of 
modern secular sciences but that it is yet to be well studied, especially when one thinks 
that the emergence of such a concept in precisely those terms is identified by Foucault in 
a book subtitled An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, sciences which Foucault 
characterises as being strictly modern and secular. It remains unclear to what extent 
Anderson was aware of Foucault and to what extent the latter influenced the former. 
Although Anderson refers to a "Foucauldian sense of abrupt discontinuities of 
consciousness"* when comparing the notion of time in nationalistic and not-nationalistic 
works of literature, no explicit references to what would appear to be the most relevant 
work (i.e. The Order of Things, that is, where the notion of epistemic breaks and the rise 
of historical linearity is formulated) appears to be made in Imagined Communities. This 
is a theoretical vacuum we have hoped to f i l l in the presentation of Foucault's description 
of linear history as an enforcer of the empirico-transcendental doublet and, by extension, 
of the modern episteme. 
Ibid., 28 
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*** 
The reproduction of the past into the present as a means of generating nationalist 
discourse is evident in the case of Kosovo. Whereas it is impossible to narrate the run up 
to the Kosovo crisis without outlining the broader context of Yugoslav politics in the 
1990s it would be a mistake to consider Kosovo simply as the latest chapter in the post-
Cold War Balkan tragedy. Indeed, Kosovo provided the myth upon which the Yugoslav 
tragedy unfolded, and as such it ought to be regarded as the origin of the subsequent 
conflicts, including those that unfolded in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia. The fact that 
Kosovo was the last conflict to be 'actualised' does not mean that it was a consequence of 
the others - on the contrary, it means that, precisely because it represented the myth upon 
which all other myths were constructed, it was the myth which took the longest to 
conflagrate.^ Thus, the following arguments w i l l not only seek to elucidate how the axes 
of modernity conditioned the way in which knowledge was generated and deployed in the 
immediate run up to the war in Kosovo. Rather, it wi l l be argued that a Complexity-
informed epistemic approach calls for an understanding of how the history of Kosovo that 
was constructed in order to support immanent political struggles which conditioned - in 
a ver}' modern way - the entire Yugoslav crisis in the decade of the 1990s. This is so 
^ Indeed, Richard Holbrooke recognised that Kosovo represented, i f anything, even a 
more difficult hurdle than Bosnia, and Kosovo was side-stepped at Dayton precisely 
because it was feared that its inclusion in the talks may have derailed the entire process. 
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because the Complexity paradigm calls for an understanding of how the constitution of 
linear histories shape the way in which knowledge is generated and deployed in order to 
enforce contingency, and in our case the constitution of such linear histories - which is 
precisely what Complexity identifies as the major rupture with other scientific paradigms 
and thus seeks to overcome - the linear history that enforced conceptual contingency on 
the entire Yugoslav crisis began in Kosovo, and found in Kosovo its point of origin. 
Therefore, the 'Kosovo crisis', from a Complex-epistemic point of view, does not 
begin in January 1998 (escalation of violence in the province), as policy-oriented, 
'problem solving' approaches would indicate."^ It also does not begin in June 1389 
(battle of Kosovo Polje on the Field of the Blackbirds, which seals Ottoman rule on the 
area) as the nationalists on both sides and the adherents of a 'Clash of Civilizations' 
approach would have us believe." Equally, it does not begin in March 1999 (NATO 
campaign) as military observers would put it. More importantly, it does not start in 1989 
(collapse of the Soviet Union and of the related international system that prevented the 
conflict - which was always waiting to happen - from unfolding). The latter hypothesis 
is a standard in mainstream structural International Relations theory which, as it was 
presented in Chapter 4, needs to believe that the crisis was always waiting to happen -
'° U K Parliament, House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Select Committee, "Fourth 
report: Kosovo, Volume I I , Minutes of evidence and appendices", 23 May 2000: 14. 
' ' Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 
(New York: Simon & Shuster 1998): 130 and 138. 
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that is, it constantly lived in the present - and the 'the international system' prevented it 
from happening: such commentators usually point out that Titoism successfully 
negotiated the Kosovo riots in 1981 precisely because of the very nature of Titotism, 
implying that once Titoism disappears such convulsions are allowed to degenerate into 
wider conflict.'^ Here the influence of such thinking on the actual process of policy 
making is obvious.'^^ 
As discussed in Chapter 4, and as it w i l l be further argued below, it is precisely 
the need to begin with such assumption that prevents this particular transcendental 
philosophy of the object to recognise the very immanent nature and origin of the crisis. 
This grand vision of events, which assumes that history, once unfrozen, would simply 
1 . ^ 
Adams, "'Structural Realism: the Consequence of Great Power Politics". 
Consider for instance the official view of the UK Parliament: "The death of Tito in 
1980, a growing desire for change in the constituent parts of Yugoslavia and the collapse 
of communism in central and eastern Europe led after 1990 to the implosion of the 
Yugoslav Federation. With the restraints of the Cold War removed, a spasm of war 
convulsed the area over the 1990s. A state simply disintegrated. Rioting in 1981 in 
Kosovo, and the removal in 1989 of previous Kosovan autonomy, had presaged the 
conflicts to come, and it was war in Kosovo, and NATO's bombing campaign against the 
residue of Yugoslavia, which ended the millennium." U K Parliament, House of 
Commons, Foreign Affairs Select Committee, "Fourth Report: Kosovo. Volume 1, 
Report and Proceedings of the Committee", 23 May 2000: ix, emphasis added. 
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take its natural, pre-determined (by ancient ethnic hatreds...) course, fails to explain why 
the removal of the Cold War lid led to perfectly peaceful fragmentations 
(Czechoslovakia), a complete absence of fragmentation in countries with acute "ethnic 
minorities' problems (Roma and Hungarians in Romania), or in countries where such 
problems were compounded by religious diversity (Albanian Islamic minorities in 
Macedonia, for example). 
From a Complexity-epistemic perspective, the Kosovo crisis begins in the 
afternoon of the 28'^ of June 1987, when Slobodan Milosevic, the then Chairman of the 
Serbian Communist Party, formally established the myth of Kosovo as the foundational 
myth for the entire political vision and programme of his party in a speech delivered in 
the town of Gazimestan, Kosovo. We are not referring to the events of 24 Apri l 1987 -
when Milosevic pronounced the famous "No one should dare to beat you" speech to a 
crowd of angry Kosovo Serbs in the outskirts of Pristina. At that point the discourse was 
not yet a ful ly a nationalist discourse: it had not yet engaged the process of generating the 
'homogenous, empty time' Anderson asserts is necessary for the establishment of a ful ly-
fledged nationalist agenda. It is on the 28'^ of June that Milosevic consciously delivers a 
vision which links the future of the nation to the past of Kosovo, thus grounding the 
discourse on f irm nationalist bases by deploying a language and a symbolism designed to 
ensure that events that had occurred 600 years earlier were felt, sensed and internalised in 
the present. 
The occasion was perfect. The 28'^ of June of 1989 marked the 600'^ anniversary 
of the battle of Kosovo. The first steps to bring the past back into the present were taken 
the previous winter, when "the bones of the medieval Serbian leader, Lazar, under the 
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supervision of the church, toured the holy places in Serbian-populated territories before 
being returned to their resting place in the monastery Lazar founded at Ravanica. The 
arrivals of these relics in the months preceding the Kosovo anniversary were occasions 
for excitement and veneration."''* 
In order to ensure that the contemporaneous nature of Lazar's 'feats' were not lost 
on the public, "As Milosevic addressed his audience portraits of Lazar and Milosevic 
were held aloft by members of the audience, the medieval monarch alongside the 
Communist apparatchik.''^^ The speech itself was delivered on a stage designed to 
suggest continuity (the encompassing circle) between the dates 1389 and 1989: 
Thomas, Serbia under Milosevic, 50. 
'Mbid, 50-51. 
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Figure 1: The man and his stage. Note the prominence of the dates, and the surrounding circle. 
Image courtesy of the onHne edition of the Spanish newspaper "El Mundo". 
But let's proceed to examine the documentary monument which is being credited 
with establishing the concept of 'empty time' thus elevating Kosovo as the foundational 
myth of all consequent Serbian nationalism. In the transcript of the speech the techniques 
used to bring the events that occurred 600 years earlier into the contemporary national 
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consciousness are rather evident. Indeed, in commenting the speech, Edit Petrovic 
comments that Milosevic sought to combine "history, memory and continuity", 
promoting "the illusion that the Serbs who fought against the Turks in Kosovo in 1389 
are somehow the same as the Serbs fighting for Serbian national survival today."'^ James 
Gow, on the other hand, asserts that the objective was to further Milosevic's political 
campaign, which was "predicated on the notion of redressing this mood of victimisation 
and restoring the sense of Serbian pride and, most important of all, power."'^ Introducing 
the speech, Milosevic mentions the battle of Kosovo and states that 
By the force of social circumstances this great 600th anniversary of the Battle of 
Kosovo is taking place in a year in which Serbia, after many years, after many 
decades, has regained its state, national, and spiritual integrity. Therefore, it is not 
difficult for us to answer today the old question: how are we going to face Milos 
[Milos Obilic, legendary hero of the Battle of Kosovo]. Through the play of 
history and life, it seems as i f Serbia has, precisely in this year, in 1989, regained 
Edit Petrovic, "Ethnonationalism and the Dissolution of Yugoslavia", in Neighbors at 
War: anthropological perspectives on Yugoslav ethnicity, culture, and history, ed. Joel 
Martin Halpern and David Kideckel (Penn: Penn State Press, 2000): 170, emphasis 
added. 
James Gow, The Serbian Project and Its Adversaries: A Strategy of War Crimes, 
(London: Hurst & Co. Publishers, 2003): 10. 
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its state and its dignity and thus has celebrated an event of the distant past which 
has a great historical and symbolic significance for its future.'^ 
Here Milosevic is referring to the constitutional changes which reduced autonomy of 
Serbia's provinces and strengthened the central rule. The first clear parallelism is thus 
presented: precisely on the year of the 600"" anniversary of the battle of Kosovo Serbia is 
opening a new chapter in its history. He continues by stating 
Today, it is difficult to say what is the historical truth about the Battle of Kosovo 
and what is legend. Today this is no longer important. Oppressed by pain and 
filled with hope, the people used to remember and to forget, as, after all, all 
people in the world do, and it was ashamed of treachery and glorified heroism. 
Therefore it is difficult to say today whether the Battle of Kosovo was a defeat or 
a victory for the Serbian people, whether thanks to it we fell into slavery or we 
survived in this slavery. The answers to those questions w i l l be constantly sought 
by science and the people. What has been cenain through all the centuries until 
our time today is that disharmony struck Kosovo 600 years ago. I f we lost the 
battle, then this was not only the result of social superiority and the armed 
advantage of the Ottoman Empire but also of the tragic disunity in the leadership 
of the Serbian state at that time. In that distant 1389, the Ottoman Empire was not 
A l l quotes from Milosevic's Gazimestan speech are taken from Auerswald, The 
Kosovo Conflict, 30-34. 
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only stronger than that of the Serbs but it was also more fortunate than the Serbian 
kingdom. 
Milosevic then seeks to place his speech in the context of the post-World War I I history 
of Yugoslavia, in which Serbia's influence had been restricted through constitutional 
arrangements, thus diluting its power. This had been a long-running controversy in 
Serbian politics, particularly after Kosovo and the northern Serbian province of 
Vojvodina were granted influence over Serbia under Yugoslavia's 1974 constitution. 
Indeed, Sabrina Petra Ramet and Vjeran Pavlakovic argue that Milosevic sought to make 
"clear parallels between the Battle of Kosovo Polje and the Yugoslav constitution of 
1974, both considered to be defeats in the Serbian national consciousness."'^ Milosevic 
continues by stating that disunity has haunted Serbs throughout history. Such disunity 
among Serbian political leaders meant that they were "prone to compromise to the 
detriment of its own people", compromise which "could not be accepted historically and 
ethically by any nation in the world". However, "here we are now at the field of Kosovo 
to say that this is no longer the case". 
Thus the disunity the Serbian leadership allegedly showed in 1389 is inserted in 
the context of events in the second post world war period. The first case of disunity led 
to Ottoman conquest, the second to fascist aggression. 
Sabrina Petra Ramet and Vjeran Pavlakovic, Serbia Since 1989: politics and society 
imder Milosevic and after, (Washington: University of Washington Press 2005): 13. 
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Thanks to their leaders and politicians and their vassal mentality they felt guilty 
before themselves and others. This situation lasted for decades, it lasted for years 
and here we are now at the field of Kosovo to say that this is no longer the case ... 
Serbia of today is united and equal to other republics and prepared to do 
everything to improve its financial and social position and that of all its citizens. I f 
there is unity, cooperation, and seriousness, it wi l l succeed in doing so. 
In an elaboration of another of the major motifs of the Kosovo myth, that of the purity of 
Serbian motives, Milosevic asserts that 
Serbs have never in the whole of their history conquered and exploited others. 
Their national and historical being has been liberational throughout the whole of 
history and through two world wars, as it is today. They liberated themselves and 
when they could they also helped others to liberate themselves. 
The middle section of the speech took a markedly different line from the nationalist 
expressions which characterised the beginning of it, to the point that Louis Sell describes 
it as sounding "as i f it was written by his wife" ' " (Mirjana Markovic, who was known for 
•° Louis Sell, Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2003): 88. 
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her hard-line communist views). Indeed, Milosevic goes on praising the virtues of ethnic 
tolerance and socialism, describing how "the world is more and more marked by national 
tolerance, national cooperation and even national equality" and calling for equal and 
harmonious relations among the peoples of Yugoslavia. 
Milosevic then went on to portray medieval Serbia as not just the defender of its 
own territory, but of all Europe in the fight against the Ottoman Turks. He declared that 
"Six centuries ago, Serbia heroically defended itself in the field of Kosovo, but it also 
defended Europe. Serbia was at that time the bastion that defended the European culture, 
religion, and European society in general". According to Arne Johan Vetlesen this was 
an appeal "to the values of Europe, meaning to Christianity, to modemiry, to Civilization 
with a capital C, exploit[ing] Orientalist sentiments and help[ing] to amplify the 
Balkanism widespread in Western governments.""' 
Finally, the most obvious example of continuous time in the speech: 
Six centuries later, now, we are being again engaged in battles and are facing 
battles. They are not armed battles, although such things cannot be excluded yet. 
However, regardless of what kind of battles they are, they cannot be won without 
resolve, bravery, and sacrifice, without the noble qualities that were present here 
in the field of Kosovo in the days past. Our chief battle now concerns 
21 Arne Johan Vetlesen, Evil and Human Agency: Understanding Collective Evildoing, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005): 153, emphasis added. 
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implementing the economic, political, cultural, and general social prosperity, 
finding a quicker and more successful approach to a civilization in which people 
wi l l live in the 21st century. 
McDonald also notes the visual analogies with the past, "Orthodox priests held aloft 
icons of Milosevic and Lazar, while thousands of men and women crowded around the 
podium. Arguably, this was Milosevic's finest hour."" Thomas agrees, "in Milosevic 
the man and the moment were well met...while Milosevic himself may not have been a 
Serbian nationalist by nature his background, coming from the small provincial town of 
Pozarevac in eastern Serbia with a father who studied Orthodox theology, would have 
meant that he understood the habits and thought patterns of that creed."^"^ Nonetheless, 
according to McDonald, "secretly, however, he admitted that most of this was nothing 
more than 'bullshit'.""'* 
But what was the reason behind this nationalist appeal, and why did it have to be 
delivered through a mystification of Kosovo? 
According to Thomas, 
MacDonald, Balkan Holocaust?, 71. 
Thomas, Serbia under Milosevic, 47. 
MacDonald, Balkan Holocaust?, 71. 
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...while the inability of democracy to put down f i rm roots can be attributed in part 
to weaknesses and fault-lines within Serbian society, the decisions of individuals 
and personalities have also played a critical role both in the failure to bring about, 
or in actively seeking to thwart, the process of democratic consolidation. It 
follows that i f contingent factors played a role in the failure of democratic 
development in Serbia during the 1990s then there was no cultural inevitability to 
the triumph of authoritarianismP 
In other words, it was individuals and personalities that were responsible for the triumph 
of authoritarianism, and not the end of the Cold War, nor the presence of ancient ethnic 
hatreds. Authoritarianism, on the other hand, necessitated a nationalist discourse to 
survive: "Milosevic and his supporters from within the regime apparatus were not only 
able to use nationalism to cling to power at the end of the 1980s, but would continue 
throughout the 1990s to use "nationalist mobilisation' as a means by which Serbian 
society could be kept in a state of 'permanent revolution'."'^ 
The Kosovo battle of 1389 provided perfect materials for the creation of 
nationalist myths, especially myths designed to polarise public opinion, portray 
the values of 'unity' and parade Milosevic as the great unifier (see the content of 
the Gazimestan speech). However, as Thomas outlines, "Of perhaps greater 
Thomas, Serbia under Milosevic, 4, emphasis added. 
Ibid, 5. 
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influence was the way in which the events of the battle of Kosovo were 
incorporated into, and elaborated in, a body of folk poetry which developed 
amongst the Serbian communities within the Ottoman empire.""^ 
These are myths that recurred thanks to the immobilisation of history 
throughout the 1990s, serving the political purposes of the Serbian leadership. 
The first myth (the acquisition of redemption through defeat) was very much 
27 
Thomas continues, "In these poems historical personages were transformed into mythic 
archetypes of virtue and villainy. The Serbian leader, Lazar, became the embodiment of 
saintly self-sacrifice. According to legend, on the eve of the battle of Kosovo, Lazar had 
been offered the choice between 'earthly' victory in the battle against the Ottomans, or to 
suffer defeat and death thereby securing spiritual victory and the 'heavenly kingdom'. 
By choosing the latter course he sacrificed himself so that his people could attain future 
redemption. The poem also celebrated the exemplary heroism of Milos Obilic. Before 
the battle Obilic had been accused of treason, and during the next day's fighting he had 
sought to redeem his own personal honour and avenge the defeat of the Serbian army by 
infiltrating the Ottoman camp and killing Sultan Murat before slain himself...While 
Obilic's conduct was celebrated that of Vuk Brankovic was deplored. Brankovic, a 
Serbian noble and Lazar's son-in law, had betrayed his leader and his people by refusing 
to during the battle of Kosovo to commit his fighters to the struggle. Vuk Brankovic 
would remain an enduring symbol of the dangers posed to the Serbian people by internal 
strife and disunity." Ibid, 13. 
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present on the eve of the NATO strikes. The other (absolute need to avoid 
Serbian disunity) played an important role in justifying policies directed towards 
the abolition of Albanian autonomy and the bringing of the province under the 
direct control of Belgrade. The Kosovo myth also played a role in determining 
Serbian views and policies throughout the Yugoslav crisis, and especially in 
Bosnia. The particular significance of Kosovo was outlined in 1983 by the 
Orthodox ecclesiastical establishment. It is difficult to find a more suitable 
description of the myth's construction as a modern nationalist ideology reliant on 
empty time and metaphysical approaches: 
Kosovo is not simply a physical dwelling place rather it is a metaphysical 
creation. This Serbian homeland situated between the land and the sky translates 
a spiritual phenomenon into one of time and space. That is the greatest 
demonstration that ownership of a land cannot simply be reckoned in terms of 
numbers, or the composition of the mass of its inhabitants, but rather i t is a 
spiritual concept which has come into being in an existential way. The process of 
ideogenesis is in this case the most important from ethnogenesis.'^ 
The Banality of Ethnic Conflict and Immanent Power Struggles 
Ibid, 38. 
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At this point the likes of Cviic ask: "In 1991 Milosevic converted to the concept 
of the Greater Serbia that had previously been the preserve of nationalists like Vuk 
Draskovic and Vojislav Seselj. This was a political master-stroke because it completed 
the process of Milosevic's transformation into a national icon. But what made this 
possible? Why did the Serbs respond to him so well?"'^ 
The point is that they did not. In fact. 
In early elections in Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic controlled the media and 
essentially bought the vote by illegally using public funds - hardly a sign of 
enormous public appeal, and an act that was foolhardy as well because it greatly 
accelerated the breakup of the country. Moreover, like Tudjman's party, 
Milosevic's party was comparatively well organized and widely based and had an 
enormous advantage under the election rules. Although it garnered less than half 
the vote, it gained 78 percent of the seats. Milosevic's fortunes were further 
enhanced because Kosovo Albanians boycotted the election, allowing his party to 
win that area."^° 
Christopher Cviic, "The Serbian Exception", International Affairs No. 3, Vol . 75 
(1999): 639, emphasis added. Quoted in Chapter I . 
John Mueller, "The Banality of 'Ethnic War'", International Security 25, No. 1 (2000): 
45-46. 
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In this context, the idea according to which Milosevic used the Kosovo-Serbian unity 
myth in order to deprive Kosovo from its autonomy^' precisely to ensure that Kosovo 
Albanians - who were unlikely to fall for such nationalist agenda - did not participate in 
the vote is not entirely implausible. The fact remains that had they voted in the election 
there was every chance that Milosevic would have lost it.^" 
Further evidence that nationalism was not rampant in Yugoslavia is presented by 
Mueller: 
A poll conducted throughout Yugoslavia in the summer and autumn of 1990, even 
as the nationalists were apparently triumphing in elections, more accurately 
indicates the state of opinion after centuries of supposed ethnic hatreds and after 
years of nationalist propaganda. The question, "Do you agree that every 
(Yugoslav) nation should have a national state of its own"? elicited the following 
Two months before the Gazimestan speech, "Kosovo was finally brought under 
Milosevic's control on 23 March 1989 when the Kosovo assembly voted itself out of 
existence following heavy deployments of Serbian police and troops of the Yugoslav 
National Army (JNA) and the arrest of the deposed Albanian provincial leader, Azem 
Vllasi". Thomas, Serbia under Milosevic, 46. Albanian abstention in the 1990 elections 
came as a result of this development. 
On this point, see Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the 
Cold War, (Washington: Brookings 1995): 121. 
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re.sponses: completely agree, 16 percent; agree to some extent, 7 percent; 
undecided, 10 percent; do not agree in part, 6 percent; and do not agree at all, 61 
percent.'^ 
A Complexity-informed epistemic approach demands that we look at the immanent 
political struggle which generated the nationalist discourse which then characterised the 
conflict. Whilst it has been possible to answer Cviic's first question (what made it 
possible?) by outlining how the nationalist discourse followed strictly modem epistemic 
rules, which were further refined by Anderson's critique of 'homogeneous and empty 
time', an answer to the second question (Why did they respond to it so well - the answer 
being, they did not) allows us to further understand why the conflicts were fought in the 
way they were, and how the construction of the Kosovo historically linear myth 
characterised all clashes in the former Yugoslavia throughout the 1990s. 
For example, it is precisely because there was a nearly absolute absence of 
nationalist rhetoric that the war in Bosnia had to be fought by paramilitary forces. On the 
absence of ancient ethnic hatreds in Bosnia, consider: "...the casual notion that each 
ethnic or national group in Yugoslavia (or indeed anywhere else) is united by deep bonds 
of affection is substantially flawed. Serbs in Serbia have expressed little affection for the 
John Mueller, "The Banality of 'Ethnic War'", 46. On this point see also Laslo Sekelj, 
Yugoslavia: the Process of Disintegration (Highland Lakes: Atlantic Research and 
Publications 1992: 277. 
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desperate and often rough rural Serbs who have fled to their country from war-torn 
Croatia and Bosnia And: "The great divide within Yugoslav society was increasingly 
that between rural and urban communities, not that between peoples.''^ 
In support of this latter argument, Peter Maas observes that "to a surprising extent, 
this was a war of poor rural Serbs against wealthier urban Muslims, a Deliverance 
scenario.""'^ Donia and Fine conclude that it was the "relatively uneducated armed 
hillsmen, with a hostility toward urban culture and the state institutions (including taxes) 
that go with \\....who proved susceptible to Serbian chauvinist propaganda...dWovj'ing 
themselves to be recruited into Serb paramilitary units and formed a significant portion of 
those shelling Bosnia's cities."^^ Thus the reliance on paramilitaries. Indeed, there 
Yugoslav army fell apart very quickly - 'Yugoslav' soldiers did not really know what 
they were fightinh for, and refused to be drafted. Mass desertion did not really leave 
many options for those willing to pay any price to cause havoc, and the use of (criminal) 
paramilitaries becaume not only very attractive, but the only viable solution. Mueller 
provides comprehensive evidence on this: 
Mueller, "The Banality of 'Ethnic War'", 97. 
Christopher Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, (New York: New York University 
Press 1995): 63. 
Peter Maas, Love Thy Neighbor: A Story of War, (New York: Knopf, 1995): 159. 
Robert Donia and John Fine, Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed, (New 
York: Columbia University Press 1994): 28, emphasis added. 
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Significantly, the Serbian (or Yugoslav) army substantially disintegrated early in 
the hostilities. There may well have been hatreds, and there surely was 
propaganda. But when ordinary Serb soldiers were given an opportunity to 
express these presumed proclivities or to act in response to the ingenious televised 
imprecations in government-sanctioned violence, they professed they did not 
know why they were fighting and often mutinied or deserted en masse. 
Meanwhile, back in Serbia young men reacted mainly by determined draft-
dodging. Some 150,000 or more quickly emigrated or went underground. In one 
city, only two of the 2,000-3,000 "volunteers" expected in a call-up showed up, 
and in several towns there were virtual mutinies against conscription. Overall, 
only 50 percent of Serbian reservists and only 15 percent in Belgrade obeyed 
orders to report for duty. Because Serbs from Serbia proper were unwilling to 
fight outside their own republic, Belgrade had to reshape its approach to the wars 
in Croatia and Bosnia in major ways. As a Serbian general put it, modification of 
Belgrade's military plans was made necessary by the "lack of success in 
mobilisation and the desertion rate". Part of the solution involved arming the 
locals, particularly in Serb areas of Croatia and Bosnia. But in general the 
fighting quality of the militaries, especially initially, was very poor: There was a 
lack of discipline, ineffective command and control, and, especially in the case of 
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the Serbs, a reluctance to take casualties. Such deficiencies, as Steven Burg and 
Paul Shoup observe, "led all sides to rely on irregulars and special units."''* 
A quick analysis of the situation in Bosnia is important because: 1) the Kosovo 
myth was utilised to justify actions that otherwise may have been regarded as lacking 
legitimacy, 2) the situation largely conditioned the way in which developments in Kosovo 
were interpreted, and in particular 3) by the end of Bosnia the conflict had already been 
framed along 'ancient ethnic hatreds' lines, whilst the ultimate analytic of finitude 
embodied by the Holocaust (Srebrenica) had already been crossed: this very much 
conditioned NATO's decision to initiate the bombing campaign. 
For the first point above, it is imponant to consider the reality of combatants who 
operate largely outside established military frameworks and who suffered from a 
particularly bad reputation.''^ Not surprisingly the appeal to myths - allowed for by the 
•^^ Mueller, "The Banality of 'Ethnic War'", 48-49. 
As Mueller explains, "The most dynamic (and murderous) Serbian units were notably 
composed not of committed nationalists or ideologues, nor of locals out to get their 
neighbours, nor of ordinary people whipped into a frenzy by demagogues and the media, 
but rather of common criminals recruited for the task. Specifically, the politicians urged 
underworld and hooligan groups to get into the action, and it appears that thousands of 
prison inmates, promised shortened sentences and enticed by the prospect that they could 
"take whatever booty you can", were released for the war effort". Ibid. 
6. Kosovo: From 1389 to 1999 and Back, 301 
original delineation of such myth as a matter of national policy - became very attractive 
for legitimising what constituted, otherwise, actions that were broadly regarded as being 
criminal.""^ 
For the second point above (the situation in Bosnia largely conditioned the way in 
which developments in Kosovo were interpreted) it may be interesting to take official 
stances at face value. The UK Parliament's Foreign Affairs Select Committee identified 
the primary reason behind intervention in Kosovo: "Guilt over past inaction regarding 
Bosnia (the then Defence Secretary, George Robertson, said on 12 June 1998: 'the worid 
has learned its lessons from Bosnia. The international community now knows it must be 
For example, "On 28 June [1995], shortly after his troops had repelled the Bosnian 
government assault, Mladic celebrated in the town of Bijeljina. Speaking to his fighters, 
he recalled the circumstances of the battle of Kosovo and affirmed his continuing sense 
of personal mission. He said that on the day of the battle "Prince Lazar took communion 
with his army and submitted himself to the heavenly kingdom, defending his fatherland, 
faith, freedom and the honour of the Serbian nation. We must understand the essence of 
that sacrifice so that we can draw from it a historical lesson. The fact that we have today 
created a victorious army has ensured that Lazar's sacrifice has passed beyond the realms 
of simple myth". Thomas, Serbia under Milosevic, 237. 
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united, f i rm and determined from the earliest possible moment in dealing with the 
Balkans'".^' 
It has been established that the absence of nationalist fervour is precisely what led 
to the strategy of relying primarily on paramilitaries. Thus, i f it can be reasonably argued 
that those paramilitaries committed most of the actions over which past inaction 
generated a sense of guilt, it would be possible to argue that, by extension, it was 
precisely the absence of nationalist fervour that led to the atrocities in Bosnia, which in 
turn led to the intervention in Kosovo. Indeed, the link between paramilitary action and 
serious war crimes is well documented^'. A United Nations (UN) commission notes a 
UK Padiament, House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Select Committee, "Fourth 
Report: Kosovo. Volume 1, Report and Proceedings of the Committee", 23 May 2000: 
xxvii . 
^' "as Susan Woodward notes, paramilitary gangs, foreign mercenaries, and convicted 
criminals roamed the territory under ever less civil control. And 'war crimes', observes 
Norman Cigar, were their 'primary military mission'. Vladan Vasilijevic, an expert on 
organized crime, says that most of the well-documented atrocities in Bosnia were 
committed by men with long criminal records." Mueller, "The Banality of 'Ethnic War'", 
52. 
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"strong correlation between paramilitary activity and reports of killing of civilians, rape, 
torture, destruction of property, looting, detention facilities, and mass graves."""' 
Then, of course, we have Srebrenica. What probably remains the most 
comprehensive enquiry on the matter was the report commissioned by the Dutch 
" ' Ibid. Please note that stating that irregular forces committed the majority of the crimes 
in Bosnia (Kosovo being a different case) does not mean that official forces did not 
commit any, nor does it diminish the burden of guilt of either regular or irregular forces. 
There is something paradoxical, however, in having the ICTY trying to prove Milosevic's 
direct involvement in massacres such as Srebrenica: arguably his biggest crime was the 
absence of direct involvement, and the fact that such a lack led to a situation of virtual 
anarchy in Serb-controlled areas. Although that is the law and there is not much the 
ICTY could have done about it, the current situation seems to send a message according 
to which genocide committed by proxy may go unpunished because it generates 
situations in which it is very difficult to assign direct responsibility, precisely because it 
was done by proxy (and vice versa - serious crimes may be committed by proxy precisely 
because such crimes are likely to go unpunished). The issue of the differential level of 
analysis that has been applied in the legal discourse (aggregate for NATO, individual for 
the former Yugoslavia) is addressed in the next chapter. Perhaps it would have been 
better to adopt an aggregate level of responsibility for the likes of Milosevic, for that is 
where their responsibilities mainly rest. 
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Government to the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation."" As the BBC 
reported, "former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic - on trial at The Hague on a 
genocide charge citing Srebrenica - is not linked to the killings by the researchers. 'No 
evidence had been found that suggests the involvement of the Serbian authorities in 
Belgrade,' the report says.""*^  
Commenting on the report, Noam Chomsky contends that 
...the worst crime, the one that they were really going to charge him [Milosevic] 
for that genocide was Srebrenica. Now, there is a little problem with that: namely 
there was an extensive, detailed inquiry into it by the Dutch Government, which 
was the responsible government, there were Dutch forces there, that's a big, you 
know, hundreds of pages inquiry, and their conclusion is that Milosevic did not 
44 Peter Romijn and JCH Blom, Srebrenica: A Safe Area. Reconstruction, Background, 
Consequences and Analyses of the Fall of the Safe Area, (Amsterdam: Netherlands 
Institute for War Documentation 2002). Available online at: 
http://www.niod.nl/default.asp (accessed 15 April 2008). 
BBC, "Srebrenica blame 'must be shared'", 10 April 2002, 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/europe/1920357.stm (accessed 15 Apri l 2008). 
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know anything about that, and that when it was discovered in Belgrade, they were 
horrified.^^ 
The Dutch report has not remained unchallenged"*^, and claims that point to the 
local nature of the massacre should not be necessarily interpreted as attempts at removing 
responsibility at the central level.''^ The point here is that the absence of nationalist 
feeling led to the very formation of paramilitaries which, acting under varying degrees of 
central control, committed the bulk of the atrocities in the former Yugoslavia. This is not 
being argued in order to discuss responsibility, but in order to demonstrate the argument 
'^ ^ Noam Chomsky, "On the NATO Bombing of Yugoslavia: Noam Chomsky interviewed 
by Danilo Mandic", RTS Online, 25 Apri l 2006. Interview available online: 
http://www.chomskv.info/interviews/20060425.htm (accessed on 15 April 2008). 
Consider, for example, an article published by Karen Meirik, "Controversial Srebrenica 
Report Back on Table", the Institute for Peace and War Reporting, 6 February 2004: 
http://www.iwpr.net/?p=tri&s=fcS:o= 166497&apc state=henitri2004 (accessed 15 April 
2008). 
On the contrary, Belgrade has enormous responsibilities for forming and arming the 
paramilitaries in the first instance, and letting them run lose on the second instance. An 
important contribution here is provided by Bob de Graaff, "The Difference Between 
Legal Proof and Historical Evidence: The Trial of Slobodan Milosevic and the Case of 
Srebrenica", European Review 14, (2006): 499-512. 
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according to which it was the absence of 'ancient ethnic hatreds' that determined how the 
conflict developed in a first instance, and how it was interpreted (precisely as the 
opposite of what it was, that is, a case of ancient hatreds) on a second instance. As 
Mueller concisely put it, "Ethnicity proved essentially to be simply the characteristic 
around which the perpetrators and the politicians who recruited and encouraged them 
happened to array themselves. It was important as an ordering device or principle, not as 
a crucial motivating force. 
The rest of this chapter wi l l be largely about defending the third point above 
(interpretation of the Kosovo crisis as an issue of ancient ethnic hatreds) whilst Chapter 8 
w i l l deal with the issue of the Holocaust / Srebrenica. The next section wi l l also look at 
how the absence of nationalistic feelings in Serbia shaped Serbian strategy towards the 
Kosovo issue, exploiting such issue in the context of immanent political struggles. 
Clashes of Modernities: Apprehensions of Time in Reaction to Nationalist Discourse 
At this point an observation could be reasonably made: the fact that hatreds were 
absent in Bosnia does not necessarily means that they were absent in Kosovo. This final 
section wil l counter such hypothetical observation by seeking to argue two related points: 
Mueller, "The Banality of 'Ethnic War", 62. 
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• First, the conflict in Kosovo iiad a priori been construed on the bases of historical 
linearity by key players and shapers of public opinion following the flawed 
understanding of the Bosnian tragedy. However, historical linearity characterised 
responses to Bosnia and to Kosovo differently: whereas Bosnia was a matter of 
"letting the violence run its course" (Mueller, below), Kosovo was the opposite, 
and it was so because the threshold imposed by the invocation of the Holocaust 
had been surpassed. Chapters 6 and 7 wil l demonstrate how a mixture of 
historical linearity and analytical fmitude (a finitude embodied in the 
remembrance of the Holocaust) conditioned NATO's campaign. 
• Second, the modus operandi of the Kosovo conflict proper was not entirely 
dissimilar from the Bosnian experience. It was mainly characterised - contrary to 
the perceptions of many - by immanent political struggles implemented by proxy 
due to the overwhelming absence of intense ancient ethnic hatreds. 
Michael Brown produced a timely reminder of the way in which 'ethnic' conflicts are 
perceived by outlining a short compendium of relevant statements. 
Many policymakers and journalists believe that the causes of internal conflicts are 
simple and straightforward. The driving forces behind these violent conflicts, it is 
said, are the "ancient hatreds" that many ethnic and religious groups have for each 
other. In Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and elsewhere, these deep -
seated animosities were held in check for years by authoritarian rule. The 
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collapse of authoritarian rule, it is argued, has taken the " l i d " o f f these ancient 
rivalries, allowing long-suppressed grievances to come to the surface and escalate 
into armed conflict. U.S. President George Bush, for example, maintained that 
the war in Bosnia between Serbs, Croats and Muslims grew out of "age-old 
animosities". His successor. B i l l Clinton, argued that the end of the Cold War 
"lifted a lid from a cauldron of long-simmering hatreds. Now, the entire global 
terrain is bloody with such conflicts". Writing about the Balkans, the American 
pohtical commentator Richard Cohen declared that "Bosnia is a formidable, scary 
place of high mountains, brutish people, and tribal grievances rooted in history 
and myth born of boozy nights by the fire. It's the place where World War I 
began and where the wars of Europe persist, an ember of hate still glowing for 
reasons that defy reason i t se l f . Serious scholars reject this explanation of 
internal conflict''". 
It would appear that the creation of 'vacuous, empty time' is not only present in the 
formulation of nationalist myths, but that it is equally present in the understanding of 
other issues as nationalist problems proper. Furthermore, the intellectual apparatus in 
question works in ways that are strikingly similar to the way in which academic 
Michael Brown, "The Causes of Internal Conflict", in Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict, 
Revised Edition, eds. Michael Brown, Owen Cote, Sean Lynn-Jones and Steven Miller 
(Cambridge: M I T Press 2001): 3. 
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International Relations - that modern empirical science based on transcendental 
philosophies of the object - argues that "the enduring anarchic character of international 
politics accounts for the striking sameness in the quality of international life through the 
millennia."^' Note in that in both cases the organising principle is anarchy - anarchy thus 
provides the objective transcendental on the bases of which the subjects wi l l be studied. 
In one case, anarchy is the result of the collapse of order (the removal of the Communist 
lid), in the other case it is an enduring characteristic of international politics. Again, the 
formation of theories of International Relations are not studied in virtue of what they say 
or claim to explain, rather, they are studied in virtue of what they (epistemically) 
represent. 
The presence of this empty, linear time is evident in the images that the discourse 
deploys to offer explanations for the conflict. As such, the construction of the nationalist 
myth on the one hand, and the interpretation of a conflict as having nationalist causes on 
the other correspond to an enforcement of the historical linearity and empty time 
Anderson and Foucault identify as a primary component of the modern episteme. These 
are essentially modern understandings of conflicts which, in the end, generate and deploy 
similar understandings of conflicts. Under this perspective, Zizek is not entirely wrong 
when he argues: 
^' Kenneth Waltz, "Laws and Theories", 53. 
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Recently, one of the American negotiators said that Milosevic is not only part of 
the problem, but rather the problem itself. However, was this not clear from the 
very beginning^ Why, then, the interminable procrastination of the Western 
powers, playing for years into Milosevic's hands, acknowledging him as a key 
factor of stability in the region, misreading clear cases of Serb aggression as civil 
or even tribal warfare, initially putting the blame on those who immediately saw 
what Milosevic stands for and, for that reason, desperately wanted to escape his 
grasp (see James Baker's public endorsement of a "limited military intervention" 
against Slovene secession), supporting the last Yugoslav prime minister Ante 
Markovic, whose program was, in an incredible case of political blindness, 
seriously considered as the last chance for a democratic market-oriented unified 
Yugoslavia, etc.etc? When the West fights Milosevic, it is not fighting its enemy, 
one of the last points of resistance against the liberal-democratic New Worid 
Order; it is rather fighting its own creature, a monster that grew as the result of the 
compromises and inconsistencies of the Western politics itself."''" 
We would add that such inconsistencies are generated precisely by the nature of 
modernity: the fact that the West fights 'its own creature' is epitomised by the fact that 
the West understood the conflict precisely in the same way as the perpetrators of such 
Zizek, Against the double blackmail, http://www.lacan.com/kosovo.htm. strong 
emphasis in the original. 
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conflict understood it and wanted it to be understood: in other words, such 
understandings all belong to the same modern way of generating and deploying 
knowledge. 
In this context it is interesting to see how the recurring images and discursive 
techniques (for example, reliance on the notion of memory) can be found in Milosevic's 
Gazimestan speech, in the presidential statements above, and in any attempt to validate 
the 'ancient ethnic hatred' hypothesis. For example, Robert Kaplan made extensive use 
of relevant discursive techniques as he systematically "described the Balkans as 'a region 
of pure memory' where 'each individual sensation and memory affects the grand 
movement of clashing peoples', and where the processes of history and memory were 
'kept on hold' by communism for forty-five years, 'thereby creating a kind of multiplier 
effect for violence'."''''' 
These arguments are not inconsequential: in this context it is not surprising to 
learn that Clinton was fond of Kaplan's Balkan doomsday books, and that such books 
significantly influenced Clinton's policy in the Balkans.^"* In any case, assumptions of 
Mueller, 'The Banality of 'Ethnic War'", 44. 
54 
Michael Kaufman. "The Dangers of Letting a President Read", The New York Times, 
22 May 1999, 
http://querv.nvtimes.com/gstyfullpage.html?res=9E00E6D61631F931A15756C0A96F958 
260&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss (last accessed on 7 July 2008). 
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historical linearity can be found throughout relevant biographical accounts of the key 
people that shaped policy towards Kosovo from the mid 1990s onwards. Clinton's views 
on Bosnia are outlined above, but just to confirm that those very same views persisted in 
the case of Kosovo, consider what the then President announced to his nation on 24 
March 1999: "Take a look at this map. Kosovo is a small place, but sits on a major fault 
line between Europe, Asia and the Middle East, at the meeting place of Islam and both 
the Western and Orthodox branches of Christianity...all the ingredients for a major war 
are there: ancient grievances..."^"^ 
It is interesting that Clinton adopted this view, which - to his credit - he later 
publicly regretted on 14 May 1999, stating: 
There are those who say Europe and its North American allies have no business 
intervening in the ethnic conflicts of the Balkans. They are the inevitable results, 
these conflicts, according to some, of centuries-old animosities which were 
unleashed by the end of the Cold War restraints in Yugoslavia and elsewhere. /, 
myself, have been guilty of saying that on an occasion or two, and I regret it now 
more than I can say. For I have spent a great deal of time in these last six years 
reading the real history of the Balkans, and the truth is that a lot of what passes for 
http://Querv.nvtimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E00E6D61631F93lA15756C0A96F958 
260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all (accessed 15 April 2008). 
Auerswald, The Kosovo Conflict, 730. 
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common wisdom in this area is a gross oversimplification and misreading of 
history. The truth is that for centuries these people have lived together in the 
Balkans and southeastern Europe with greater or lesser degree of tensions, but 
often without anything approaching the intolerable conditions and conflicts that 
exist today."**^  
Yet, why is it that the 'common wisdom' Clinton refers to is based on a 'gross 
oversimplification and misreading of history'? Could we be dealing here with some sort 
of 'modern epistemic reflex'? Because such 'common wisdom', as the next chapters wi l l 
also outline, was certainly present in the minds of most key policy makers (including 
Clinton) as key decisions regarding the various Balkan conflicts (including Kosovo's) 
were being made."''^  I f this was the case. Complexity could be an ideal remedy for this 
reflexive disorder, as it is argued in the conclusion of this chapter. Chris O' Sullivan has 
explored at length the nature of this reflex in the major formers of public opinion - and 
CNN, "Transcript: Clinton Justifies U.S. Involvement in Kosovo", 19 May 1999, 
http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/05/13/clinton.kosovo/transcript.html 
(accessed 15 April 2008), emphasis added. 
John Norris, Collision Course, xix. 
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considering the role that public opinion increasingly plays in determining geopolitical 
goals, as Kolossov and O'Loughlin argue"''^ , this is a matter of extreme importance. 
These conflicts are often described as 'ancient ethnic conflicts' pitting 'neighbor 
against neighbor' which are rooted in, and conditioned by an abstract and 
seemingly unknowable 'history'. While generally acknowledged as tragic, these 
events often persist because "that's just the way those people are'. Such 
statements have tremendous con.sequences for shaping public opinion, as well as 
for influencing the views of public officials...When the news media do focus on 
world conflicts, it frequently emphasises one particular causation at the expense 
of other possible explanations. Media concentration on 'ethnic identity' and 
'history' with its stress on inevitability and determinism, can often overlook the 
critical political and economic factors that contribute to violence. Such 
approaches can contribute to popular misconceptions of wars being fought solely 
for 'historical' and 'ethnic' reasons which are beyond the comprehension of 
everyday media users. Increasingly, historical context is offered, if at all, as a 
final verdict'. In many cases, historical analogies and precedents are used, not to 
58 
O'Loughlin, John and Vladimir Kolossov. "Still Not Worth the Bones of a Single 
Pomeranian Grenadier: the Geopolitics of the Kosovo War 1999". 
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lend context or substance to a particular conflict, but to support an all-
encompassing theory to explain a specific conflict.^ 
. .'59 
I f any concrete example of how Anderson's continuous time is necessary in order to 
understand any conflict as a modern, nationalist conflict, consider the quotes of many 
prominent journalists: 
"The Battle of Kosovo', wrote Time Magazine's Lance Morrow, 'when the 
Turks, advancing west toward Vienna in 1389, defeated the Serbs and left their 
bodies to the crows - might have been the day before yesterday'"'. 
Is it better to remember or to forget?' wrote Time Magazine's Lance Morrow in 
the midst of the Balkan conflict. 'Forgetting - even without its sainted better half, 
forgiveness - is sometimes the only route to sanity. I f only the Balkans, for 
example, could be enfogged by a massive forgetting. As it is, every generation of 
Serbs remembers, as if it were last Saturday, their defeat by the Turks at the 
Battle of Kosovo in the year 1389. The result has been centuries of self-renewing 
59 
Chris O'Sullivan, "The News Media and the Resolution of Ethnic Conflict: Ready for 
the Next Steps?", The Global Review of Ethnopolitics 1, no. 2, (2001): 55 and 57, 
emphasis added. 
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reciprocal atrocity between Serbs and Muslims. Massacre is the Balkan national 
flower.' 
When violence in Kosovo began to grab worid attention, the media had already 
been reporting warnings that NATO might need to occupy the Balkans for years 
to come. It thus seemed to many that a durable peace anywhere in the Balkans 
was an unattainable goal. The conflicts by and large stemmed from ancient 
hatreds, many in the media asserted, and while such tensions might be buried for 
years or decades, they would ultimately surface^'^ 
In reality, the Kosovo conflict proper was characterised by many of the features 
that characterised Bosnia, namely, a pronounced reliance on paramilitaries due to a 
distinct absence of nationalist feeling, the whole framed in the context of immanent 
political struggles. As Muller puts it . 
Although there are differences, the Serb rampages in Kosovo in 1999 often 
resembled those seen earlier in Bosnia and Croatia. The army provided a sort of 
generalised support, it participated directly in some areas, and it hardly escapes 
^° Ibid, 58-60, emphasis added. 
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blame for the results in any case. But, as one report puts it, "in hundreds of 
interviews" Kosovo Albanians "have said that nearly all the killings of civilians 
were committed by Serbian paramilitary forces and not by the regular 
army"...whilst released criminals formed an imponant component of Serb 
forces.^' 
The comprehensive UK Pariiamentary report reaches similar conclusions: 
The fact that elements of the campaign against the Kosovo Albanians were 
planned does not mean that, overall, the campaign was smoothly directed and well 
organised. Different elements of the Serb security apparatus appear to have had 
different agendas. One source quoted by Tim Judah states that "there were 
differences between the police and the army. The police were in favour of the 
expulsions because they could steal money from people. The intelligence guys 
were against \\....tlie worst were the paramilitaries and the locals". The OSCE 
also records that "'paramilitaries appear to have meted out particularly savage 
treatment" and, by way of contrast, reports an incident where a young Serb 
soldier helped a wheelchair-bound Kosovo Albanian woman, returning her 
documents after paramilitaries had seized them, and subsequently organising 
food, water and medicine for a mosque where villagers were sheltering. The 
61 Mueller, "The Banality of 'Ethnic War'", 58, footnote 57. 
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picture is one of generalised violence against the Kosovo Albanians, with some 
elements organised from Belgrade, hut much of the violence was not carefully 
orchestrated. This picture is consistent with a confidential memorandum provided 
to us by the FCO.^^ 
And the evidence suggests that this situation is largely the consequence of a distinct 
unwillingness on the part of the Serbian population to fight and die for Kosovo. Indeed, 
Public opinion in Serbia was by the spring of 1998 characterised by political 
apathy, and social and economic exhaustion. A poll published in the Nedeljni 
telegraf showed that more than 70 per cent of those asked would be against 
having their close relations sent to fight in Kosovo. Even Ljubomir Tadic, the 
veteran Praxis activist who ten years earlier had played a key role in opposing the 
1974 constitution, said: i feel personally apathetic even though I understand the 
issue intellectually...People don't have pensions. The Americans have frozen our 
money. It is hard to get passionate about it '.^' ' 
62 
UK Pariiament, House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Select Committee, "Fourth 
Report: Kosovo. Volume 1, Report and Proceedings of the Committee", 23 May 2000: 
paragraphs 97-98, strong emphasis added. 
Thomas, Serbia under Milosevic, 410. 
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In order to reinforce this point, it would be important to elucidate some detail on the 
emergence of the warring parties before examining some of the detail of the run up to the 
crisis outlined in the table below. 
11997 
jSeptember Contact Group discusses Kosovo 
September-
November 
European pressure on Belgrade for dialogue 
November K L A attack Serb patrol 
1998 
February-March Escalating violence in Kosovo 
March —North Atlantic Council expresses concern and calls for all sides to 
reduce tension 
—Contact Group's ten point action plan 
—United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1160 
May Hopeful signs from Milosevic /Rugova meeting dashed 
June —EU Sanctions imposed 
—NATO begins initial military planning—Cardiff European Council 
threatens Milosevic i f repression does not cease 
July K L A controls large areas of Kosovo 
August Serb counter-offensive, 250,000 internally displaced by end of month 
September —UNSCR 1199 
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—Serbian forces commit serious human rights violations in the Drenica 
valley. 
—Activation warning to NATO forces 
October —Holbrooke to Belgrade—Activation Orders by NATO—Milosevic 
agrees to verification—UNSCR 1203—Activation Orders put on "soft 
trigger" 
November OSCE verifiers arrive, but violence continues 
November-
December 
Christopher Hi l l shuttle diplomacy 
1999 
January —Ra?ak massacre—Hill draws up package as basis for Rambouillet— 
NATO's solemn warning 
February Rambouillet begins 
March —Holbrooke in Belgrade—Talks reconvene at Kleber Centre, and are 
adjourned—Holbrooke again in Belgrade—Bombing begins 
The emergence of Albanian armed resistance in Kosovo broadly obeyed the same 
patterns that applied to the formation of Serb paramilitaries in Croatia and Bosnia. The 
first known incident involving the Kosovo Liberation Army occurred on 22 Apri l 1996 
when three Serbian refugees from Krajina were killed whilst drinking in a cafe. On the 
same night two a policemen were killed in the towns of Pec and Stimlje. To most 
people's mind the idea that a genuine provincial guerrilla could have committed such acts 
was not even worth contemplating. Indeed, 
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When a group called the Kosovo Liberation Army claimed responsibility for the 
attacks...the mainstream Albanian political leadership in Kosovo sought to cast 
doubt on the idea that these killings were the work of Albanians using 'terrorist' 
methods. According to Ibrahim Rugova they were more likely to be a 
'provocation whose origins can be found in Serbian extremist circles'. It came to 
be widely believed that the UCK [ K L A ] was in fact a creation of the Serbian state 
and its agencies. While it was perhaps not surprising that such a belief should 
take root among the Albanian population, who were fundamentally alienated from 
the Serbian state and its institutions, it was more remarkable, and indicative, that 
such ideas should find an echo with key Serbian 'opinion formers' in Kosovo. In 
January 1997, for instance, when the Serb rector of Pristina University, Radovoje 
Papovic, was injured in a bomb attack, for which the UCK [ K L A ] reportedly 
claimed responsibility, the Serbian Orthodox bishop of Raska-Prozen, Artemije, 
publicly emphasised that it remained 'unclear' who was behind the bombing and 
he suggested that the 'regime' could have been the true initiator of the attacks.^ "* 
And yet the K L A really existed: but it was more the product of the generalised 
permissiveness allowed for by the collapse of state authority - itself caused by the 
incapability of the Serbian military apparatus to control the situation - than by a 
Ibid, 400, strong emphasis added. 
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widespread popular sentiment. Indeed, few question the fact that the movement was 
financed by organised c r i m e . A l s o , there is every chance that the movement started as a 
means of providing territorial safe-heavens for organised criminal activity: "Observers 
noted that in the area of both sides of the border between Kosovo and Albania the UCK 
[ K L A ] insurrection was being used as a cover for the activities of various criminal 
gangs."^' 
By early 1998 the K L A had managed to effectively control the Drenica valley. 
Whilst this did not constitute a major security threat, such development was disastrous in 
the context of the very difficult political situation Milosevic was facing and home. 
Indeed, the escalation of violence in Kosovo was rendering intense political negotiations 
between Milosevic's Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and the Serbia Renewal Movement 
(SPO) very difficult for Milosevic, "as the commencement of hostilities in Kosovo 
facilitated a fundamental change in the Serbian political landscape...as the negotiations 
Roger Boyes and Eske Wright, "Drugs Money Linked to the Kosovo Rebels," The 
Times (London), March 24, 1999. Also consider the recent serious allegations made by 
Caria del Ponte, former prosecutor at the ICTY, Ian Traynor, "Former war crimes 
prosecutor alleges Kosovan army harvested organs from Serb prisoners", The Guardian 
(Manchester) Saturday, 12 Apri l 2008. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/apr/12/warcrimes.kosovo 
(accessed 16 April 2008) 
Thomas, Serbia under Milosevic, 412. 
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progresses the SPO had significantly raised the level of their demands."^^ In a sense, this 
was unsurprising: after all, Milosevic was coming under attack for failing to f u l f i l 
expectations precisely in the context of the myth upon which much his political career 
was constructed. As such, accusations of betrayal had a certain multiplier effect, 
especially when these were pronounced - with a certain degree of perceived plausibility -
by the likes of Momcilo Trajkovic, the president of the Serbian Resistance Movement 
(the main movements of Serbs in Kosovo): "Kosovo and Metohija helped Milosevic and 
the Socialist Party of Serbia to achieve and preserve power, now the regime wants to turn 
the people against Kosovo and is seeking to create a situation in which the public wi l l 
find it easy to accept some future act which wi l l free Serbia from the burden which is 
called Kosovo."^^ 
This is the political background of one of the most violent episodes in the conflict, 
that is, the Serb assault on the Drenica valley. Indeed, "Milosevic seemed to believe that 
that decisive police / military action in the Drenica region would allow him once again to 
present himself once again as the defender of the Kosovo Serbs. He calculated that, as on 
previous occasions in his career, the rhetoric and symbolism of nationalism could be used 
to rally popular support behind him."^^ Nonetheless, Milosevic was well aware that war 
in Kosovo would have jeopardised the excellent links he had been cultivating with the 
Ibid, 414. 
Ibid, 401 
Ibid, 405. 
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international community. In this context the events of 23 February 1998 are significant, 
as 
Robert Gelbard, the US envoy in the Balkans, gave a press conference in Pristina 
in which he praised Milosevic in lavish terms and described the UCK [ K L A ] as a 
terrorist organisation. These comments were made shortly after Milorad Dodik 
had been appointed, with Milosevic's backing, as Prime Minister in the Republika 
Srpska and Gelbard was apparently trying in these statements to highlight the 
'positive' role played by Milosevic in these events. Milosevic, however, chose to 
interpret Gelbard's gesture as a 'green light' for a security crackdown in 
Kosovo.^° 
This began the planning for the assault on the Drenica valley. Yet, with very few Serbs 
will ing to fight - precisely because of a manifest lack of nationalist fervour^' - and with 
the army in a state of disarray, Milosevic had to rely on paramilitaries and special units. 
As such, '\he operations were reponedly spearheaded by members of the Special Ant i -
™ Ibid, 406. 
71 
This lack of fervour is also what characterised Milosevic's political problems at home, 
and Kosovo was precisely an attempt at revitalising the nationalist discourse. See 
Thomas, Serbia under Milosevic, Chapter 29. 
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terrorist Unit (SAJ)."^- Just to confirm that the SAJ conform with the notion of special 
unit populated by thugs and petty criminals presented by Mueller in the context of 
Bosnia, 
...the SAJ effectively acted as Milosevic's personal praetorian guard within the 
state security apparatus. During the war in Bosnia the SAJ had organised the 
arming and training of paramilitaries, and had even co-operated with them in the 
field. During the opposition winter protests of 1996/7 members of the SAJ were 
reported to be roaming the streets of Belgrade looking for demonstrators to beat 
up. In the autumn of 1997 Simatovic's men were back in Bosnia attempting, 
unsuccessfully, to engineer the overthrow of Biljana Plavsic. In Kosovo in early 
1998 the SAJ were once again in the front rank acting as the trusted executors of 
Milosevic's policies.^'^ 
It is thus not surprising that the first major military operation - which had to be 
conducted, by the force of necessity, by infra-military means - coincided with gross 
human rights violations. As Human Rights Watch observed. 
Ibid, 407. 
" Ibid. 
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The Yugoslav Army, Serbian police, and paramilitaries were all responsible for 
war crimes in Kosovo. In general, however, paramilitaries appear to have been 
more extensively involved in the most violent abuses, specifically the executions 
and rapes. While police and army units are by no means exempt from 
responsibility in this regard, the paramilitaries were more commonly engaged in 
arbitrary' killings and sexual violence. But paramilitary forces were not operating 
on their own. On the contrary, paramilitary units were operating in close concert 
with the police, army, and secret police (known as the state security service). 
There may have been specific incidents when paramilitary units or individuals got 
out of control, but the general deployment of paramilitary units and their 
coordination with other sectors of the security apparatus were planned 
components of the Kosovo campaign. 
The fact that SAJ reported directly to Milosevic's means that it is more likely that they 
were under Milosevic's direct control. Nonetheless, as stated above, "There may have 
been specific incidents when paramilitary units or individuals got out of control". 
Human Rights Watch. Under Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo - 3, Forces in the 
Conflict, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2Q01/kosovo/undword-02.htm (accessed 16 April 
2008), emphasis added. 
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Whether the primary driving force behind NATO's intervention - the Ra^ak 
massacre, which brought Holocaust-like memories back via Srebrenica" - was 
characterised by paramilitaries "getting out of control" or by direct central orders is a 
matter of considerable controversy. What is for sure is that there was a substantial 
paramilitary presence in the assault.'"' British journalist Julius Strauss conducted 
extensive research into the matter. According to the survivors that he interviewed 
...a small group of men dressed all in black and wearing gloves and balaclavas ... 
co-ordinated the attack on the village and the subsequent executions. Men had 
been separated from women and children before being led away to be executed. 
Some of the Serbs were in blue, some in black. The men in black appeared to be 
in control and wore balaclavas over their heads. Some had uniforms with insignia 
which included a Serbian flag; some had none. They carried automatic guns and, 
as we were led up the hi l l , both units started shooting us.^ ^ 
*** 
" See Chapter 8 
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As outlined in Ignatieff, Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond, 59. 
" Julius Strauss. "Military 'death squads' behind Kosovo massacre". Daily Telegraph, 27 
January 1999. 
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In a slight modification of Cviic's question, we could ask, "there is ample 
evidence that the conflict was not generated by ancient ethnic hatreds, yet public opinion 
and key policy makers understood it as i f it was. Why?". Our Complexity-inspired 
epistemic approach can begin to provide an answer. Facing a situation that had gone 
beyond the ethical analytic limits acceptable by the modern episteme, the "West" sought 
to understand the circumstances that had generated such violation. Naturally, in trying to 
understand the situation, the crisis was objectified, analysed and studied according to the 
fundamental rules of the modern epLsteme, which quickly proceeded to fully enforce 
historical linearity in order to make the situation understandable and knowable on the 
bases of a classical transcendental philosophy of the object (anarchy - which is 
significant given the arguments of Michael Dillon outlined in the next chapter). Given 
the importance of the argument, it would be important to repeat it in different terms. 
Whilst Mueller argues that in the case of Bosnia "a misguided assumption that the 
conflicts stemmed from immutable ethnic hatreds made international military 
intervention essentially impossible until the violence appeared to have run its course.""^^ 
we can argue that once the "course of violence" crossed the limits acceptable in the 
context of a modern ethical analytical finitude exactly the opposite became true: the 
absence of military intervention was rendered impossible by the very fact that the line 
78 
Mueller, "The Banality of 'Ethnic War'", 44, strong emphasis added. Mueller 
substantiates this assertion through extensive quotations and numerous references to a 
number of works in the article. 
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appeared to have been crossed, and by the impossibility of permitting such a crossing to 
occur again. Yet the crossing of the line had nothing to do with ancient ethnic hatreds: an 
immanent Complexity approach - which refuses to acknowledge any time reversible 
argument - reveals that the line was crossed precisely because such ancient ethnic 
hatreds were mostly absent, this absence characterised the way in which the war was 
conducted (reliance on paramilitaries), which in turn determined its brutality and its 
crossing of ethical-analytical lines. Finally, it was precisely because the conflict was 
framed along the axes of the modern episteme that those lines were crossed: First, 
because historical linearity, as Mueller suggests above, encouraged inaction, second, 
because parallelisms betw>een the massacres in Srebrenica and Ragak can only be 
compared to the Holocaust in the context of 'empty, homogeneous time'. Third, because 
the presence of the Holocaust as an analytic limitation to what can be understood and 
accepted corresponds to the other leg of the empirico-transcendental doublet: and in this 
case, as in any other, modernity requires that historically linearity and analytical finitude 
must both be present and constitute each other. The remainder of this research exercise 
wil l seek to further elucidate how the 'Holocausts' of Srebrenica and Ra^ak played a 
fundamental role in taking NATO to war. 
Conclusion: Analytical Finitude and Historical Linearity at Work 
Paul Cilliers has noted that Complex systems share a number of characteristics 
with Postmodern societies as Lyotard has described them: 
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\ . Complex systems are comprised of a large number of elements; 
2. The elements in a complex system interact dynamically; 
3. The level of interaction is fairly rich; 
4. Interactions are non-linear: 
5. The interactions have a fairly short range; 
6. There are loops in the interconnections; 
7. Complex systems are open systems; 
8. Complex systems operate under conditions far from equilibrium; 
9. Complex systems have histories: 
10. Individual elements are ignorant of the behaviour of the whole system in 
which they are embedded. 
By analogy: 
1. Postmodern societies have millions of agents operating within them at any one 
time; 
2. The agents f u l f i l roles in a number of dynamic and multiple roles (teacher, 
consumer, parent, child, etc.); 
3. In a Postmodern society, the level of interaction between agents and between 
agents and mechanisms of the societal level are extremely rich and diverse. 
Examples include economic transactions and market consumption; 
4. Societal relationships in postmodern society are nonlinear. It is within these 
asymmetrical power relationships that people operate as teachers, students, 
consumers, and citizens... 
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5. Individuals interact on local levels. Although local levels influence other 
local levels, there is no "metalevel controlling the flow of information"; 
6. A l l interpretations are local, contingent and provisional. In this situation, 
paralogy and dissensus rather than homology prevail; 
7. Open systems such as the social interact with other open systems such as the 
ecolosical: 
8. Social disequilibrium characterizes the postmodern condition; 
9. Althoush the concept of history' is dismissed as a grand narrative in the 
postmodern, local narratives tell the histories of individuals and groups: 
10. It is impossible for an individual to have a complete understanding of the 
operations of the entire social system in which they live and interact.^^ 
These ten features characterised the Kosovo conflict too. As such, the current research 
could have focussed on any of these ten, or on all of them. We would then have 
Abraham, "Towards the End of Ethics and Law Parading as Justice", 121-122, strong 
emphasis added. The meaning of the term paralogy in this context relates to the use of 
the word in biology: paralogy is the contrary of homology, homology being the term used 
to describe similarities between species with common ancestors in evolutionary biology. 
Jean Francois Lyotard uses the term paralogy to describe any movement that is opposed 
to established ways of reasoning. See Jean Fran9ois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: 
A report on Knowledge, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1984), 60. 
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proceeded to define how the Kosovo crisis stood in relation to this Complex-Postmodern 
'checklist'. Indeed, Kosovo represented, in many respects, an incredibly 'complex' 
operation. The NATO machinery had to face the test of the reality of war for the very 
first time, a test which - according to the Supreme Allied Commander - NATO failed.^° 
Reading Clark's account the first feature of Complex systems (the large number of 
relevant actors) is immediately obvious: "we have 19 countries who all think they can be 
boss", Clark famously complained.^' Indeed, as John O'Loughlin and Vladimir Kolossov 
outlined, the very geopolitical objectives of the 19 countries were being simultaneously 
defined by 19 - some times very different - bodies of public opinion.*" Also, all agents 
involved in the crisis fulf i l led "a number of dynamic and multiple roles." For example 
Clark, as a four star general, was asked to transcend his military expertise and f u l f i l a role 
usually reserved for public relations experts. Much to his surprise, many in Washington 
were not pleased about his perceived incompetence in such area: 
"Wes, at the White House meeting today there was a lot of discussion about your 
press conference", Shelton began. "The Secretary of Defense asked me to give 
SO 
Wesley Clark, Waging Modern War. 
" Alastair Campbell, The Blair Years: Extracts from the Alastair Campbell Diaries, 
(London: Hutchinson 2007): 384. 
^- O'Loughlin and Kolossov. "Still Not Worth the Bones of a Single Pomeranian 
Grenadier". 
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you some verbatim guidance, so here it is: 'Get your fucking face of f the T V . No 
more briefings, period'. That's it. I just wanted to give it to you like he said it. 
Do you have any questions?". Unfortunately, the speaker phone was on, and 
several members of the staff probably heard the call.^" 
Since Clark was seen to be insufficiently savvy, NATO asked Alistair Campbell to spend 
some time in Brussels and coordinate NATO's public relations effort.^'* 
Instead of ticking all 'Complexity criteria', or attempting to focus on a number of 
these characteristics enumerated above at random, the research has focussed on the two 
specific features that have been emphasised in the list above: Complex systems are open 
systems and Complex systems have histories. The epistemic approach adopted allowed 
for - and demanded - a discrimination of criteria precisely on the bases of a detailed 
understanding of the nature of the modern episteme, and a related understanding of what 
the requirements for transcending such modern episteme are. This epistemic approach 
has allowed the current research to focus on the two crucial issues of historical linearity 
and analytical finitude, thus allowing for the identification of clear linkages between 
Complexity and Postmodernity, in a strictly Foucauldian sense (that is, anything that is 
seen as transcending the modern episteme). And those linkages are to be found precisely 
at the level of historical linearity - consider Prigogine's assertions on the arrow of time 
•^^  Wesley Clark, Wagitig Modern War, 273. 
For an informative account see Alastair Campbell, The Blair Years, 362-389. 
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and his acknowledged debt to Bergson who, according to Foucault, in the first 
philosopher to transcend the modern episteme precisely in virtue of his thought on 
temporality.^^ 
It is for this reason that this chapter has focussed so much on the issue of how 
temporalities are constructed and deployed, and how this fundamentally determines how 
the conflict is framed and acted upon. A Complexity approach allows for the following 
statement to be made whilst and epistemic approach allows for such statement to be 
understood in the context of all of the implications that it entails: the arrow of time is 
irreversible. I f we could go back in time and see the Kosovo conflict unfolding again 
there is a probability of zero that it would have unfolded in the way it has. The number 
of emerging variables is too high, and countless butterfly effects interact: what if , for 
example, Clinton had never read Kaplan's books? An epistemic understanding demands 
that two conclusions are made from this apparently innocuous claim: first, the absence of 
reversibility undermines all knowledge constructions on the Kosovo crisis and second, 
this is so because historical linearity is at the heart of the modern episteme's machinery. 
Following Foucault's insights on the empirico-transcendental doublet, without 
reversibility subjects of enquiry cannot be isolated and studied, that is, an analytic of 
finitude could not be enforced; which in turn means that no transcendental philosophy of 
the object - which in this case based on the notion of Anarchy - is possible. In this 
See Chapter 3. 
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modern epistemic vicious circle, an imperative to render a particular subject knowahle 
demands that historical linearity is constructed and analytical finitude enforced. 
This does not mean that a Complexity-ethic advocates the idea that nothing is 
determined and therefore that nothing can be studied. Indeed, 
Cilliers uses his analogy between complex systems and postmodern societies to 
dismiss the notion that postmodernism sanctions an "anything goes mentality" in 
which relativism reigns supreme. Instead, he assens, postmodernism leads us to 
new ethical horizons and commitments. He draws on Lyotard to emphasize this 
point: "the breaking up of the grand Narratives...leads to what some authors 
analyze in terms of the dissolution of the social bond and the disintegration of 
social aggregates into a mass of individual atoms thrown into the absurdity of 
Brownian motion. Nothing of this kind is happening: this point of view, it seems 
to me, is haunted by the paradisaic representation of a lost 'organic society'."^^ 
The same argument is to be applied to knowledge, and to those who regret the loss of an 
organic knowledge. Interestingly, Foucault described the results of the modern episteme 
precisely as organic constructs of knowledge. 
The next two chapters wil l proceed to analyse how the two axes of modernity 
conditioned legal and political debates, and how these differ from the two rules of 
Abraham, "Towards the End of Ethics and Law Parading as Justice", 122. 
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complex systems this research has chosen to focus on: Complex systems are open 
systems (argument to be deployed against the notion of analytical finitude) and Complex 
systems have histories (contrary to the assumptions of linear time). 
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/ hope the distress of the public will, must undermine support for the authorities in 
Belgrade...! think no power to your refrigerator, no gas to your stove, you can't get to 
work because the bridge is down - the bridge on which you held your rock concerts and 
you all stood with targets on your heads. That needs to disappear at three o'clock in the 
morning. 
General MicJiael Short in "Belgrade people must suffer", International Herald 
Tribune, 16 May 1999' 
The question is not what is virtue without terror but what is terror other than consistent 
idealism. 
Peter Sloterdijk^ 
' Michael Gordon, "Crisis in the Balicans: The Overview", The New York Times, 13 May 
1999. 
" Peter Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press 1987): 102. 
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Introduction 
This chapter is an attempt to apply the arguments presented above - in particular, 
those presented by Zizek on the notion of Universal Exclusion, by Rasch on a 
Complexity-ethic, and by Kratochwil on the nature of a jurisprudence-based approach to 
law and ethics - to specific law cases that followed the Kosovo crisis. It is very 
important to bear such conceptual framework in mind when approaching the specific 
cases outlined below. For example, when Kratochwil states that a new form of 
jurisprudence must be based on heuristic principles, to what extent is it possible to claim 
that such a knowledge practice would be consonant with a Complexity ethos, and indeed 
with a Complexity-e//i/c? The refusal of departing from a metaphysical ground in itself 
would cover jurisprudence with a level of immanence that is hard to find in the modern 
age. Heuristic jurisprudence would be a continuation of the epistemic revolution outlined 
above in the realm of law, it would necessitate a flat ontology and it would be - strictly in 
the Foucauldian meaning of the word - absolutely positivist (i.e. Foucault describes 
positivism simply as the rejection of all transcendentalisms, that is why he described 
himself as one). Could we not say of modern jurisprudence what Davidson said of 
empirical positivism before the advent of the Vienna Circle (see Chapter 2)1 The 
foundations of knowledge must be simultaneously objective and subjective, that is, certain 
but nevertheless subject to eventual refutation. Is the problem of foundationalism in 
science and in law, and throughout the modern episteme, not strictly the same thing? A 
trial is supposed to be an enquiry into the Truth, and the Truth must be absolute. One 
cannot be guilty only in pan (curiously, Foucault detects the rise of the concept of 
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'absolute guilt' in Discipline and Punish, where the birth of Man is shown to correspond 
to the emergence of the modem episteme, and thus with the modern concept of law).^ In 
other words, is the modern episteme not throwing at us the same potential schism in the 
law that has already occurred in other fields of knowledge? One can perfectly imagine a 
re-conceptualisation of the dilemmas faced by the likes of Carnap and Popper in law: the 
paradox of simultaneous objectivity and subjectivity would encourage some scholars a la 
Carnap and Neurath to argue that it is more adequate to renounce the idea of an absolute 
foundation of knowledge in order to maintain the objectivity of justice (relativism), while 
those in the mould of Schlick would consider an absolute foundation of justice as 
indispensable, thus rejecting the idea that foundations must necessarily be objective. The 
idea of a relative notion of justice may sound odd at first, and yet there are a number of 
examples that demonstrate quite clearly how, ultimately, justice is undecidable and 
contextual. I f the European Court of Human Rights determines that the death penalty is 
inhumane, does this mean that normatively speaking the Court would regard some 
American practices as 'inhuman'? So is the essence of 'American humanity' different 
from its European counterpart? Yet anything that speaks in the name of Humanity must, 
by definition, refer to a Universal. 
Ultimately, a Complexity approach would not be troubled by these dilemmas, 
because it would have surpassed them. Just like in scientific epistemology it no longer 
makes any sense to speak of 'foundational causality' - due to the fact that we have 
•'Michel Foucault, Surveiller et Punir (Sain-Amand: Editions Gallimard 1993). 
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understood that there is no such thing as essentialist causality as all matter is about 
process - an understanding of 'humane' laws and Human Rights as such can only take 
place when we have a concept of a human being as something which is essentially 
defined. When Foucault identifies the 'birth of Man' and encourages us to overcome it, 
that is, to reach an age in which Man is dead; is he not in reality advocating the same 
move away from transcendental metaphysics that can be found in Nietzsche's death of 
God? However, Nietzsche had a lot of reasons to be worried about the death of God - as 
he saw perfectly well that God would have to be replaced by something else after men 
became engulfed by the most profound nihilism: "God is dead, but given the way of men, 
there may still be caves for thousands of years in which his shadow wil l be shown. And 
we - we still have to vanquish his shadow, too"."* In prophetic fashion Nietzsche saw the 
shadows of a defunct God in the rise of pan-germanic nationalism, as well as in the 
evolution of the scientific method. But what would a notion of justice after the death of 
Man entail? Could we still speak of Humanitarian intervention? 
This chapter wi l l limit itself to demonstrating that the legal discourse surrounding 
the Kosovo incident is conditioned by the contradictions inherent in the modern episteme. 
In particular, it wi l l be argued that as NATO faced the challenge of the law, this law had 
to deploy a characteristically modem analytic of finitude that enabled the exclusionary 
principle to take place, or what Zizek calls the 'Universal Exclusion'. This principle. 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Tlie Gay Science (New York: Vintage Books Edition, 1974): 167 
aphorism 108. 
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moreover, has to operate in tandem with a concept of historical linearity. A conclusion 
wil l seek to envisage what a flat ontology in law would look like, and to what extent a 
Complexity-ethic may take us from a 'Universal Exclusion' to an 'Exclusive 
Universality'. 
NATO and the International Court of Justice 
On June the 2"'' 1999 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) reached a decision 
regarding a request coming from the Government of the Federal Yugoslav Republic 
demanding the indication of provisional measures in the case concerning the legality of 
the use of force (Yugoslavia v. United States). The decision went against Yugoslavia, 
and was adopted by twelve votes to three. The application instituting proceedings against 
the United States of America "for violation of the obligation not to use force" was filed 
by Yugoslavia on April the 29'"^  1999.'' What was the reasoning of the Court, and how 
does this reasoning relate to the arguments presented in previous chapters regarding the 
^ International Court of Justice (ICJ), "Decision by the International Court of Justice on 
the Case Concerning the Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia Vs. United States of 
America), June 2, 1999" in The Kosovo Conflict, a Diplomatic History through 
Documents, eds. Philip Auerswald and David Auerswald (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2000). 
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analytic of finitude and the presence of the empirico-transcendental doublet in 
contemporary international law? 
Yugoslavia filed the application under article IX of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide - the Genocide Convention. 
Yugoslavia was effectively accusing the United States of participating in genocide 
committed in its own territory. The grounds for such an allegation were summarised as 
follows in the Yugoslav request: 
The subject-matter of the dispute are acts of the United States of America by 
which it has violated its international obligation banning the use of force against 
another State, the obligation not to intervene in the internal affairs of another 
State, the obligation not to violate the sovereignty of another State, the obligation 
to protect the civilian population and civilian objects in wartime, the obligation to 
protect the environment, the obligation relating to free navigation of international 
rivers, the obligation regarding fundamental human rights and freedoms, the 
obligation not to use prohibited weapons, the obligation not to deliberately inflict 
conditions of life calculated to cause physical destruction of a national group.^ 
According to the Yugoslav statement, all such actions, including the use of depleted 
uranium, the destruction of radio and television stations, of roads and bridges, of 
^Ibid, 1061. 
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hospitals, oil refineries and chemical plants corresponds to a "deliberate creation of 
conditions calculated at the physical destruction of an ethnic group, in whole or in part."^ 
Interestingly, the statement does not indicate what 'ethnic group' is suffering from acts of 
genocide, simply impersonating the victim in the institutions of Yugoslavia: "/« bombing 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia military and civil targets were attacked. Great 
numbers of people were killed...the above-mentioned facts are deliberately creating 
conditions calculated at the physical destruction of an ethnic group, in whole or in part."^ 
The statement would have us conclude that the ethnic group in question is the 
'Yugoslav', and that such an ethnic group is embodied in the territory and government of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The analytic of finitude and the delimitation of the 
inside / outside is already present in this legal reasoning. 
The argument of genocide was only part of the Yugoslav request, which also cited 
numerous pieces of international legislation (including: the Genocide Convention, The 
Geneva Convention of 1949 and of its Additional Protocol No. 1 of 1977 on the 
protection of civilians and civilian objects in time of war, Article 1 of the 1948 
Convention on the Free Navigation of the Danube, several provisions of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural and Cultural Rights and of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, but more importantly, perhaps; Article 53 
of the Charter of the United Nations). 
^ Ibid. 
^ Ibid. 
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The Yugoslav request demanded a declaration by the ICJ, consisting of the 
following, "The Court is asked to indicate the following provisional measure: The 
United States of America shall cease immediately the acts of use of force and shall refrain 
from any act of threat or use of force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." The 
American response simply requested "that the Court rejects the request of the Federal 
republic of Yugoslavia for the indication of provisional measures."^ 
In its decision the Court declared itself 
...deeply concerned with the human tragedy, the loss of life, and the enormous 
suffering in Kosovo which form the background of the present dispute, and with 
the continuing loss of life and human suffering in all parts of Yugoslavia...the 
Court is profoundly concerned with the use of force in Yugoslavia, whereas under 
the present circumstances such u.se raises very serious issues of international 
law.'° 
Nonetheless, there were more serious issues that the Court had to deal with, which 
included considerations over jurisdiction. The controversy here is caused by what kind of 
jurisdiction is necessary to enact a provisional measure. The Court's reasoning explains: 
^Ibid, 1065. 
'°Ibid. 
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Whereas the Court, under its Statute, does not automatically have jurisdiction over 
legal disputes between States parties to that Statute or between other States to 
whom access to the Court has been granted; Whereas the Court has repeatedly 
stated "that one of the fundamental principles of its Statute is that it cannot decide 
a dispute between States without the consent of those States to its jurisdiction" 
(East Timor, Judgement, ICJ Reports 1995, p. 101, para. 26); and Whereas the 
Court can therefore exercise jurisdiction only between States parties to a dispute 
who not only have access to the Court but also have accepted the jurisdiction of 
the Court, either in general form or for the individual dispute concerned." 
In essence, for a State to be subject to the ICJ's jurisdiction it has to both have access to 
the Court (i.e. be a recognised sovereign entity and member of the UN) and accept ICJ's 
authority for each particular case. Nonetheless, when it comes to provisional measures. 
Whereas on a request for provisional measures the Court need not, before 
deciding whether or not to indicate them, finally satisfy itself that it has 
jurisdiction on the merits of the case, yet it ought not to indicate such measures 
unless the provisions invoked by the applicant appear, prima facie, to afford a 
basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court might be established.''^ 
11 Ibid, 1066. 
Ibid. 
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In other words, jurisdiction does not need to be established a priori for the Court to issue 
a provisional measure, but the Court does need to have indications that it wi l l be able to 
eventually establish jurisdiction before issuing such measures. 
The issue thus becomes, did the Court have such indications? We can proceed to 
examine the arguments: 
Whereas in its Application Yugoslavia claims, in the first place, to found the 
jurisdiction of the Court upon Article IX of the Genocide Convention, which 
provides: 
"Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, 
application or fulfilment of the present Convention, including those relating to the 
responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in 
article I I I , shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of 
any of the parties to the dispute". 
Whereas it is not disputed that both Yugoslavia and the United States are parties 
to the Genocide Convention; but whereas, when the United States ratified the 
Convention on 25 November 1988, it made the following reservation: 
"That with reference to Article IX of the Convention, before any dispute to which 
the United States is a party may be submitted to the jurisdiction of the 
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International Court of Justice under this Article, the specific consent of the United 
States is required in each case."'^ 
In these paragraphs of the Court's reasoning it becomes evident that the key issue 
becomes the reservation made by the United States in 1988. Such reservation specifically 
requires that any dispute (thus including preliminary requests for temporary measures) 
which is presented on the basis of the Genocide Convention (Article IX) must obtain the 
consent of the United States before any jurisdiction is established. It follows that. 
Whereas the United States contends that "[its] reservation [to Article I X ] is clear 
and unambiguous"; that "the United States has not given the specific consent [that 
reservation] requires [and] . . . w i l l not do so"; and that Article I X of the 
Convention cannot in consequence found the jurisdiction of the Court in this case, 
even prima facie; whereas the United States also observed that reservations to the 
Genocide Convention are generally permitted; that its reservation to Article IX is 
not contrary to the Convention's object and purpose; and that, "since. . . 
Yugoslavia did not object to the . . . reservation, it is bound by it"; and whereas 
the United States further contends that there is no "legally sufficient. . . 
connection between the charges against the United States contained in the 
Application and the supposed jurisdictional basis under the Genocide 
13 Ibid. 
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Convention"; and whereas the United States further asserts that Yugoslavia has 
failed to make any credible allegation of violation of the Genocide Convention, by 
failing to demonstrate the existence of the specific intent required by the 
Convention to "destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group, as such", which intent could not be inferred from the conduct of 
conventional military operations against another State.''* 
The refusal to grant jurisdiction is accompanied by statements according to which there is 
not enough evidence linking the acts listed by the Yugoslav request and the notion of 
intent - this is of course normally for the Court to decide, but given the special 
reservations made under Article IX such Court lacks any jurisdiction, even pritna facie. 
In any case, disputes over the interpretation of the Genocide Convention are irrelevant as 
the issue of jurisdiction is paramount in determining whether the Court can act: 
Whereas Yugoslavia disputed the United States' interpretation of the Genocide 
Convention, but submitted no argument concerning the United States reservation 
to Article IX of the Convention; whereas the Genocide Convention does not 
prohibit reservations; whereas Yugoslavia did not object to the United States 
reservation to Article IX; and whereas the said reservation had the effect of 
excluding that Article from the provisions of the Convention in force between the 
14 Ibid, 1066-67. 
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Parties; whereas in consequence Article IX of the Genocide Convention cannot 
found the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain a dispute between Yugoslavia and 
the United States alleged to fal l within its provisions; and whereas that Article 
manifestly does not constitute a basis of jurisdiction in the present case, even 
prima facie; 
Thus, a piece of legislation on (Universal) Human Rights finds itself contextualised 
within a very particular reality of juridical finitude. The rest of the text however reveals 
one peculiar issue - apparently any State that does not accept the ICJ's jurisdiction 
remains nonetheless responsible for violations of international law. But responsible to 
whom? 
Whereas there is a fundamental distinction between the question of the acceptance 
by a State of the Court's jurisdiction and the compatibility of particular acts with 
international law; the former requires consent; the latter question can only be 
reached when the Court deals with the merits after having established its 
jurisdiction and having heard fu l l legal arguments by both parties; 
Whereas, whether or not States accept the jurisdiction of the Court, they remain 
in any event responsible for acts attributable to them that violate international law, 
including humanitarian law; whereas any disputes relating to the legality of such 
acts are required to be resolved by peaceful means, the choice of which, pursuant 
to Article 33 of the Charter, is left to the parties; whereas in this context the 
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parties should take care not to aggravate or extend the dispute; whereas, when 
such a dispute gives rise to a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of 
aggression, the Security Council has special responsibilities under Chapter V I I of 
the Charter.'^ 
This bizarre statement indicates that the ICJ cannot issue a temporary measure calling for 
the cease of armed intervention, that such a measure cannot be issued because the ICJ 
manifestly lacks jurisdiction, that, nonetheless, this does not make a violation of 
international law less of a violation and consequently the ICJ is effectively calling for the 
parties to resolve a dispute by peaceful means - which is precisely what the temporary 
measure (which could not be enunciated because of lack of jurisdiction) was supposed to 
do. But this 'call ' is both legal and illegal, and a violation of international law remains so 
even when international law has no jurisdiction. How can this be? 
The issue at hand is the concept of sovereignty. Is the notion of sovereignty 
ultimately not a representation of the famous analytic of finitude, the limit, the notion that 
grounds all possibility of knowledge but lies outside that very knowledge? In other 
words, is sovereignty - understood as a legal concept - at the basis of the empirico-
transcendental doublet in law, whereby the application of its principle at the metaphysical 
level must necessarily be contradictory in the realm of immanence (i.e. responsibility for 
a violation is adjudicated by an authority which recognises that it has not authority)? 
'•^Ibid, 1067-68. 
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To be sure there was a dissenting opinion from one of the judges. Inevitably, this 
opinion had to make references to legal precedents.'^ In other words, the challenge to the 
particular analytic of finitude that was deployed took the form of historical arguments, 
which are supposed to better represent the essence of the law in a particular situation. 
References to precedents naturally included previous statements of the ICJ such as "...the 
protection of human rights, a strictly humanitarian objective, cannot be compatible with 
the mining of ports, the destruction of oil installations, or again with the training, arming 
and equipping of the contras."'^ 
In any case what is important to note is that, ultimately, when the issue of whether 
NATO's humanitarian intervention was justifiable and legal under customary 
international law, the argument deployed by the interested parties did not include 
references to the ethics of intervention, did not make references to the (rather limited) 
body of intellectual-legal opinion according to which the intervention was both legal and 
justifiable; but it had to appeal to the principle of exclusion due to jurisdiction. In other 
words, the metaphysical argument was implemented through technicalities at the level of 
See International Court of Justice, "Dissenting opinion of Judge Kreca", 
http://www.ici-
ci i .org/docket/i ndex.php?pr=371 &code=yus&p 1=3&p3=6&case= 114&k=25. (accessed 
April 0, 2008). 
" Ruling of the International Court of Justice, Nicaragua v. United States, 1985, cited in 
Ibid. 
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immanence which manifestly contradicted such argument, and had to boil down to the 
notion that in order to save the human rights of some, the Genocide Convention cannot 
apply to others. The whole episode has been masterfully summarised by Mark Littman, 
QC as follows: 
On 29 April 1999 Yugoslavia brought proceedings against several members of 
NATO, including the UK, before the International Court of Justice alleging that 
the NATO intervention was unlawful.. . . 
A response to these submissions was made on behalf of the U K by distinguished 
team of lawyers consisting of Sir Franklin Herman QC, H M Attorney-General 
John Morris QC and Professor Christopher Greenwood, Professor of International 
Law at the LSE. However, no member of the U K team addressed any of the 
propositions or legal authorities cited on behalf of the complainant. They 
concentrated entirely on a jurisdictional issue: a caveat to the UK's acceptance of 
the Court's compulsory jurisdiction where the other party had made the complaint 
less than 12 months after accepting the Court's jurisdiction. The Yugoslav case 
fell within this exception to the UK's general acceptance and so it fell on this 
technicality. The Court was bound to sustain this objection since, as Judge 
Rosalyn Higgins, the British judge at the ICJ, put it: '...the jurisdiction of the 
Court - even i f one might regret this state of affairs as we approach the 21st 
century - is based on consent'. 
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However, the UK could have waived this objection and accepted the Yugoslav 
challenge to have the legality of the bombing tested before the Court. It chose not 
to do so. The Government thus deprived the British public of the opportunity of 
an authoritative decision on this crucial matter. 
By resort to a legal technicality, the Government thus deprived the British public 
of the opportunity of an authoritative decision on this crucial matter. 
In his speech, the Attorney General said: ' I say very firmly that the UK has acted and 
will continue to act, in accordance with international law'. Why then did the Attorney 
General not welcome the opportunity to gain the support of the Court for the UK 
position?'^ 
According to the British Foreign Office, the UK Government was not will ing to 
participate in what it regarded a misguided use of international justice by the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, and thus decided that holding up to technicalities was the best 
way to send the signal that it had no case to answer. 
The problem here is not so much that one ought to be scandalised because the 
intervention may have been illegal. The problem, rather, is that the Kosovo conflict, for 
18 
Mark Littman, Kosovo: Law and Diplomacy, paper published by Chamaleon Press: 
Centre for Policy Studies, November 1999. 
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the first time in the post-war legalist world order, catalysed some of the most visible 
contradictions inherent to the modern episteme insofar it put into question the notion that 
what is legal must necessarily be legitimate}^ Once this notion is superseded, we find 
ourselves dwelling again in the empirico-transcendental doublet: how do we deal with the 
ethical imperative at the level of immanence? In effect, the transcendental principle in 
itself remains unquestioned (i.e. the notion of human rights). In other words, the main 
reason for concern should simply be that positions such as "the intervention was illegal 
but legitimate" even become possible."^ This is precisely when the contradictions caused 
by transcendental theorising translate in 'Universal Exclusions' and the proverbial 
'engine for universal relativism'. By contrast, the task of the Post-modern (again, in 
Foucauldian), immanent, Complexity ethic is of resolving the issue of universality by 
Does that mean that what is illegal is therefore, by definition, illegitimate? I f we 
accept Francis Boyle's argument (See Foundations of World Order) that the legalist 
approach was set up precisely to 'illegitimise' the illegal use of force for the resolution of 
conflict it would be difficult not to reach such conclusion. I f we do not accept that, it can 
still be argued that any illegal action which is subsequently presented as being legitimate 
simply weakens the system as a whole, which means that illegality is 'indirectly' tied in 
with illegitimacy, for it attacks the legitimacy of the system. 
"° This is the conclusion reached by the Independent International Commission on 
Kosovo. See The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, Kosovo Report. 
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eliminating the transcendental realm as such - in other words, this is about the creation 
what we may call an 'Exclusive Universal'. 
NA TO and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
The issue of how the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) proceeded to examine accusations against NATO needs to be studied not so much 
because it may be a case of partisan justice (i.e. the proverbial "victor's justice') but 
because it is an extraordinary example of how the contradictions inherent within the 
modern episteme allow for an exclusionary discourse of international humanitarian law to 
even take place. The difficulties related to the need of articulating the transcendental 
notion of human rights at the level of human practices very quickly transform themselves 
in 'Universal Exclusions' which, at least at the level of normative arguments, are allowed 
to make sense due to the present epistemic configuration of knowledge. This section wi l l 
proceed to analyse ICTY's reasoning in the context of such an analytic of finitude.^' 
On the O"" of June 2000 the ICTY published its Final Report to the Prosecutor 
by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the 
21 
There has been much scholarly debate regarding ICTY's reaction to a request regarding 
the investigations of alleged NATO war crimes. In particular, see a special issue of the 
European Journal of International Law 12, (2001). 
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Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.'^ This was done in response to several requests for the 
ICTY to investigate potential breaches of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) 
committed by NATO. In what was an unusual step the Prosecutor decided to set up an ad 
hoc Committee to advise the Tribunal on whether NATO actions ought to be 
investigated. The main conclusions of the report indicate that "in all cases either the law 
is not sufficiently clear or investigations are unlikely to result in the acquisition of 
sufficient evidence to substantiate charges against high level accused or against lower 
accused for particularly heinous offences.""'' But how did the Committee reach this 
decision? More importantly, how did it - or rather, what kind of discourse allowed it to -
interpret current I H L and existing case law (much of which the ICTY had a great role in 
establishing) in such a fashion? 
On the 2"*^  of June the Prosecutor made statements that went beyond the report by 
the Committee by stating that "although NATO had made some mistakes, it had not 
deliberately targeted civilians" (the Committee never reached that conclusion, it merely 
stated that the law was not sufficiently clear and that the acquisition of further evidence 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, "Final Report to the 
Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign 
Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia", 
http://www.un.org/ictv/pressreaiynato061300.htm. (accessed Apri l 8, 2008). 
Ibid, paragraph 90. 
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was unlikely to help the investigation in that context).'"^ In either case, the question arises 
of whether I H L only covers 'intentional' breaches, or whether a war crime remains a war 
crime despite the original intentions of the perpetrators."' Moreover, the murky issue of 
whether journalists and factory workers can be considered as civilians or not does not 
seem to have influenced the Prosecutor's deliberations. 
The legal scholar Paolo Benvenuti has analysed the case put forward by the 
Committee in some detail."^ Benvenuti identifies a number of important features: 
• The unbalanced evidence on which the review committee made its findings 
• The relevance given exclusively to civilian casualties in evaluating the legality of 
the bombing campaign with regard to specific incidents 
• The assessment of damage to the environment 
U N Security Council, Press Release, SC/6870, 2 June 2000, 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20000602.sc6870.doc.html. (accessed Apri l 8, 
2008). 
" Similarly, see Ted Hondrich's criticism of arguments relying on intentionality only in 
Chapter 5 
Paolo Benvenuti, "The ICTY Prosecutor and the Review of the NATO Bombing 
Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia", European Journal of 
International Law 12, no. 3, (2001): 503-529. 
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• The assessment on the legality of use of dubious weapons (cluster bombs and 
depleted uranium) 
• Target selection 
• The principle of proportionality 
• The assessment of specific incidents: the attack on the Grdelica Gorge bridge, the 
attack on the Djakovica Convoy, the attack on the Serbian T V and radio station, 
the attack on Korisa village, the attack on the Chinese Embassy 
In each case Benvenuti proceeds to examine the arguments of the Committee in the 
context of its generic claims (i.e. that the law is not sufficiently clear and that the 
gathering of further evidence was unlikely to make it any clearer). For each one of these 
cases it becomes easy to identify the notion of analytical finitude and the confusion 
caused by metaphysical interpretations of the law. It wi l l be argued that such confusion 
provides the epistemic underpinning of Universal Exclusions and the background in 
which such arguments at the phenomenal level lake place. In particular, all the 
contradictions intrinsic within the modern episteme come out rather clearly in discussions 
surrounding the issues of target selection / level of analysis (that is, the aggregate level at 
which responsibility can be attributed) and the principle of proportionality. In reality, the 
level of analysis problem (that is, to what degree within the phenomenal world a 
transcendental principle can be applied) cuts across all the issues identified below. The 
conclusion of our analysis is that Universal Exclusions are created by a system of thought 
whereby the aggregate level of responsibility is shifted precisely because of the flexibility 
with which the limits of analysis are applied (that is, through a differential use of 
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analytical finitude). Paradoxically, within different analytics of finitude the case still 
looks as though it reflects the transcendental, in reality the transcendental has already 
been defined once analytic limits are imposed on it. As it outlined in Chapter 5, the 
transcendental can be gazed, but only within the limits of our rather phenomenal world. 
On the other hand, it wi l l be suggested that a Complexity approach to the matter would 
have focussed on the emergence of events in their own right, and that as such it is 
possible to see similarities between a Complexity ethos in the philosophy of science and a 
jurisprudence-based approach to the issue of human rights. 
I f we turn to the first of the bullet points above, we can easily identify the 
designation (or rather, analytical delimitation) of relevant actors as legitimate players in 
law processes as the principle problem of the Committee. Indeed, the Committee states 
that it relied heavily on evidence forwarded by NATO because it had no 'official 
channels' with the FKY. In the first case, it should be noted that the Committee sent a 
detailed set of questions to NATO for which it only obtained "'generic responses"." The 
second claim also seems to be plagued by an absurdity: 
Why was it impossible for an international institution - furthermore, one claiming 
primacy over national jurisdictions - to solicit informanon through a letter 
addressed to the FRY authorities? What kind of official channel is needed? One 
may observe that, in the same period, on 22 May 1999, the ICTY issued an 
Ibid, 506. 
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indictment and an arrest warrant against Slobodan Milosevic and four other high 
officials of the FRY and that the indictment and warrant were sent to the Federal 
Ministry of Justice of the FRY without raising any problem whatsoever of there 
being no official channel.** 
Thus, we have a first Universal Exclusion - the exclusion of evidence coming from the 
FRY on the grounds that the FRY falls outside the limits of institutions allowed to 
participate in the analysis of the events. Again, this contradiction is allowed for by the 
metaphysical approach of the Court - it is only by attempting to apply a transcendental 
principle to the phenomenal realm that we can find flaws in such realm, thus allowing for 
the non-application of the Universal principle at the transcendental level. But what is 
really surprising is the affirmation of the fact that exclusive attention would be given to 
NATO responses - on the basis that the Committee had no reason to doubt that such 
responses were honest - even though such responses had been judged to be inadequate 
and circumstantial: 
The Committee has conducted its review relying essentially upon public 
documents, including statements made by NATO and NATO countries at press 
conferences and public documents produced by the FRY. ft has tended to assume 
that the NATO and the NATO countries' press statements are generically reliable 
Ibid, 507. 
7. Complexity and the Kosovo Conflict: the Analytic of Finitude in Legal Discourse, 361 
and that explanations have been honestly given. The blind trust by the Review 
Committee in NATO's reliability is undiminished despite the Committee's own 
acknowledgement of the inadequacy of some of the replies from NATO. The 
Committee states: "The Committee must note, however, that when the Office of 
the Prosecutor requested NATO to answer specific questions about specific 
incidents, the NATO reply was couched in general terms and failed to address the 
specific incidents^^ 
So why is it that in these circumstances generic answers are accepted in the context of 
specific questions? To what extent does the generality of the issue exclude issues that fall 
within particular scopes? Finally, why can we even think in terms of such dichotomies 
(specific / generic) in the context of case law, whose primary objective is precisely to 
investigate case-by-case specific violations of IHL? In other words, why is a different 
level of analysis being applied to both parties in the context of the same investigation? 
Indeed, as it w i l l become evident below, the main tactic of the ICTY has been to apply a 
very generic level of responsibility to NATO countries whilst FRY officials were 
investigated for their specific involvement in precise incidents. 
A second controversial decision of the Commission related to the exclusive 
relevance given to civilian casualties in evaluating the legality of the bombing campaign 
with regard to specific incidents (and the casualty threshold applied to evaluate such 
Ibid. 
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incidents). Benvenuti focuses on how the Committee explained that, in conducting its 
review, it 
"Has focussed primarily on incidents in which civilian deaths were alleged or 
confirmed", while '"the Committee's review of incidents in which it is alleged that 
fewer than three civilians were killed has been hampered by a lack of reliable 
information." 
In other words, the attitude of the Committee was to carry out a legal evaluation 
of the facts taking into account only civilian deaths, while damage to civilian 
property was deliberately not considered. In fact, very deleterious consequences 
may result for civilians for material damage caused by an attack: therefore it was 
essential to take such damage into account. Summing up, it is unsatisfactory to 
assess the lawfulness of an attack with regard to the principle of proportionality i f 
damage to civilian property is not evaluated. 
In reality, this is a very serious matter as there is ample evidence suggesting that 
damage to property was indeed meant to undermine the morale of the populations and 
was therefore precisely targeting civilians - such strategy has been openly defended by 
NATO commanders, including, amongst others, Wesley Clark himself (consider the 
• ° Ibid, 508. 
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statement of General Short at the beginning of this chapter: " I hope the distress of the 
public wi l l , must undermine support for the authorities in Belgrade...I think no power to 
your refrigerator, no gas to your stove, you can't get to work because bridge is down - the 
bridge on which you held your rock concerts and you all stood with targets on your 
heads. That needs to disappear at three o'clock in the morning"). Besides, is the 
limitation of the number of casualties to three not another evident imposition of an 
analytic of finitude to the subject matter? How can a Universal Human Right be assessed 
on the bases of artificial delimitations? Is the message here that violations to I H L can 
indeed occur, as long as they occur in pairs only? 
Targeting civilian infrastructure exclusively or in part, but in any case 
deliberately, to cause unnecessary harm to civilians is of course illegal, both in absolute 
terms (Article 57 of Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions) and in relative 
terms (the principle of proportionality). Again, the analytical lenses applied to the 
investigation excluded - through Universal principles - precisely its constituent parts. 
The notion becomes even more worrying when one considers that some doubts had 
already been advanced on this topic by the fourteenth report of the Defence Select 
Committee of the U K House of Commons issued on 24 October 2000 (of which the 
ICTY had a copy): 
An examination of the choice of strategic targets during...the campaign does not 
readily reveal a clear pattern of a graduated strategy of coercion or evidence of 
increasing coercive effectiveness. Some targets appear difficult to justify. No 
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clear explanation of the decision to bomb the Danube bridges at Novi Sad yet 
appears to be given."" 
Is the lawfulness of the systematic targeting of power stations, industries and factories 
beyond any doubt? The fourteenth report went on to state: 
As the air campaign moved into 'Phase 2A' , U K and NATO targeteers made 
some efforts to identify and strike targets that were not just of military value to 
Serbian air defences military command and control and the field forces in 
Kosovo, but would also influence perceptions. There appear to have been two 
target audiences for this. The first was the Serbian people as a whole. There was 
a belief - or hope - in the U K and in the wider alliance that Serbian morale 
'would crack' and that the Serbian population would be encouraged by the air 
campaign to protest against the policies of the Milosevic government.''" 
In this context it is not reassuring to read the following in the repon - which reflects the 
reasoning of the ICTY Review Committee: "however, air strikes targeted at the Serbian 
UK Parliament, House of Commons, Defence Select Committee, "Fourteenth Report", 
23 October 2000: paragraph 124. 
"^ " Ibid, paragraph 99. 
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population in general were never at the heart of Alliance Strategy".-'"' The Universal 
Exclusion has now determined that specific events w i l l not be evaluated in their own 
right but in relation to how they stand within broader strategy. This effectively means 
that the level of responsibility has been lifted from the particular incident to the generic 
strategy, and that through the application of Universal I H L such particulars are de facto 
excluded. Furthermore, this equally indicates that I H L violations - even deliberate ones 
-cannot be considered i f such actions are not 'at the heart' of relevant military strategies. 
This rather staggering principle is reinforced - explicitly - when one looks at the 
Court's reasoning on target selection. In this case, it is merely sufficient to let the 
Committee speak for itself: 
In combat, military commanders are required: (a) to direct their operations against 
military objectives and (b) when directing operations against military objectives, 
to ensure that the losses to the civilian population and the damage to civilian 
property are not disproportionate to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated...The commanders deciding on an attack have the duties: (a) to do 
everything practicable to verify that the objectives to be attacked are military 
objectives, (b) to take all practicable precautions in the choice of methods and 
means of warfare with a view to avoiding or, in any event minimizing incidental 
civilian casualties or civilian property damage [the same damage that was not 
Ibid, paragraph 100. 
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considered in relation to further investigations in specific cases by the Committee 
itself!] and (c) to refrain from launching attacks which may be expected to cause 
disproportionate civilian casualties or civilian property damage.-^" 
To note that the Court is referring to requirements without dwelling into the details of 
when such requirements must be observed (as in, always, most of the time, intentionally, 
unintentionally...). This presumably means that such requirements must be respected at 
all times, in all cases. But then the Committee starts introducing doubts on the automatic 
applicability of relevant sanctions: 
...attacks which are not directed against military objectives (particularly attacks 
directed against civilian population) and attacks which cause disproportionate 
civilian casualties or civilian property damage may constitute the actus reus for 
the offence of unlawful attack under Article 3 of the ICTY Statute.-^ "^  
The above quotes leave no doubt that such attacks are committed wi l fu l ly : i f we agree 
that the law is more than mere opinion, we have to say that the Committee should rather 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, "Final Report to the 
Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign 
Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia": supra note 1 in paragraph 28. 
Ibid, emphasis added. 
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have affirmed very clearly that such attacks must (rather than may) be regarded as war 
crimes. The reader's confusion grows when the Committee subsequently explains: 
A determination that inadequate efforts have been made to distinguish between 
military objectives and civilians and civilian objects should not necessarily focus 
exclusively on a specific incident. I f precautionary methods have worked 
adequately in a very high percentage [note: no percentage given] of cases then the 
fact that they have not worked well in a small number of cases [note: no number 
given] does not necessarily mean they are generally inadequate."^^ 
The reader must conclude that the Court is saying that violations to I H L are not violations 
i f they occur in a 'small number of cases'. As Benvenuti puts it: "One could be induced 
to think that war crimes occur and should be prosecuted only i f committed in the context 
of a plan or of a large scale commission, when the inadequacy or precautionary measures 
is deliberate on the part of the warring party. This approach is inconsistent with the case 
law of the ICTY itself "^^ One is tempted to argue that the statements above leave no 
space for induction, as Benevenuti affirms: for that is precisely what the ICTY statements 
actually say. The Universal Exclusion has now introduced the notion of 'probability' in 
Ibid, paragraph 29, strong emphasis and comments added. 
Benvenuti, "The ICTY Prosecutor and the Review of the NATO Bombing Campaign 
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia", 515. 
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I H L - those falling outside cannot be considered to be the victims of war crimes. We 
have witnessed the birth of the notion of 'War Crimes Light", undeserving of the attention 
of an international Court of law. It is again through a generality, or through a vertically 
differential application of Universal principles, that constituents have been excluded. 
Another exquisite paradox emanating from the contradictions inherent within the 
modern legal episteme can be found in the Committee's reasoning on the legality of the 
use of dubious weapons. Apart from the omission of some serious legal criteria when 
evaluating the evidence (the principle of unnecessary suffering and the principle of 
distinction) we have a curious interpretation of the ICJ's advisory report on the legality of 
nuclear weapons. We are referring of course to the fuzzy classification of weapons 
containing depleted uranium. As Benevenuti puts is: 
The Committee appears to have been afraid of widening its inquiry and, because 
of such fears, it had no qualms about misinterpreting to the point of absurdity the 
Advisory Opinion of the ICJ in the Legality of Nuclear Weapons case. 'Indeed', 
the Committee observes, relying on the ICJ Advisory Opinion, 'even in the case 
of warheads and other weapons of mass destrucfion - those which are universally 
acknowledged to have the most deleterious environmental consequences - it is 
difficult to argue that the prohibition of their use is in all cases absolute'. This 
could even be understood to mean that according to the Committee's view the 
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humanitarian problems of Kosovo could have been solved through the use of 
nuclear warheads against the FRY.''* 
Is there really anything we need to add to outline the inconsistencies caused by the 
adoption of a metaphysical approach to the issue of IHL? The Universal Exclusions have 
been presented, and the mechanisms through which these operate have been identified -
for as long as the issue remains the application of a principle to phenomenal realms, the 
exclusion wi l l occur there were differential levels of application are adopted. It is 
through the imposition of this analytical finitude that 'others' are created, and that 
corresponding identities are formed. In our case, the most staggering example refers to 
the differential identification of aggregate responsibility. In this context it is important to 
thoroughly consider Benvetuti's final remarks, as these crucially address the level of 
analysis issue - although without realising that such an issue is precisely the fruit of a 
modem episteme which causes all subsequent paradoxes: 
Having completed an examination of the report, for which the Prosecutor has 
accepted fu l l responsibility, I do not have a specific final comment to add. One-
sided attitudes, the vague use of legal concepts, the disregard for ICTY case law, 
the shortcomings in legal reasoning and in selecting relevant facts, and the 
reluctance to start in-depth investigations of its own, are the preamble for a 
•'^  Ibid, 512. 
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document which is largely inadequate to its task. But 1 have to make a final 
criticism, to myself also: in fact, in coming to the end of my analysis, I have a 
feeling of dissatisfaction with it. I am aware that my comments are characterised 
by a regrettable move away from the proper ground of the conduct of the 
individual allegedly responsible for the commission of war crimes, to the ground 
of the conduct of the state allegedly responsible, at the international level, for 
violations of IHL: there is no clear-cut distinction between the two levels in my 
comments, and perhaps the second level is prevalent. I confess, it is a quite 
embarrassing confusion, because my comments relate to a report prepared by a 
committee working in the framework of an international criminal tribunal, that is 
to say an international body with the task of assessing individual positions, not in 
the framework of an inter-state tribunal (such as the ICJ) evaluating state 
positions. I apologize for this approach, but I realise that I have been led in this 
direction by the approach of the Review Committee itself and I have not been able 
to avoid this unwanted consequence while I was following its reasoning...the 
Committee has done its best to deny the international responsibility of the state as 
such, in order to achieve an a priori exclusion of the role of the ICTY in 
evaluating the positions of individuals.^^ 
39 Ibid, 526-7, emphasis added. 
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It is difficult to f ind a more apt concretisation of Zizek's Universal Exclusions - here the 
ICTY is excluding itself from its Universal role precisely by opposing its remit to the 
particular nature of the issues at hand. 
Thus, what is for Benvenuti and for the legal scholar an anecdote and passing 
remark at the end of a thorough analytical examination, is for us the crux of the argument. 
It is, in fact, the nucleus of our reasoning. The legal scholar does not ask why the Court 
chose - or rather, why it was in an epistemic position to even choose - to adopt this 
particular 'level of analysis' (for lack of a better expression). But we can relate it to the 
nature of the modern episteme, and that is how we understand the knowledge formation 
processes behind the technique. 
Another Failed Jurisdiction: the European Court of Human Rights 
Proceedings at the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) followed similar 
patterns. On the 20"" of October 1999 an application was lodged in relation to attacks on 
the RTS by six applicants, five of whom applied on behalf of relatives killed during the 
bombing, whilst a sixth applied in her own capacity as alleged victim. In response. 
The European Court of Human Rights decided that the applications were 
inadmissible against Belgium and sixteen other contracting parties to the 
European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
freedom; the extraterritorial acts in question did not bring the applicants and their 
deceased relatives under the "jurisdiction" of the respondent states as required by 
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Convention Article 1. With respect to the "ordinary meaning" of the phrase 
"within their jurisdiction" in public international law, the Court observed that the 
jurisdictional competence of a state, while not excluding extraterritorial acts per 
se, is essentially territorial in nature and hence limited by the sovereign territorial 
rights of other states. In its view, "Article 1 of the Convention must be considered 
to reflect this ordinary and essentially territorial notion of jurisdiction, other bases 
of jurisdiction being exceptional and requiring special justification in the 
particular circumstances of each caseT^'^ 
This time the finitude, or jurisdiction, of legal action is not determined by reservations 
(ICJ) or by dubious assessments on validity (ICTY) but by the notion of sovereignty 
embedded in a notion of territory. Note however such notion of jurisdiction, despite 
being 'essentially territorial' does not exclude extraterritorial acts - nevertheless such 
extraterritorial acts are exceptions (another exclusion) and require 'special justification'. 
Once again, a Court tasked with defending Universal Human Rights at the transcendental 
level needs to negotiate and limit its action in the phenomenal world through exclusive 
analysis on case-by-case bases. What was then ECHR's reasoning? 
40 
Alexandra Ruth and Mirja Trisch, "Bancovic V. Belgium, Admissibility, Application 
No. 52207/99", The American Journal of International Law 97, no. l , (2003): 168-172, 
168, emphasis added. 
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The Court then examined the special circumstances under which extraterritorial 
acts could be recognized as constituting an exercise of "jurisdiction" under Article 
l o f the Convention... It concluded that it had recognized the exercise of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction: 
"when the respondent State, through the effective control of the relevant territory 
and its inhabitants abroad as a consequence of military occupation or through the 
consent, invitation, or acquiescence of the Government of that territory, exercises 
all or some of the public powers normally to be exercised by that Government.""' 
In other words, the ECHR wi l l consider jurisdiction over extraterritorial acts when 
respondent states fu l f i l the functions they normally fu l f i l within their territories 
extraterritorially. This seems to mean that, paradoxically, the ECHR wil l claim 
jurisdiction over extraterritorial acts once respondent states have de facto imposed their 
ful l sovereignty on foreign territory and territorialised such sovereignty. The paradox 
emerges out of the fact that imposing sovereignty of foreign territories de facto equates to 
incorporating such territories into existing constituencies, and yet the Court insists in 
using the adjective "extraterritorial" to characterise its own jurisdiction in such 
circumstances. 
"' Ibid, 169. 
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The Court, however and despite all objections on recognition, conceded that i f it 
was not for the specific circumstances of the case such case would have been an object of 
the Court's concern indeed in the context of its ordre public obligations: 
Finally, the Court also rejected the argument that any failure to accept the 
jurisdiction of the respondent states for the impugned acts would defeat the 
Convention's ordre public mission and thus leave a regrettable vacuum in the 
Convention's system of human rights protection. Recalling the "essenfially 
regional vocation of the Convention system", the Court pointed out that its 
comments in Cyprus Vs. Turkey concerning the need to avoid such a vacuum had 
to be understood against the background that the territory in question, but for the 
specific circumstances of the case, would normally have been covered by the 
Convention.'*' 
Needless to say, the ECHR is stating that cases which usually fall under its jurisdiction -
both on the bases of the Convention and on the bases of the ECHR's own case law - need 
to prove that they do not constitute specific or exceptional circumstances. For Human 
Rights to be protected relevant humans need to prove first that they are not exceptional 
humans according to whatever definition of exception the Court may have decided to 
adopt in any particular case. 
' - I b i d , 170. 
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Riith and Trisch proceed to analyse and criticise each of the ECHR's claims 
regarding its lack of jurisdiction in turn. 
In its first decision related to NATO's military operation in Kosovo, the Court, 
seemingly in an effort to limit its rather broadly phrased findings in the Northern 
Cyprus cases, adopted a restrictive approach to the Convention's applicability in 
extraterritorial contexts. In so doing, the Court set what may well prove to be an 
imponant precedent for possible future complaints in connection with 
international military conflicts. In the Northern Cyprus cases, the Court had 
stressed that "under its established case-law the concept of jurisdiction under 
Article 1 of the Convention is not restricted to the national territory of the 
Contracting States", and had concluded that Turkey was bound by the Convention 
for acts relating to its occupation of Northern Cyprus. In the instant case, 
however, the Court noticeably changed its use of terminology, thereby restricting 
its interpretation of earlier cases. It claimed, in particular, to have previously 
held that extraterritorial acts satisfy the requirement of state jurisdiction "only in 
exceptional cases", and that "equally exceptional circumstances" therefore had 
to be met in Bancovic. Notably, the Court did not conduct its own, independent 
examination of whether a further exception was justified, but contented itself. 
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instead, with the mere refutation of the applicants' submissions (dealing, in 
particular, with their proportionality argument).'^"' 
In other words, the Court itself created and defined new territory-based 
exceptional circumstances (which were not created in the Cyprus Vs. Turkey case) and 
then, instead of conducting its own investigation on whether such circumstances applied, 
it decided that Bancovic and others did not do enough to prove prima facie that their 
cases did not constitute an exceptional circumstance as the Court defined it. Again, the 
point here is not that we should find the whole affair offensive or infuriating, rather, the 
point is that transcendental notions (Human Rights) utilise mechanisms to limit such 
transcendence and therefore become applicable at the level of immanence (through an 
analytic of fmitude) through mechanisms that are fundamentally exclusive - for exclusion 
comes logically with any effort to delimit a transcendental realm. 
Not surprisingly, Riith and Trisch think that, "in sum, the Court's findings 
constitute a turnabout from its earlier decisions"'*'', further arguing that 
^-^Ibid, 171. 
44 
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The Court's reasoning is not entirely persuasive. To start with, one may question 
the Court's principal assumption that the notion of "jurisdiction" under the 
Convention is necessarily identical with its ordinary meaning in public 
international law. Though correctly noting that the travaux preparatoires and 
state practice confirm, in principle, this essentially territorial conception, the 
Court avoided any substantive answer to the question of whether its 
methodological approach of interpreting the Convention according to "present-
day conditions" could be applied to determine the meaning of "jurisdiction" in 
Article 1 - and therefore to determine, in effect, the very scope of the Convention 
itself. Rather than analyzing why, or even if, a dynamic interpretation was 
prohibited or inappropriate, however, the Court appeared merely to hold that any 
further analysis was dispensable since the Convention's travaux preparatoires 
confirmed the ordinary meaning of "jurisdiction" under public international law.*^ 
It should be noted once again that the analytic of finitude (territoriality-based jurisdiction) 
deployed by the Court is enforced through a notion of historical finitude: thus the 
insistence on 'present day conditions'. Indeed, the entire sentence "interpreting the 
Convention according to 'present-day conditions' in order to determine the meaning of 
'jurisdiction' in Article 1 - and therefore determining, in effect, the very scope of the 
Convention i t se l f seems like a rather perfect crystallisation of the empirico-
Ibid, 171. 
7. Complexity and the Kosovo Conflict: the Analytic of Finitude in Legal Discourse, 378 
transcendental doublet and of its two axes of modernity (analytic of finitude meaning 
jurisdiction, and present day conditions meaning historical linearity) in the modern legal 
episteme. Are considerations over "modern day conditions", after all, nothing but an 
attempt to freeze temporality? Is this not strictly the same thing as Anderson's 
'homogenous, empty time', which is a necessary pre-condition for the formulation of the 
idea of nationalism? Is this concept of nationalism embedded in a territory not, 
ultimately, what informs the reasoning of what was supposed to be a Court of (Universal) 
Human Rights? 
Conclusion: Universal Exclusion and the Complexity Ethic 
The chapter has sought to concretely show what, according to Zizek, the "usual 
notion of human rights as a universality only possible on the basis of a series of 
exclusions (women, children, the mad, the primitive), a universality from which 
ultimately everybody is excluded" looks like in practice.''^ 
The links between a Complexity ethos and transcendental law may not be readily 
apparent. It would have been necessary to highlight how the legal discipline evolved 
according to the patterns of the modern episteme - in a way akin to the process through 
which this work outlined the evolution of the discipline of International Relations. It is 
Butler, Slavoj Zizek: Live Theoiy, 8. 
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hoped however that the previous chapters have provided a solid enough theoretical basis 
for the reader to discern the common threads, or parallelisms, occurring across the history 
and philosophy of science (in particular the events that followed the Vienna Circle), the 
history of 'scientific' International Relations theory and the contradictions evident within 
contemporary legal practice. 
When considering these questions one is tempted to ask what a "Complexity-
based" legal practice would like, and how such practice would better address the issue of 
ethical responsibility. In a sense, the answer has already been partially provided by the 
presentation of the case for a jurisprudence-led approach to international law - whereas 
Complexity represents a drive towards anti-reductionism and Bergsonian 'superior 
empiricism', jurisprudence can be seen as a more holistic approach to the issue. It can be 
suggested that by keeping the criteria of analysis at the level of immanence a 
jurisprudence approach fails to repeat the Universal Exclusions that so often characterise 
contemporary legal thought and practice. 
One is tempted to add that present approaches to knowledge are convenient 
precisely because they fail to enforce ethical relationships. In this sense, the modern 
episteme allows for a form of legal thought that portrays itself as Universal and yet 
excludes those particular components that happen to represent uncomfortable truths - and 
what is more, such inconsistencies are well embedded in the modern episteme, which 
means that they do not even appear to be inconsistencies at all, since it is precisely those 
that ground our possibility for knowledge. Another interesting paradox: it is this 
transcendental Universalist approach that creates an engine for Universal Relativism, and 
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not post-structuralist thought which - understood strictly in Deleuzian / Complexity way 
- demands rigour in what remains, admittedly, a probabilistic and holistic world. 
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8. Historical Linearity in Political Discourse 
/ have tried to gather together a few facts which have come out of this conflict. It is taking 
place in an area which is and has been constitutionally unstable for 2,000 years. Had any 
of those in authority thought about it, an understanding of history might have helped. 
Lord Belhaven and Stenton - Debates in the House of Lords' 
"Histoiy", n. An account mostly false, of events mostly unimportant, which are brought 
about by rulers mostly knaves, and soldiers mostly fools. 
Ambrose Bierce^ 
Introduction: Archaeological Evidence and the Modern Episteme 
It is difficult to expose the ways in which imaginary histories of the region have 
contributed both the explosion of 'ethnic' hatreds and to the formulation of international 
' UK Parliament, House of Lords, Hansard Debates, 06 May 1999, Column 857. 
- Ambrose Bierce, The Unabridged Devil's Dictionary, (Athens GA: University of 
Georgia Press 2002): 110. 
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policy towards the subsequent conflict. The works of McDonald"- and Thomas'* alone 
provide ample evidence on the former, whilst research such as Garofano's^ but especially 
Record's^ perfectly outline how Western policy is enfirely based on a linear vision of 
history, and on notions of historical analogies. Furthermore, the biographies of various 
actors involved in the conflict reinforce this nofion by making repeated references to the 
Holocaust and to the ancient roots of ethnic hatreds in the region. It is particularly 
interesting to note how the accounts and understandings of these significantly differ from 
the far more accurate perspectives of Thomas and McDonald, where national historical 
narratives are showed to be constructed on the basis of present (immanent) political 
preoccupations - this is particularly evident in Thomas' work. In this context, what could 
this chapter bring to existing research, and how should it proceed to analyse the issue? 
As in previous chapters the analysis wi l l focus on an examination of primary sources in 
order to outline the argument according to which approaches to historical considerations 
in the context of the Kosovo conflict are caused by the metaphysical essence of the 
modern episteme. 
MacDonald, Balkan Holocaust? 
* Thomas, Serbia under Milosevic. 
^ John Garofano, "Historical Analogies and the Use of Force", Journal of Cold War 
Studies 6, no. 2 (2004): 64-68. 
^ Jeffrey Record, Making War, Thinking Histoiy: Munich, Vietnam, and Presidential 
Uses of Force from Korea to Kosovo (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press 2002). 
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Complexity, the Politics of Security and the Holocaust 
The current chapter wishes to establish four links: 
• the link between a Complexity-based understanding of the modern 
episteme and the metaphysical knowledge, 
• the link between metaphysical knowledge and the political, 
• the link between the political and the Holocaust 
• and finally, a link between the Holocaust and understandings of the 
Kosovo crisis. This wi l l be done through an examination of proceedings 
in the U K Pariiament. 
The establishment of these links wi l l be used to substantiate the following claim: 
an understanding of the Kosovo crisis based on the rules of the modern episteme has 
meant that the two axes of modernity were used to generate and deploy knowledge on the 
crisis. In this case, historical linearity characterised the interpretation of the conflict as 
something that emerged out of perennial ancient ethnic hatreds. On the other hand, an 
analytic of security ensured that the other lenses for the understanding of the crisis were 
provided by the production of parallelisms with the Holocaust. This is so because the 
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Holocaust represents the extreme manifestation of the politics of security, which are in 
turn generated by modern-metaphysical approaches to knowledge. A Complexity-based 
epistemic approach, as a knowledge framework which fundamentally transcends 
modernity's metaphysical approach by questioning modernity's two fundamental 
principles (time is not reversible and systems are not closed, that is, they cannot be 
isolated through an analytic of finitude) allows for an understanding of the way in which 
knowledge on the Kosovo crisis was generated. Thus, it is possible to claim that 
discursive practices on Kosovo were deployed in such a way that the principle of 
historical linearity was enforced through a concept of ancient ethnic hatreds, whilst the 
principle of analytical fmitude was enforced through the invocation of the Holocaust. 
The concluding section of this chapter wil l examine how a Complexity approach offers 
alternative understandings which would fundamentally challenge modern interpretations 
of the Kosovo conflict. 
Our Complexity-based epistemic approach has allowed us to identify the defining 
feature of modernity - a transcendental philosophy of the object based on the two axes of 
modernity, namely historical linearity and analytical finitude - as constituting an 
essentially metaphysical approach to knowledge. The objective of this section is to argue 
that such metaphysical knowledge is based on the notion of certainty, which translates 
into the notion of security in the political realm. The certainty - security link thus 
epitomi.ses the metaphysics - politics link, whereby any metaphysical (certainty-based) 
5. Historical Linearity in Political Discourse, 385 
approach to political knowledge necessarily translates into a discourse on security. This 
link has been firmly established by Michael Dillon (below). Furthermore, the Holocaust 
constitutes the limit of a metaphysical, and therefore security-based, approach to the 
political - and this limitative quality is what ensured that parallelisms to it were deployed 
in the framing of the Kosovo crisis. 
In the area of 'security', Michael Dillon has already identified how the analytic of 
finitude translates into a paradigm of security not only in international relations, but in 
politics as a whole: thus Dillon's attempt to reclaim the political from such metaphysical 
theorising.' Dillon effectively recognises the analytic of finitude in the contemporary 
paradigm of security: he locates in the limit imposed by the security paradigm the very 
essence of the analytic of finitude, the limit which allows the being to be without faUing 
into non-being, and vice versa. This is the very limit which necessitates a historical 
linearity to maintain the being, or to prevent, as Foucault would put it, 'man from 
building other, alternative worids' (see Chapter 2). And Dillon also demonstrates how 
the metaphysical notion of 'security' allows such philosophy to exist; how it becomes 
present in all knowledge formations, and how it surfaces in humanistic sciences and in 
any other science. The metaphysical concept of 'security' is nothing but that which 
secures the very existence of man understood as an object of enquiry in the modern 
episteme (the phenomenon that Foucault calls the 'Birth of Man'). On the other hand, 
security is based on a metaphysical understanding of certainty that is present throughout 
' Dillon, The Politics of Security'. 
8. Historical Linearity in Political Discourse, 386 
the modern episteme.^ It is for this reason that Dillon quotes Leibniz in order to describe 
modernity's metaphysical search for Truth: 
I f one builds a house in a sandy place, one must continue digging until one 
meets solid rock or f i rm foundations; i f one wants to unravel a tangled thread; i f 
the greatest weights are to be moved, Archimedes demanded only a stable place. 
In the same way, i f one is to establish the elements of human knowledge some 
fixed point is required, on which we can safely rest and from which we can set out 
without fear.'^ 
Thus Dillon can write that for this reason "metaphysics first allows security to 
impress itself upon political thought as a self-evident condition for the very existence of 
life...security thereby became the value which modern understandings of the political and 
modern practices of politics have come to put beyond question, precisely because they 
" For this reasons, it was argued in Chapter 3 that Complexity has the potential to shift the 
classical understanding of Reason after the Enlightenment form that which is supposed to 
provide certainty to that which enables humans to understand uncertainty as an intrinsic 
characteristic of reality, and to cope with it. Not surprisingly Prigogine entitled one of his 
books The End of Certainty. And uncertainty entails diversity (open complex systems) 
and time irreversibility (or the end of determinism). 
^ Dillon, The Politics of Security, 13 
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derived its very requirement from the requirements of metaphysical truth itself. This 
is the security of fundamental principles that characterise Newtonian physics, and the 
overall scientific paradigm up to the Vienna Circle (see Chapter 3). Security, which has 
to be secured via an analytic of finitude and a corresponding concept of historical 
linearity; is the symptom of an essentially metaphysical approach to knowledge. 
An analytic of finitude, compounded by historical teleology, is fundamental not 
only for the creation and deployment of a 'technicalised' security paradigm: these two 
epistemic rules characterise processes of identity formation (both the way in which the 
Self perceives the Self, and how the Other perceives the Other). For Kosovo, we have 
examples of how the region was crucial for the construction of victim-centred 
propaganda (ba.sed on a constant evocation of the Holocaust), and how these techniques 
were constructed in the immanent present for the purposes of political struggle. 
McDonald's research reinforces the idea according to which the construction of this 
victim-centred propaganda is inevitably based upon representations of the Holocaust, 
which represents modernity's very analytic of finitude in terms of the security paradigm: 
the Holocaust cannot be surpassed as the extreme security measure and as the most 
extreme product of metaphysical security (first, identification and second; total 
liquidation of; the 'other'). The Holocaust thus becomes the very ' l imi t ' , against which 
new 'security-based' identities wi l l be constructed. A modern analytic of finitude 
characterised the way in which the identities of the subjects of military intervention 
' " Ib id . 
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('Kosovars', 'Kosovo Albanians', 'Serbs', 'Kosmet') were framed. Such identities were 
limited by historico-teleological approach (ancient ethnic hatreds etc.), which served the 
purpose of placing contingency upon the constructed identities. Once these contingencies 
were in place, the political could once again mediate, calculate, and prevail. But the 
process is dialectical - it is because there is immanent political struggle that new forms of 
security-based identities are required (the contingent), and it is these forms which allow 
the immanent political struggle to continue. 
Thus the Holocaust is the product of modernity's metaphysical (security-based) 
approach to the political. Consider, for example Bauman's views: 
Bauman argues that the Holocaust was not a novum in history but the 
outcome of technological rationalism of modern society and the attendant 
normative socialisation of modern subjects." 
Or Robert Fine's 
Anthony Gorman, "Whither the Broken Middle? Rose and Fackenheim on Mourning, 
Modernity and the Holocaust" in Social Theory after the Holocaust, ed. Robert Fine and 
Charles Turner (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press 2000): 49. 
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Drawing on the ontology of Martin Heidegger, philosophy even imputed the 
murderous tendencies evinced in the Holocaust to the metaphysics of the subject 
and to the hubris of Western humanism.'^ 
Or, perhaps more indicatively. 
The Holocaust was not an irrational outflow of the not-yet-fully-eradicated 
residues of pre-modern barbarity. It was a legitimate resident in the hou.se of 
modernity; indeed, one who would not be at home in any other house.'-' 
The Holocaust thus represents the limit, or what Dillon would call the radical non 
relational, of a modern understanding of politics. In particular, an invocation of the 
Holocaust was used to justify NATO's intervention despite acceptances that such 
intervention may well be illegal. As such, the Holocaust adopts the role of a mysterious 
radical event that is outside the possibility of knowledge, but grounds all possibility of (in 
this case legal) considerations. The Holocaust transcends the notion of legality, and 
12 
Robert Fine, "Hannah Arendt: Politics and Understanding after the Holocaust," in 
Social Theory after the Holocaust, ed. Robert Fine and Charles Turner (Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press 2000): 35. 
Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity' and the Holocaust, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 
989): 17. 
13 
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conditions the point up to which legal considerations can be deployed in order to justify 
an act. 
Through a critical geopolitical perspective Gearoid 6 Tuathail has described the 
narrative maps that characterised the approach of the U.S. towards a possible intervention 
in Bosnia: 
As "Bosnia" emerged as a sign of post Cold War chaos and ethnic hatred in 1991, 
two competing scripts struggled to enframe it within the U.S. geopolitical 
imagination. Like all foreign policy scripts, each of these scripts was associated 
with a clear policy imperative for U.S. policymakers. Both these policy 
imperatives are sloganistically encapsulated by the same idiomatic declaration: 
"Never Again". The first script, which was a script generated both within the 
global mass media and by the mid-level U.S. foreign policy diplomats who read 
the daily cables coming from the U.S. embassy in Belgrade, wrote "Bosnia" 
within the terms of a modified World War I I script as the site of modern-day 
"Holocaust". The Serb policy of "ethnic cleansing" that began in Krajina and 
Croatia in 1991 and spread to Bosnia in 1992 was interpreted as a horrific case of 
"genocide" once again irrupting on the European continent. The policy 
imperative for the United States, in the face of this genocide, was its officially 
enshrined attitude given the historical experience of the genocide: never again 
should the United States be a bystander as genocide unfolds. The second script, 
which was the first script adopted by the foreign policy leaders in the Bush 
administration and later in the Clinton administration, wrote "Bosnia" within the 
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terms of a Worid War I / Vietnam script wherein "Bosnia" was a site that was a 
dangerous military quagmire.''' 
The rest of this chapter w i l l seek to demonstrate that the scripts which applied to Kosovo 
were not entirely dissimilar, with the big difference that genocide had already occurred, 
and that - as official records from within the U K Parliament argue - intervention was 
mainly motivated by a feeling of guilt. At this point, however, it would be important to 
emphasise how the two scripts cortespond two the two axes of the modern episteme. On 
the one hand, the Holocaust served as the ultimate ethical analytical limit imposing an 
ethical imperative. Is this not a classical example of ethics policing the havoc that a 
moralistic approach to the law is capable of unleashing? On the other hand, historical 
linearity served to present the conflict as a potential quagmire. Indeed, as was 
demonstrated in Chapter 6, it was those ancient ethnic hatreds which determined that 
violence must run its course, for intervention in areas dominated by such passionate 
feelings could only end in disaster. But more interestingly still, Gearoid 6 Tualhail 
argues that such 'Vietnam' script required an understanding based on historical linearity 
and ancient ethnic hatreds. Commenting on the Holocaust script, he argues that 
The recognition of "Bosnia" as a site of genocide and a late twentieth century 
form of fascism has been consistently blocked by the instrumental reasoning of 
"* 6 Tuathail, Critical Geopotitcs, 192. 
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institutions such as the Pentagon, the State Department, and NATO. The 
bureaucratic culture of such institution produces, as a matter of course, a moral 
indifference and a moral invisibility to the victims of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. 
The expression of such moral indifference is found in the World War 
Wietnam/Somalia scripts, the reading of contemporary Bosnian conflict as an 
ancient "bloodfeud" that is centuries old...^^ 
6 Tuathail concludes with a relevant encouragement, "Rather than seeing 'centuries-old' 
ethnic hatreds in our symbolically constructed Bosnia, perhaps we should consider the 
view from Bosnia and what it shows us about our own indifferent, postindustrial, and 
postmoral society."'^ 
The evidence examined below wi l l be deployed to argue that the understanding of 
the Kosovo crisis follows similar scripts, which conditioned Western reactions to the 
conflict. In parficular, the Holocaust script wi l l be presented as a prevailing script 
precisely because of the guilt dimension. On the other hand, the fact that a script based 
on ancient ethnic hatreds was present limited the way in which the Holocaust script could 
be deployed. This quintessential modern epistemic paradox led to an understanding and 
reaction to the crisis whereby a robust response had to be given, but that response could 
not be strong enough (ground troops) to allow the conflict to degenerate - or to be 
Ibid, 220, emphasis added. 
Ibid, 223. 
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understood to be degenerating into - the Vietnam, quagmire script. Thus the very 
epistemic framework that allowed arguments such as "diplomacy backed by force" to 
take place also undermined them by expressing from the very outset the limit that would 
be applied to such force, that is, by ruling out the deployment of ground troops from the 
very beginning. Note in particular the comments - which absolutely reinforce the 
argument that the Vietnam scripts was still very vivid in the realms of public option - of 
National Security Advisor to President Clinton, Sandy Berger: " I honestly think that i f we 
had not put that issue of ground troops to the side of the table at the beginning of the 
conflict, we would have had a devising and disabling debate here."'^ The word 
"disabling" is suggestive, as it indicates that in order to even be able to do something that 
something must be limited from the outset. The ultimate paradox, of course, is that the 
well-meaning policy of being able to do something good by limiting that action led to a 
result which was exactly the opposite of what it had intended: air strikes coupled with the 
absence of ground troops led to the intensification of ethnic cleansing in the province. 
This outcome resembles the debates that were presented in the context of legal debate: it 
seems that in order to protect a generic. Universal principle, some (in this ca.se the 
Kosovo Albanians who suffered precisely because the bombing led to an intensification 
of the cleansing) have to be excluded by it. The relevant U K Parliamentary Committee 
was rather puzzled by this: "We believe a very serious misjudgement was made when it 
Norris, Collision Course, 7. 
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was assumed that the bombing would not lead to the dramatic escalation in the 
displacement and expulsion of the Kosovo Albanian population."'^ 
Unsurprisingly, it was precisely those who did not see the conflict in terms of 
ancient ethnic hatreds who remained unconvinced by the quagmire script and who 
therefore advocated the deployment of ground troops.'^ And it was precisely the threat of 
ground troops that led to the desired result: 
Remarkably, the FCO memorandum does not directly address the issue of 
whether a ground assault should have been launched: testament perhaps to the 
Government's sensitivity on the issue at the time the memorandum was written. 
However, an FCO telegram written just after the end of the campaign, provided to 
us by the FCO, states that there were "probably a range of issues" that made 
18 
UK Parliament, House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Select Committee, "Fourth 
Report: Kosovo. Volume 1, Report and Proceedings of the Committee", 23 May 2000: 
paragraph 105. 
General Clark, the man who declared that "fundamentally, quarrels in the region were 
not really about age-old religious differences but rather the result of many unscrupulous 
and manipulative leaders seeking their own power and wealth at the expense of ordinary 
people in their countries", was the biggest driving force behind the issue of ground 
troops. See Clark, Waging Modern War, 65 and Norris, Collision Course. 
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"Milosevic cave in" one of which was "the mounting likelihood of a ground 
offensive in Kosovo."° 
Kosovo in the UK Parliament 
Consider the following two statements as evidence of the two scripts through which the 
conflict was understood: 
But having arrived at the situation of March 1999—or even March 1998—it is 
difficult to see how military action could have been avoided. As Tim Judah told 
us, "at any time we could have had a new Srebrenica: how was one supposed to 
know that was not going to happen?"'' 
And 
The history of the Balkans suggests that the period of revenge wil l be long-lasting 
and its nature vicious. Equally, it may be difficult to prevent the revenge of the 
UK Parliament, House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Select Committee, "Fourth 
Report: Kosovo. Volume 1, Report and Proceedings of the Committee", 23 May 2000: 
paragraph, 112. 
-' Ibid, 123. 
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Albanian people against the Serbs. The experience of Bosnia and Croatia does not 
give us much ground for optimism at the present time."" 
The latter characterised policy-making in the House of Lords. It is the history of the 
Balkans, and not the actual power-political situation on the ground that suggests how the 
conflict wi l l evolve. This quote is indicative, but not sufficient to outline the role that the 
notion of linear history as a determinant cause has played in shaping relevant debates in 
the U K Parliament. Ironically, it w i l l be argued that such historical considerations 
contributed to the elimination of arguments - made in the same Pariiament - which 
actually did refer to a real situation on the ground. 
Whether Kosovo is partitioned or made independent, it wi l l have to be protected 
by an international force prepared and ready to fight. It wi l l be no good having 
blue-helmeted police who withdraw when the going gets rough. As Bogdan 
Bogdanovich, once Serbia's leading architect and a former mayor of Belgrade, 
observed in a remarkable article written as long ago as 1991 and recently 
republished in this country. 
-" UK Padiament, House of Lords, Hansard text 6 May 1999, column 833 
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"The people of the Balkans have become addicted to guns, in the same way that 
we have drug addicts in other parts of the world ... This is true not only of Serbs, 
Croats, Albanians or Moslems, but of all the Balkan peoples." 
That reinforces the comments on the same lines made eariier in this debate by the 
noble Lord, Lord Merlyn-Rees. We can be certain therefore that the difficulties of 
maintaining peace after the war wi l l be formidable. History' suggests that order 
can be maintained between warring peoples in the Balkans and places like it only 
by the exercise of imperial powerP 
In this passage, the honourable Lord Crickhowell advocates what he openly describes as 
an imperial policy on the basis of his understanding of the region's history. Indeed, even 
the need of a reconstruction programme is based on historical considerations over the 
perceived cause of ethnic hatred. However, not all the Lords found this summoning of 
History appealing: 
It is important that we do not demonise the Serbs and Serbia. I felt uneasy as the 
noble Lords, Lord Merlyn-Rees and Lord Crickhowell, talked about the lessons of 
the history of the Balkans, the extent to which these people have been killing each 
other for years and years. I remind the House that in 1990 the most predicted 
23 Ibid. 
5. Historical Linearity in Political Discourse, 398 
conflict in the region was over Transylvania, between the Hungarians and the 
Romanians. I was in Transylvania in 1990. One has only to go into Orthodox 
churches in the region to see murals of wicked Catholics slaughtering the 
Orthodox people to recognise how close to the surface some of the hatred was 
between the two religions and ethnic communities. That conflict did not break 
out because political and military leadership in those two countries worked hard 
to prevent it. The conflict broke out in Yugoslavia because particular political 
leaders - Milosevic, above all, must share some of the responsibility - worked to 
use ethnic conflicts to maintain military power."'' 
In these statements, two opposing views - which clearly outline the paradoxes inherent 
within the modern episteme - are adopted. On the one hand, we have the structuralist 
view, or the view according to which meta-historical structures (the 'history of the 
Balkans') have a role to play in the determination of immanent outcomes. On the other, 
we have a more idiosyncratic view, according to which outcomes at the immanent level 
are primarily caused by immanent action at the immanent level. It is fascinating to note 
how this structure and agency debate, which previous chapters show is nothing other but 
a consequence of what Foucault called the empirico-tran.scendental doublet, can be found 
in all contemporary debates, both on the side of the transcendental, analytic of finitude 
argument (i.e. the application of Universal law whose jurisdiction is Humankind) and on 
Ibid, column 894. 
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the side of the empirical considerations (the analysis on the extent to which history plays 
a role in determining specific outcomes). Naturally, the links with the evolution of 
scientific epistemology and the emergence of Complexity are clear: a Deleuzian / 
Bergsonian Complexity approach would be characterised by what Bergson defined as 
'superior empiricism', which would in turn be composed of a drive towards holism and 
immanence. In other words, a Complexity approach would have considered emerging 
populations (or phenomena) as a whole and identified the 'history' of their emergence but 
strictly in a non-reversible way: the history that we are referring to is strictly 
circumscribed as the history of the immanent phenomenon. It would be, indeed, the 
history of the immanent political struggle which generated a perception of the 'history of 
the Balkans' in order to justify its motives. A history of a history: an Archaeology. 
But again, it is easy to determine which side of the argument won the day. 
Historical linearity, the approach according to which meta-historical considerations are 
crucial in the understanding of a conflict, was very well encroached in the minds of many 
in the U K Houses of Parliament. This was so much so that the history of a specific 
region comes to be seen as more important than the classification of actual and immanent 
practices such as genocide: 
Lord Shore of Stepney: 
We heard some relevant contributions today from those who know about Balkan 
history, what went on under the old Ottoman Empire and the hatreds which were 
generated. My good friend Lord Merlyn-Rees spoke about that earlier today. 
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Those hatreds are formidable. They are not merely the meeting point of religions 
but of different linguistic, cultural and racial groups clashing together. When I 
think about it a little, I would quarrel with the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, whose 
speeches I generally agree with entirely, when he uses the word "genocide". It is 
not genocide. Genocide is the deliberate destruction of a race. By God! we saw it 
under Nazi Germany dealing with the Jews, as they did in their Holocaust. It is 
not that. It is ethnic cleansing. We are seeing a deliberate expulsion of people, 
triggered by deliberate terror, resulting in mass migration. It brings with it 
slaughter and wickedness of all kinds; but the aim is to expel. Frankly, that is part 
of the history of the Balkans."^ 
Genocide: what is, and what is not, genocide? Was Srebrenica's (very much a Balkan 
thing) aimed to ki l l or to expel? How can we disregard acts of genocide simply because 
they do not pass the test in relation to that ultimate standard imposed by the Holocaust? 
And such notions of genocide are thrown away precisely because of direct comparisons 
with the Holocaust: the Holocaust being that silver lining of our understanding, the 
horizon of our approaches, or, as Foucault would put it, that which grounds our 
possibility of knowledge but is at the same time outside our possibility of knowledge. In 
Dillon's words: a radical non-relational. Indeed, to some the Holocaust is precisely what 
caused the fundamental split between two fundamental approaches to the Law: 
"" Ibid, 877, emphasis added. 
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173. (Tim Judah) I am no an international lawyer, but it seems to me quite clear 
that we are at a stage in international law where there are two bodies of opinion, 
one which says it is legal and one which says it is not legal, and international law 
is in a constant state of development and we have no parliament to declare "this is 
law". So we have two legitimate arguments... 
175...Mr. Sweeney? 
(Mr. Sweeney) Professor Roberts taught me at LSE, and I cannot do anything 
better than he did, which was -
(Professor Roberts) I disclaim all responsibility 
(Mr. Sweeney) And he taught me to be flamboyant in committees. There was a 
magnificent letter by another Prof., from Sussex University, in the New 
Statesman, when this was going on, or shortly after this, which said that the kind 
of thinking which said you cannot intervene because it is illegal, because you are 
interfering with the internal affairs of a country, that kind of talk, went out with 
the Holocaust, and I believe that to be so.'^  
26 
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That kind of talk "went out with the Holocaust": this kind of talk is however the moral 
talk which advocates the absolute necessity of foundations in international law. Is this 
not a perfect example of the Holocaust serving as the analytic of finitude which allows 
ethics to police the havoc that morality is otherwise capable of unleashing? 
Two legitimate arguments - and what stays between the two, is the Holocaust. It 
is hoped that the parallelisms with what was exposed in previous chapters regarding the 
evolution of scientific epistemology, the emergence of complexity and the empirico-
transcendental doublet are evident. Empiricism in science collapsed because it could not 
longer sustain its arguments - it lost the battle of 'scientific' public opinion, it was 
relegated to insignificance: the empirico-transcendental doublet lost one leg: the raise of 
formalism, a new conceptualisation of empirical evidence and ultimately the emergence 
of Complexity are a consequence of this. The scientists at Vienna, remember, were 
facing a very specific dilemma: 
The foundations of knowledge must be simultaneously objective and subjective, 
that is, certain but nevertheless subject to eventual refutation". The problem is 
that these two requirements (objectivity and subjectivity) are simply not 
compatible, and cannot be satisfied by an irreducible proposition. As Barberousse 
notes, "from this moment the road taken by Neurath and Carnap leads to the 
opposite direction to the one taken by Schlick. 
The turn had been made. In fact, this paradox encouraged some philosophers such as 
Carnap and Neurath to argue that it was more adequate to renounce to the idea of an 
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absolute foundation of knowledge in order to maintain the objectivity of science 
(relativism), while other members of the Circle, headed by Schlick, considered absolute 
foundations indispensable, thus rejected the idea that foundations must necessarily be 
objective. As we noted, this paradox terminated, via scientific fragmentation, 
reductionism in science, a philosophy that sought to reduce the whole of science to 
experienced singular phenomena. 
Chapter 2 and 3 went on to demonstrate that such paradoxes were inherent within 
the modern episteme. What the people in Parliament were facing was exactly the same 
paradox in the context of ethics and international law. Indeed, one is tempted to say that 
the foundations of the Law must be simultaneously objective and subjective, that is, 
certain but nevertheless subject to eventual refutation. The problem is that these two 
requirements (objectivity and subjectivity) are simply not compatible, and cannot be 
satisfied by an irreducible proposition. From this moment the road taken by the legal 
positivists is radically different from the road taken by humanitarian interventionists. The 
turn had been made. In fact, this paradox encouraged the legal positivists to argue that it 
was more adequate to renounce the idea of an absolute moral foundation of the Law in 
order to maintain its objectivity, while other members of the this 'Circle', headed by the 
interventionists, considered absolute ethical foundations indispensable, thus rejected the 
idea that legal practice must necessarily be objective, consistent or coherent with the 
'Founding Texts' of International Law (the UN Charter, for example): this is how an 
epistemic-based Complexity approach contributes to solving the problems related to the 
morality / ethics nexus outlined in Chapter I . 
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Henceforth the Holocaust is posited as the radical non relational in ethical-
foundationalism accounts: it is outside the possibility of knowledge, but it founds the 
possibility of ethical knowledge in law. Thus the Holocaust is that which allows 
Sweeney to position himself in the empirico-transcendental doublet. And yet, the 
Holocaust is being conceptualised according to the standard techniques of the modern 
episteme: it is idealised, placed at the level of transcendental type, and used to adjudicate 
and classify phenomena at the level of immanence (see quotes above). 
But is such an understanding of the Holocaust legitimate? Or, as McDonald asks, 
"does the comparative genocide debate work?""^ His answer is no. But in noting this, 
McDonald once again notes how Holocaust-centred reactions in the West (which he 
believes undermined the interventionist argument rather than the opposite) obeyed the 
constraints imposed by historical linearity: 
Academics, journalists, and politicians bear a heavy responsibility for the 
nationalist fever that so dominated these countries in the 1990s. George 
Santayana's banal and over-quoted observation that 'those who neglect the past 
are condemned to repeat it ' was thoroughly debunked in both the Serbian and 
Croatian cases. It was precisely this obsession with past mistakes and past 
27 
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injustices that led to the tragedies of war - with the helping hand of the nationalist 
elites, of course."^ 
The Holocaust is both what people against intervention and people in favour of 
intervention used to justify their positions: thus, the Holocaust is not only the Vienna 
Circle of legal theory, but also the Vienna Circle of ethical approaches. Indeed, whilst 
Lord Stepney argued that the events in Kosovo were radically different from the 
Holocaust, members of Government would identify in Kosovo a repetition of the 
Holocaust, subsequently appeahng to the moral authority this conferred: 
The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. George Robertson): ...Like my right hon. 
Friend the Foreign Secretary, I start with a slightly personal comment. Last 
month, I addressed a meeting at the Glasgow South Side synagogue with my hon. 
Friend the Member for Eastwood (Mr. Murphy) and the new Member of the 
Scottish Pariiament for the constituency. I gave the packed audience my 
explanation of what was happening in Kosovo—what the situation was about, why 
it mattered and why Milosevic and his savage ethnic cleansing had to be defeated. 
During the question session that followed my speech, a small old man rose at the 
back of the hall to put a point to me. In the silence of the meeting, he told me that 
he had been in Auschwitz concentration camp in Nazi Germany in his youth. That 
Ibid, 268, emphasis added. 
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small old man told me and the people at the meeting that, as a holocaust survivor, 
he could recognise genocide when he saw it and that he was seeing it again today 
in Kosovo. Mr. Michael Sanki reminded us that, after the second world war, we 
all said "Never again". He pleaded with me to make good that pledge. We are 
involved in a just cause-one worth fighting and even dying for. For my 
generation and so many others in this country-who are very lucky to be alive in a 
democracy today-this is our moment to say and to mean "Never again". 
And again: 
Mr. Malcolm Savidge (Aberdeen, North): I hate war. I am devoted to the cause of 
peace, but I could never be a pacifist - although I respect pacifists. I was 
reminded of the reason why last summer when I visited the Holocaust museum in 
Washington. The evil of armed conflict is a lesser evil than the triumph of tyranny 
and genocide. 
Indeed, the word Holocaust was used to actually describe events in Kosovo: 
29 
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Lord Vivian: My Lords, I rise to speak drawing on some 37 years of military 
experience and a sense of outrage at this horrifying matter of ethnic cleansing and 
mass murder of the Kosovar people. I never thought that such a holocaust would 
take place in a civilised Europe.'' 
To detractors of intervention, who deny similarities between occurrences in the Balkans 
and the Holocaust, many arguments seem to be valid. However, both Lord Shore and 
Lord Weidenfeld chose the bizarre tactic of separating the two issues on technicalities, 
showing once again how the deployment of the Holocaust takes place within very 
specific epistemic constraints, whereby the 'ideal-type genocide' is presented, and 
differences are noted on the basis of dissimilarities between the phenomenal issues at 
hand an what has become the transcendental definition of genocide. The presentation of 
the Holocaust as the ideal-type genocide which serves as the benchmark of other crimes 
is a quintessentially metaphysical approach, which, as the first section of this chapter 
argued, is inherent within the modern episteme. It is interesting to note how in this 
debate the issue of motive is not addressed: 
Lord Weidenfeld: Having listened to the noble Earl, Lord Onslow, the noble 
Lords, Lord Shore and Lord Stoddart, I shall think twice before drawing historical 
parallels or indulging in terminological exercises comparing holocaust, genocide. 
UK Parliament, House of Lords, Hansard text 6 May 1999, column 886 
Or: 
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ethnic cleansing. Hitler versus Milosevic. As someone who has had more than 
tangential personal experience and indeed a lifelong involvement with the 
exploration of the horrors of the Third Reich, I say with diffidence that, although 
Milosevic, Mladic and Karadzic lag behind the Nazis in the thoroughness and 
sophistication of mass destruction, some of the Serb soldiers and police, and 
certainly the para-military gangs, have nothing to learn from the panzer 
movement of the SS. In fact, I dare pay them the ghoulish compliment that, in 
relation to sheer brutality, inventiveness and the minutiae of torture, slaughter and 
rape, they are a notch higher in the league table of evil.'" 
Mr. George Galloway (Glasgow, Kelvin): I believe that our failure has been to 
get carried away in the flood of rhetoric. This wickedness in Kosovo is appalling, 
but it is not the holocaust. Milosevic is a brute, but he is not Hitler. This is an 
appalling problem, but it is not the second world war. As the now much maligned 
correspondent, John Simpson, said in his admirable memoirs, which I read only 
last weekend, i f we persist in treating conflicts as though they were Armageddon, 
32 Ibid, column 892 
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we run the risk of getting in over our heads. That is what we have begun to do, 
especially with the escalation of our war aims this afternoon. 
Conclusion 
Historical linearity - that second axis of the modern episteme, without which the 
notion of analytical finitude could not function - is what characterised most debates on 
how to respond to the Kosovo crisis. Inevitably, one specific notion took over the 
function of delimitating the subject of enquiry: the Holocaust. The Holocaust is thus 
what plays the essential role of delimitating what Foucault called the analytic of finitude. 
In previous chapters, it has been noted how Complexity differs from the modern episteme 
precisely because of its alternative conceptualisation of time and its drive towards the 
adoption of philosophies of immanence. Through an analysis of parliamentary debates it 
becomes obvious that the Holocaust did not play the role of dissecting a principle of time 
irreversibility (what are the immanent emerging conditions that result in outcome X, and 
how can such causes be addressed?) but a notion of time linearity (it has happened 
before, it will happen again, and what we must decide is how to deal with the 
consequences). In other words, a Complexity ethic would neither have encouraged actors 
to differentiate between real phenomena and the ideal type 'Holocaust', or to immediately 
recognise in such phenomena the ideal type 'Holocaust'. A Complexity ethic would have 
33 
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demanded an analysis of the practicalities on the ground recognising that, in matters 
governing complex human relations, it is simply not enough to make parallelisms with 
ideal type genocides. In this context, it would be arguments such as these that would 
prevail: 
Mr. Donald Anderson (Swansea, East): We should leave the door open for 
compromise, and avoid that absolutist language which, alas, is used by some 
retired US generals and even President Clinton. To make an eventual negotiated 
settlement possible, we should avoid using words such as holocaust and 
genocide.'''' 
The recognition of a delimitating phenomenon as a benchmark for action - in typical 
modern fashion - must be overcome through the recognition that probabilistic and 
complex phenomena characterise the real state of affairs in the human relationships, 
which cannot be reduced to historical precedents. 
Ibid, 613 
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We should remember the complexities of the history of the Balkans - the fault line of 
Europe. A multi-ethnic empire is unravelling, with all the consequences that might flow 
from that. 
Mr. Donald Anderson (Swansea, East) - Debates in the House of Commons' 
"All truth is simple " - Is that not a compound lie? 
Friedrich Nietzsche^ 
On the 17'*' of February 2008 Kosovo's Parliament unilaterally declared 
independence from Serbia and established the Republic of Kosovo.^ This brought to an 
end nearly a decade of negotiations regarding Kosovo's final status and - despite the fact 
that the Republic of Kosovo is likely to remain dependant on international support for the 
' UK Parliament, House of Commons, Hansard Debates 19 April 1999, Column 612, 
emphasis added. 
" Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, Or How to Philosophise with a Hammer 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 1998): 5. 
^ As of 21 April 2008, 37 out of 192 sovereign United Nations members recognised the 
new Republic. 
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foreseeable future - independence brought an end to the formal United Nations 
administration mandate in the province. 
More importantly, it brought to an end Western hopes for the states of the former 
Yugoslavia, and for Kosovo in particular, as these were outlined by the Contact Group's 
foreign ministers on the 3"^  of April 1999: "we want a peaceful, multiethnic Kosovo in 
which all its people live in security.'"'^ In 2004, reputable organisations such as the 
International Crisis Group used once again the expression "ethnic cleansing" following 
the riots in March that year, but this time the sentence referred to the cleansing of Serbs: 
On 17 March 2004, the unstable foundations of four and a half years of gradual 
progress in Kosovo buckled and gave way. Within hours the province was 
immersed in anti-Serb and anti-UN rioting and had regressed to levels of violence 
not seen since 1999. By 18 March the violence mutated into the ethnic cleansing 
of entire minority villages and neighbourhoods. The mobs of Albanian youths, 
extremists and criminals exposed the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the 
NATO-led peacekeeping force (KFOR) as very weak. Kosovo's provisional 
institutions of self-government (PISG), media and civil society afforded the 
rioters licence for mayhem. The international community urgently needs new 
policies - on final status and socio-economic development alike - or Kosovo 
instability may infect the entire region. The rampage left nineteen dead, nearly 
Norris, Collision Course, 23, strong emphasis added. 
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900 injured, over 700 Serb, Ashkali and Roma homes, up to ten public buildings 
and 30 Serbian churches and two monasteries damaged or destroyed, and roughly 
4,500 people displaced. The riots were more spontaneous than organised, with 
extremist and criminal gangs taking advantage, particulariy on day two. 
Frustration and fear over the international community's intentions for Kosovo, 
UNMIK's inability to kick-start the economy and its suspension of privatisation, 
and Belgrade's success over recent months in shredding Kosovo Albanian nerves 
all built the tension that was released with explosive force by the inciting 
incidents of 16 March."'' 
Paradoxically, it was the fear that such riots may occur again that led to accelerated 
negotiations on the final status, which, by now, were inevitably geared towards 
independence. Such independence constituted the very partition exercise the West 
wanted to avoid, and the irreducible paradox that the West nevertheless had to face: this 
was either about supporting formal partition (independence) so as to encourage the new 
sovereign entity to respect whatever was left of its minority groups, or to risk having a 
completely cleansed province on the ground. In a version of the principle of Universal 
Exclusion, it seems that "ethnic minorities" can indeed be protected in principle as long 
- International Crisis Group, "Collapse in Kosovo", Europe Report Number 155, 22 April 
2004, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2627&l=:l (accessed 21 April 
2008). 
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as they populate sovereign entities in which they constitute, precisely, a minority (that is, 
as long as they have been conceptually excluded by the 'majority').^ 
It is not as if the main actors were not aware of the dangers - on the contrary, such 
dangers were so entrenched in the minds of key actors that independence was not even 
considered as an option. As John Norris narrates. 
While NATO had clear preferences for the peacekeeping operation, its vision of 
Kosovo's status was carefully hedged. NATO wanted to keep Yugoslavia intact, 
and many of the Allies were firmly opposed to independence for Kosovo. NATO 
feared an independent Kosovo would trigger instability in Greece, Macedonia, 
Albania, Bulgaria, while encouraging other secessionist movements to drag the 
Alliance into their violent liberation struggles."^ 
These words come from the very top in the U.S. administration (John Norris served 
Strobe Talbott - Deputy State Secretary at the time and main negotiator on Kosovo. 
Talbott endorsed Norris' account in the foreword he wrote for his colleague's book), and 
as such they do carry some weight. The principle of Yugoslav territorial integrity was 
also unequivocally enshrined in UN resolution 1244, which insisted in "reaffirming the 
commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 
^ It is estimated that only around 120,000 "Serbs" remain in Kosovo. 
^ Norris, Collision Course, 135. 
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Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other states in the region, as set out in the 
Helsinki Final Act."* 
On the other hand it is difficult to imagine how these players could have possibly 
foreseen an outcome different from independence as the consequence of the bombing 
campaign. The difficult job of having to implement precisely what he had always been 
against fell to the brave former Finnish President Ahtisaari. Ahtisaari played a key role 
in negotiating the cease-fire whose main sticking point was the composition of the NATO 
peacekeeping force and the presence of Yugoslav forces in the province.^ Whilst 
NATO's line was that absolutely no Yugoslav forces should be allowed to remain, 
Ahtisaari was well aware that such forces may have constituted the last (weak) defence 
against a possible future secession: 
President Ahtisaari continued to defend his position that a limited number of 
Yugoslav 'stay-behinds' should have been allowed in the peace agreement with 
^ "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, June 10, 1999" in Auerswald, The 
Kosovo Conflict, 1127. 
^ The failure to reach an agreement with the Russians (who refused to serve under a 
NATO commander on who insisted in being allocated a specific sector - conditions 
which were regarded as inadmissible by NATO precisely because of fear that these would 
lead to partition - led to Russia's unilateral deployment towards the Pristina airfield and 
to Clark's (disobeyed) orders to engage Russian troops. See ibid. 
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Milosevic. " I f there was an understanding that less than 1,000 Serbs would be 
allowed to stay, they should have been allowed to stay. The mere fact that they 
had to go out and then return was not practical." Athisaari argued that it became 
impossible for any of these Serbs to return and that an alternative approach may 
have eased the transformation process, "Now, I don't think we have any choice 
but to give Kosovo independence. It leaves a bit of a bad aftertaste that so many 
Serbs had to leave. Whether we can have a multiethnic society is unclear. It is 
dangerous to have monoethnic societies such as the way Kosovo is developing"^^. 
This is, in many ways, an unusual study. It is hoped, however, that the few 
paragraphs above convey some additional paradoxes that characterised the Kosovo 
conflict, which make it so difficult to understand. For instance, the considerations above 
lead to the conclusion that in order to safeguard a "multi-ethnic Kosovo" NATO 
embarked in the creation of a "monoethnic Kosovo", a development which was 
Ibid 298, strong emphasis added. Despite being a opposed to independence it was 
precisely Ahtisaari who, after nearly 10 years of failed negotiations, had to propose 
"supervised independence" as the only remaining solution under the Ahtisaari Plan. For 
Ahtisaari's strong opposition to independence see Martti Ahtisaari, Mission to Belgrade, 
(Helsinki: WSOY Press 2000). 
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recognised as being "dangerous". Furthermore, it was the very principles that NATO 
vehemently defended in order to avoid partition (refusal to grant Russia an independent 
sector and refusal to allow Yugoslav forces to participate in the policing of the province) 
which, at least according to Ahtassari, led to partition on a bigger scale (independence) 
and to the formation of what he considered to be a dangerous monoethnic society. 
Kosovo thus represents, in many ways, an unusual conflict. There is something 
intrinsically ironic (or tragic, depending on the point of view) in fighting a war in order to 
safeguard a "multi-ethnic" Kosovo whilst assuming that the conflict was generated by 
ancient ethnic hatreds. It is like offering as a solution what one believes is the cause of 
the problem. 
This work was emphatically not about 'explaining' the 'strategic reasons' or the 
'bureaucratic processes' that ultimately pushed NATO to intervene militarily in the 
region. It was not about explaining how the conflict emerged on the bases of underlying 
(hidden) ethnic, historical, social or economic forces, which a science based on 
transcendental philosophy of objects could unveil. It was rather an attempt at elucidating 
what epistemic constraints conditioned the way in which Yugoslav actors had to deploy a 
particular discourse in order to survive immanent political struggles, and in outlining how 
such constraints led NATO and other relevant stakeholders to conceptualise the conflict 
in the way they did. In exploring Complexity epistemology, the study sought to present 
alternative frameworks for the production and deployment of knowledge related to the 
conflict. 
There are a number of relevant variables that characterised the decision-making 
process, and the exploration of such variables falls within the remit of history, or rather. 
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liistoriography. Unfortunately it seems that what information is available in the public 
domain at the moment is not sufficient to initiate such a critical historiographical project. 
Moreover, the retrieval of information that would shed light on such variables appears to 
be a task that is beyond our possibilities at the moment, although this is not for lack of 
trying." However, this study shares the intuition of Eric Hobsbawm regarding the nature 
of NATO's motivations (or lack of thereof), as the historian declared that the war had no 
specific purposes and brought no advantages to Western powers. In other words, it was 
just a mistake (or 'pasticcio', in Italian).'^ As more information becomes available, it 
wi l l be interesting to analyse it with a Complexity approach in mind: it may just be that 
NATO powers found themselves in a complex, emergent situation that, due to various 
" Throughout 2004/5 the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) has refused to 
disclose information requested by this author under the Freedom of Information Act. The 
legal exemptions that have been invoked to back this refusal are most revealing: they 
include clauses regarding information that "may harm the diplomatic relations of the 
United Kingdom with other States", and the 'State' that was cited in official FCO 
correspondence is 'Kosovo'. This is intriguing given the legal limbo in which the 
province found itself prior to a final status settlement, which is when the request was 
made. 
Eric Hobsbawm, "Guerra Umanitaria? No, e solo un pasticcio'" in L'Ultima Crociata? 
Ragioni e Torti di una Guerra Giusta, ed. Ulrich Beck and Norberto Bobbio (Rome: 
Libri di Reset 1999), 58-67. 
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institutional processes and evolving contexts, seems to have acquired a life of its own. 
This is a view that 'social science' may not be well equipped to accept. 
More than anything, this study was about elucidating what made specific 
discourses and understandings possible, and explaining the way in which such discourses 
could be challenged. As the title of the study suggests, two instruments were used: an 
epistemic approach was deployed to outline what made relevant (and modern) discourse 
formation processes possible, whilst an epistemic understanding of Complexity described 
the way in which such processes constitute outdated techniques for the generation of 
knowledge and understanding. Those two instruments led to the three concise research 
questions presented at the beginning of the study: 
Question one: 
• In what way can the emergence of what we loosely refer to as "Complexity 
Theory' enhance our understanding of social affairs generally, and of human 
conflict in particular? 
Question two: 
• Why is the Kosovo conflict a particularly good example to illustrate the role that 
Complexity can have in enhancing such understanding? To what extent can we 
speak of a new Complexity-based episteme as a break from the current 
configuration of knowledge? 
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And question three: 
• What epistemic constraints - based on particular understandings of humanity and 
therefore humanitarian war - led to a particular understanding of the Kosovo 
conflict which resulted in a particular response? 
Before attempting a conclusive and comprehensive answer it may be useful to summarise 
the findings. 
In order to answer our three questions the study began by presenting the most salient 
debates surrounding the Kosovo crisis. The objective was to synthesise all such debates 
from an epistemic perspective, in order to demonstrate in later chapters that these debates 
had common roots and represented different ways in which the modern episteme was 
deployed in order to formulate related questions. In particular, it was shown that all 
debates / questions related to the inevitable paradoxes that must be faced whenever 
transcendental or metaphysical concepts (which are allowed for by the modern episteme) 
have to be applied in the realm of immanence. 
Chapter 2 proceeded to present the modern episteme and to explain how such 
episteme conditioned the formation of knowledge frameworks in the disciplines of 
economics and biology. The main findings of the chapter relate to the unveiling of 
modernity as a knowledge practice which allows for a number of approaches to 
knowledge. Within this modem framework, however, the modern empirical sciences 
were shown to be based on transcendental philosophies of the object, which in turn are 
Conclusion: Kosovo, Complexity', and the Role of a Complex Geo-temporal Critique, 421 
based on an empirico-transcendental doublet (the mechanism whereby the relationship 
between the metaphysical and the immanent is negotiated). Such empirico-
transcendental doublet is in turn based on the notions of analytical finitude and historical 
linearity which, in virtue of the roles these fu l f i l within the modem episteme, have been 
referred to throughout the Theses as the "axes of modernity'. Economics and biology 
represent but two disciplines which have been constituted on the bases of such axes. The 
chapter concluded by outlining how the scientific method proper had - following the 
conclusions of the Vienna Circle - shifted towards the transcendental philosophy of 
objects pole in the modern configuration of knowledge and was therefore governed by the 
requirements of the axes of modernity. It was argued that such shift is significant 
because this is precisely what led the academic discipline for International Relations -
which is responsible for producing knowledge related to international conflicts - in the 
same direction. 
Chapter 3 analysed how Foucault provided a 'falsification test' for the modern 
episteme which, due to its reliance on historical linearity, was considered by Foucault as 
having inaugurated the 'Age of History'. The test relies on the notion that knowledge 
would move beyond the modern episteme once it ceased to regard history as that which 
enforces the contingency demanded by the empirico-transcendental doublet and regarded 
history as precisely the opposite: that is, the primary source of novelty and uncertainty. 
Thus Foucault identified in Henri Bergson the first philosopher who moved beyond the 
modern episteme, precisely in virtue of his understanding of time. The chapter continued 
to note how Ilya Prigogine - one of the main Complexity theorists and founder of the 
Complexity strand in the biological sciences - used precisely Bergson's conceptualisatic ion 
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of time as a point of departure for his Complexity approach. On these bases the chapter 
sought to offer a solid, epistemic-based definition of Complexity science as a knowledge 
framework that relies on time irreversibility (thus undermining one of the axes of 
modernity, that is, linear time) and on a notion of open systems (thus undermining the 
other axis, that is, analytical finitude) in order to produce 'uncertain knowledge', where 
uncertainty is regarded and accepted as an intrinsic quality of nature and not as a result of 
imperfect knowledge. Complexity's focus on the realm of immanence, coupled with its 
anti reductionism (which was presented through a detailed explanation of Prigogine's 
understanding of the collapse of wave functions) provided bases for the formulation of 
parallelisms between Complexity and post-structural philosophy in general, and 
Deleuze's thought (which, incidentally, also takes Bergson's conceptualisation of time as 
a point of departure) in particular. Failing to resist the temptation of digging deeper, the 
research revealed that a number of Complexity's precursors were influenced by German 
Romanticism and Natural Philosophy, especially by the likes of Goethe. Considering 
Hobsbawm's account of Europe's 'epistemic civil war' it was argued that Complexity 
brings back to light an old, quintessentially European debate about the role of Reason 
after the enlightenment, suggesting that whereas modern metaphysical knowledge assigns 
to Reason the task of providing certainty, Complexity-based, post-modern knowledge, (in 
a strictly Foucauldian sense) tasks Reason with the role of enabling humans to cope with 
uncertainty and the fundamental element of randomness that is inherent in nature. The 
notion of certainty is important as Chapter 8 argues that - following Michael Dillon's 
work - such notion mutates into the concept of security when applied to the realm of 
politics, and that such concept conditioned the way in which the Kosovo crises was seen 
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through the prism of the ultimate security mechanism (not) allowed for by the modern 
episteme: the Holocaust. Chapter 3 thus provides the theoretical bases upon which 
subsequent arguments related to Complexity's challenge to the modern episteme are 
constructed. 
Chapter 4, as a whole, sought to build the link between meta-theory and theory by 
carefully analysing how the empirico-transcendental doublet characterised the formation 
of knowledge in the fields of International Relations (Chapter 4) and Law / Ethics 
(Chapter 5). Chapter 4 picked up the argument where Chapter 2 left it and proceeded to 
prove that the academic discipline of International Relations explicitly sought to emulate 
those developments in the epistemology of science (the formulation of metaphysical, or 
paradigmatic, science following the Vienna Circle) which Chapter 2 demonstrated were 
responsible for the introduction of the empirico-transcendental doublet in the scientific 
method. Drawing parallelisms with the disciplines Foucault himself had analysed 
(Economics and Biology), the chapter proceeded to demonstrate that an understanding 
and emulation of metaphysical science led academic International Relations to formulate 
knowledge on the nature of crisis based on the principles of the modern episteme. Thus, 
an analysis of the subject 'Man' (or States) that proceeded through the prism of the 
transcendental philosophy of the object (in this case Anarchy) led to a vision that entailed 
historical immobility (historical linearity) and the isolation of international problems to 
state interactions (analytical finitude). It was argued that this was of crucial importance 
as it formed the (conscious and subconscious) intellectual grounds upon which the 
formation of knowledge on the Kosovo crisis, based on immutable 'ancient ethnic 
hatreds', could be constructed. 
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Chapter 5, on the other hand, examined how the formulation of knowledge in the 
areas of law and ethics also followed the rules inherent in the modern episteme. It was 
argued that with the implementation of the empirico-transcendental doublet ethics and 
law imported the paradoxes that came with it, and that these paradoxes generally arise 
whenever the relationship between the metaphysical (or Universal, such as for example a 
notion of Human Rights) has to be reconciled with the immanent through the mechanisms 
provided by the empirico-transcendental doublet. Chapter 5 deployed the readings of 
Slavoj Zizek and of Niklas Luhmann to argue that a metaphysical approach to law and 
ethics engender, on the first instance, situations in which 'Universal Exclusions' have to 
be build at the level of immanence for a transcendental principle to be implemented and 
that, on a second instance, Luhmann's Complexity approach leads him to formulate a 
division between ethics and morality whereby "ethics is charged with minimizing the 
devastation morality is capable of unlashing". This is important because it elucidates the 
root of the debates on ethics and the law presented in Chapter 1, but mainly because it 
allows Chapter 8 to argue that the Holocaust could be invoked as the ultimate ethical 
argument which enforced an analytic of finitude on morality thus minimising the 
devastation that a moral approach to international law (in this case, respect, application of 
the law, and therefore lack of intervention) was capable of unleashing (namely, another 
Srebrenica, or Holocaust). In other words, the Holocaust embodies the analytic of 
finitude which ethics enforces on morality in the context of the legal empirico-
transcendental doublet in order to negotiate what is permissible and what is not when the 
paradoxes inherent in the need of implementing metaphysical principles to the immanent 
reality need to be faced. 
Conclusion: Kosovo, Complexity, and the Role of a Complex Geo-temporal Critique, 425 
The Intermezzo sought to distil the theoretical arguments in order to outline how 
such arguments are concretely used to generate an understanding of the Kosovo crisis. 
As such, the Intermezzo sought to initiate the transition between the theoretical and 
empirical parts of the study by outlining how the empirical parts elucidate the ways in 
which the theoretical notion of historical linearity was deployed in relation to Kosovo by 
elaborating arguments on the 'ancient ethnic hatreds' (that allegedly were at the roots of 
the conflict), whilst an analytic of finitude was enforced through tangible references to 
the Holocaust in the pohtical debate and in public opinion. Thus, the rest of the study 
proceeded to examine how the two axes of modernity conditioned the generation and 
deployment of knowledge on the Kosovo conflict, and to explain how an episteme-based 
Complexity approach allows for the identification and dismissal of such discourse 
formation techniques. 
Thus, Chapter 6 proceeds to analyse how, following Benedict Anderson's insights 
on the raise of nationalisms, a concept of linear finitude mutates into a notion of 
'homogeneous, empty fime' which in turn allows the nationalist discourse to be thought. 
According to Anderson, linear time is needed to provide an otherwise absent feeling of 
simultaneity without which it would be difficult for a multitude for individuals to feel 
part of a single imagined community. The chapter applies these insights to an analysis of 
how such linear temporality was used by Yugoslav improvised nationalists in the 
formation of the Kosovo myth and in the deployment of such myth through 1990s. The 
chapter also elucidates how such notion of empty time needs to be present in the minds of 
interpreting outsiders in order to accept that the crisis is, as the nationalist allege, indeed 
based on immutable ethnic hatreds. Here, there are striking similarities between the ways 
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in which academic International Relations understands the nature of international conflict 
and the way in which key policy-makers and the media understood the Kosovo crisis in a 
temporally linear fashion. Chapter 6 also proceeds to examine how a Complexity-
informed analysis of the conflict would have focussed on the immanent political struggles 
within the former Yugoslavia and the way in which such struggles determined the way in 
which the past was constructed in the present. The chapter shows that, whereas the 
standard historically linear account attributed the brutality of developments in Bosnia and 
in Kosovo to the presence of incomprehensible ancient ethnic hatreds, such brutality was 
caused precisely by the opposite: the absence of such visceral hatreds and, in the case of 
Kosovo, the progressive collapse of the nationalist discourse. Kosovo is thus presented 
as a consequence of the failed understanding of Bosnia - and of such failed 
understanding's consequent guilt - and as case of renewed misunderstanding of the 
conflicts' causes (historical linearity metamorphosed into ancient ethnic hatreds) coupled 
with related feelings of guilt (analytical finitude metamorphosed into memories of the 
Holocaust, courtesy of Srebrenica and Ra?ak). 
Finally, Chapters 7 and 8 constitute detailed case studies whose main purposes are 
to identify how the axes of modernity conditioned understandings in the realms of 
international law and policy making respectively. Chapter 7 thus goes on in applying the 
concept of 'Universal Exclusion' to the way in which the legal discourse was applied to 
NATO, whilst Chapter 8 proceeds to analyse how the two axes of modernity - disguised 
as arguments on ancient ethnic hatreds and the need prevent another Holocaust -
characterised the political debate in the U K Parliament. 
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On the bases of these findings it is possible to elaborate an overall conclusion on 
the merits of engaging Complexity thinking for the purposes of analysing conflict and the 
way in which conflict is often (erroneously) framed. Answering the first research 
question of this study, we can argue that Complexity - understood in an epistemic context 
- has the potential to enhance our understanding of social reality in general and of 
conflict in particular because it provides an alternative framework for the framing of such 
realities. In a nutshell, whilst the study has demonstrated that traditional modern 
approaches to knowledge (epitomised by Neorealist theories of International Relations) 
fundamentally rely on the twin epistemic axes of analytical finitude and historical 
linearity, Complexity's most salient differences in this context - as outlined in the 
conclusion of Chapter 6 - consist in its insistence to consider all systems as open systems 
(denying the contingency that analytical finitude enforces in the modern episteme) whilst 
emphasising the fact that all such open systems have a non-reversible history (thus 
eliminating the contingency that historical linearity plays in the modern context). Thus, 
by systematically underlining what Foucault described as the twin engines of modern 
understanding - the mutually dependent notions of historical and analytical 
(anthropological) finitude - Complexity forces us to look beyond certainty-based, 
contingent frameworks of knowledge as we seek to interpret and understand conflict. 
Crucially, Complexity re-opens the question of what exactly should be the role of Reason 
after the Enlightenment, suggesting that Reason should be that which enables us to cope 
with uncertainty (which is a fundamental and objective property of nature, in both the 
natural and social worlds) rather than that which encourages us - as i f by automatic reflex 
- to look for certainty-based explanatory models. 
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So, what does Complexity deliver in relation to the Kosovo conflict (which is the 
focus of our second research question)? An epistemic-Complexity approach enabled this 
study to reveal how modern assumptions on the production and deployment of 
knowledge conditioned the way in which the Kosovo conflict was framed and acted 
upon. In particular, it allowed us to identify the very real impact that legal and ethical 
reasoning based on an analytic of finitude - which, by virtue of its function (the provision 
of contingency), must necessarily exclude some elements in order to analyse others - has 
on the way in which ethics and the law were deployed in the context of the conflict. 
Whilst the 'anthropological finitude' axis of modernity could be discerned in ethic-legal 
understandings of the Kosovo conflict, the related 'historical finitude' element was 
clearly discernible in the way in which historically linear arguments (the 'ancient ethnic 
hatreds' approach) came to play such a dominant role in the collective symbolic imagery 
- and therefore in collective understandings - of the causes of the Kosovo conflict. Do 
we need Complexity to argue that the war had little to do with such imagined ethnic 
hatreds? No. However, by placing concepts which are diametrically opposed to the axes 
of modernity at the heart of its methodology. Complexity forces us to systemically look for 
modernity-caused reflexes in the ways the Kosovo conflict was understood and acted 
upon. Such systematic and comprehensive undermining of the modern episteme is thus 
necessary i f we are to go beyond refuting specific aspects of modern understanding 
(ethnic hatreds) and into linking and seeing such various aspects as being part of an 
internally coherent (modern) whole. Through Complexity we can see why an argument 
based on the 'ethnic hatreds' approach finds in legal 'universal exclusionary' principles 
its logical counterpart in the field of ethics and in the law. Furthermore, Complexity 
Conclusion: Kosovo, Complexity, and the Role of a Complex Geo-temporal Critique, 429 
allows us to go beyond simple rebuttals of modernity-based approaches and into 
secondary lines of questioning. For example, it allows us to ask why the 'ethnic hatred' 
approach gained such popularity in public opinion despite its evident lack of validity. By 
concentrating on the two elements that set Complexity apart from the modern episteme 
(open systems and time irreversibility) Complexity understands that modern approaches 
wi l l have conditioned answers to questions regardless of any evidence that may be 
available. In other words. Complexity delivers a roadmap of counter-questions to be 
asked, of counter-arguments to be explored, and of counter 'modern-intuitive' attitudes to 
adopt. Complexity thus does a lot more than provide an alternative theory for the cause 
of conflicts - it provides an alternative ethos with which we can embark on the discovery 
of evidenced no-one had sought to unveil, or of evidence no-one sougth to relate to other 
elements in the (open) system (evidence that lies outside the Kuhnian paradigmatic black 
box, for example). In our case, Complexity provided clear guidance towards the way in 
which contradictory events and statements (the pursuit of multi-ethnicity through 
panition, the implementation of Universal principles through institutions characterised by 
jurisdiction based on very Particular criteria, and so on) could be understood and 
contested. For the common thread is a particular ethos characterised by a restless pursuit 
of certainty, whose various forms and facets are only clearly identifiable as pertaining to 
a single phenomenon (modernity) once such phenomenon has been fully understood in 
Complex, post-modern terms. 
1.3 
Again, I am taking the freedom to used concepts such as 'post-modernity' on the 
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Thus, after having identified the very modern constraints that characterised a 
modem formation of knowledge (the nature of our third research question), our 
Complexity-inspired approach led us to thoroughly examine questions that are strictly 
related to the two axes of modernity - for it allowed us to discriminate by pointing to the 
fundamental importance of such two axes. It led us to look at ethical and legal theory, 
without worrying too much about formal academic-disciplinary boundaries. It 
encouraged us to look at what Foucault would called historical-epistemic 'monuments', 
where we could find traces of the two axes of modernity, and such traces took the most 
varied forms: a speech, a photograph, a legal statement, a biography, a memory, an 
academic study, an interview with a taxi driver... 
At this point the reader may complain that the study has not offered any 
Complexity-inspired 'solutions' for the crisis. A response to this hypothetical critic 
would consist in outlining how an epistemic approach has allowed a critique and 
understanding of the way in which the conflict was understood and acted upon to take 
place, whilst the presentation of Complexity's ethos indicated how alternative 
understandings are both more accurate and, cracially, more consonant with the way in 
which knowledge is currently being generated in the sciences. What this means in 
practice is, as it were, detail. Accepting that history is not that which causes things to be 
understanding that such concepts have been ful ly defined throughout the study. In all 
cases, we are referring to modernity as understood by Foucault, and post-modernity as 
defined by Foucault as something that takes us beyond teh "Age of History". 
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the way they are but that it is, rather, that which allows a number of infinite virtual 
alternatives to be actualised; entails innumerable consequences for those wishing to 
produce 'practical' advice for policy-makers. For example, understanding that 
generalised violence in the former Yugoslavia was caused more by the ambition of 
individuals competing in a transformed political environment than by the alleged 
presence of historical hatreds may have warranted a more concerted and focussed action, 
based perhaps on incentives (membership of the European Union, international support, 
and so on) and disincentives (lack of the aforementioned incentives for policy-makers 
that did not comply), at the relevant specific (political) level. Understanding that the lack 
of ancient hatreds (rather than the opposite), coupled with the immanent need to 
formulate nationalistic discourses, is what caused such extreme levels of violence may 
have led to the conclusion that it may have been relatively easy to extinguish the 
nationalist fires through political action aimed at maintaining the status-quo (for example, 
through a commitment not to recognise any of the former republics which did not achieve 
independence legally, and therefore by consensus, Czechoslovakia-style) and that doing 
the opposite (German unilateral recognition of Croatia, for example) may lead to the 
augmentation of such fires. Understanding that Bosnia and Kosovo were, to a certain 
extent, also severe criminal problems may have led to an approach more focussed on 
international policing solutions rather than on international military solutions. And so on. 
Finally, it is hoped that this study has opened up new, Complexity-inspired 
research agendas for the disciplines of International Relations and Critical Geopolitics. 
The introduction of critical geopolitics - with its analysis on the social construction of 
space - and an accurate study of 'ethnic nationalisms' - which implies an analysis of the 
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social construction of time - correspond to the Complexity agenda insofar they relate to 
Progogine's maxim on the nature of 'truth' and the related objectives of scientific 
enquiry. In particular, an epistemic-based and Complexity-inspired analysis of the 
modern episteme has revealed how modern identity formation processes rely on a 
spacialisation of time (linear time) and on a temporal immobilisation of social space 
(consider, for example, the European Court of Human Right's decision to link 
jurisdiction to previously existent territory). By deconstructing the processes that lead to 
these two outcomes, a Critical Geopolitical stance (responsible for analysing the socio-
political construction of space) and a 'Critical Diplomatic History'"* approach 
(responsible for analysing how sovereign political actors have created their past in the 
present, and how other actors have interpreted such histories...in other words, a discipline 
charged with analysing the socio-political construction of time) could move our 
understanding of social realities beyond the modern episteme and into Complexity-based, 
post-modern frameworks. They would constitute Complex Geo-temporal critiques, 
capable of establishing the intellectual grounds for the creation of what we can hope wil l 
be more adroit political solutions. Or political solutions that are more in tune with 
genuine complex realities at the level of immanence. More importantly, solutions which 
accept the fundamental principle of uncertainty whilst moving away from the very 
modern idea according to which the role of reason after the Enlightenment (and therefore. 
For lack of a better term. 
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of knowledge) should be that of providing certainty for decisions on human action. 
Solutions which fundamentally embrace the insight: 
"All truth is simple" - Is that not a compound lie? 
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